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Abstract
In view of the 2017 famine in Eastern Africa, the incredible human suffering caused by
extreme poverty once more becomes evident. This makes poverty in developing countries
a pressing ethical issue.  But how to solve this  complex global problem? Peter Singer
(2009a and 2015)  argues  that  there  is  an  individual  responsibility  to  save  a  life.  His
proposed solution: Each citizen in affluent countries should dedicate as much as possible
of his or her income to eradicating poverty. Singer's approach  makes use of new findings
on donor behaviour,  proposing that it  is  possible to establish a “culture of giving” or
“effective  altruism”  that  will  finally  overcome poverty.  Importantly  the  donor  should
select and support the most effective projects. This thesis argues that while Singer's moral
maximalist position is asking too much of each of us individually, a duty to act against
global poverty can nevertheless be established, depending on personal responsibility and
fellow humanity. Unfortunately, from a psychological standpoint appeals such as Singer's
may increase donations temporarily, but cognitive limitations will prevail in the long run,
as they are intimately related to our altruistic behaviour. Even more problematic may be
Singer's underestimation of the complexity of the causes of poverty and of development
aid. Reasons for a country's poverty can be international political and economic structures
that disfavour developing countries. Internal reasons for a country's poverty are the lack
of  functioning  institutions,  conflict  and corruption.  Neither  of  these  problems can  be
solved by charity  alone.  Charity  may even be  harmful,  as  it  often  focuses  on  donor
opinion instead of recipient need. An analysis of different interventions finds that direct
financial  support  is  the  best  way  to  aid  the  world's  poorest  population.  Due  to  the
psychological  mechanisms  of  donor  behaviour  and  distrust  towards  the  poor,  this  is
however  highly  unlikely to  be  financed  via  donations.  A global  Tobin  or  wealth  tax
combined with efforts from the developing countries themselves is proposed as a solution.
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Resumen en español 
Percepción Pública y Motivación de la Ayuda al Desarrollo 
– 
La Viabilidad de la Cultura de Ofrenda de Peter Singer
En esta tesis se discuten y contrastan las implicaciones éticas, psicológicas y prácticas de la
“cultura de dar” o del “altruismo efectivo” de Peter Singer con el fin de responder a la pre-
gunta de qué papel deben tener las donaciones y la recaudación de fondos en el contexto
del alivio de la pobreza extrema global. Se examinan las consideraciones éticas del punto
de vista maximalista moral de Singer, que se basa en la responsabilidad individual de ali-
viar la pobreza global mediante la inversión personal, especialmente limitando los gastos,
aumentando los ingresos a través de opciones de carrera y donando la cantidad máxima po-
sible durante la vida. Esta posición es rechazada como demasiado exigente, ya que deja
poco espacio para el desarrollo de la persona y de otras actividades valiosas, como la fami-
lia, los amigos o, por ejemplo, el arte. Si bien una vida centrada en el altruismo puede ser
una vida buena y satisfactoria para algunos, la consideración individual de otros, por ejem-
plo, los pobres globales, implica que hay una razón necesaria y éticamente importante para
ser libre de considerar sus propios planes de vida y desarrollar sus capacidades. Además,
atribuir la máxima responsabilidad a cada individuo que podría ayudar donando una gran
parte de sus ingresos, implica la pérdida de importantes consideraciones de justicia y res-
ponsabilidad. Dependiendo de la posición individual, el lugar y la capacidad, las personas
tienen diferentes niveles de responsabilidad hacia los demás. Por ejemplo, el jefe de go-
bierno de un país desarrollado o el director general de una empresa que importa recursos
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naturales del un país en vías de desarrollo tiene una mayor responsabilidad hacia los pobres
del país. 
Se demuestra que hay muchas maneras en que las instituciones globales, las regula-
ciones comerciales y el estilo de vida occidental perjudican a la gente que vive en los paí-
ses en vida de desarrollo, por lo que la responsabilidad de los ciudadanos occidentales de
actuar colectivamente parece razonable. Peter Singer capta así una importante intuición éti-
ca, que es que parece irresponsable que la riqueza global se distribuya de tal manera que
parte de la población viva en la abundancia, mientras que aproximadamente mil millones
estén sometidos a sufrimientos y que se acorte drásticamente su vida porque ni siquiera
cuentan con servicios básicos de salud y unas condiciones mínimas de vida. Esto implica
una responsabilidad mínima de cada individuo que podría hacer algo contra la pobreza glo-
bal de sacrificar una parte de sus ingresos, pero existe una responsabilidad mucho mayor
de individuos y corporaciones muy ricos con inversiones o proveedores en los países en
desarrollo.
Además del fundamento ético, el altruismo efectivo se basa en dos implicaciones
prácticas. La primera es que es más fácil convencer a las personas a donar a un alivio efec-
tivo de la pobreza que implementar medidas legales o políticas. Esto justifica una delibera-
ción en profundidad de la psicología de los donantes, el análisis estadístico de los niveles
de donaciones y los métodos de recaudación de fondos, como se indica en el capítulo 3 de
la tesis. La investigación del comportamiento de los donantes ha ganado mucho impulso en
los últimos años, en parte debido al auge de la economía experimental. Los psicólogos mo-
rales en la tradición de David Hume muestran claramente que los seres humanos tienen in-
clinaciones altruistas y se sienten bien al ayudar a otros (el llamado “resplandor cálido”).
El comportamiento pro-social como la donación realmente aumenta la felicidad personal.
Pero hay varias emociones e intuiciones en conflicto que impiden tomar acciones concretas
y efectivas hacia un mundo mejor, por ejemplo: tendemos a identificarnos con las víctimas
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individuales hacia las que sentimos una cierta conexión. Como Singer ve claramente, el
problema es que, aunque tengamos instintos altruistas, estos instintos sólo funcionan bien
en casos en los que nos sentimos personalmente responsables y cercanos a la víctima. Sin-
ger propone varias soluciones, en particular que los individuos deben unirse en un compor-
tamiento generoso comprometiendo públicamente sus donaciones, alentando así a otros y
poniendo cara a los necesitados. Pero subestima el grado en que los donantes se centran en
sí mismos y que la decisión de donar está influida por factores situacionales. 
La argumentación racional en realidad tiende a disminuir la voluntad de donar. El
estudio de los fenómenos del comportamiento de evitación y de la contabilidad mental,
junto con un análisis del patrón de donación de la sociedad, indican que las donaciones son
un recurso de crecimiento lento y que sólo una cantidad limitada se dedica a los pobres del
mundo. La atención de los medios es un factor clave en este caso: los desastres naturales
en los países de vacaciones arrastran mucha atención y donaciones, mientras que otros de-
sastres tienden a ser olvidados. 
Junto con una industria de recaudación de fondos muy profesionalizada, los medios
de comunicación (sociales) también son parcialmente responsables de la continua imagen
negativa de los pobres globales, especialmente en África, y de la prevalencia de modas de
desarrollo como muestra el ejemplo de la campaña KONY 2012. Mientras los donantes
sean estereotipados como “salvadores blancos”, que son la única esperanza para los pobres
estereotipados como niños, el paternalismo inherente a la industria de recaudación de fon-
dos será realmente un obstáculo para aumentar la justicia global.
La segunda premisa práctica del altruismo efectivo es que la donación de manera
sostenible de pequeñas sumas, impiden un sufrimiento enorme. La cuestión de si la ayuda
oficial y privada beneficia a los países en desarrollo en general es difícil de responder debi-
do a las dificultades para obtener e interpretar correctamente los datos pertinentes. Muchos
proyectos demostrablemente aportan poca mejora sostenible a las condiciones de vida lo-
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cales, ya que los proyectos se seleccionan centrándose en los intereses estratégicos y eco-
nómicos de los países donantes, en lugar de centrarse en aliviar la pobreza. La corrupción y
la malversación de fondos son problemas endémicos, al igual que los efectos secundarios
no deseados como el desplazamiento de los productores locales. Los críticos de la ayuda
señalan que las ONG y las agencias de ayuda al desarrollo pueden beneficiar a los regíme-
nes cleptocráticos y opresivos, ya que ayudan a ocultar las fallas del régimen, tales como la
incapacidad de proporcionar educación pública, servicios de salud y un servicio tributario
efectivo,  debilitando la  responsabilidad gubernamental.  Los estudios de caso del  movi-
miento de las microfinanzas, del “comercio justo” y de los “Pueblos del Milenio” de Je-
ffrey Sachs, indican que los sesgos, las modas, la desconfianza y la falta de comprensión
de los pobres que se muestran en el capítulo 3 se traducen en el fracaso de los proyectos de
ayuda al nivel de implementación. La doble rendición de cuentas de las organizaciones ha-
cia los donantes y el grupo destinatario a menudo se presenta como una vía unidireccional
hacia la tranquilización y el fortalecimiento de los donantes público y la autoestima, y no la
eficiencia real.
Hay, sin embargo, algunas buenas noticias: simples intervenciones médicas, tales
como vacunaciones, desparasitación o la provisión de mosquiteras contra la malaria, tienen
un efecto considerable en la salud individual y el bienestar. También se demuestra que los
proyectos que confían en los pobres simplemente apoyándolos con dotaciones monetarias
comparativamente pequeñas, con poca o ninguna condición, son efectivos, sorprendente-
mente con efectos positivos que sobreviven al período de distribución. El aumento de los
ingresos y la salud se traduce en una mayor capacidad de los pobres para ayudarse a sí mis-
mos mediante la inversión en su propia educación, participando económicamente y políti-
camente, proporcionándoles la suficiente energía y el tiempo para formar asociaciones ci-
viles. También puede significar menos dependencia de los partidos políticos, el clientelis-
mo o las estructuras de clanes. Aquí las donaciones pueden tener un efecto sostenible. Des-
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afortunadamente, estos mismos proyectos tienden a ser infra-reportados, ya que no son
muy espectaculares, y por lo tanto acaban siendo sub-financiados. Es dudoso que el lauda-
ble ascenso de los evaluadores de caridad como “GiveWell” pueda cambiar esto. La canti-
dad de personas que están dispuestas a donar puede ser aumentada, pero no significativa-
mente. La voluntariedad de los donantes seguirá siendo voluble y dependerá de factores
moralmente irrelevantes. Más importante aún, se ha demostrado que la caridad desinforma-
da puede causar daño a largo plazo en lugar de hacer el bien.Como conclusión propongo
tres maneras de actuar frente a estas dificultades psicológicas e institucionales:
• De acuerdo con Peter Singer y William MacAskill, debemos centrar nuestras do-
naciones en las ONGs más eficientes e intentar convencer a otros de que sigan el ejemplo.
Los “evaluadores de caridad” deben desempeñar un papel más importante en el discurso
público sobre la distribución de la ayuda. Debemos asegurarnos de que son escuchados por
el Estado y los donantes, la academia y los medios de comunicación. Una evaluación pro-
funda y veraz de los resultados de un proyecto caritativo o de un gobierno puede mejorar
las actuaciones y, junto con el uso extensivo de los sistemas de gestión de la información,
crear  conocimientos  que  pueden  aplicarse  en  escenarios  de  desarrollo  similares.  Stern
(2013a) exige correctamente que algunas organizaciones filantrópicas sean excluidas por lo
menos del privilegio de deducibilidad impositiva, si tienen un desempeño muy bajo en
comparación con sus competidores.
• En contra de la recomendación de MacAskill (2015a, 181ff. and 2015b) de no tra-
bajar en una organización caritativa y en su lugar centrarse en ganar para donar, sostengo
que una persona debe ser libre de seguir su propio plan de vida. Sin embargo, la decisión
de trabajar para una institución gubernamental o una ONG incluye la responsabilidad de
aumentar el uso efectivo de los recursos existentes. Se ha demostrado que las organizacio-
nes grandes y establecidas, y por lo tanto bien conocidas, se quedan con gran parte de las
donaciones existentes. Trabajar para hacer a estas mismas organizaciones más eficaces, y
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estar dispuestos a escuchar a los beneficiarios de las ayudas, puede marcar una importante
diferencia. 
• El discurso del desarrollo necesita urgentemente un cambio de paradigma. Necesi-
ta ser re-enmarcado como un asunto de justicia, no de caridad, pero no desde un punto de
vista moral maximalista, sino con responsabilidades claramente establecidas. Para un pro-
grama eficaz contra la pobreza y el hambre, las naciones desarrolladas – y en esto Europa,
debido a su historia y poder económico, tienen un lugar especial en el mundo – deben cen-
trarse primero en crear las instituciones democráticas internacionales necesarias para per-
mitir que la población de un país se mantenga por sí misma en vez de depender de la buena
voluntad internacional (cp. Crocker 2008). Esto incluye las regulaciones sobre los flujos fi-
nancieros ilícitos y la corrupción, pero también el perdón de la deuda. El acaparamiento de
tierras debe ser bloqueado en todo el mundo, y debe permitirse en cierto grado la protec-
ción de la industria con mano de obra infantil para dar a las manufacturas en las naciones
en desarrollo una oportunidad justa. Por otra parte, unas regulaciones justas en el tema del
cambio climático deberían ayudar a los pobres mundiales a salir de su apuro. Pero la prin-
cipal responsabilidad recae en los propios países en desarrollo. En muchos casos, los regí-
menes corruptos y cleptocráticos o incluso opresivos se preocupan poco por el bienestar de
parte o de toda su población. Apoyo la afirmación de Leif Wenar (2011a y 2015) de que
debemos detener el comercio y los intercambios bancarios con regímenes que no se adhie-
ren a un estándar ético mínimo. Por esta razón, las corporaciones multinacionales también
tienen una fuerte responsabilidad. Nicole Hassoun (2012) se ocupa del hecho de que las
enfermedades que ocurren frecuentemente en los países pobres no son atendidas por la in-
dustria  farmacéutica,  ya  que  no  hay grandes  beneficios  (Pogge,  Rimmer  y  Rubenstein
2014) . Con el resultado de que en 2014, el largo descuido de la investigación y el desarro-
llo de la medicina contra Ebola se ha tomado su venganza matando a varios miles de perso-
nas (Baker 2014). Otras industrias que comercian, invierten y contratan personal en países
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en desarrollo tienen responsabilidades similares. La inversión y la creación de empleos con
estándares mínimos deben ser un foco de desarrollo.
• Un paso necesario podría ser establecer un impuesto Tobin dirigido a la especula-
ción financiera para financiar un sistema social mínimo que apoye directamente a las per-
sonas más necesitadas (Lauer y Lepenies 2015). Otras alternativas serían un dividendo glo-
bal de los recursos (Pogge 1998 y 2010a), un impuesto universal sobre el lujo o el patrimo-
nio mundial, tal como prevé Piketty (2014) o un impuesto mundial sobre las empresas mul-
tinacionales. Si bien este proyecto no será fácil de implementar políticamente, las conclu-
siones del capítulo 3 indican que esto puede ser realmente más fácil y ciertamente más sos-
tenible y fiable que tratar de canalizar la ayuda a través de donaciones voluntarias. Dos fac-
tores podrían servir para hacer esta propuesta más aceptable. Por razones de aceptabilidad
política y rendición de cuentas en el país en desarrollo, es necesario que el propio país en
desarrollo contribuya al fondo social que beneficia a los ciudadanos más pobres. Esto po-
dría ser financiado por los países en desarrollo a través de los ingresos de exportación de
recursos naturales, como propone el Banco Mundial, por ejemplo (Moss 2011). Además,
los impuestos deberían ser dirigidos de una manera que incida sobre las empresas y firmas
más ricas o multinacionales, no sobre los trabajadores o la clase media y los pequeños y
medianos empresarios de los países desarrollados, que ya están sujetos a una alta carga tri-
butaria.
Como se menciona en el capítulo 2 de esta tesis, la desigualdad es un problema importante
tanto en los países en desarrollo como en los desarrollados. Esto se repite en una encuesta
de Pew Research Center (2014, 3) de los ciudadanos de 44 países, que encontró que una
media del 60 por ciento – incluido el 46 por ciento de los estadounidenses – dice que la de-
sigualdad es un problema muy grande en sus respectivas sociedades. Varios economistas
importantes (Cingano 2014, Lansley 2011 y Stiglitz 2012) ya han advertido que el aumento
de la desigualdad perjudica el crecimiento económico y el orden social, y los filósofos tien-
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den a estar de acuerdo (Nagel 1991, Sandel 2012, Temkin 1993 y van Parijs 1995). Pero la
opinión es bastante limitada a nivel nacional. Para incluir el nivel internacional, deberían
establecerse vínculos (quizás incluso interdependencias) entre la justicia nacional e interna-
cional. Esta reelaboración del desarrollo como una cuestión de justicia que nos concierne
también a nosotros, así como el establecimiento de un diálogo con las personas que quere-
mos apoyar como verdaderos interlocutores y no como solicitantes de ayuda, servirá para
dar algunos pasos importantes hacia la reducción Y, con suerte, un día para la abolición de
la pobreza absoluta. 
Los esfuerzos de Singer y MacAskill para crear un movimiento de altruismo efecti-
vo son loables. Sin embargo, a menos que el movimiento avance hacia la inclusión de los
pobres y la justicia internacional, corre el peligro preocupante de convertirse en una moda.
Mientras los pobres sólo sean vistos como un número, una vida que se necesita salvar, son
fácilmente excluidos de la atención de la privilegiada comunidad de donantes predomi-
nantemente blanca. Jennifer Rubenstein (2015, trad. el author) en una respuesta a Peter
Singer en la revista Boston evalúa la situación así:
“El problema es que aborda estos desafíos a través de un movimiento social centra-
do en aliviar la pobreza que excluye a la gente pobre de sus filas. Este movimiento
viola el principio democrático de inclusión, resumido en un eslogan utilizado por
décadas por los movimientos sociales de Polonia a Sudáfrica: “Nada sobre nosotros
sin nosotros”. [...] Esta orientación pasa por alto el papel central de las personas po-
bres en aliviar su propia pobreza y el de la gente rica en contribuir y beneficiarse de
ella. El movimiento altruista efectivo dirige las energías y compromisos emociona-
les de sus miembros hacia los otros miembros, no hacia las personas que apuntan
ayudar. Singer se centra en perfilar al altruista eficaz que sus lectores pueden emu-
lar; no describe a la gente pobre que quiere salir de la pobreza. Del mismo modo,
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organizaciones tales como Give What We Can anima a sus miembros a establecer
compromisos y participar en la construcción de su propia comunidad – no con los
pobres. Estas estrategias evitan acertadamente el uso de la piedad como herramienta
de motivación, pero también impiden formas de conexión más prometedoras, como
la solidaridad política.”
Esta preocupación se ilustra con las recientes tendencias del movimiento de hacer de la
evitación de los “eventos de extinción” una prioridad (Matthews 2015). Los eventos de ex-
tinción son catástrofes globales a gran escala, como una guerra nuclear global o una coli-
sión masiva de meteoritos, pero los altruistas eficaces también incluyen escenarios más in-
verosímiles como una inteligencia artificial asesina. En una versión de la apuesta de Pas-
cal, la aniquilación completa de la humanidad por medio de uno de estos eventos hace que
la donación hacia los temas mencionados sea de repente más urgente que aliviar la pobreza
global. Un ejemplo sería la donación al Instituto de Investigación de Máquinas Inteligentes
en Berkeley. En su intrigante artículo de Vox “Pasé un fin de semana en Google hablando
con nerds sobre la caridad. Salí... preocupado“,  Dylan Matthews (2015) especula que si el
movimiento continúa por este camino de inteligencia auto-congratulatoria, fácilmente lle-
gará al altruismo efectivo sin alivio de la pobreza. Por lo tanto, abogo encarecidamente por
limitar nuestra arrogancia occidental, para que no olvidemos que sólo los pobres mismos
pueden salir de la pobreza. Son seres humanos que pueden tomar las riendas de sus vidas
en sus propias manos, que saben lo que es bueno para ellos mismos a largo plazo y que
quieren actuar responsablemente hacia sus familias, su futuro y su medio ambiente. 
Se necesita más investigación para determinar cómo comunicar eficientemente a la
hora de captar el interés de los posibles donantes, por ejemplo a través de técnicas narrati-
vas. Una posibilidad podría ser hacer uso de una idea similar a los patrocinios de niños o el
mecanismo utilizado por Kiva que permite a los donantes directos de efectivo sentir una
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verdadera conexión con el hogar que están apoyando. Aún más importante sería una inves-
tigación sobre el papel de diferentes actores multinacionales y nacionales en beneficiar o
perjudicar a los pobres del mundo, en la línea del análisis de Nicole Hassoun sobre la in-
dustria farmacéutica o, menos extensamente, la de Oxfam“Behind the Brand“ sobre las
corporaciones alimentarias (Hoffman 2013). Esto serviría de indicador para los ciudadanos
y consumidores, así como una base para el cálculo de “quién debe lo que a los pobres del
mundo” (Pogge 2007). También significaría que la noción de Responsabilidad Social Cor-
porativa aumentaría en importancia. Un proyecto importante sería determinar cómo es po-
sible mejorar la imagen de los pobres y cómo comunicar las complejidades del desarrollo y
la pobreza de una manera que llegue a la población occidental no concernida (cp. Darnton
y Kirk 2011 y Kennedy y Hill 2010). Por último, es necesario un análisis detallado y multi-
disciplinario de las formas de implementar y financiar la red global de seguridad para la
pobreza absoluta para que pueda ser efectiva su realización.
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1. Introduction
The struggle against global poverty continues to be one of mankind's greatest challenges.
According to a conservative estimate by the World Bank (2016),  767 million  people are
estimated to have been living below the updated international poverty line of US $1.90 per
person per day.  This is 10.7 per cent of the global population.  The financial  aspect of
having a  purchase parity adjusted  income below the  just  the  very top of  the  iceberg.1
According to the 2015 Human Development Report slightly more than 1 billion people are
not able to meet their basic needs, which means constant risk of under- and malnutrition,
lack of access to sanitation or safe drinking water (UNDP 2015, 4). The consequence are
typical diseases such as cholera or intestinal worms (Deaton 2013, Sachs 2005, 58ff. and
Shiffman  2006).  Added  to  this,  many  people  in  developing  countries  suffer  from
preventable (tropical) illnesses such as malaria, tuberculosis, different forms of hepatitis,
dengue fever, or sleeping sickness (WHO 2013 and 2014). Especially cruel are diseases
such as  the  one  caused by the  chigoe  flea  (Latin  denomination  Tunga penetrans)  that
burrows into the underside of the foot to hatch its young and may cause crippling pain
(Cestari, Pessato, and Ramos-e-Silva 2007). It means a lack of access to contraceptives and
other means of family planning, leading to young women becoming mothers and having
far more children than financially or physically safe. It means that these births will not take
place in a hospital or be accompanied by skilled health staff, resulting in a high risk of
maternal mortality. New research points out the crippling psychological effects of poverty,
which are chronic stress, addiction, reduction of cognitive capabilities and unhappiness
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013 and World Bank 2015, ch. 4 and 5). 
An  estimated  18  million  human  beings  die  every  year  around  the  world  from
avoidable, poverty-related causes, with ten of these 18 million are children under five years
1 For a discussion on the problems and exactness of the poverty line see Alkire and Foster 2007 and 
2009 and Pogge and Reddy 2010.
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of age (Singer 2009a, 4f, and UNDP 2015, 5). This means approximately 16.000 to 30.000
children die every day from malnutrition and preventable diseases. The faces and effects of
poverty are manifold (Narayan et al. 2000, ch. 2 and World Bank 2016, 5ff.).  A constant
however, remains that poverty shortens life and causes much suffering. Although there has
been progress in several countries, most notably China, the return of hunger crisis in East
Africa in 2011 and again this year (2017), putting over 12 million humans in danger of
starving, shows quite clearly that the problem of poverty and the resulting human suffering
will not disappear by itself (cp. Carstens 2011, Perry 2011, and Conrad 2017). The “call to
arms” against poverty is not something new.2 There have been many such calls throughout
the 20th century, often accompanied by heavy media attention, at least for a short while.3
However, poverty, even if somewhat reduced, is still looming over humanity in the 21st
century.  Why a  problem so  universally  recognised  has  yet  to  find  a  solution  will  be
discussed in this work.  A main reason for the unsatisfactory current situation is that the
world-wide poor do not have sufficient buying and political power to change their situation
by themselves. It seems a terrible paradox that in theory the planet earth seems to be able
to  yield  enough to  feed  and clothe  all  its  children  (Pogge 2010a 21ff.  and Sen 2001,
160ff.). But far too many are not reached by this food and clothing, e.g. due to problems of
redistribution  and  priorities.  William  Easterly  (2007b,  4)  illustrates  this  with  an
uncomfortable example: We live in a world, where it was possible to deliver nine million
copies of the sixth volume of the Harry Potter series to bookstores in several countries on
July 16th 2005. All of these where available on a single day and many actually were even
2 For example, in 1982 James P. Grant, head of UNICEF from 1980 until his death in 1995, held a 
lecture in front of the the UN assembly entitled “Why the Other Half Dies” (Bornstein 2007, 242ff and 
George 1976). Written by child paediatrician Jon Rhode, the lecture stated that each year in the developing 
world 14 million children under the age of five died of easily and cheaply preventable diseases, such as 
diarrhoea and immunisable diseases, for example polio, measles or smallpox. Grant called people in the 
western world to imagine 120 jumbo jets full of children crashing each day to understand the magnitude of 
preventable child deaths (ibid., 247). His efforts in global child vaccination and oral rehydration therapy 
(ORT) are estimated to have saved 25 million children worldwide. His efforts in establishing an international 
Convention on the Rights of Children lead it to become the most widely embraced rights treaty in the history 
of the UN with only a handful of countries, as for example Somalia and the USA, not being among the 
ratifiers (ibid., 253).
3 Take for example the “Band Aid” famine relief campaign for Ethiopia in 1984, accompanied by the 
“Do they know it´s Christmas?” song by Bob Geldof and Midge Ure (Ellis-Petersen 2014). Or more recently 
the 2005 campaign by British NGOs to “Make Poverty History” (Sireau 2009).
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sent directly to customers. Easterly makes the valid point that it remains a mystery why
simple and affordable solutions such as malaria bed-nets or de-worming programmes for
children,  both  costing  only  a  few  cents  per  unit,  are  not  distributed  globally.  The
explanation is partly that the poor simply lack the income and the buying power to afford
even these simple health interventions. Additionally, the lack of a local infrastructure and
functioning markets adds to the cost of providing these goods, meaning that these solutions
are left to be provided, or not, by international charitable institutions. However, Easterly
raises some scepticism whether these solutions can and should be provided. Ethically, the
valid  question  can  be  asked,  why Western  citizens  should  compensate  for  the  lack  of
political  will of local extractive elites, as most developing countries are rich in natural
resources and could easily afford a limited health system.
From the point of view of several philosophers, most notably among them Peter
Singer (2009a and 2015), it is difficult to explain and even more difficult to tolerate, that
the Western public can ignore this huge amount of suffering. While dying from starvation
and illness has been a sad constant in human history, it seems obvious that we now would
have the resources, medical and otherwise, to prevent this in many cases from happening
day in, day out (Deaton 2013, 59ff. and Sachs 2005, 244ff.).  Yet, we seem to have no
problem in living our everyday life while this occurs. Seen from a moral maximalist, as
utilitarian  Peter  Singer  does,  but  also  from an everyday ethics  point  of  view,  there  is
something strange about societies that care more about the birth of a prince in England,
about  soccer  matches,  about  the  newest  movie  blockbuster,  their  pets,  or  the  newest
celebrity extravagances. And these are just some of the topics that completely dominate
global poverty in the media.
This dissertation uses and integrates results from several disciplines: most notably
philosophy (ethics), psychology, sociology, and economics to gain an understanding of this
puzzle  (philanthropic studies as necessarily a  multi-disciplinary field).  This monograph
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begins  with  a  philosophical  deliberation  of  what  we  owe  to  distant  needy  strangers.
Starting point will be the ethical claims made by the Australian philosopher and ethicist
Peter Singer. Singer (2009a, 3ff.) adopts a moral maximalist point of view, arguing that
saving a distant stranger is as much a requirement as saving a drowning child in a shallow
pond you encounter on your way to work. He proposes that costs incurred by the saving of
the drowning child have to be  borne by the individual who has the ability and thus the
responsibility to help and proposes the hypothesis that this case is analogous to the case of
the typical member of a Western society, who compared to the global situation, is well-off
(cp.  MacAskill  2015a, ch.  1).  He concludes that  we therefore have a duty not only to
donate a large part of our income, but we should take the appropriate steps to limit our
expenses  and increase our  income,  for  example  by choosing to  work as  a  Wall  Street
broker, so that we may donate more (MacAskill 2015b and Singer 2015, 3f. and 39ff.).
In the first part, this proposal will be discussed in depth. Singer's argument in its
original form does ask too much of us as individuals confronted with poverty on a global
scale, this excessive demand of others leaves little to no room for personal projects, such as
family and friendships, choosing a fulfilling career or dedications such as arts and sports.
In a reductio ad absurdum it will be argued, that dedicating your life completely to others'
means giving their lives more importance than your own (Cullity 2003 and 2004, 90ff.,
Williams 1972 and 1985, and Sinnott-Armstrong 2014, ch. 6). Neither is the situation of
the drowning child an exact analogy. In the case of the child a shared situation, time and
space,  among  other  factors,  place  the  would-be  rescuer  in  a  situation  of  special
responsibility, this is not necessarily analogous to supplying several children in Kenya with
malaria nets.
However, this rebuttal of the extreme individual responsibility does not mean that
we owe the global  poor  nothing at  all.  Singer  captures a  convincing intuition that  the
ravages of absolute poverty should be avoidable in the face of global affluence and should
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be  a  higher  priority,  if  not  necessarily  for  individuals  but  the  collective  nation-states.
Additionally,  there  are  many historical,  economical  and  political  connections  that  link
different societies to each other, some of them have been and continue to be harmful for
the population of poor countries, from colonialism to the current practise of illicit financial
flows, which siphon capital from developing countries or trade with illegitimate regimes,
which pose a case for cessation and reparation (Kar and Leblanc 2013,  Kohn 2014, and
Wenar 2008 and 2011a). But this does not mean that the responsibility for supporting the
global poor rests solely or even primarily on the affluent citizens of developed countries.
Rather, corrupt and inefficient local government structures, sometimes combined by local
conflict, are primarily responsible for a lack of development, just distribution of natural
resources and the resulting inability to make simple medical care and financial support
available,  as  human rights  and decency would demand.  Another  important  part  of  the
responsibility  lies  in  international  institutions  such  as  the  World  Trade  Organisation
(WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multinational companies who, through
trade regulations, red tape and support of corrupt elites limit  economic participation of
large part of developing countries populations (Pogge 2007, 2010a and 2011 and Wenar
2011a and 2105).
 Effective altruism relies on the paradigm of charity in  the fight  against  global
poverty, not global justice. Each citizen in affluent countries should dedicate between one
and five per cent of his or her income to eradicating poverty. Singer (2009a, 63ff.) is of the
opinion that findings on donor behaviour allow us to establish a “culture of giving” that
will finally overcome poverty. However, an overview of the state of psychological research
on donor behaviour  presented in  part  3 offers a sceptical view on the effectiveness of
donations. The study of charity, donor behaviour and motivation is a very recent domain of
the  social  sciences  that  will  turn  out  to  be  highly  relevant  in  the  future.4 While
understanding the psychological basis of charitable behaviour is important, the research
4 As argue Oppenheimer and Olivola in their 2011 book The Science of Giving – Experimental 
Approaches to the Study of Charity.
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also  points  towards  one  basic  problem:  As  the  results  for  example  compiled  by
Oppenheimer  and  Olivola  in  their  2011  book  The  Science  of  Giving  –  Experimental
Approaches to the Study of Charity clearly indicate, donating behaviour largely depends on
our emotions.  To resume the main results: Our limited cognitive (and emotional) abilities
prevent us from correctly perceiving the suffering caused by global poverty. As the victims
are dispersed over  several  continents  and different  moments in time,  we are unable to
really understand the extent of the suffering. There is no clear cause for us to identify.
Moreover,  our  emotional  system is  bounded  by simple  decision  algorithms  and  near-
altruism. 
Therefore our intuitions, our emotions, and our compassion are not adequate tools
to solve such a complex and large-scale problem as world poverty. It can be shown that the
voluntariness to aid depends heavily on morally and economically irrelevant features, such
as geographical distance, attractiveness of person asking for a donation, and the perceived
cause of the disaster, and are notoriously fickle. Donors on average give in a way that
strengthens  their  self-image  and  if  they  have  a  personal  connection  to  the  cause.  A
fundraising industry has risen that favours larger NGOs that are able and willing to spend
considerable amounts on acquiring donations (Andreoni and Payne 2011, Stern 2013a and
Plewes and Stuart 2006). 
Moreover,  everything  points  towards  an  upper  limit  to  the  possible  amount  of
donations a society is willing to muster, as the total amount of donations per society grows
only very slowly.  It  has  to  be noted,  that  only a  minor  part  of  total  spending will  be
targeted towards global poverty. In this context, it is important to scrutinize the relationship
between public perception of and opinion on development aid. Both private and official
development  aid  remain  a  fringe  topic  in  the  public  debate,  and  surveys  in  different
societies reveals that the public remains uninformed about use and extent of spending on
aid, let alone its effectiveness (Bølstad 2011, CARMA 2006, Darnton and Kirk 2011, and
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Riddell 2008, 107ff.).
The charitable approach alone cannot be a solution to the problem. Recent literature
in  moral  psychology5,  in  tradition  of  the  Humean  view  of  human  nature,  shows  that
altruism and compassion do exist, but tend to be near-sighted and group-focused in their
extent.  It  also seems that they are quite easily distractable and manipulable.  Using our
compassion to solve global problems therefore is an over-extension of our emotional space
(Innerarity 2011). This is reflected in the media and marketing campaigns by a growing
number of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs). As Daniel Innerarity
(2011, transl. by the author) writes:
“Compassion, which is a sign of humanity, has its quirks. Our emotional space, as
our attention to the world, is often selective, arbitrary and inconsistent. The care
agenda tends to be fickle and to prioritize what is most sensational. Our emotional
space also has a bad memory. The most intense emotions often are the most quickly
forgotten. In any case, there are dramas before the media's arrival and often they
continue after their leave.”6
Development aid motivated only by charity is necessarily short-term and thus inefficient in
the long run. The charitable approach tends to promote a way of giving that is motivated by
feelings such as culpability or sympathy, which results in an aid that is not focused on the
specific local needs of the recipient, but on the ideas or feelings of the donor. Furthermore,
media and donor attention is fickle and easily seduced by attractive campaigns and fads.
The influence of the Internet and social media seems to increase this tendency, as the case
5 I refer to the results of moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt (2001) and Joshua Greene (2007).
6 “[L]a compasión, que es un signo de humanidad, también tiene sus caprichos. Nuestros espacios 
emocionales, como nuestra atención hacia el mundo, es frecuentemente selectiva, arbitraria e inconstante. La 
agenda de la atención está configurada de manera bastante caprichosa y tiende a priorizar lo que resulta más 
sensacional. También tiene mala memoria. Las emociones más intensas suelen ser las más rápidamente 
olvidadas. En cualquier caso, los dramas existen antes de que los medios se fijen en ellos y persisten también 
cuando éstos dejan de atenderlos.“ (Innerarity 2011).
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study  of  the  KONY  2012  campaign  reveals.  The  considerable  cost  of  fundraising
campaigns means that  larger  organisations  able  to  spend more have  an advantage,  not
necessarily the most effective ones (Dogra 2012, 27ff. and Stern 2013a, 183ff. and 190f.).
Overcoming these problems sustainably could be difficult enough to warrant a different
approach towards global poverty. Before we donate blindly, it is our duty to define our
ethical requirements in full view of all consequences. The next step is recognizing that
saving a human being from starvation today makes little sense, if all his or her future has to
offer is dependence and insecurity.
Singer's  analogy  relies  heavily  on  the  existence  of  efficient  International  Non-
governmental Organizations (INGOs), that actually save human lives in a sustainable way.
Findings indicate that there are indeed projects that save the equivalent of a human life for
between $3.500 to $6.000, while not literally, but for example by reducing the burden of
the diseased mentioned at the very beginning or by giving a poor household a stipend that
enables them to invest into education, housing and medical care, increasing quality and
length  of  life  (MacAskill  2015a,  63ff.). However,  only  a  handful  of  the  proposed
interventions actually benefit the intended recipients, most misguided attempts of helping
are  maladapted  to  local  conditions  and  needs  and  in  some  cases  outright  fraud  and
embezzlement of resources (Polman 2008, chp. 6, MacAskill 2015a, 1ff. and Stern 2013a,
105ff.). This is further complicated by possible non-intentional (perverse) effects such as
crowding out or dependency. The unfortunate result is that well-intended measures against
poverty remain ineffective and may even be counterproductive. Crowding out (Kiely and
Marfleet 1998 and O'Neill 1986) in this context refers to the fact that aid supplants and
actually damages the local economy, for example it is no longer worth while for a local
farmer to produce rice or corn if the population receives them for free. This is indicated for
example  by  Kenyan  Professor  James  Shikwati  (2006)  or  Ugandan  journalist  Andrew
Mwenda (2006). Their critical opinion is that all forms of development aid are paternalistic
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and keep especially their countries in a situation of perpetual dependence on aid money
and regimes from undertaking necessary reforms. If this thesis holds water, it is necessary
to  propose  alternative  concepts  of  and  approaches  to  foreign  help.  A similar  thesis  is
advocated by Dambisa Moyo in “Dead Aid” (2009) and by William Easterly in his book
“The  White  Man's  Burden”  (2007b).7 The  capacity  of  both  private  and  official
development aid as a tool to solve internal problems, such as corruption or conflict, are
limited. Thus many projects do not bring any demonstrative improvement or may even be
pernicious. From a practical perspective, the question raised should be whether in view of
the  complexity  of  economic  development  and  poverty  any  long-term  results  can  be
sustained by external actors (Ramalingam 2013).
On the other hand,  the elimination of smallpox was a success of international aid
that continues to save several million people annually (Fenner et al. 1988 and MacAskill
2015a, 10ff.). So at least in some cases sustainable benefits are possible, especially if aid is
directly  targetted  towards  the  poor.  The greatest  contribution  by the  effective  altruism
movement is therefore the call to focus donations on effective organisations and projects,
by establishing organisations such as “GiveWell” that monitor, evaluate and publish INGO
results. Helping effectively is both a rational and, confronted with the challenge of limited
resources dedicated towards supporting the global poor, an ethical requirement. While the
trend towards scrutinizing INGOs and aid institutions predates their work, both Singer's
(2009a and 2015) and MacAskill's (2015a) contribution to this field are noteworthy and
impressive. In addition to their academic work, the philosophers were active in the creation
of the website “Giving What We Can”8 and “The Life You Can Save”9 thus informing
many people  not  only  of  the  need  to  donate,  but  crucially,  how to  do  so  effectively.
Unfortunately, besides epistemological problems, the central problem of the paradigm of
charity remains, with donations being influenced by fads in the media and a lack of respect
7 These critics of development aid refer to the groundbreaking work of Peter Bauer “Dissent of 
Development” (1971).
8 www.givingwhatwecan.org.
9 www.thelifeyoucansave.org.
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and inclusion of the poor themselves in the development and implementation of solutions,
due to them being donor-centred (cp. Anik et al. 2011, Baaz 2005 and Ratner, Zhao, and
Clarke 2011). Even the very concept of measuring effectiveness has been misunderstood,
as the debate on “overhead costs” reveals (Bowman 2006).10 Making things even more
difficult, psychological research reveals that appeals to rationality may actually diminish
willingness to donate (Oppenheimer and Olivola 2011 and Slovic and Västfjäll 2010). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how efficiency could be marketed in the view of
donor psychology. This may be called the Machiavellian problem, as for fundraising – as
well as for the  Principe – appearance  seems to matter more than actual efficacy (Stern
2013a, 17ff.).11 Some NGOs act  like show-offs (Gharib 2015, Dogra 2012, Cameron and
Haanstra  2008,  Plewes  and  Stuart  2006  and  Westhead  2013).  This  is  fuelled by  the
tendency of many donors to give to charity for the sake of their reputation and/or to calm
their bad conscience. In such a case, donating is not primarily efficiency-oriented. Similar
tendencies  can  be  observed  in  Corporate  Social  Responsibility-campaigns  (cp.  Baines
2014).
Additionally, the problem of self-servingness, in this case of national interests not
only dictates private donations, but also global trade and official development aid (ODA).
This limits calls to simply increase governmental spending on aid and thus taking away the
voluntariness to aid, where it would seem ethically appropriate. Here several ideas will be
presented on what could be done better. 
It is thus important when communicating with the public to frame donations in a
specific way (Darnton and Kirk 2011). That donating to development aid projects is futile
remains, a  widespread  position  in  Western  public  (Bølstad  2011,  79ff.).  This  is  not
surprising, as many of the projects are actually wanting in efficiency. Additionally, biases
10 “Overhead” refers to the general costs that an organisation spends on management, evaluation, 
fundraising, and transfers, i.e. money that is not directly invested in projects or the target group. It has 
unfortunately become popular in recent years to use overhead costs as a overly simple rule of thumb to 
determine the efficiency of an NGO (Bowman 2006).
11 Charles Baudelaire illustrates this in the story “La Fausse Monnaie” (1868), where he observes a 
wealthy friend self-congratulating himself on his generosity. In fact he gave the beggar a false coin.
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and  ideological  constructions  such  as  (N)eo-Malthusianism  continue  to  influence  the
Western public (Abramitzky and Braggio 2005 and Ross 1998). Thomas Robert Malthus
will be presented as an early critic of charity. He probably is the first one to advance the
position  that  charity  can  create  harm  in  the  long  run.  However,  his  thesis  has  been
disproven, as there has been considerable success in alleviating global suffering related to
poverty, most notably the rapid rise of the Chinese economy, that has allowed a large part
of the population to lift themselves out of poverty by finding work (even if many of them
are in so-called “sweat-shops”) in budding industrial centres and thus support their families
(Blattman and Dercon 2016, Li et al.  2009, and MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8). Additionally,
health interventions, family planning and increased incomes are a good way to limit family
sizes (The Economist 2009). 
The problems of donor-centricity plague aid projects in several other ways, as will
be demonstrated by case studies of several approaches to combat global poverty. Central
problems  such  as  distrust  towards  the  poor  (microcredits),  self-image  and  pressure  to
succeed from donor community (Millennium Village Project),  focus on donor life-style
(Fair Trade), result in a lack of effectiveness and continuation of programmes, even if they
have no demonstrative effect  on poverty relief.  Positive examples  tend to  be  not  very
spectacular  and attractive,  for example de-worming and malaria  nets.  One of  the most
effective ways to support the poor is by providing them with direct financial support (Aker
et al. 2014, Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013, Glassman 2014, Melo 2007, and Standing
2008). This reflects what is largely absent, unfortunately both from most development aid
projects and effective altruism, the poor themselves. It will be argued, that taking human
lives as intrinsically valuable should entail that we do not simply strive to save as many as
them as possible, but actually listen to their needs and wants (Anderson, Brown, and Jean
2012 and Wenar 2006 and 2011b). While providing them with basic health, and even better
with financial support, is an important first step, the long-term focus should be on avoiding
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harm by partaking in exploitative international structures, to allow them to lift themselves
out  of  poverty  by  becoming  active  members  of  the  world  economy,  and  even  more
important, by supporting their protest and changing of the global and local political system
that excludes them. Without this focus on the poor, the effective altruism movement itself
is at risk of becoming another fad, as the worrisome new tendency to focus on “extinction
events”  within  the  movement  and  the  focus  on  philanthrocapitalism reveals  (McGoey
2015).  To assure that  global  poverty is  reduced in  a  sustainable way,  effective  altruist
should therefore not only fight for more donations to effective organisations, but towards
the establishment of a global wealth or speculation tax, that targets especially the super-
wealthy and multinational corporations, that have been avoiding their fair share so far. The
income thus created should finance a global minimal income for the poorest of the planet.
New insights or findings from this thesis:
This  thesis  falls  into  the  wider  field  of  ethics  of  philanthropy,  necessarily  a
multidisciplinary field, uniting sociology, ethics, economics, and psychology (Illingworth,
Pogge and Wenar 2011, 4f), as seen by Peruvian economist Javier Iguiñiz in his  2009
“Invitation to Multidisciplinary” in the combat against poverty and for democracy (also cp.
Narayan et al. 2000). This thesis will indicate the possible ways ahead in the global combat
against poverty and show the difficult relationship between fundraising and poverty relief.
Combining  different  approaches,  an  overview  of  different  fields  concerning  both
willingness and possibilities of global poverty assistance will be given. The goal is the
establishment  of  a  moral  duty  to  act  against  poverty,  but  also  defining  the  limits  of
international poverty relief on the example of charitable donations. 
The  thesis  offers  an  in-depth  discussion  on  the  ethical  basis  of  the  “effective
altruism”–movement,  as  developed  by  Peter  Singer  (2009a  and  2015)  and  William
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MacAskill (2015a), namely that we should base our life path on how much we can do to
alleviate global suffering. While rejecting the principle as to demanding and an inadequate
allocation of responsibility for most citizens, it can nevertheless be shown, that there is a
certain duty to help to support the global poor as fellow human beings and as reparation for
damages suffered from the global political and economic order. However, it has to be noted
that most of these duties are collective in nature, and thus cannot easily fulfilled by private
donations. As Miller (2004, 376) describes
“If so, the critique of Singer's argument should be a preliminary to a better, more 
political argument in the interest of those he seeks to help. As an effort to base a 
fairly radical conclusion about giving on ordinary moral convictions, this further 
project pays homage to Singer's pathbreaking work.”
The second part  of  the  thesis  provides  an overview over  the  state  of  literature  on the
research on donor behaviour. It is shown that increasing donations is very difficult and that
donors often behave paradoxically and self-centeredly. This determines the limits, but also
the possibilities of the charitable paradigm. The hypothesis, that charity is a scarce resource
and therefore the total amount of donations per society is limited, will be reinforced. 
Combined with the findings on the difference of effectiveness of different forms of
aid in the last part, this results in the conclusion that establishing a quality standard for
INGOs and to support and communicate the work of charity evaluators was an important
contribution by both Peter Singer and William MacAskill. It should however still remain
clear that charity has it's limits and cannot do the work of justice. As Richard Rorty puts it
(1994, 182)
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“We resent the idea that we shall have to wait for the strong to turn their piggy little
eyes  to  the  suffering  of  the  weak,  slowly  open  their  dried-up  little  hearts.  We
desperately hope there is something stronger and more powerful that will  hurt the
strong if  they do not  do these things  – if  not  a  vengeful  God, then a  vengeful
aroused  proletariat  or,  at  least,  a  vengeful  superego  or,  at  the  very  least,  the
offended majesty of Kant's tribunal of pure practical reason.”
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2. The Philosophical Discussion and Ethical Background to Giving
2.1. The Life You Can Save – Peter Singer's Utilitarian Appeal
“UNICEF, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, estimates
that about 24,000 children die every day from preventable, poverty-related causes.
Yet  at  the  same time almost  a  billion  people  live  very comfortable  lives,  with
money to spare for many things that are not at all necessary. (You are not sure if
you are in that category? When did you last spend money on something to drink,
when drinkable water was available for nothing? If the answer is “within the past
week”  then  you  are  spending  money  on  luxuries  while  children  die  from
malnutrition or diseases that we know how to prevent or cure.)
The  Life  You  Can  Save  seeks  to  change  this.  If  everyone  who  can  afford  to
contribute to reducing extreme poverty were to give a modest proportion of their
income to effective organizations fighting extreme poverty, the problem could be
solved. It wouldn't take a huge sacrifice.”
From the A Life you can Save-website.12
In his two books “The Life You Can Save” (2009) and “The Most Good You Can Do”
(2015),  Peter  Singer,  perhaps  today's  most  prominent  utilitarian,  picks  up  a  debate  he
started in 1972 when publishing the influential essay “Famine, Affluence and Morality”.13
His  argumentation  in  essence  has  not  changed  during  the  last  forty  years,  with  the
challenge of world poverty remaining to this day. Singer's argumentation is important in
this context as it is straightforward and consequent. However, I do not fully share his point
of view. I  will  present his position as an introduction to the problem and then specify
where I differ.
Singer's basic position is utilitarian in nature. According to utilitarianism, it is our
12 www.thelifeyoucansave.org.
13 A preliminary version of this chapter has been developed in Lauer (2011).
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duty to alleviate suffering and promote good living conditions (i.e. utility, happiness or in
the  more  complicated  version  of  preference  utilitarianism,  which  Singer  favours,
individual choices and interests).14 In the consequentialist tradition, he argues that a just
ethical system has to apply the principle of equality. This means that every human being's
suffering or well-being counts the same, regardless of differences  such as gender,  age,
nationality,  or  geographical  distance.15 These  differences  should be  considered  morally
irrelevant and therefore have no influence on our actions.
In ethics we can find what Matravers (2007, 77) calls the “Kantian aspiration to
purge luck from the determination of what we deserve”. When determining what a person
is to receive in goods, we want a choice-sensitive, but endowment-insensitive method of
distribution (Matravers 2007 and Rawls 1971). This is connected to the moral argument of
the lottery of birth (cp. Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 and van Parijs 1995). The argument can
be resumed in the following question: 
Why am I  born  into  the  developed world  and can  enjoy a  life  in  security  and
relative comfort,  while  another  person will  have to  struggle his  entire  life  with
malnutrition,  disease  and  insecurity  just  because  of  a  geographical  accident  of
birth? 
We need not  be convinced by a  veil  of  ignorance-type  argument,  to  agree  that  fellow
rational and emotional human beings should not suffer undeserving from poverty.16
According to Singer, in a world where international poverty relief organisations,
such as UNICEF or Oxfam, are already “on the ground”, this is not difficult to do. One
14 I shy away from the common usage of the term “happiness” in this context. Happiness is a very 
individual notion and notoriously difficult to measure. I am not sure whether promoting happiness could 
really be an ethical duty.
15 This understanding of our humanitarian duties including every single member of our species can 
also be found in many religious world-views. Most notably for Westerners it is an important part of Christian 
doctrine.
16 Some people deny the fact of undeserving suffering and adhere to the just world theory, they even 
maintain this belief contrary to overwhelming evidence. This problem will be discussed in chapter 3.10.
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does not need to fly to Somalia or visit the slums of New Delhi and establish a hospital or
build a school, this work should be done by experts. What we as normal citizens should
and can do is donating money.
Singer  illustrates  his  reasoning  with  a  moral  tale  from  the  Confucian  scholar
Mencius (Shun 2010, also cp. Unger 1996, 9f.):
The drowning child scenario: You see a small child drowning in a shallow pond.
You could wade out and save the child's life, but doing so would ruin your $200
suit. Would it be acceptable to refuse saving the child?
Our intuitive response in this case is clear: It is unacceptable to let the child drown. Singer
thinks  that  the  reason  we  believe  that  we  ought  to  save  the  drowning  child  can  be
generalized as the
“Principle of sacrifice: If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought,
morally, to do so.” Singer  (1972,
241, cp. Miller 2004, 357).
Or in a more abstract formulation:
If by doing X, S's life can be saved, and X entails personal costs of <c, then I ought
to do X.
Cp. Miller (2004) and Mulgan (2001)
After establishing this principle, he proposes a second scenario:
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The letter scenario: You receive a letter from UNICEF, telling you that a donation
of $200 will save a dozen innocent third-world children. Without even considering
donating, you throw it away. Is your behaviour morally acceptable?
Singer argues that while we are quite seldom confronted with the first scenario, we are
quite frequently challenged by the second one. But, at least in practice, our moral actions
are quite different: We permit ourselves to throw the letter away.
Indeed most people will judge this to be a much lesser, if any, moral failing on the
part of the agent, contrary to the case of the drowning child. But throwing the letter away,
in Singer's  view,  violates  the  principle  of  sacrifice  in  the  same way as  not  saving the
drowning child would, because for a utilitarian, distance is not a morally relevant factor
(cp. Singer 2002, 2009a, 7ff., and 2011a). Singer uses these scenarios to point towards one
central  problem:  The  incoherence  of  our  ethical  intuitions.  He  demands  that  we  ask
ourselves  the  question:  Who has  more  right  to  the  $200,  the  one  who is  currently in
possession of them, or the one who needs them most. Singer sides with the latter, adopting
a position of prioritarianism.17
In view of findings in human moral psychology,  we can safely assume that the
desire to save the child in this scenario is a human universal (cp. Aknin et al. 2013, Brown
1991 and Greene 2007). Here Singer very ingeniously combines an intuitional approach to
ethics with utilitarianism. For a utilitarian, saving the child is of course mandatory, as he is
bound by the moral importance of each person's well-being (cp. Ashford 2011, 29 and
Cullity 2004, 16ff.). But because the example of the drowning child speaks directly to our
empathy and our moral intuitions, the example should be convincing for virtue ethicists or
deontologists as well. In the first case one can simply argue that among the virtues one
should cultivate there are beneficence and compassion (cp. Slote 2007). This is true for all
religion-based virtue ethics models such as Islam, Christianity, or Judaism (cp. Beauchamp
17 See Arneson (2000) for a defence and Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) for a critique of the position of 
prioritarianism.
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2013 and Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006).
Ashford (2011, 29) analyses that Singer's premise is convincing for a deontological
position that has the “most minimal concern for persons' well-being or respect for their
dignity  as  rational  autonomous  agents.”  Applying  the  categorical  imperative  to  the
situation results in a clear duty to save the child (cp. O'Neill 1986).
Singer wants to convince as many people as possible with his example, and with
the first step of his argumentation he does this quite successfully. In the following I will
consider  the  duty to  save  the child  as  established.  Some people will  still  refrain  from
saving  the  child,  but  they  do  something  morally  reprehensible  and  in  some countries
illegal, for example in German law, the duty to rescue is codified in the  Strafgesetzbuch
section 26 § 323c. Unterlassene Hilfeleistung (failure to provide assistance) is considered
an offence against public safety and punishable by imprisonment up to a year. 
Singer's argument is quite powerful. By combining the  principle of sacrifice  with
the moral irrelevance of distance, derived from the principle of equality, Singer postulates
a moral duty to donate for development aid, adding the  principle of priority – there are
people in the Third World who – by buying food and essential healthcare for their families
– can make better use of our money than we ourselves. His premise is that the institutions
that  can save lives and provide people in the poorest  countries  with food, shelter,  and
medical care are already in place (be it UNICEF, Oxfam, or some other agency), and we
have information and the possibility to help. All you have to do is give a certain amount of
money to save someone instead of spending it on non-essential luxuries.18 
18 Such as expensive clothing, cars, cinema visits. Singer himself seems particularly offended by the 
luxurious use of drinking bottled water in countries where drinking water is available from the tap. He points 
out that by simply donating the money for bottled water for charity and drinking tap water, one could do the 
right thing (Singer 2009a, 142). While his examples may sometimes seem a little far fetched, his point is a 
valid one: For reasonably affluent person it is always possible to make some relatively unimportant sacrifice, 
say a daily Starbucks coffee, and donate the money saved. The question that arises though is how much am I 
obliged to sacrifice to be a good human being. This will be discussed further on.
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2.2. How Can Singer's Argument Be criticised?
Singer's starting point, the ethical requirement of saving the child, is very solid. A world
where it would be acceptable for people to disregard other human beings' interests in such
a way as to decline saving the child does not seem attractive. Indeed there seems to be little
room for argumentation here that does not resort to crude and philosophically uninteresting
egoism.19 Singer successfully shifts the burden of proof. Weighing the need of the  poor
against  the  small  cost  of  a  donation  for  the  well-off  individual  results  in  such  a
disproportion  of  interests  that  the  well-off  will  have  to  justify  why  not  donating.
Convincing  criticism  will  therefore  not  focus  on  Singer's  moral  example,  but  on  the
generalising step, denying that the case of the child suffering from poverty is analogous to
the case of the drowning child and that therefore the consequences Singer draws are the
correct ones.20 As Sias (2005) asks: 
“Why suppose that the conflict in this circumstance lies in the intuitions rather than
the principles we are supposed to derive from those intuitions?”
To illustrate his point, Sias (2005) proposes the following example of moral blackmail:
“The  hostage  scenario: You  receive  another  letter  from  UNICEF.  This  time,
however, you read that UNICEF is holding your neighbours hostage in their home,
and that, unless you reply with a 200 € donation by a certain deadline, they will be
killed.”
19 For a discussion and rejection of egoism see Feinberg (2012).
20 For example Leif Wenar (2011b) titles an article arguing “poverty is no pond”, although he writes 
with great sympathy for Singer's approach.
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A similar thought experiment has been forwarded by the University of York's Christian
Piller.21 Imagine a man who thrusts a collection box in front of you and asks you to give
him €5 or he will kill himself in front of you. Should you give him the money? 
In  both  thought  experiments  the  principles  of  reasonable  sacrifice  and  equality
apply. However, we reject any moral obligation in both cases, as they both constitute a
felony, and giving in to blackmail will probably lead to a vicious circle with continuous
extortion. These would be the consequentialist arguments against giving in these cases. A
deontological position would be that we simply cannot give in to blackmail, even out of
beneficence, without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance (cp. Arneson
2009, 268). Garrett Cullity (2003, 406) formulates the limits of our obligations to others
thus: “If a gangster's gun jams, I ought not to help him fix it.”
2.3. Excessive Demand
“And finally — this is the cardinal point — for the seeker after goodness there must
be no close friendships and no exclusive loves whatever. Close friendships, Gandhi
says, are dangerous, because “friends react on one another” and through loyalty to a
friend one can be led into wrong-doing. This is unquestionably true. Moreover, if
one  is  to  love  God,  or  to  love  humanity  as  a  whole,  one  cannot  give  one's
preference to any individual person. This again is true, and it marks the point at
which  the  humanistic  and the religious  attitude cease to  be reconcilable.  To an
ordinary human being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people
more than others. The autobiography leaves it uncertain whether Gandhi behaved in
an inconsiderate way to his wife and children, but at any rate it makes clear that on
three occasions he was willing to let his wife or a child die rather than administer
21 During a 2010 module in Social Choice for the Master in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the 
University of York, England.
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the animal food prescribed by the doctor. It is true that the threatened death never
actually occurred, and also that Gandhi — with, one gathers, a good deal of moral
pressure in the opposite direction — always gave the patient the choice of staying
alive at the price of committing a sin: still, if the decision had been solely his own,
he would have forbidden the animal food, whatever the risks might be. There must,
he says, be some limit to what we will do in order to remain alive, and the limit is
well on this side of chicken broth. This attitude is perhaps a noble one, but, in the
sense which — I think — most people would give to the word, it is inhuman. The
essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes
willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to
the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in
the  end to  be  defeated  and broken up by life,  which  is  the  inevitable  price  of
fastening one's love upon other human individuals.” 
George Orwell [1949] (1998, 6f.)
Utilitarian positions such as Singer's are often criticised for not respecting interpersonal
boundaries, or special personal relationships, and for demanding too much in terms of self-
sacrifice (Cullity 2003 and 2004, 90ff., Williams 1972 and 1985, Scheffler 1982, Sinnott-
Armstrong 2014, ch. 6, and Vallentyne 2006). Taken seriously, the principle of sacrifice
combined with the dire need of absolute poverty could mean that an individual would be
morally required to forsake any income that is not necessary for his survival and donate it
to  help the world's  worst  off.  This is  reinforced when we consider  positions of  utility
maximization: Faced with the dire need present in the world, I would be obliged to donate
until  the expected marginal value of my donation equals  the marginal  costs  to  myself.
Miller (2004, 357) calls this the radical conclusion: 
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Everyone has a duty not to spend money on luxuries or frills, and to use the savings
due to abstinence to help those in dire need.
This would be deeply counter-intuitive, and Garrett Cullity (2003 and 2004, ch. 5 and 6)
accuses Singer of “asking too much”.22 But simply pointing out that the extreme demand
(Cullity 2004, 70) is counter-intuitive is not sufficient to discredit the argument. Indeed,
Peter Unger (1996) agrees that the results of the argument are counter-intuitive, but that we
would still have to accept the argument and its consequences if they cannot be disproven in
a valid way. Indeed, both Unger and Singer (2007) are sceptical about our moral intuitions,
which often consist in nothing more than “biological residue of our evolutionary history”.
They are  often  conflicting  and  contradictory, and  an  important  part  of  philosophical
reflection  is  weighing  them against  each  other,  to finally  (hopefully)  come up  with  a
judgement.23 The authors' conclusion would be  that we simply have to accept these high
moral demands and act accordingly.24
While I do have the greatest sympathy for the above authors, as their position is a
deeply  humanist,  even  humanitarian  one,  I  cannot agree  with  them.  In  the  following
chapter I will  argue that there are limits to  altruistic demands of others on my person.
Indeed,  extreme demand is  excessive demand. But fortunately, it seems as the conflicting
feelings  that  we  have  a  duty  to  help,  while  rejecting  the  extreme  demand,  can  be
reconciled.
22 This is the title of his 2003 essay in The Monist. He further elaborated his position in the book The 
Moral Demands of Affluence (2004). 
23 Philosopher Peter Unger (1996, 14ff.) refers to this as the liberationist approach.
24 A reader may of course point out now that Singer relies on a moral intuition when he asks whether 
we would rescue the child. It is therefore important to point out that he uses this as a way of illustrating that 
his utilitarian starting point is the right one.
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2.4. The Permissiveness of Personal Projects
This leads us to the  question of legitimate limits to obligations towards the poor on the
giver's side. The first constraint is simply one of prudence. Even  if you accept the most
extreme interpretation, you will only have to give until you and your family are left with a
reasonable amount so that in the foreseeable future none of you will experience dire need.
Prudence also dictates a second constraint: In a Rawlsian interpretation, we have to allow
for expense and investment that will benefit the worst off. The logic being that if we can
use  our  given resources  to  increase  our  income so  that  the  increased  total  amount  of
donations can then save more people, this is a sort of twist on “invest today so that you can
save more  tomorrow”.  Singer  (1972,  242 and 1977,  49)  himself  gives  the example  of
purchasing an expensive suit to succeed in gaining a well-paid job at a New York law
firm.25 This will lead to more income which can then be donated, an approach supported by
the charitable organisation “80.000 hours”.26 Singer explicitly praises such behaviour in
both 2014 and 2015 articles in the Boston Review and his book “The Most Good You Can
Do” (2015, 3f):
“Recent Princeton graduate Matt Wage, for example, was offered a place for
postgraduate  studies  at  the  University  of  Oxford  but  instead  went  to  Wall
Street,  where  within  a  year  he  had  earned  enough  to  donate  $100.000  to
organizations helping people in extreme poverty.”27
25 Similar examples would be investing into a good business idea or a good education.
26 Co-founded by William MacAskill (cp. MacAskill 2015a and 2015b and www.80000hours.org).
27 Unfortunately, the activities on Wall Street are in themselves not neutral, indeed no job position is. If
part of the donated money is earned by speculating on food and resources gained through slave-like work 
such as coltan, bananas, or cocoa, and financing arms sales and corporations that profit from lack of 
functioning justice systems in the third world, for example by not paying taxes or not compensating for 
created environmental damage, Mr. Wage may not perform an altruistic action at all, he may simply repay 
some of the damage he has done. There are many ways in which a career in finance, and just being a 
consuming Western citizen can hurt the poor, which will be discussed in chapter 2.11. Singer ignores these 
difficulties , which is difficult as in any but the strictest utilitarian interpretation, the “do no harm”-principle 
has priority over supporting others.
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Both Singer and MacAskill (2015a, 181ff.) argue that we should not “follow our passions”
but consider choosing a career path that ensures we make a lot of money to donate more.
Naturally, a person who acts in this altruistic way must be very strongly motivated. As
human beings have a tendency to act in their self-interest, many people would probably not
be motivated to work extremely hard if  they had to donate all  their  benefits.  So some
luxury could be allowed,  if  people are  thereby motivated to work harder  or in a less
appreciated, but better paid job, earning – and finally donating – more. Singer (2015, 47)
conceding that an opponent arguing that “earning to give is not for everyone”, would be on
“solid ground”.
Finally, why limit our altruism to monetary donations? After all, there is much more
you can – and according to extreme demand – need to do to save other people. Donating
blood will be the easiest way (Singer 1973 and Campbell, Tan, and Boujaoude 2012). But
more parts of your body may be needed and expendable, notably bone marrow, and in most
people one of their kidneys (Drakulić 2008 and Singer 2015, ch. 6). But can we really say
that someone who does not willingly undergo surgery and donate one of his kidneys to a
complete stranger behaves egoistically and unethically? How far does the requirement go?
This illustrates the problem with extreme demand. If you fully accept it, you will be
denied the possibility to lead an autonomous life and make individual decisions. All your
decisions would have to be weighed against the need of the many poor, therefore limiting
one's life-choices to altruistic-oriented ones (Cullity 2004, 137ff., Lichtenberg 2014, 47ff.
and Miller 2004). We would no longer be allowed to choose to conduct our expenses in a
way we see as right, as the majority of them would be destined towards others.  Unger
argues we should accept this claim on us if we want to be good human beings. But he here
commits a typical error some radical ethicists or moralists may be quite prone to: reducing
the value of human existence to the moral (Cp. Badhwar 2006, 73ff., Cullity 2004, 137ff.
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and Miller  2004).28 While  moral  aspects  are  highly  important,  there  is  much more  to
human existence than taking care of humanity. There is art, science, literature, sports, a
satisfying  job,  and  there  are human  relationships,  friends, and  family.29 Those  are  all
valuable things that increase happiness, and some of them, such as aesthetic pleasures and
human  relationships, may  be  intrinsically  valuable.  Cullity  shows  that  the  extremist
demand  results  in  a  very  limiting  view  on  what  constitutes  a  good  life  and  –  most
importantly – can be lead ad absurdum. 
When  subscribing  to  the  principle  of  sacrifice  in  the  extreme  interpretation,  I
sacrifice income so that others may have more. I do so as I recognise that they are rational
human beings who have needs similar to mine and suffer the same as I would. I am obliged
to help them get things they see as worthwhile. However, to do this I myself must sacrifice
things I  see as worthwhile.  Cullity (2004, ch.  8,  esp.  133ff.  and 147ff.)  concludes that
therefore it must be permissible for me to get things I see as worthwhile for myself. In
Cullity's own words (2004, 144):
“[As] I am morally required to treat other people's interests in getting a certain good
as a good reason for helping them to get it, it must be defensible for me to take that
good for myself.”
Unfortunately, this implies that in some cases goods or personal pursuits are worth more
than a human life. I argue however that we can accept this bitter pill here. A good and
fulfilled life necessarily is more than mere survival, as for example the capability approach
shows clearly. It is therefore justifiable that the mere survival of other humans is not the
only focus of our lives. Additionally, the pill is a lot less bitter than it would appear at first
28 Badhwar goes even further in her criticism, accusing Singer and Unger of “moral monomania”, as 
such an excessive demand would reduce the good life to moral aspects, but moral worth is reduced to 
beneficence. 
29 Nussbaum (2011) gives a very extensive list of worthwhile aspects of life in her eudaimonia-
influenced capability approach.
44
taste, because even if living an altruism-oriented life cannot be required of all of us, this
does  not  mean  that  I  am nevertheless  obliged  to  treat  all  human  beings  fairly  in  my
interaction with them. Neither does it mean that not helping at all can be justified. It just
means that there are limits to the claims others have on me (Arneson 2009, Cullity 2004,
and Temkin 2004).
Another  problem for  radical altruists  would  be  the  situation  where the  cost  of
saving the drowning child right in front of me surpasses the cost of saving a child with a
donation. An act-utilitarian would then have to refrain from saving the child, as Kwame
Anthony Appiah elaborates  (2007, ch. 10).  To paraphrase Bernard Williams (1981), the
one who first has to calculate whether he can afford to save the child has one thought too
many. 
Of course this does not mean that a radically altruism-oriented life would not be
worth-while. It could indeed be an ethically praiseworthy life, as the examples of Mahatma
Gandhi or Mother Teresa illustrate. It will probably be a very fulfilling and also a happy
life,  as  happiness  is  one  of  the  effects  of  donating  time  and  money  (cp.  Smith  and
Davidson 2014, this will be presented in the next part of the thesis). However, it cannot be
maintained that the sacrifice of personal projects and plans to become a “moral saint” is the
only possible life-plan. Susan Wolf (1982, 421), goes as far as denying that this live is
worth aspiring to, labelling as “strangely barren”. This is echoed by the opening quotation
by George Orwell in the preceding chapter. In an interesting approach, journalist Larissa
MacFarquhar (2015) in “Strangers Drowning: Impossible Idealism, Drastic Choices, and
the Urge to Help”, approaches the problem from an investigative angle and examines the
life of examples that could be considered “moral saints”. The examples of people fighting
against injustice, providing medical care to the disenfranchised and forgotten victims to
civil conflict or just donate a majority of their income to charitable causes, demonstrate
that the sacrifices come at a high personal costs, often a lack of family, personal happiness,
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and safety. MacFarquhar (2015) shows that, while the lives of what she calls them “do-
gooders” are not “barren”, indeed their lives are more than filled with strife and conflict,
these people are not what we would consider normal from a societal or often even from a
psychological perspective.
As Cullity (2004) shows for the special case of global poverty relief, and Williams
(1981 and 1985) shows for utilitarianism in general, the demands of an altruism-oriented
life will severely impede other important personal projects, thus not taking into account the
moral separateness of persons. It will dictate your choice of job and severely limit the time
and  resources  you  can  spend  on  family  and  friendships.  The  point  has  been  made
frequently that this extreme interpretation of impartiality is not only counter-intuitive, but
in  danger  of  contradicting  utilitarianism  itself  (Arneson  2003,  Scheffler  1982,  and
Vallentyne 2006, 30). As normatively separate individuals, we have the right to make our
own choices and pursue our own interests. These include personal projects and ties such as
friendships and family (cp. Arneson 2003 and Nagel 1991 and 2005). But while these are
intrinsically valuable, they need time and resources that we cannot dedicate to the saving
of others. Additionally, as a simple requirement of prudence, individuals are justified in
creating financial security for themselves and to a certain degree for their children to avoid
becoming themselves candidates for charity. An ethical model that undermines these moral
intuitions  and  liberties  probably  would  create  unhappiness.  This  would  be  especially
difficult for utilitarianism whose goal is the creation of happiness for the greatest possible
number. A worthwhile life is more than just survival. It consists in taking meaningful and
responsible decisions and creating and following your very own personal path in life (Sen
2001  and  Nussbaum  2011).  This  personal  freedom  is  intrinsically  valuable  and
instrumentally the basis for a flourishing society (Fleurbaey 2007, Miller 2004, Popper
1945, Williams and Smart 1973, and Williams 1981). This means that there are limits to
demands others can have on you. I argue that your obligations depend on the impact of
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your  actions  on  the  other  person.  Meaning  that  for  example  a  parent  have  strong
obligations towards their children, and vice versa, or the employer towards his employee.
The connection to the anonymous poor person rescued by your donation definitely is a
real, although it is a very distant one. Therefore your obligations are limited. As will be
shown in chapter 2.11., there are many ways in which our lives as Western consumers and
citizens impact people in developing countries negatively. Limiting harm here should be
our first priority.
As for any prioritarian, it is difficult for me to say “this is sufficient” and to draw a
line which does not appear arbitrary and would not create several problems (cp. Arneson
2013). Arguably, establishing such a line would be committing the  fallacy of misplaced
concreteness.30 Rather I want to argue that the moral urgency of addressing the problems of
poverty  diminishes,  as  poor  people's  welfare  increases.  We  would  then gradually  be
moving out of the realm of the morally necessary into the ideal, from the obligatory into
the realm of the supererogatory.
Singer  rightly recognises  extreme poverty as a  moral  evil  (cp.  Pogge 2007 and
2010). Accordingly the more poverty is reduced, the less it  is an evil  that needs to be
addressed. The moral urgency of the problem diminishes, and so does our responsibility for
it. Allow me to present an illustrating example, say I am a Saudi-Arabian prince and I want
to buy a 180 metre yacht, including a 3D-cinema and concert hall, for €500 million.31 Now
in a world where 1.2 billion people do not have enough to, in which children starve, and
contracting malaria is a long drawn-out but sure death sentence because you cannot afford
the medicine, this crass indulgence in prestige and luxury is morally reprehensible. Simple
concern for other human beings would oblige you to buy a less grandiose yacht and donate
the difference. Now imagine a world where everybody is adequately fed and housed and
30 A notion of Aristotle's (NE I 1094b11, NE 1094b23, and NE 1098a26), further refined by 
Anagnostopoulos 1994 and Whitehead 1925. In this context I take it to mean that neither is it possible nor 
important in the context of this thesis to work out an exact amount of donations needed to end world poverty.
31 The yacht is called Azzam (Der Spiegel Online 2013). To be fair it should be mentioned that 
Alwaleed bin Talal prince now actually promised to donate part of his fortune of $32 billion to charity 
(Hubbard 2015).
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with free clinics within reasonable distance, but the poorest lack a second pair of shoes.
Having only one pair of shoes is inconvenient, it can cause unpleasant odour and athlete's
foot. However, while the need for a second pair of shows may still be more important than
the need for a 180 metre yacht, I argue that in this world the prince's purchase is much less
reprehensible.  The moral  urgency of  the donation of  shoes,  especially second pairs,  is
much less important. 
2.5. The Principle of Reasonable Sacrifice
The rejection of extreme demand may leave us with conflicting feelings. On the one hand
one may feel relieved that one can continue to live one's life without having to devote the
larger share of one's resources to the welfare of others. On the other hand, there is a certain
uneasiness that  in spite  of the  severe inequality of wealth and the suffering caused by
poverty there really would be no reason for ethical action.
In the following, I  will  show that while we should reject the extreme demand, it
does not mean that we owe nothing to the poor. As Lichtenberg (2014, 21) distils Singer's
position marvellously, “rich should help poor because poor needs his help and because he
can.“ Or making the humanitarian argument explicit:
 Poor is a fellow human being, with feelings, life-plans, and rational awareness.
 His need is dire, his life will be significantly shortened, he will lose loved ones to
easily preventable illness, and he will suffer.
 Unjust distribution of global resources and luck of birth have contributed to the
plight of the poor, meaning that their poverty and resulting suffering are unmerited.
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We need not value the interests of others as high and important as our own ones and that of
our families. What is important, is that we value them minimally and act according to this
valuation. Singer (2009a, 160ff.) provides a good rule of thumb, calculating that we should
donate between one and five per cent of our income, based on how much we earn. But it is
important  to  note  that  he  settles  more  for  practicality's  sake  than  from  conviction,
recognising that asking too much would be psychologically self-defeating. I want to argue
here that between one and five per cent are actually quite OK considering our obligations
to the poor, the current state of the world and the effectiveness of INGOs in combatting
poverty (discussed in part 4 of the thesis).
Asking  too much may be detrimental, and this  is  just  one of the psychological
barriers we will have to confront when it comes to increasing the amount of donations. In
the final part  of this  thesis  will  be  tried to show that  simply injecting more and more
money into the global humanitarian system has only limited potential to eliminate poverty.
Nevertheless, I would conclude that it is not only inconvenient reality which forces us to
accept these limits to the demands of others on our lives, it also makes philosophically
good sense to to raise the argument of demandingness objection in favour of a more liberal
requirement of individuals to be beneficent. 
Miller (2004, 358) allows for a more reasonable, one might say humane, principle
of  sacrifice  that  allows  for  some indulgence  while  “condemning  callous  indifference”.
Minimal consideration of other people's interests results in the  principle of beneficence,
demanding reasonable sacrifice (Cullity 2004, 16ff. and 102f.). 
“The  principle  of  sympathy  or  beneficence:  One's  underlying  disposition  to
respond to neediness as such ought to be sufficiently demanding, and it need not be
any more  demanding than  this.  A form of  giving  which  would  express  greater
underlying concern could impose a significant risk of worsening one's life, if one
fulfilled all further responsibilities.”
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Another  appellation  is the principle  of  benevolence (Mulgan  2001,  8)  or  principle  of
humanity (Fishkin 1982). As shown above, such principles have considerable moral force
on  their own. It will be difficult for us to reject the principle without losing something
morally valuable and negating our common humanity and need for solidarity. Indeed it will
be difficult to argue against this principle without resorting to crude and philosophically
uninteresting  egoism,  i.e.  that  all  of  our  actions  are  undertaken  to  benefit  ourselves
(Feinberg  2012).  The  most  plausible  position  here  is  libertarianism,  which  will  be
discussed further on (cp. Hassoun 2012, ch. 3). What remains then is the question whether
the consequence Singer draws from this intuition, namely that we should donate, is the
right one. I need to postpone this question for now, as it is one of the essential questions of
this thesis, it will treated and attempted to explain more fully later. 
The question “How much am I obliged to give?” has still not been answered finally.
I think  that this is a very individual decision, and consequently it varies according to ones'
position, ability, and special responsibilities. 
2.6. Position, Ability, and Special Responsibilities
To introduce  the  concept  of  position, let  us  consider  a  possible  objection  to  Singer's
argument arising from fairness. In a nutshell the question raised by this objection is “Why
me?” What if someone else has pushed the child into the pond? What if a lazy bystander is
much closer to the victim and wearing much cheaper clothes (Temkin 2004, 421f)? Is not
he supposed to do the rescuing?
These objections are easily defeated. To start with, it has to be emphasized that of
course the pusher's ethical failing would be much greater than the bystander's. But that
does not absolve the bystander from his responsibility to rescue the child (cp. Cullity 2004,
18ff. and Temkin 2004, 421f.). Analogously, as a person who is able to help, you still have
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a responsibility to do so, even if you are not the only person on site. This argument is
similar to the tu quoque-fallacy: Other people's moral failings are in this case irrelevant to
your  own.  Moreover:  You  and  the  child,  respectively  his  or  her  parents,  can  ask  for
reparation from the pusher. Accordingly the (as Temkin calls him) “lazy” bystander will
have to justify himself for his inaction.  This question is very important in the context of
development aid, as  the following thought experiment  may illustrate (cp. Badhwar 2006,
81ff. for a similar argument):
The constant rescuer: After having just rescued a small child from drowning in a
shallow pond, which ruined your € 200 suit, you go home and put on some new
clothes. As you leave your home, you see that the same child has fallen into the
same pond again. At the same time you see several other children drowning in other
ponds, so that you will only be able to save some of these children. Even worse,
some of the children actually were pushed into the ponds by bullies. How many and
which children should you or can you save?
In fact, the situation of the donor (of development aid) is much closer to that of a constant
rescuer than to that of the person confronted with a single drowning child. He or she is
confronted  with  a  constant  moral  dilemma  of  being  able  to  help  people  who  are
endangered  through  no  fault  of  their  own  but  by catastrophes,  conflicts, and  unjust
economic  structures  both  on the  local  and global  level.  One has  to  be  aware  that  the
essential difference between saving a child from drowning and saving a child from poverty
and famine is that the first child – once it is saved – is secure, whereas the second one goes
on living in a region where, due to environmental, political, and economic reasons, it is
continuously confronted  with insecurity,  lack  of  adequate  nutrition  and healthcare  (cp.
Appiah 2007, 200 and Wenar 2011b). The analogy of saving a drowning child to saving a
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starving  child  is  therefore  problematic.  It  seems  obvious that  just  saving  the  poverty-
stricken child once would be rather futile. Even worse, as will be shown in part 4, some
charities do more harm than good in the long term, for example by creating dependency
(Easterly 2007b,  Moyo 2009 and Mwenda 2006)  or unintentionally supporting corrupt
local politicians or guerillas (Polman 2008 and de Waal 2011).
While our spontaneous emotional reaction would be to try to save as many children
as possible, wading out again and again until becoming exhausted or crazy, our rationality
tells us that we should do something different, for example putting up fences around the
ponds or prevent the bullies from pushing the children in. Analogically, when confronting
world poverty, maybe we should rely less on our moral intuitions and emotional reactions
but confront the problem with scientific rigour and reflection (cp. Bloom 2014 and Singer
2014). Perhaps even more important, we should not approach the problem on our own, but
include  all  who  are  involved,  especially  the  recipients  of  aid  themselves (Anderson,
Brown, and Jean 2012).
This is not a counterargument against Singer's position, but rather a refinement. The
situation of eliminating poverty has more to do with “putting up fences around the pond” –
i.e. establishing advantageous conditions towards beneficial economic growth – than with
the one-time action of saving a drowning child in the above example. So besides donating
for food aid and malaria nets, we need to think ahead and try to find ways to establish fair
institutions and economic and political structures that benefit the poor (Wenar 2011b and
Pogge 2010a). This refinement is to a certain degree recognised by MacAskill, who argues
for voting according to priorities of global justice (2015a, ch. 6).
Temkin (2004) analyses convincingly that a priori another person's failing in his or
her responsibilities does not change my obligation to help. It rather places an additional
moral requirement on the perpetrator. Singer's “moral vice” (Arneson 2009, 267) varies in
its intensity, if  we take into account that there is the necessity of indirect measures and that
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there are unjust actors and institutions. 
This leads us to the argument of position and ability (cp. Hassoun 2012, Miller
2004,  Temkin  2004,  and  Wenar  2011b).  What  you  are  obliged  to  do  against  poverty
depends on your position in society and your abilities (NE 1106a36-b7). Singer plausibly
points out that if you are able to afford donations without suffering restrictions, you should
donate. However, this is only the financial aspect. Assuming that you are not just a simple
consumer, but the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a major pharmaceutical company or
of a bank, or an influential politician, you are under a duty that goes further. It is the duty
to  take  into  account  the  interests  of  people  who are  affected  by your  decisions.  This
responsibility is even more important than the “positive” humanitarian duty to donate, as it
includes  “negative” duties  of  avoiding  harm.  Hassoun  (2012,  90ff.)  works  out  very
carefully what those duties mean in the respective case. As a consumer, you can be partly
responsible for child labour on Ghanaian chocolate plantations (Berlan 2004), slave labour
in coltan mines in the Republic of Congo (Nest 2011 and van Reybrouck 2012, 537ff.), or
the working conditions  in  garment  factories  in  Bangladesh (Mahr 2013).  Although the
influence of the individual consumer is minimal, his choices can help to securing minimal
workers' rights and security standards. As concerns phenomena as different as Bangladesh
working conditions, the Ethiopian famine, or the Haiti earthquake, correct information is
crucial. This is not easily obtained, as journalism has a tendency to search for good stories
that shock the audience. But sensational journalism may also reinforce stereotypes, e.g. on
dark-skinned people or on Africa (Bølstad 2011, CARMA 2006, Dogra 2012, and Kennedy
and Hill 2010).
A CEO of  a  pharmaceutical  corporation  may be uniquely placed in  a  situation
where he could be able  to  influence both the research of  and the pricing of medicine
against common developing world diseases such as malaria and health problems such as
HIV/AIDS (Hassoun 2012, 179ff., Pogge 2010a, 21ff., 73f. and 127ff.). A politician in a
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developing  country  is  responsible  for  fighting  –  if  not  eliminating  –  corruption  and
establishing  functioning  and  just  institutions  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson  2012,  Easterly
2007b,  112ff.,  Mwenda and Tangri  2006,  and Sen 2001,  51ff.).  His  counterpart  in  the
developed world has to refrain from imposing trade restrictions that benefit his industry at
the cost of the developing countries' welfare, a responsibility he shares with his elective
body (cp. Goodin 1988 and Hassoun 2012, 169ff.).
Singer's strong moral requirement actually interchanges willingness to help with the
responsibility to help, by placing harsh moral constraints on everyone. But if a western
citizen  is  as  responsible  for  letting  the  poor  die,  as  for  example  the  corrupt  president
minister of health, who has spend a majority of the budget on luxuries and the military and
police force to ensure continuing repression, responsibility means little any more. Although
Singer would surely disagree, this is a result that he probably would have to accept, when
taking his moral maximalist position to the end.
Whenever an individual is in a position to significantly improve welfare or when he
or she  has a special responsibility, e.g. as a company executive towards employees of sub-
contractors, the bell tolls for him or her. This includes negligence, for example when poor
working conditions result in a horrible accident. In a globalized world, these causal chains
of establishing  responsibility  have  become increasingly  complex  (cp.  Culp  2014).
Additionally, it is often difficult to weigh up special responsibilities against each other. Just
as discussed before in the context of donating, there are limits to how far this responsibility
goes. It cannot be expected of the pharmaceutical  company to act  in the same ways as a
non-profit  organisation,  as  they have  a  special  responsibility  to  their  shareholders  and
employees. How much should you donate when you have family members relying on you?
What  responsibility  do politicians  have towards  their  electorate  and their  compatriots,
compared  to  people  in  developing  nations?  The  question  of the  Western  world's
responsibility for poverty will be discussed later on by reference to the examples of David
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Miller and Thomas Pogge. Their positions focus on the history of colonisation (cp. Miller
2007) and the political and economic power of the industrialised countries, which “stack
the game in their favour” (Pogge 2010a, 34ff.). 
Singer's idea in this context seems to be that, as it is difficult to establish an overall
individual responsibility and as there is a high risk of moral defection, we should establish
a  culture  of  giving  as  insurance  against  damages  caused  by  global  injustices  or
compensation for bad luck (e.g. natural disasters such as earthquakes).
Unfortunately there are two major problems with Singers position which will take
up  some  part  of  this  thesis.  Singer  thinks  we  can  realise  the  utilitarian  principle  of
beneficence by establishing a culture of giving to distant strangers and by changing the
way society perceives far-away poverty. However, it has to be asked whether this does not
constitute  an  “overextension”  of  our  capabilities  for  solidarity  –  or  even  sympathy
(Innerarity 2011). Distance and indirectness might make it psychologically impossible for
our limited cognitive, moral, and intellectual capacities to follow through with the project
of donating our fair share. The capacity of human beings for altruism seems to be limited
(Andreoni 1990, Arrow 1972, Rutherford 2010, and Schroeder et al. 1995).  Moreover, in
public interest, global poverty is only a fringe phenomenon.  (Bølstad 2011, Olson 2000,
and Darnton and Kirk 2011). Finally, as Singer (2009, ch. 4) himself recognises, in the
context of donating effectively, we are confronted with a multitude of psychological biases.
This will be discussed in part 3 of this thesis.
Finally, the poor are no children. As argued above, from an ethical, epistemological,
and economical point of view, the individual is in the best position to take care of its own
interests Consequentially, the preferable – and presumably the only sustainable – way to
combat  poverty is   to  trust,  to  listen  and to  empower  the  poor.  But  how can this  be
accomplished? An important aspect of this  personal responsibility is  not harming other
people  and  taking  care  of  the  people  entrusted  to  one.  Due  to  their  position,  family
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members, spouse and children have a special claim on oneself, bringing with it special
responsibilities. Contrary to what Singer and MacAskill's position entails, one may not be
“forced” into a position of special responsibility. Choosing to live as a hermit, harming no-
one, with no obligations cannot be a morally despicable act. However, most of us would
not  choose  this  life,  as  we  would  not  choose  the  altruism-focused  life  that  moral
maximalists  demand.  We  choose  a  normal  life  and  the  ensuing  responsibilities,  this
includes family,  friends,  co-workers and subordinates. It  also,  to a much lesser degree,
includes fellow countrymen and finally the whole of humanity (cp.  Goodin 1988, Hurka
1997, and Lichtenberg 2014, ch.  7).  If  one has  the  ability to  help them, one certainly
should,  but  one's  main  motivation  should  be  to  avoid  causing  them  any  harm.  Are
donations as reparation an effective and efficient means here? Or does charity, distributed
through Western NGOs, widen the gap and extend the differences between rich and poor,
especially concerning power? This will be discussed in the fourth part of this thesis.
2.7. Our Duties Towards Others
The establishment of a duty to help distant strangers on the basis of a moral intuition is not
without its problems, as we have seen. Nevertheless, there are certain responsibilities to be
met. You certainly cannot save all of the poor, but this does not mean you should save
none. What you should (and could) do is to budget, to assess how much you should give
and can afford according to position,  ability,  and responsibility.  Singer (2009, 152 and
2011) proposes a similar – simplified – version of this when he – as already mentioned
above – calculates that one should donate between one and five per cent of one's income,
perhaps  more  if  one  is  part  of  mankind's  “one  percent”  super-rich.  This  however
contradicts  his  former  moral  maximalist  claim  and  seems  to  be  more  a  result  out  of
practicality  than  a  moral  argument.  It  is  important  that  one  donates  rationally  and
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efficiently, keeping the interests of the people concerned in mind. Humanitarian duties are
“by their nature indeterminate and require judgement in their application” (Culp 2014, 4).
They are not only about giving, as argued before, but they demand more of us, namely first
and foremost that we abstain from harming or exploiting others.
In  the  following  I  will  attempt  to show  that  there  are  some  good  additional
arguments that reinforce the duty to act against global poverty. I will begin with contractual
arguments. The representatives of most nations have signed the Charter of Human Rights,
which include the right of freedom from poverty and the right to decent living conditions
in accordance with human dignity. As the interactions of nations and people increase due to
globalisation, we would be obliged to interact only with states that respect human rights,
and support these states when it is needed. Additionally, the existence of and cooperation
with international institutions are coercive (Hassoun 2012, 45 and 49ff.). It seems self-
explaining (or even trivial) that we can only bargain and trade with people who are at least
theoretically able to consent (or dissent).
More  straightforward  is  Singer's  argumentation  targeted  at  libertarians.  When
establishing a duty or a responsibility to help, we encounter a difficult problem. Duties
seem only feasible in cases of direct causation. Strong duties are duties of avoiding harm to
others, for example the commandment Thou shalt not kill. in the Old Testament. Whenever
Western societies did or still do benefit from unjust, exploitative international structures,
this establishes a responsibility for compensation (Miller 2007). Advocates of development
aid, instead of focusing on moral maximalist positions, can therefore focus on harms done
to poor people, claiming that reparations and support are a matter of justice and not of
charity. 
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2.8. The Human Right of Freedom from Poverty
Article 22.
• Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with  the  organization  and resources  of  each  State,  of  the  economic,  social  and
cultural  rights  indispensable  for  his  dignity  and  the  free  development  of  his
personality. 
Article 23.
• (1)  Everyone has  the  right  to  work,  to  free  choice  of  employment,  to  just  and
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
• (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
• (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for  himself  and  his  family  an  existence  worthy  of  human  dignity,  and
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
• (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
We can appeal  to  arguments  from contractualism to further  reinforce  the  humanitarian
argument. Every nation state that has signed and ratified the  Human Rights Charter has
accepted the obligation to uphold and protect Human Rights. In articles 22 and 23 of the
Declaration of Human Rights  and in a separate treaty signed in 1966, the “International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (sometimes also called the “Social
58
Covenant”)32, are codified the right to social security, the right to work, and to receive a
fair remuneration for this work that allows every human being and his family a dignified
existence. Taken as a whole, we are invited to the interpretation that the treaties entail that
every human being should be able to live his or her life in dignity, and with at least the
basic necessities provided for (cp. Buchanan 1987 and 1996, and Nickel 2014). However,
this human right of freedom from poverty is denied to and does not exist for one sixth of
humanity,  making  it  the  human  right globally  most  frequently  violated  and  withheld
(Alston 2005, 786 and Pogge 2002 and 2007). 
Additionally,  as Hassoun (2012, 46ff.) points out,  contracts between nations are
only ethically justifiable if all parties affected are – at least theoretically – able to give
consent. This does not mean that they all do actually consent, as this would be unfeasible,
but it requires just democratic institutional structures on the national and the global level
with the basic requirement that all citizens have a minimal level of autonomy (ibid., 26ff.).
This entails a minimal level of welfare, so that basic reasoning and planning capacities
remain intact for every human being, respectively for every citizen (ibid., 28). Only if this
minimal level is secured, the individual has a realistic possibility to make plans, engage
politically, and access information to meaningfully partake in political life (cp. Nussbaum
2011). 
As trade  agreements,  national  debt, and economic and monetary reforms partly
depend on coercion through international institutions such as the United Nations, the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization, or the International Monetary Fund, this is especially
important. Interactions  between  states  or  actors  within  the  states  are,  among  others,
contracting debts, granting credit agreements on terms of trade, or providing humanitarian,
military, or development aid. These treaties of trade, financial exchange, and cooperation
32 As Nickel (2014) summarises “[t]he Social Covenant's list of rights includes non-discrimination and 
equality for women in economic and social life (Articles 2 and 3), freedom to work and opportunities to work
(Article 4), fair pay and decent conditions of work (Article 7), the right to form trade unions and to strike 
(Article 8), social security (Article 9), special protections for mothers and children (Article 10), the right to 
adequate food, clothing, and housing (Article 11), the right to basic health services (Article 12), the right to 
education (Article 13), and the right to participate in cultural life and scientific progress (Article 15).”
59
influence  the  personal  lives  of  citizens  sometimes  beneficially,  sometimes  negatively
(Hassoun 2012 and Pogge 2010a).  Accordingly,  any decisions  taken and enforced,  for
example through trade sanctions, by these organisations and actors are justified if and only
if all countries and international bodies concerned respect and uphold the Human Rights.
This interpretation is put forward by advocates of global discursive or procedural justice in
the  Habermasian  tradition,  referring  to  the  German  philosopher  and sociologist  in  the
tradition of critical theory and pragmatism Jürgen Habermas well known for his theory of
communicative rationality and fair discourse. Notable examples are Forst (2007), Hassoun
(2012),  and  Culp  (2014).  Discourse  in  this  context  means  the  finding  of  solutions  or
compromises exclusively by discussion, exchange of ideas and opinions, and consensus, in
absolute absence of force or violence. 
Due to this  interpretation  of  the  Declaration  of  Human Rights,  providing basic
necessities to the world's poorest people is no longer a matter of charity, but of justice. In a
world, in which there is enough for all to meet their basic needs, everybody should have a
claim to the basic necessities. This translates into a right of freedom from dire poverty
(Pogge 2002 and 2007, van Parijs 1995 and Hahn 2009, 46, 52ff., and 120f.). 
However, there are several problems related to the Human Rights approach. Many
capable and competent philosophers have attempted to provide a solid, culture-independent
foundation of Human Rights (Buchanan 1987 and 1996 and Nickel 2014).33 One promising
approach is the interpretation of Human Rights as a contract between all human beings, in
the form of a globally acceptable minimal compromise solution of how human beings are
to be treated and how they can live together peacefully (Appiah 2007 and Peña 2010).
33 Richard  Rorty's  pragmatic  approach  to  Human  Rights  brings  us  full  circle  to  the  principle  of
beneficence He argues that, as living a safe and dignified life is simply good for all humans, we should forgo
any foundationalism of Human Rights and instead “concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on
sentimental  education”  (Rorty  1994,  176).  This  means  expanding  the  circle  of  our  moral  concern  and
sympathy to include all of humanity. The similarities to Singer are apparent The problem here is that Rorty
relies on the previously presented principle of beneficence, only reinforcing it with the notion of Human
Rights as  a  contract  of solidarity between different peoples or  nations.  This vision of Human Rights as
humanitarian ideal and “valuable goals” is certainly convincing and has considerable moral force behind it.
However, the problem remains, especially in a situation of non-enforceability of an agreed norm, how we can
move from a morally desirable outcome to a moral duty.
60
Another justificatory attempt would be legal positivism combined with moral emergentism
(cp. Matravers 2007 and Nussbaum 2000c). This attempt states that Human Rights have
emerged as moral values in the course of the last century and have been agreed upon and
signed by the member countries of the United Nations. This, so defenders stipulate, gives it
the nature of a moral fact and shifts the burden of proof to the critics.
But especially social human rights have been the source of much controversy (cp.
Beetham  1995  and  Nickel  2014).  Social  rights  are  often  seen  as  mere statements  of
desirable goals and not as true rights, and thus not comparable to civil and political rights.
Nickel (2014) resumes the criticisms as follows:
1. they do not serve truly fundamental interests;
2. they are too burdensome on governments and taxpayers, and 
3. they are not feasible in less-developed countries.
An in-depth discussion of these issues would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Allow me
therefore just to sketch out a possible reply. 
The first argument seems not very convincing, as absolute poverty endangers lives
in a way that certainly seems “particularly moral urgent and basic” (Ashford 2007, 184ff.
and  189f.).  The  lives  of  the  poor  are  drastically  shortened,  and  malnutrition  leads  to
cognitive and physical stunting (Keneally 2011, 143ff., Trentmann and Weingärtner 2011,
42ff., and WHO 2014). Without a secure basic level of survival, it seems improbable that
any other fundamental interests could be safeguarded and maintained.
The second argument – of affordability – and the third argument – of feasibility –
are more difficult to refute, as indeed the implementation of a minimal welfare system
depends on the wealth and technical and institutional development of the nation concerned.
However, while there is of course an absolute minimal level of national wealth necessary
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to establish a welfare programme, surprisingly, most developing countries would have little
problems here.  Many emerging countries and even some developing countries,  such as
Brazil,  China, and Ethiopia, have been able to implement some kind of welfare system
(Melo 2007 and Mogues, Ayele, and Paulos 2008). Even comparatively small sums can
have a very significant positive impact on the quality of life of poor families, as will be
shown in part 4. Therefore the sums redistributed through welfare need not be particularly
large. On the other hand, developing countries are usually characterised by high inequality
and may actually be quite  rich in natural  resources,  the sale of which  could finance a
minimal security net if the profits were not diverted due to mismanagement and corruption
(Moss 2011). To conclude, the problem of establishing a functioning welfare programme is
less one of affordability but one of surmounting the current unjust political and economic
system.
This leads us to a final and very definite problem of Human Rights and especially
Social Human Rights: Who is responsible for their protection? A world government seems
neither feasible nor desirable (cp. Culp 2014, 42f, Kant 1970[1795], and Peña 2010). It is
not what people want and carries the potential of brutal infighting in a global civil war. As
centralisation of power increases, it could become easier for power groups to influence
law-making procedures to further their interests. This could lead to a situation far worse
than today's dominance of the United States of America. Finally, it could reduce interstate
competition  and  thus exit  options  for  citizens,  and  it  would  very likely suffer  from a
democratic deficit due to bureaucratisation, leading to less possibilities for normal citizens
to influence politics or economy, even carrying the danger of tyranny. But contrary to Kant,
who advocates for the important goal of fair and equal treatment of all global citizens,
there does not seem to be little probability that any extra-state authority could serve as
Hobbesian – referring to the English 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes – enforcer
of fairness, law, and order. But as long as there is no guarantor, the role of Human Rights in
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general and Social Human Rights in particular remains more one of an ideal than of a
claimable law. 
An inviting answer could be that the international community itself takes over this
role, with  United Nations peacekeeping forces or the NATO providing military support for
the moral  authority of Human Rights.  Paul  Collier  (2008, 161ff.)  thinks that  there the
Western nations have the responsibility to enforce protection from poverty through military
intervention.34 But  there  is  only  a  very  limited  chance  that  Western  nations  will  act
adequately, as there are diverging national interests, there is an unwillingness to risk their
own soldier's lives, and there are bad experiences, e.g. the lack of true improvements  in
countries such as Somalia, and to a lesser degree Afghanistan and Iraq (Clarke and Herbst
1996). Even if these obstacles could be overcome, the question remains whether military
interventions  can  be  justified  at  all  (Orend 2008 and Walzer  1977).  Consequently,  the
decisive question is no longer “Who is responsible?”, but “Who could be effective?” The
examples given raise doubts if this could be the West alone.
Advocates  of  Human  Rights  in  consequence  often  argue  for  a  “soft  power
approach”, preferring to use the state of these rights as a benchmark, an ideal that serves to
test the quality and justice of existing social institutions (Ashford 2007). These advocates
denounce their  violation and rely on the moral force of Human Rights to hold  leaders
accountable,  while  at  the  same  time  supporting  peaceful  opposition  and  reform
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 and Easterly 2007b, 115 and 323ff.). This should be done
by individual citizens, and more likely through political representation, using advocacy and
giving  financial  support  to  INGOs  such  as  Amnesty  International,  Transparency
International, or Oxfam, so that these can effectively help the poor to claim their rights. 
As a very first step it should be taken care that there is neither violation of Human
Rights, nor contribution to violation through unfair international treaties. In this context,
34 This is a more extreme version of John Rawls' argument in Law of Peoples (1999, 90ff.). Rawls 
argues for a military intervention in “outlaw states” in case of human rights violations, but he reserves this 
right for situations of extreme direct violations such as genocide.
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the  constitution  of  an  interactional  account  is  promising  (cp.  Pogge  2002  and  2007,
Ashford 2007, 185f, and Hassoun 2012). In a globalized economy, citizens of different
countries often interact indirectly,  sometimes unknowingly through exchanges of goods
and  to  a  lesser  degree  of  services.  Take  for  example  the  battery  and  microprocessor
(“chip”) of the laptop I am using to write these very words, which contain materials that
have  been  extracted  under  exploitative  labour  conditions  and  in  some  cases  outright
slavery in central Africa at high cost to the environment (Batstone 2010, Belser, de Cock,
and  Mehran  2005,  Berlan  2004,  and  Montague  2002).  The  components  are  then
manufactured and assembled in emerging countries, for example in China, again under
dubious  working  conditions  and  at  a  high  cost  for  the  environment.  They  are  then
transported and sold to relatively wealthy consumers in the global North by companies that
make use of lobbying, tax loopholes, complicated accounting procedures, and global tax
havens to contribute as little to societal welfare as possible (Bräutigam 2008 and Kar and
Leblanc 2013). 
As a consumer, I am indirectly involved in acts of exploitation and human rights
violations. I cannot claim ignorance, as the information on these violations is accessible
through  the  global  media;  and  while  I  certainly  did  not  wish  for  these  violations,  by
purchasing a certain product I  unwillingly contribute to them (Ferguson 2016). We are
globally interconnected by “causal chains that involve additive and multiplicative harms”,
as Ashford (2007, 194) outlines. This will be discussed more thoroughly and in depth in the
following  chapters.  International  justice  and  Human  Rights  are  only  guaranteed  if
negotiations between the different parties affected happen on equal terms (Culp 2014 and
Forst 2007). Unfortunately, the reality of globalisation is often that the poor, those with the
weakest political influence and bargaining power, are easily taken advantage of. A global
system of ethics therefore requires to strengthen and empower the poor so that they can
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make their voices heard. This entails that there is a move from passive receivers of charity
towards active claimants of justice. 
2.9. Additional Arguments for Libertarians
In this  chapter I will further strengthen the established responsibility of supporting the
needy by including the notion of reparation for caused harm (cp. Hassoun 2012, ch. 3 for a
more elaborate version of this project). In this context, special attention will be paid to the
libertarian position, as it is much more interesting than egoism, which can be revoked quite
easily (for a complete revocation see Feinberg 2012, Cullity 2004, 16ff. and 119ff., and
Lichtenberg 2014, 214ff.). Libertarianism is defined here as a strong form of individualism
with absolute, inviolable property rights that negates responsibility for other human beings
unless by choice or under contractual obligation (cp. Mulgan 2001, 11). This position has
some attraction, as individual responsibility can improve  the wealth of societies  through
markets, as demonstrated by Adam Smith in  The Wealth of Nations (1976 [1776]), and
besides, individual freedom as  a  moral value is a good starting point for argumentation
(Hayek 1945, Nozick 1974, Williams and Smart 1973, and Williams 1972, 1981 and 1985).
However, personal freedom and individual choice as moral  goods can enter into conflict
with  utilitarian  notions  of  aggregate  welfare  improvement,  as  White  (2008,  also  cp.
Nozick, 1974, 28ff.) writes: 
“Individuals are “inviolable”: they have rights, and these rights may not be violated
even for the sake of increasing aggregate welfare – indeed, even for the sake of
preventing the wider violation of rights.”
Libertarians may recognise the desirability of donating money, but they deny that there can
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be an obligation to donate, thus denying the principle of enforceability (Mulgan 2001, 12).
But how successful can it be to establish a duty without enforceability? Actions to change
the current global income distribution towards more equality and more fairness will be
even more problematic for a libertarian, as in his way of thinking or patterns of thought,
property and contract rights are highly valued. 
There are two ways to justify enforced positive duties in this context. The first one
is over negative duties: If an individual harms another  one, the harmed one  can demand
compensation. Second, libertarians rely on the principle of self-ownership, meaning that an
individual  exclusively  owns  himself,  his  knowledge,  and  the  fruits  of  his  labour.  But
people own more than that, they also own land, resources, and goods, which are finite.
According to Nozick (1974, 151 and 174ff.),  a libertarian therefore must  balance
his or her  account of justice in acquisition. This means that exclusive ownership of finite
resources, for example cultivable land, has to be justified against a fictional state of nature.
A strict interpretation of this principle results in what Nozick calls the Lockean proviso: 
“An acquisition is just if and only if it leaves other people no worse off  than they
would have been if the acquisition had not taken place.”
Mulgan (2001, 12)
As  this  is  difficult  to  implement  and  enact  in  practise,  this  idea opens  the  door  for
arguments against an exclusive right to property in the face of dire need and a lack of
international justice, resulting in the libertarian having to agree to use personal resources to
act on behalf of the world's poorest. Even Nozick (1974, 152f.) accordingly argues that we
should establish a minimal welfare programme to alleviate the worst of injustices. Now we
are  no  longer  talking  about  benevolence,  but  of  justice,  as  we have  left  the  realm of
positive duties. In a less strict interpretation this means that justified reparatory claims or
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claims for compensation  can arise out of previous and current injustices, such as theft,
exploitation, slavery, political or military pressure. 
In the following chapters of this thesis, many such injustices throughout history will
be used to illustrate how they have contributed to today's high imbalances in income and
living standards. It will be attempted to demonstrate that it is possible to speak of at least a
partial responsibility of the people in the developed world, as they have profited – and still
do – from power imbalances in the world – historical and present (Pogge 2010a, 34ff.).
People in developing countries deserve support because
 
• of the damages suffered during the period of imperialism and colonialisation, 
• of  the  damages  resulting  from  the  current  organisation  of  international  trade,
institutions, and contracts,
• of the damages resulting from environmental and climate degradation.
All  three arguments  rely on the principle  of  reparation,  according to  which  a  party is
deserving  of  restitution  if  another  one  has  caused  it  harm,  especially  if  the  latter has
profited from it  (cp. Cullity 2004, 65ff.).  The three arguments for partial responsibility
given above, in connection with the principle of sympathy, result in a very strong moral
basis for acting against global poverty. 
2.10. Colonialism and Imperialism and their Aftermaths
The historic event of  colonisation is often used as an argument for reparations (Glennie
2013, Miller  2007, and Riddell  2008, 136).  The  violent military intrusion of European
forces into foreign countries was accompanied by an exploitation of human beings and of
resources.  As  harms  done  in  the  past  echo  in  the  present,  this  results  in  a  current
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responsibility  for  poor  living-standards  in  former  colonies.  The  inheritance  of
colonialisation  has  had  a  strong  negative  influence  on  the economic  productivity  and
institutional quality of many of the countries concerned (van Reybrouck 2012, ch. 3). With
the  exception  of  the  very special  cases  of  the  United  States  of  America,  Canada,  and
Australia, even today, the economy of former colonies is significantly less successful, and
they  are  more  unequal  in  their  income  distribution  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson  2012,
Diamond 1999, and Landes 2010). 
The reasons  for  this  are  manifold.  The economic  system of  most  colonies  was
focused on providing primary resources for the benefit of colonial  powers,  such as the
mining of silver and gold in South America and the growing of cash crops such as cotton,
tea, natural rubber, sugar, tobacco, or coffee in India and the Caribbean (ibid.). This forged
an economic tradition and prevented investment in manufacturing and in technologically
advanced  and  intensive  branches of  production.  This  is  especially  problematic,  as  the
current system of global patent rights makes it difficult for newcomers to catch up (Chang
2002b and 2008). Most of these branches of production focused on low-wage and low-skill
work, formerly often performed by slaves. Consequences of this are e.g. underdeveloped
institutions, inherited inequality, and racial discrimination. Additionally, in many cases the
colonised population,  while being treated as second class citizens, had to pay direct or
indirect special taxes for the “homeland”, for example the infamous salt tax in India or – at
its worst – the forced British sale of opium in China (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 118f).
After giving up their colonies, the former colonial power often left behind a politically
precarious state with a difficult heritage of ethnic tensions arising out of the colonizers
arbitrary  state  creation,  and  high  inequality  (Fearon  and  Laitin  2013,  Landes  2010,
Marshall  2015,  and  Michalopoulos  and  Papaioannou  2011).  This  contributed  to  an
unfortunate tradition of  political instability and even  dictatorships.  Finally, many former
colonies still suffered from meddling even long after their formal independence, as former
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and new colonial powers made their influence felt to secure their access to resources or a
strategic advantage (Baaz 2005, David 1986, and Kohn 2014).35
But the period of colonisation ended more than half  a century ago. Since then,
many former colonies had time and possibility to shape themselves into prosperous nations
and  some,  such  as  China  or  India  (and  some parts  of  Latin  America),  have  done  so,
although they still suffer from high economic and institutional inequality (cp. Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012).36 It may be oversimplifying to say that as China and India (and some
parts of Latin America) are doing more or less well, colonialism can be considered only
one factor (among others) of the current situation in many former colonies. It certainly is
the most influential one. A decisive factor certainly is how, and how recently, colonisation
took place. 
But claiming that colonisation is responsible for all  the former colonies'  current
problems is the analogue to explaining a criminal's career alone by his bad childhood. This
has  explanatory  value,  but  reducing  the  problem  to  this  one  single  fact  is  an
oversimplification and fails to give the individual adequate responsibility. It implies that
the people in the country concerned are similar to children who squabble and neglect their
work when the parents are away. An analogy to children was exactly the argument that
defendants of colonisation used to put forward (cp. Baaz 2005). It can be estimated that
reducing the poverty problem to colonisation is in itself a certain form of colonisation.
What I am trying to put forward is the moderate position that their colonial history,
35 Especially  during  the  cold  war,  there  was  a  continuous monetary  and  military  support  of
dictatorships by both sides, often disguised as foreign aid. This was a huge impediment for the development
of democratic institutions in developing countries (David 1986). The USA primarily made their influence felt
in Asia, South, and Middle America, while the former colonial powers France, Great Britain, and Belgium
tried to maintain their influence over their former colonies. Western-backed coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala
(1954),  Congo (1961),  Brazil  (1964),  Indonesia (1965),  Chile (1973),  and Burkina Faso (1987) deposed
democratically elected leaders with pro-poor platforms to install dictators (Hickel 2014). The Soviet Union
occupied the reluctant  Eastern Europeans to keep them on the right side of  the iron curtain.  Both sides
financed and supported military groups in foreign countries with weapons, intelligence, and often direct
intervention. The Soviet Union most notably in Egypt (1952), Cuba (1959), Iraq (1958), Peru (1968), Syria
(1966), Somalia (1969), Libya (1969), Sudan (1969), Ethiopia (1974 and 1977), and Afghanistan (1978).
36 Although it could be argued that these countries have done better because colonialisation did only 
little damage to them. For example China was already a unified country with a rich bureaucratic and cultural 
heritage, and Indian native rulers cooperated with the British Empire, thus ensuring relative stability.
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combined with current unfair structures of international institutions and trade, has lead to
an  extremely  unequal  worldwide  distribution  of  resources,  which  severely  impedes
developing nations from reaching their full economic potential, and that this results in a
special  responsibility of  former colonizers,  nations such as Britain,  France,  or  Spain,37
towards their former colonies, in which both parties have to come to an agreement of what
constitutes  just  recompense.  The  degree  of  recompense  is  debatable.  As  the  damages
happened  in  the  past,  the  question  is  not  easily  solved,  to  what  degree  the  present
population of a former colonial power is responsible for past wrong-doings (cp. Miller
2007). Going into this in detail for every developing country would result in a doctoral
thesis of its own. 
The views on the legitimacy of colonialism has changed dramatically in the course
of the last century. While it was seen as legitimate and necessary roughly until the end of
the  Second  World  War,  public  and  academic  views  on  colonialism  now  are
overwhelmingly negative (Kohn 2014). The Western public and academia generally see
colonialism  as  irreconcilable  with  civil  rights,  democratic  institutions, and  self-
determination.  Political  (and  economical)  power  at  first  sight  agrees  and  follows  the
rhetoric of civil rights and democracy. 
The historical period of colonisation is hardly something Europe can look back on
with pride. The accompanying rhetoric of benevolence did not make the violent intrusion
of European forces into foreign countries acceptable. On the contrary, this rhetoric was
cynical. It was at its most cynical at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference, where was claimed to
act against slavery and for the “betterment of the Negro condition” in the Congo.38 The
37 This is also true for Germany, which has a special responsibility towards the countries it invaded 
during World War II, and towards Israel. Germany has paid over 80 million Euros in reparations to Israel. In 
total, Germany has paid over 65 billion Euros in reparation to countries and individuals that suffered under 
the “Third Reich” (Miller 2007, 112). 
38 The Berlin Conference: The General Act of Feb. 26, 1885 chapter II article IX. “[…] the Powers 
which do or shall exercise sovereign rights or influence in the territories forming the basin of the Congo 
declare that these territories may not serve as a market or means of transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever 
race they may be. Each of the Powers binds itself to employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to 
this trade and for punishing those who engage in it.” As Pogge (2010) points out, this use of pro-poor rhetoric
to hide personal or political profit is still very much in use today. We will find evidence of this further on 
when discussing exploitation and the reasons behind foreign aid.
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truth, however, was a division of central Africa into spheres of interest for the colonial
powers  and  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  native  population  as  cheap  labourers,
especially to obtain caoutchouc to privately enrich Belgium's king Leopold II. A multitude
of  atrocities were committed in the Belgian Congo, killings and mutilations lead to the
death of an estimated 10 million people (van Reybrouck 2012, 77ff.). Another such sad
example is Imperial Germany's South-West Africa war in which 65.000 Herero and 10.000
Nama were killed or starved to death in concentration camps (Erichsen and Olusoga 2011,
229f.).
The  denial  of  rights,  exploitation,  slavery,  and  massacres,  were  unfortunately
commonplace during colonialisation. Landes (2010, 187ff.) estimates that 90 percent of the
Mexican Native population was wiped out by the brutal Spanish conquerors and the even
more deadly illnesses they brought with them (cp. Diamond 1999, chp. 3). A similar fate
awaited the North American and Australian native populations. “Homeland first”-policies
meant that often colonies, although suffering famines themselves, had to export large parts
of  their  agricultural  produce  to  their  colonizing  countries  (De  Waal  2011,  27ff.  and
Keneally 2011).  This treatment of the colonised population was facilitated by perceiving
them not  only as culturally and technologically backwards,  but  as somewhat  less  than
human. The issue of racism is intimately related to the history of colonialism. Especially
the  persistence  of  racist  and  social  Darwinist  attitudes  plays  an  important  part  in  the
justification of current global inequality and as rationalisation of inaction in the face of
suffering of human beings from poverty.
The Oxford Dictionary of English (2010, 1461) defines racism as the “belief that all
members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race,
especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races.”  Racism
has shaped the previous centuries. It served as pseudo-scientific foundation for political
decisions and as rationalisation for wars and genocides (Allison 2009, 448ff. and Michael
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2012). Racism caused terrible suffering in human history.  The belief in racial superiority
has  facilitated  the  military  dominance  of  some  countries,  serving  their  strategic  and
economic interests.  If  the native population is  regarded as somewhat less human, their
suffering does not count as much.
Racism played  an  integral  role  in  the  conquest  and subsequent  colonisation  of
Middle and South America by Spain and Portugal. It was used to justify the slave trade that
supplied North America and the Caribbean Islands with cheap labour.39 Finally, in the 20th
century,  pseudo-scientific  racial  theories  lead  to  laws  such  as  the  Nürnberger
Rassengesetze  and  the  subsequent  racially  motivated  Holocaust.  Since  then,  positive
developments such as the civil rights movement in America or the abolition of apartheid in
South Africa give hope that social progress will  overcome institutional racism some day.
Yet racism continues to be an impediment for development and peace within and between
nations.
Another fundamental error of scientific racism consists in the misconception that
evolution favours strength and competition, while it actually favours adaption and in-group
cooperation (Bauer 2008). With cooperation being a forte of the human “social animal”,
who  takes  long  to  develop  as  a  child, but  is  capable  of  long-term  learning  and
communication. 
In  conclusion, countries  who  suffered  from  historic  injustices  –  caused  by
colonialism based on and justified by racism – are entitled to reparations. The extent will
be difficult to ascertain, as we do not have the counterfactual situation of how the countries
would  have  developed  without  outside  intervention.  This  entitlement  is  more  of  a
collective than  an individual nature. However, as long as official reparations are lacking,
39 It is often overlooked by Western scholars that Europeans do not have the exclusive privilege of 
being racist. There are the Arab countries with their long history of slavery. There are racially motivated 
ethnic conflicts, e.g. the sad example of the Tutsi genocide committed by the Hutu majority in 1994 Rwanda. 
Similarly, white visitors to central Africa will be called mzungu (“white”) and be confronted with 
preconceived stereotypes (Baaz 2005). 
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private  initiative  to  repair  these  injustices  seems  an  adequate  first  step  into  the  right
direction (Glennie 2013 and Miller 2007). 
2.11. Exploitation and Harm
Exploitation  can  occur  in  different  circumstances  and on different  levels.  One feature,
however, is common in all cases of exploitation: The unequal distribution of (bargaining)
power and  consequently the dependency of the weaker party on the stronger one. The
outcome of any negotiated contract will therefore be more profitable for the stronger party,
while  the  weaker  one gains  much  less, or  may  even  lose  in  the  long-term.  As  was
attempted to illustrate in the chapter on colonialism, in former centuries exploitation used
to be facilitated through military power and pressure. Today's exploitative structures are
more  a  feature  of  economic  inequality.  Critics  of  the  international  institutional  order,
among  them  Erik  Reinert  (2008),  Ha-Joon  Chang  (2008  and  2012),  Nicole  Hassoun
(2012), and Thomas Pogge (2007, 2010a and 2011), argue that developing countries are
forced to adopt neo-liberal policies and open their markets for Western firms and products
through  the intervention of global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or the World Bank, e.g. by means of aid
conditionalities  (World  Bank  2005).  This  severely  limits  the  decision  autonomy  of
developing  countries  concerned  and  negatively  influences  the  lives  of  the  poor,  for
example in the following ways (cp. Pogge 2002, 214 and 2010b, 534 and Riddell 2008,
136ff.):
• They impede the creation of manufacturing industries in developing countries. Poor
nations have an insufficiently developed economy, often focused on the production
of primary goods.  Budding infant  industries in  these countries have to  compete
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with the already fully developed, established, and often well-subsidised Western
industry.  While  in  theory,  mostly due  to  competitive  labour  prices,  the  country
could  establish  a  functioning  clothing  or  manufacturing  industry,  in  reality
individual  entrepreneurs  have  enormous  difficulties  raising  funds,  develop,  and
then compete  in  face  of  a  strong competition profiting from effects  of  scale,  a
global distribution network, political influence, and large cash reserves.  In some
cases,  unwanted  products  are disposed  of  in  developing  countries  take  the
camouflage of  trade  goods  or  even  donations.  As  European  poultry consumers
become more discriminate in their taste and only consume the breast and legs of the
animal, the heavily subsidised producers freeze and transport their surplus to Africa
(Buntzel and Marí 2007). As  local producers cannot compete with the dumping
prices for these chicken leftovers, local jobs and markets are destroyed. A method
to  overcome this  problem would  be  government  grants  and industry protection
measures such as tariffs (Chang 2005, 2002b and 2008). However, the dominance
of  rich  countries  and  neo-liberal  guidelines  in  the  IMF  and  WTO,  as  well  as
conditions  attached  to  foreign  aid  make  such  an  approach  very  costly  for  a
developing country, which would face trade sanctions and fines. 
• The  IMF,  WTO,  and  World  Bank  have  counselled  and  often  even  forced  the
privatization  of  government  services  and  companies  in  developing  countries,
following the neo-liberal ideological creed that private markets are more effective
than  government  interventions  in  every  single  case  (Klein  2007,  49ff.).
Unfortunately, this has been both a theoretical mistake as well as an implementation
failure  (Chang  2002a,  2008  and  Müllerson  2008,  2f.  and  24f.).  Obtaining  a
company – or a mandate – in emerging and developing countries has more often
than not been enabled by bribery and good connections to local political leaders
and not on a basis of competence and a fair call for tenders. As many of these
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companies  were  monopolies,  they  could  reserve either  the  exclusive  rights  to
exploit a natural resource or be the unique provider of a service or an essential
good, such as the distribution of drinking water or energy. The result has often been
a loss of government income, while citizens are faced with a reduction in quality of
services and rising prices, often accompanied by social  spending cuts and wage
deregulations,  in this process enriching few at the expense of many, (Klein 2007
and Munk 2013, 9ff.). 
• Western multinational companies have often profited from unfair deals, either with
non-representative  governments,  such  as  dictatorships  who  rule  by  force  and
suppress at least part of their population, or through corruption. Pogge (2002, 265
and  2010a 18ff.  and 47ff.)  refers  to  this  as  the  resource  privilege.  Due  to  the
purchasability of political influence in some countries, Western companies could
secure valuable resources and commodities for themselves (Pogge 2002, 19 and
176), among them fuel and other natural resources, and mines.  Local leaders can
quite easily abstract money from their  very country itself  by taking up national
debts which  are  then  transferred  into  private  accounts  (Pogge 2010a,  18ff.  and
49ff.),  while  developing  countries lose  $600  billion  each  year  in  debt  service
mostly to first world banks (Hickel 2014).40 This paradox of natural resource rich
countries, suffering from lack of development, inequality and a democratic deficit
is referred to as “resource curse” or “Dutch disease” (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011,
Gylfason 2001, and  Wenar  2008 and 2011a).  Recently,  arable  land has  become
increasingly valuable and lead to the phenomenon of land-grabbing. In this context,
countries that are often unable to effectively feed their population lend arable land,
although it is often already in use by subsistence farmers, to foreign agro-industrial
ventures (Borras et al. 2011). Consequently, national resources that should benefit
the whole population are privatised.
40 For the purpose of this thesis I will be referring to the number 1.000.000.000 as “billion” using the 
modern British and American English denomination.
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• This form of privatisation is further encouraged by the possibility of illicit financial
flows to tax havens (Bräutigam 2008, Sharples, Jones, and Martin 2014, and Kar
and LeBlanc 2013). Kar and Brian LeBlanc (2013, ix) estimate that nominal illicit
outflows from developing countries amounted to $832.4 in 2010 and $946.7 billion
in 2011, an increase by 13.7 percent. While  some individuals just want to escape
monetary and political instability, the larger part of this enormous sum of money is
a result of tax evasion, fraud, corruption,  and other illegal activities. This money
would be needed to finance the budgets of developing countries and contribute to
their  economic growth. As Western countries often welcome these capital  flows
themselves  and  permit  the  persistence  of  tax  havens  such  as  Luxembourg,
Switzerland, or the Cayman Islands, they share the responsibility for this effective
money laundering.
• While the above exploitation is worse enough on its own right, this multinational
system of bribery, combined with the lack of accountability of national leaders in
weak  democracies,  reinforces  clientelism,  corrupt  structures,  and  may facilitate
conflicts  and military coups (Bates  2008,  Gibson 2005, and  North et  al.  2013).
Developing  societies  typically  have  a  weak  economic  performance  and  are
characterised by high unemployment. Due to a lack of alternatives, there is a high
economic  incentive  in  these  countries  to  gain  political  or  military  power,  thus
securing resources which guarantee a high income for oneself and one's entourage.
In the worst case, foreign aid can become such a coveted resource (Anderson 1999,
Gibson 2005, and Polman 2008, 107ff.).
• The WTO's international rule of patent rights and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are sometimes criticised for being
unfair  to  developing nations,  especially  in  the  fields of  information  technology
(Darch 2004) and medicine (Hassoun 2012, 171f. and Pogge et al. 2014). Critics
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claim that the patent holders, usually wealthy Western companies, have extended
their patent rights and raised their prices far beyond of what the developing nations
can  afford. In some cases they are even said to  profit  from diseases while not
providing  adequate  care.  This  problem  is  further  exacerbated by  the  need  of
developing  countries  to  acquire  foreign  currency  to  finance  the  purchase  of
machinery, medicine, new technology, and in case of a famine, the food needed, as
these are produced in the West and in emerging countries. To acquire this currency,
the  only way for  a  developing country with  an  unstable  currency is  to  sell  its
natural resources, to try to compete with the subsidised agro-industry in the West,
or to get into debt (Chang 2002b and 2005 and Moyo 2009, 115ff.).41
• Environmental destruction and depletion of natural resources are frequent problems
that confront developing countries (Pogge 2005, 48ff.). As will be illustrated in the
following chapter, the proceedings from exploitation usually go towards the richer
countries, while the developing countries are left with the environmental backlash.
• Moreover, there  is  the  direct  exploitation  of  individual  labourers  in  developing
countries,  be it  in  so-called  “sweat-shops”,  in  mines, or  on plantations  (Adams
2002,  Andrees  and Belser   2010,  Batstone  2010,  Belser,  de Cock,  and Mehran
2005,  and  Wertheimer  and  Zwolinski  2013).  These  labourers  work  more  than
twelve  hours  a  day for  wages  that  do  not  allow a  minimal  standard  of  living
(McMullen et al. 2014).  In consequence,  they often go hungry, and their children
have only limited access to education, as they, too, need to earn money to support
their families. Sometimes these activities support rebel groups or organised crime,
such as in the case of blood diamonds (Baker 2015). Other examples are human
trafficking  and  sex  tourism  (Carter  and  Clift  2000  and  Kempadoo  1999).  As
41 Subsidies paid for agriculture in OECD countries amounted to $311 billion in 2001, or about $850 
million per day (Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003). This practise is a wastage of public resources and 
contributes in no small manner to the sinking global prices for “cash crops”. Even while benefiting from 
lower wages and perhaps better suited climate, it is difficult for developing countries to compete with this 
violation of liberalism by its most avid proponents.
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consumers and corporations make use of the products, partake and profit in this
exploitation, they are partly responsible for it.42
• There are also indirect ways in which the richer countries harm the poor, due to the
high inequality of income distribution and the globalisation of food markets. The
average household in developed countries spends only a fraction of its income on
food, for example in Germany and Spain between 14 and 15 per cent (INE 2011, 22
and Statistisches Bundesamt 2014, 171), but poor people in the developing world
have to dedicate a large part of their – already quite low – income to victuals. As a
consequence of this, middle and upper class Westerners give little weight to food,
and price fluctuations are barely registered. Well-off people can also afford high
amounts of wastage, which increases food prices, as more is bought than needed.
For example in Germany, almost 11 million tons of food are thrown away each year
(Kranert et al. 2012). Additionally, Western – and increasingly emerging – countries
have  high  levels  of  meat  consumption,  meaning  that  much  agricultural  land is
dedicated to the growing of forage crops, thus again putting pressure on food prices
(World Bank 2013, 93). In 2007, due to droughts in several grain-exporting nations
and due to high oil prices, food prices nearly doubled, and they reached a peak in
2008. The situation was exacerbated by speculation and the increased use of biofuel
in developed countries (Runge and Senauer 2007 and World Bank 2013, x and 93).
Many  poor  people  were  therefore  unable  to  afford  enough  food.  In  theory,
developing countries with an agriculture-based economy should benefit from high
food prices. In reality – as urbanization increases and small farmholds are more and
more disenfranchised in favour of big agribusiness – it is not be the poor that profit.
The situation is rather that food is exported to wealthy consumers in the West, even
though there is shortage in the country of origin (Drèze and Sen 1991, De Waal
42 It should however be noted that, as for example Baker (2015, 32f) and MacAskill (2015a, ch. 8) 
argue, the case of “sweat-shop” labour is much less difficult to evaluate than the one of outright slavery. In 
many cases even the punishing and from our perspective badly paid jobs are preferable to the alternative of 
unemployment and subsistence farming.
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2011, and Keneally 2011, 61ff.).
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO)43, there are at least 12.3 million
people in forced labour worldwide (Andrees and Belser 2010 and  Belser, de Cock, and
Mehran 2005, 1). These cases are clear occurrences of exploitation. People are held captive
against their will, forced to work, to prostitute themselves, or to become conscripts who are
threatened with violence (Carter and Clift 2000 and Kempadoo 1999). Often, the exploited
persons are migrants with little rights or security in their host country (Cingano 2014).
Partaking in  this  in  any way,  for  example by buying products  of forced labour,  or by
practising sex tourism, is of course morally wrong. 
But apart from these clear-cut cases, it is notoriously difficult to define exploitation
(cp. Steiner 1984 and 2013 and Wertheimer and Zwolinski 2013).  Defendants of “sweat-
shop” labour (MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8, Maitland 1997, and Moyo 2009, ch. 8) often argue
that  while  the  working  conditions  and  salaries  are  deplorable,  “sweat-shop”  labour  is
necessary as it attracts foreign investment and leads to economic growth. Hopefully, once
the growth is there, working conditions will improve. Another argument is that the workers
are paid according to their productivity. This idea of the priority of economic growth and
the possibilities of development through trade will be discussed further on, but its record of
actually achieving success is doubtful, as it  goes along with a limited understanding of
development (Sen 2001), an overestimation of the trickle down effect (Stiglitz 2012),44 and
a certain economic naivety towards the possible negative effects of trade (Tonelson 2002).
But this discussion illustrates the difficulties of defining exploitation. In some cases,  the
poor  may  profit  from  “sweat-shop”  labour, if  increased  national  wealth  and  income
opportunities transform into improved opportunities for the next generation. So how to
define exploitation exactly, when there are no clear delimitations?
43 Cp. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang-en/index.htm.
44 The trickle down-effect refers to the claim that created wealth, even if it primarily benefits the a 
societies most wealthy, will eventually trickle down to the lower classes through upper class consumption. 
For criticism see Lansley 2011, Stiglitz 2012, and Piketty 2014.
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In  the  words  of  Wertheimer  and  Zwolinski  (2013),  exploitation  is  a  form  of
injustice where person “A exploits  B when A takes unfair advantage of  B” (cp. Feinberg
1988,  178).  In  a  Kantian  formulation,  Buchanan  (1985,  87  emphasis  in  the  original)
defines exploitation like this:
[T]o exploit a person involves the harmful, merely instrumental utilization of him
or his capacities, for one's own advantage or for the sake of one's own ends.
Although this definition in principle is convincing, it is very difficult to use it to identify
occurrences of exploitation, therefore an additional or enlarged definition is necessary. 
In the classical  Marxist view, the working class is always exploited. The logic is
straightforward: The capitalist owner of an enterprise will only employ a worker if he can
make a profit from him.45 This logically entails that the worker will have to produce more
wealth for the firm than he takes home as wages (cp. Holmstrom 1997, 357ff., Heyden
1983, 176, and Marx 1867, I, 16). According to this definition, almost any work that is not
self-employed is exploitative. 
However, this way of looking at things is not very helpful and  probably ignores
some  realities  of  modern  economics.  There  is  the  widely held  view that  entrepreneur
“capitalists” shoulder the financial risks of an enterprise, for which they arguably deserve a
bigger share of the surplus, and it is often their creativity that drives the enterprise.46 The
definition also  ignores  the possibility of  unionisation  and political  support  of  workers,
which leads  to  increasing wages  and better  working conditions.  Nor  does  it  apply for
workers with scarce valuable skills, for which firms will have to compete. The relationship
between  employer  and  employee  is  probably  better  characterised  as  mutually
45 “Ausbeutung ist allgemein durch die Tatsache gegeben, daß sich die Eigentümer der 
Produktionsmittel unentgeltlich fremde Arbeit […] aneignen.” Heyden 1983, 176. Translation by the author: 
“Exploitation is generally given by the fact that the owners of production means gratuitously acquire the 
work of somebody else.”
46 The late Steve Jobs who invented the iphone and the ipad for Apple may be seen as an example for 
this.
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advantageous exploitation (Wertheimer and Zwolinski 2013), when they both profit from
their contract. 
Liberalism has apparently no use for the concept of exploitation at all, as it relies on
the individual  freedom to  enter  contracts.  This  could be taken to  mean that  unless  an
individual is physically forced into a labour contract, exploitation is not possible,  and as
Maitland (1997) argues, the work offered by the aforementioned “sweat-shops” is gladly
accepted and highly competed for by citizens of developing countries (cp. Adams 2002).
Even Marxist theorist David Harvey (2003, 164) admits that it is “complicated” and that
“[f]aced  with  the  choice  of  sticking  with  industrial  labour  or  returning  to  rural
impoverishment, many within the new proletariat seem to express a strong preference for
the former.”  Taking the economic principle of revealed preference into account,  which
states that your taking a job means that you actually prefer it to the alternatives, liberal
theorists tend to neglect or disregard the topic of exploitation (cp. Steiner 1984). 
Yet, as for example McMullen et al. 2014 point out, there remains some discomfort
about the gap between workers' wages and the overall profits  of many companies. When
wages amount to only less than one per cent of the price of a T-shirt (McMullen et al. 2014,
13), with larger sums going into marketing, transport, and profit, it is clear that something
is not right.
How can a definition of exploitation take this into account? The crux for a liberal
theory of exploitation lies in the notion of the alternative, as for example Meyers (2004,
324ff.)  illustrates  quite  drastically.47 In  many  emerging  and  developing  countries, the
alternative to taking up an underpaid, insecure, and often hazardous job is simply to die of
hunger. Many people have to accept even indecent wages as long as it keeps them from
starving.  When workers receive only so little money that they can scarcely maintain the
lives of themselves and their families, this is very close to slavery.
47 In Meyers' thought experiment, Carol is lost in a desert. Jason comes by on his jeep and offers to 
save her if she agrees to have anal intercourse with him. She consents and is rescued. Meyers argues that this 
case shows that – while no coercion occurred and Jason has only added to Carol's set of options – Jason still 
acts immorally, as he exploits Carol's dire situation.
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With their lack of alternatives, the poor are the very weakest link in a global chains
of decreasing bargaining power. This can be illustrated with an  example of the clothing
industry, referring to calculations made by the “Clean Clothes Campaign” (McMullen et al.
2014, 13). The customer in Western or emerging countries is in a comfortable situation, as
many retailers compete  for his purchase. They do so by reducing the price, increasing the
quality, and  using  marketing  strategies to  catch  and  maintain  a  potential  customers'
attention. The customer will usually tend to choose the cheapest product and will have to
be convinced – e.g. by expensive advertisements – to do otherwise. A large part of the price
the final  customer pays  for  a product  is  claimed by the retailer,  who in a  situation of
competition can simply decline to sell certain branded (or labelled) articles in his stores, be
they online or offline, if the brand name (or label) company claims too high a price for its
products. The company, for example “Nike”, does usually not contract the labourers itself.
Rather this task is sub-contracted, often again over several steps, to local entrepreneurs in
countries with low labour costs. Brand name (or label) companies claim on average twelve
per cent of the final selling price for themselves. The competition among “sweat-shop”
producers allows the brand name (or label) company's intermediaries or sub-contractors to
negotiate for the lowest price. Additionally, parts of the price go towards transportation
and, in case of fashionable brands or labels, a majority of the price goes into marketing and
advertisement of the brand name (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012, 206ff). 
The labourers in Bangladesh or elsewhere have to contend with pittances,  which
make up for the smallest part of the final price of a product. because they are at the very
end of a non-ransparent chain of bargainers with ever decreasing bargaining powers. As
Glennie (2009) convincingly points out, the one thing emerging and developing countries
have in abundance is manual labour.48 Labour protection laws, in case they exist, can easily
be avoided, e.g. by bribery. An often used tool of exploitation is the artificial restriction of
bargaining  power  by  denying  labour  rights,  especially  unionisation  and  freedom  of
48 What they lack is financial capital, good infrastructure, institutions, and human capital (cp. Guisan 
and Exposito 2008).
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movement, to individuals (Steiner 1984 and 2013).49 This  leads to a crucial  problem of
poverty: The lack of power – be it political or economical – and consequently the lack of
influence on decisions made (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Baaz 2005, Culp 2014,
and Meyers 2004). Exploitation is therefore taking advantage of an individual who, due to
a lack of feasible alternatives and subsequently bargaining power, is forced to agree to
someone else's demands. In this way, it is close to blackmailing.
From the individual account of exploitation, a communal account can be developed.
If  the livelihood of people is negatively affected,  if  their interests  are not recognized and
accepted and there is no just compensation, we can say that they are exploited. While the
contracts  between  exploitative  elites  and  firms  on  the  one  side  and  poor  (and  maybe
unskilled) workers on the other side may actually be legal,  nevertheless they are often
unethical, as they take something away without adequate compensation, to which the local
population has  a  right  (Pogge 2002,  2010 and 2011).50 In a  similar  way, global  trade,
patents, and policy negotiations influence the everyday lives of people, but as democracy is
lacking both in their own country and  in the global institutions,  this happens without an
ethical basis (Culp 2014, 133ff., Hassoun 2012, 92ff., and Pogge 2010a, 10ff.). So far, the
richest high-income countries which constitute the Group of Seven (G 7) control more than
60 percent of the voting power at the World Bank, but are home to less than 15 percent of
the world's population (Hickel 2014). Similar problems arise in connection with the WTO
and the IMF (Pogge 2010a, 22f. , 40f. and 50ff. and Stiglitz 2002). 
Globalisation essentially means a world where goods and capital can move freely.
However, labour, for psychological – but mostly for legal reasons – may not do so (Stiglitz
2012).  Employment opportunities  are  limited in  a  way that  capital  and goods are  not,
49 Steiner proposes the denying of options on the an individual's decision matrix as a liberal definition 
of exploitation. This allows for an approximate calculation of the cost of exploitation and underlines the 
international problem of restricted freedom of labour (cp. Stiglitz 2012). It does, however, not capture the 
uneasiness we feel at the disproportionateness of labour wages, product prices, and company profits, neither 
does it take into account Meyers' (2004, 324f.) thought experiment on mutually beneficial, but immoral 
exploitation.
50 I base my argument on the collective national ownership of national resources and rights of the land 
after living there for generations.
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which contributes to  a  global devaluation of labour and an inequality of wealth (Rajan
2011). While quite fiercely rejecting immigrants, several nations actually welcome illegal
capital  from  corrupt  politicians  as  well  as  from  tax-evading  multinationals  (Kar  and
Leblanc  2013).  This  means  that  the  new  possibilities  of  globalisation  are  distributed
unevenly, leading to a global system by the rich and for the rich. 
Thomas  Pogge's  Rawlsian  notion of  collective  exploitation  is  worth  mentioning
here. Pogge (2010b, 528f) argues that today's poverty could be abolished, were it not for
the enormous inequality of wealth. Indeed the wealth is very unequally distributed: 60 per
cent  of the world's  population hold less than two per cent  of global  wealth,  while  the
richest one per cent hold 40 per cent (Hardoon 2016, Piketty 2014, and World Bank 2016).
This inequality can be partly explained by morally neutral occurrences such as economic
growth, globalisation, and technological change, by which new wealth is  created. People
with  rare  talents,  innovative  ideas, and  high  endowment  of  capital  do  profit
disproportionately (Rajan 2011). Moral claims are limited to the humanitarian principle.
But part of this wealth is created by regulatory capture, meaning that interest groups use
political influence to ensure that they profit disproportionately, or that such groups even
take away wealth and earning opportunities from others, for example by curtailing labour
standards or facilitating tax breaks for the super-rich (Pogge 2010b, 536f). Pogge's bleak
vision is one of self–aggravating regulatory capture: As the rich get richer, it  becomes
easier and easier to purchase political and medial influence, thus ensuring that large parts
of  nationally  and  internationally created  wealth  lands  in  their  pockets.  While we  as
consumers  profit  somewhat from products  which  are cheap  due  to  exploitation,  main
profiteers are the owners of the multinational companies. 
Pogge (2002, 176) maintains that if an institutional order that improves the position
of the poor  is possible, we are harming them by not bringing this improved order about.
This seems to be  too high a claim on us, actually going into the direction of the extreme
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demand, as well as  it is difficult to achieve practically (Culp 2014, Hassoun 2012, and
Risse 2005).  However,  this does not mean that we should not engage for a more just
institutional order. It could be well in our self-interest that no one is influenced negatively
without compensation. Arguably the best situation we can hope to bring about is one  in
which  both the poor, as well as we (middle-class) citizens of the privileged nations, can
engage in a meaningful dialogue on what international justice means. To enter on this path,
it is clearly necessary to  strengthen the position of the poorest through empowerment, as
well as to improve institutional quality and justice, both at home as in the international
sphere (Culp 2014, 153ff.).
What does this mean for us as individuals?  We may believe that this is not our
responsibility.  Indeed, this  type of argument is often advanced by Western corporations
who  reject  the  responsibility  for the  working  conditions  their  sub-contractors  are
accountable for (Brown,  Deardorff, and Stern 2004 and Segal, Sobczak, and Triomphe
2003). I do agree with this position in so far as it is not only the responsibility of the West –
be it as consumer or as a company – to ensure safe working conditions, adequate pay, and
standards of  environmental protection.  With regard to the argument  about position and
ability, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the local government to protect its citizens
from  gross  exploitation  and  insecurity, and  local employers  should  have  the  minimal
decency to put  their employee's or worker's lives before their profits. But as long as the
situation persists in its current imperfect form, we still share the responsibility, especially if
we profit from it with cheap goods. In the the age of Internet and global media, we cannot
claim ignorance of these facts. Singer is probably right when maintaining that we are partly
able to reach improvements via donations, but political action is at least as important.
All these arguments may read as a severe critique of globalisation, as the emphasis
is on the negative side of this world-spanning process. However, there is also a positive
side, as globalisation has led to rapid economic growth in some countries, notably China
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and South Korea, thus improving the lives of millions of people (Chang 2010, 25ff. and Li
et  al.  2009).  Globalisation  has  not  only  provided  new and cheaper  products,  but  also
quickened technological change through the rapid diffusion of information via the Internet
(Janus and Paulo 2013). Freedom of movement and capital meant increased productivity
(cp.  Stiglitz 2012).  Yet the problem remains that due to a  lack of just  and democratic
international structures, some are left behind and others have to pay quite a hefty price for
globalisation.
2.12. A Climate Problem
In  rich  countries,  people  profit  from  a  comfortable  lifestyle  and  a  high  level  of
consumption. Insofar as this lifestyle and consumption are based on overuse of fossil fuel,
they contribute to climate change. This is accompanied by environmental degradation, due
to exploitation of  natural resources. In this way, too, the rich countries could be said to
cause harm to the poor.  (Ahmed and Suphachalasai 2014). The question, to what degree
climate change is caused by human influence, remains difficult to answer, although there is
more and more proof available (Arendt et al. 2002, National Research Council 2010, and
Parmesan  and  Yohe  2003).  What  cannot  be  doubted  is  the  reduction  of  rainfall  and
subsequently the increase of desertification, together with a degradation of fertile soil, in
some regions of the world (Ziegler et al. 2011, 338ff.).51 
A  2007  report  by  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  (UNEP),  for
example, on the situation in Sudan (meanwhile separated into a Northern state and the state
of South Sudan) describes the continuing expansion of the Sahel desert zone since rainfall
and vegetation records were begun in the 1930s. Due to declining precipitation, this trend
is expected to continue. As the report estimates (2007, 9):
51 “In particular, there have been huge increases in hydrometerological disasters such as floods and 
windstorms, while the frequency of other categories of natural disaster has not changed markedly, though 
there is a small but perceptible increase in droughts.” Chhibber and Laajaj (2013, 28). 
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“The remaining semi-desert  and low rainfall  savannah on sand, which represent
some 25 percent of Sudan's agricultural land, are at  considerable risk of further
desertification.  This  is  forecast  to  lead  to  a  significant  drop  (approximately 20
percent) in food production. In addition, there is mounting evidence that the decline
in precipitation due to regional climate change has been a significant stress factor
on pastoralist societies – particularly in Darfur and Kordofan – and has thereby
contributed to conflict.”
The advancing desertification  – and accompanying general water scarcity – will increase
poverty, causing further conflicts in the regions affected, and finally lead to migration to
developing  nations  (Chhibber  and  Laajaj  2013,  Nkonya  et  al.  2011,  and  Schubert,
Schellnhuber, and Buchmann 2007). Sharples, Jones, and Martin (2014, 6) estimate that it
will cost Africa $10.6 billion to adapt to the effects of climate change that it did not cause,
and a further $26 billion will be needed to promote low carbon economic growth. 
Of course it is difficult to say to what extend desertification and reduced rainfall
since 1930 are man-made or just natural variations of the climate. It is equally difficult to
differentiate  between the  impact  of  local  influences  such as  overgrazing  by cattle  and
global ones such as greenhouse gas emissions by developed nations. But as the science of
climate change advances, it becomes more and more obvious that the developing nations
will have to pick up large parts of the tab accumulated by the developed nations both in
exploitation of natural resources and  CO2 exhaust  (National Research Council 2010 and
UNEP 2007).
While  some  regions  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  are  stricken  with  drought  and
desertification, other regions – primarily in South Asia – are threatened by flooding, as the
ocean  level  rises.  A  recent  report  by  the  Asian  Development  Bank  (Ahmed  and
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Suphachalasai 2014, XV) estimates that the region of South Asia “could lose an equivalent
1.8% of  its  annual  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  by 2050,  which  will  progressively
increase to 8.8% by 2100.” This is  especially problematic, as the region's long coastal
strips are densely populated with 1.43 billion people.  One-third of the current population
lives  on  less  than  $1.25  a  day,  leaving  both  families  and  governments  little  room to
manoeuvre for the evacuation of the threatened areas and other disaster prevention (cp.
Lauer 2011).52 
An  additional  problem for  some  developing  countries  is  that  they  are  used  as
dumping grounds for our waste (Mattioli and Palladio 2012). Once broken or supplanted
by a newer, better product, many of our everyday electrical appliances, or other waste, are
smuggled into countries such as Ghana or Nigeria. There people live among toxic smoke of
garbage fires, trying under dangerous conditions to pry valuable parts from former high-
tech instruments. They take up this work because they lack alternative income possibilities,
even if they are not ignorant of the danger to their health. 
Moreover, waste is simply dumped close to the African coast of developing nations
such as  Senegal  to  avoid recycling  fees.  There  is  strong evidence  that  toxic  and even
nuclear  waste  was  dumped  illegally  near  the  Somalian  coast,  killing  the  fish  and
endangering the people that live in these parts. The UNEP (2005, 134) reported that the
2004 tsunami had washed up rusting containers of toxic waste on the shores of the Somali
state of Puntland. 
Another example of environmental destruction  (and a form of robbery) is illegal
fishing. In poorly controlled areas, e.g. off the coast of Senegal, vast flotilla of industrial
52 Additionally, the extend of the damage a natural disaster causes in human casualties and property 
damage depends on preventive procedures such as early warning systems and disaster resistant buildings 
(such as the earthquake secure building techniques used in Japan). Afterwards the damage reduction depends 
on factors such as the government's ability to implement humanitarian measures, for example to send in 
professional rescue teams and medical equipment. A wealthy and well-organised nation is much better 
equipped to confront the challenges of natural disaster. Haiti 2010 would be an example of a nation that has 
failed in implementing preventive measures against earthquakes, and even with international support, the 
reconstruction efforts are still not satisfactory (Lauer 2010). If a nation is poor and this poverty is partly due 
to international structures and institutions, the extend of the damages done by a natural disaster can therefore 
be blamed partially on the developed world (cp. Hahn 2009, 58).
88
trawlers from the European Union, China, or Russia, but also local “pirate fishing fleets”
are scouring the ocean floor (Agnew et al. 2009, LaFraniere 2008, and Lennox 2008, 8).
This fishing is either done illegally (this is the case in an estimated 40 per cent of catches),
or the fishing rights or quota are sold off by government officials to foreign nations. These
sales are in violation of the 1994 United Nations treaty on the seas that acknowledges the
right of local governments to sell fishing rights to foreigners only to their surplus stocks.
Illegal fishing does not respect regulations such as net size, but tends to completely empty
the ocean where it passes. 
Here we are confronted again with “criminal globalization”. While freedom of trade
has brought wealth to a lot of people, it has severely worsened the quality of life of others.
As the above examples show, globalisation offers many opportunities to  increase one's
income at the expense of others. These examples could go on indefinitely. Bad governance,
lack  of  accountability, and  corruption  undermine  existing  protection  to  people  and
environment. In some cases, identifying the culprits can be extremely difficult, as the case
of illegal waste dumping illustrates. Even if they are  identified, prosecuting them is not
always  easy.  One  reason  for  this  lies  in the  lack  of  local  environmental  and  health
protection laws, but even more problematic is the corruption and often the incompetence of
local authorities, although this is not necessarily a part of Western responsibility. Another
reason is the lack of a transnational agency with true legal and executive power.
Developing  countries  not  only  suffer  disproportionately  from  the  problems  of
environmental destruction and climate change. It also seems that they will have to sacrifice
disproportionately  when  it  comes  to  disadvantages  from  environmental  protection
measures.  They  now  produce  much  less  CO2  than  developed  countries,  but  with
international treaties in place, they will not be able to expel carbon dioxide to the extent as
was  possible in  the  early  stages  of  their  development.  Is  it ethically  justified  that
developing nations  are not “allowed” to develop in a  similar  manner as the developed
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countries  did? It may be argued that a period of extended CO2-exhaustion is needed as
industrialization  progresses  and  production  capacities  increase,  citing  the  examples  of
rapid catch up development processes in China and South Korea.  Similar problems  can
arise  from a  forced liberalisation  of  trade,  as  developing countries  are  severely  under-
represented  and  underpowered  in  global  negotiations.  This  ensures that  the  field  of
international competition remains biased in favour of developed countries (cp. Chang 2010
and Pogge 2010a). As Singer and Fei (2013) analyse, the current solutions proposed in the
Kyoto Protocol are based on the grandfathering approach, which bases emission rights on
existing patterns. This scheme requires countries to reduce emissions relative to their levels
in 1990, resulting in the paradoxical conclusion that countries that emitted more in 1990
are entitled to emit more in the future than countries that emitted less in 1990. 
These  institutional  problems  and  inequalities  of  power  are  less  a  question  of
personal  but  of collective responsibility (cp. Lichtenberg 2014, 67ff.).  Individual actions
alone cannot plausibly have a  noticeable influence on global climate, this can rather be
achieved by a shared one. Change depends on the lifestyle and political decisions of many
– perhaps with exceptions  such as  the  CEO of  a  major  multinational  company or  the
President of the United States of America. 
The sociologist Ulrich Beck's (1986, 2009 and 2011) concept of Risikogesellschaft
(German  for  risk  society)  is  useful  in  this  context  of  individual  versus  collective
responsibility.  Modern  societies  are  under new  kinds  of  global,  unforeseeable  risks,
characterised by three features (Beck 2011): 
1. De-localisation: Its causes and consequences are not limited to one geographical
location or space, they are in principle omnipresent. 
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2. Incalculableness:  Its consequences are in principle incalculable; at bottom it's a
matter of “hypothetical” risks, which, not least, are based on science-induced not-
knowing and normative dissent. 
3. Non–compensatibility:  The security  dream of  first  modernity  was based on the
scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever
more  controllable;  accidents  could  occur,  as  long  and  because  they  were
considered compensatible. If the climate has changed irreversibly, if progress in
human genetics  makes irreversible  interventions in human existence possible,  if
terrorist groups already have weapons of mass destruction available to them, then
it's too late. Given this new quality of “threats to humanity” – argues  François
Ewald – the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle of
precaution through prevention. 
In view of these new realities of interconnectedness, there is an urgent need for global risk
governance and cooperation, both to prevent global risks and to help affected societies to
cope. However,  so far there has been a notable lack of success in negotiations, because
politicians of rich countries who are most responsible for CO2 exhaustion are also the ones
with most negotiation power (Pogge 2010b). Fearing for their domestic support, in case
people may have to accept reductions in their standard of living, and pressured by powerful
industrial and economical interest groups, in Germany most notably the car industry or in
the  United  States the  oil  industry,  politicians  tend  to  delay  actions  in  this  matter
(Goldenberg 2015, Jochum 2005, and Pogge 2010b). For developing countries, this comes
at a high price. In the long term, a solution can only consist in a democratisation of the
international sphere so that countries may negotiate on a level playing field (Stiglitz 2002
and Culp 2014). As privileged citizens, we have a political responsibility to pressure our
governments  to  act,  as  consumers  we  should  reduce  our  ecological  footprint, and  as
91
individuals,  we  should  donate  in  cases  of  natural  and  environmental  disasters  as  a
temporary relief for the people concerned.
2.13. Security
The reader may find one very common argument missing from the canon presented so far:
The reference to political security and self-interest. The argument goes as follows: Helping
developing countries is in the West's self-interest, as it will  reduce the risk of political
conflict and radicalisation, thus reducing the threat of terrorism (Sachs 2005, 328ff.). A
related argument is that reducing poverty is in the West's self-interest as it will reduce the
pressure from illegal immigration (Pritchett 2006, 4 and 90ff.).
While  the fate  of the victims of the 2001 World Trade Center  attack,  the 2004
Madrid train bombings, and the 2005 London bombings were of the most tragic nature, on
a statistical level, the number of deaths caused by terrorism are minuscule, compared to the
number of victims of global poverty in developing countries (or compared to the number of
victims of road accidents, of deaths as consequence of smoking or the abuse of alcohol, or
of suicides in rich countries (cp. Horgan 2011, Sachs 2005, 215, and WHO 2014). In the
West,  the  fear  of  terrorism seems  to  be  much  exaggerated by  media  and  politicians,
especially in the United States,  but the countries suffering most intensely from terrorism
are emerging and developing countries  such as  Iraq,  Afghanistan,  Nigeria,  or Pakistan
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2014, 2).  The reality shows that  political  decision-
makers seem to have only few problems to use large resources on locating and killing
(potential) terrorists, for example by drones, or conducting expensive wars, but they seem
to be reluctant to agree on aiding the needy without a clear strategic or economic benefit
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for themselves or for their countries.53 All the expenses for warfare mentioned above dwarf
official and private aid taken together. For example US official development aid (ODA) in
2013 was $30.46 billion (OECD 2014), an previously unknown all-time high, while the
defence  budget  was  $640  billion  (Norton-Taylor  2014).  But  the  results  of  both  the
Afghanistan  as  well  as  the  Iraq  engagements  have  proven  that  wars  have  limited
effectiveness  in  the  reduction  of  radicalism  and  terrorist  threat  (cp.  Perry  2011  and
Taspinar 2009).
For  the  prevention  of illegal  immigration,  combating  poverty  in  third  world
countries at first glance seems much more costly than the more direct solution of border
patrols, containment camps, high fences, and deportations. As inequality and poverty, as
well as conflicts, force more and more people to seek a better fortune in the global North, it
will become increasingly difficult both practically and ethically to keep them out.  Better
security, a more just distribution of income, and better conditions in the countries of origin
would reduce the incentive for many people to try to flee to the developed world. 
This  argument  referring  to  political  security and self-interest  has  some difficult
implications.  Ethically,  however, it  somewhat  contradicts  the cosmopolitan principle  of
benevolence, as it relies on the exclusion of others. Development aid would be reduced to
the status of a handmaiden of foreign policy and the military, with the resources going
mainly to strategic partners or “pacified” regions. In fact, this  is very much the reality
today (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2003d and Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998).
To resume, while increased security and stability, as well as a reduction in refugees, are
good  side-effects  of  increasing  aid  and  donations,  this  argumentation  should  not  be
mistaken as the primary one for global solidarity.
53 According to the costs of war organisation (Crawford 2014), the Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost the 
US $4,4 trillion (including both direct government spending as well as indirect cost, such as forgone income 
by soldiers). Unfortunately, it is idle speculation to imagine what could have been achieved for human 
development with this sum.
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Conclusion
As was attempted to show in the first part of the thesis, the different arguments to act
against global poverty combined have considerable force. While it is unreasonable – and
unrealistic – to ask that we follow the principle of benevolence to its extreme demand and
dedicate our lives to others entirely, this does not mean that we  are not  at all  obliged to
help. Most of Singer's reviewers, with the exception of more ideologically motivated critics
such  as  Badhwar  (2006),  agree  with  him  on  this  part  (Arneson  2009,  Cullity  2004,
Lichtenberg 2014, Nagel 2010, and Wenar 2011b). Not helping, when we could easily do
so, seems ethically problematic to the point of reprehensibility, revealing  a gap between
claims  of  being  a  morally  decent  person  and  one's true  behaviour.  The  reality  of
globalisation, in a situation which is characterized by high inequality, means that we are
intimately connected to distant strangers, for example through our purchases, our driving a
car, or our political representatives who negotiate multinational treaties in our name. In
many  cases,  this  harm  is  not  a  result  of  malevolence,  but  of  simple  negligence or
ignorance, and in some cases of  laziness, lethargy, or idleness. Not taking  other  people's
interests into account,  profiting from or partaking in the exploitation of others seems even
worse. Singer (2007 and 2011a) is  convincing when he points out that the fact that we
cannot  see  or  observe  the  suffering  of  fellow human  beings does  not  mean  that  it  is
meaningless to us. However, as our cognitive apparatus is not primed for this, we feel less
guilty or have less  pangs of consciousness when acting against the interests of poor, far
away strangers. Yet, donations to eradicate poverty arguably are not as high as they should
be,  although  poverty  is  one  of  the  biggest moral  problems  of  our  times,  with  the
consequences of unnecessary deaths and suffering (Sachs 2005, 288ff., Singer 2009a, 23ff.,
and Pogge 2010a, 11f.). 
But apparently there seems to be a problem. From an ethical perspective it is likely
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that the supererogatory humanitarian duty of charitable giving is much less pressing than
the requirements of justice in international relations – especially between rich and poor
countries – and international institutions.  Why do eminent philosophers Peter Singer and
Peter Unger focus on this issue? Although no explicit evidence, hint, or clue to this can be
found in their texts, we can assume that the answer is relatively straightforward: Donating
seems  much  easier.  Changing  global  institutions  and  economic  systems towards  more
fairness and inclusivity is an arduous task,  which necessitates the overcoming of many
obstacles, individual and national interests. Moreover, this task can only be accomplished
collectively (cp. Lichtenberg 2014, 8f. and 239ff.). Donating between one and five per cent
of  one's  income  seems  quite  simple  and  is  a  purely  individual  decision,  thus  no
coordination  problems  arise.  Additionally,  most  INGOs  that  act  against  poverty,  for
example Oxfam, also lobby for more just conditions and a change of attitudes towards poor
countries.  Thus  donating  may be  not  only  compatible  with  political  action  for  global
justice, it may be complementary.
Yet whether it really is as simple to convince people to increase their donations and
channel  them  towards  efficient  programmes  against  global  poverty  is  an  empirical
question. As societal perception and religious and ethical codes already highly favour and
praise altruistic behaviour, it seems difficult to imagine how further increases are possible
(Adloff  2010 and  Reitsma,  Scheepers,  and Grotenhuis  2006).  How successful  Singer's
culture of giving can truly be in convincing significant numbers of people to donate (or to
donate more) will therefore be considered  in the next part of this thesis.
Besides, it is important to discuss how much good we can do through donations. As
Mulgan (1997 and 2001) shows, any obligation to donate depends on how much good can
be achieved via this donation. This will be discussed in part 4. 
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3. Why and When do Human Beings Help Each Other?
At a first glance, a discussion on the realisability of Peter Singer's culture of giving seems
to be philosophically irrelevant.  As philosophers have argued since Kant ([1793]1970),
once a duty to act, in this case against global poverty, has been identified, one is ethically
required to behave accordingly. Pointing out that there are always some who do not act
according to what is ethically required is of little argumentative value.
On the other hand, as has been indicated in the previous part, “ought implies can” is
an important dictum in ethics as well (Kant [1781]1970, A548/B576 and Stern 2004). Only
acts that are physically and psychologically possible are reasonable candidates for moral
duties. I am unable to provide first aid to the man suffering a heart attack on the other side
of the planet, my contribution to reduce climate change is so minuscule, it doesn't even
register, I cannot even prevent  a car accident happening 100 meters from my flat. In the
following chapters, this issue will be discussed in depth with a focus on the psychological
feasibility of Peter Singer's culture of giving. While in the previous part the need to go
beyond simply donating towards poverty relief was attempted to explain, a step back will
be  taken  in  the  following  part,  and  the  main  concern  will  lie  on  the  realisability  of
donations, as this is not only Singer's main argument, but it can also serve as a basis to
understand the psychology behind Western efforts of poverty relief.54 
Psychological possibilities are by their very nature more difficult to evaluate  than
physical ones. What costs can I be expected to incur to act against global injustice and
deprivation? Doing the right thing will entail cognitive effort and cost time and money.
These  factors  are  limited,  even  though  Singer  (2009,  160ff.)  rightly  argues  that  most
people in the developed countries are much better off than the world's poorest. Still, the
question remains, how much can the individual person be expected to donate of his or her
54 The psychological limits and possibilities of ethical consumption and political activism will be 
discussed in the last part of this thesis.
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income?  It is evident that giving  money away is hard and requires an ethical effort,  but
does  that  mean that  we expect  too  much when asking for  five  per  cent  of  someone's
income? A virtue ethicist convinced by the Singer-Unger thesis would argue that we only
need to cultivate the virtue of generosity. But how do we cultivate this virtue further than it
is already developed? Altruism and generosity are values encouraged by all major religions
(e.g. “zakat”, the third of the five pillars of Islam, requests believers to give 2.5 per cent of
their savings to the poor and needy) and within most societies (cp. Farah 2000 and Roberts
2008). This is a main reason why governments make donations tax deductible and provide
financial  support  to  many charitable  organizations  (Bekkers  and  Wiepking  2011).  The
question “How  much  is  donated  already,  and  if  and  how  can  this  amount  be  raised
further?” is therefore highly relevant. A psychological assessment will be used to try to
show how we are to proceed if we want to implement a culture of giving. It may indicates
that we have to look for alternative solutions, for example substituting lacking donations
by involuntary contributions such as a Tobin tax (on speculation with currencies), a global
resource dividend, or some other form of global welfare provision, as exists on the national
level, especially in Europe (Buchanan 1996 and Pogge 2002, 197 and 205ff.).  As a start,
the following question has to be dealt with: How feasible is Peter Singer's idea to establish
a culture of giving?
3.1. Altruism and Cooperation
The need for human beings to cooperate and to help one another is probably at the origin
of mankind as a species. There is ample evidence that a certain type of altruism and thus
charitable behaviour has been hardwired into our emotional-cognitive system (cp. Bauer
2008, de Waal 2012, Greene 2013, Haidt 2012, Klein 2011, and Nowak and Sigmund
2005; for a classical view cp. Hume [1751]1977 and Smith [1759]2010). This does not
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only apply to humans. Authors such as Rowlands (2008), Klein (2011), and Suchak and de
Waal (2012) demonstrate that higher mammals such as chimpanzees and elephants help
members of their group or herd in certain conditions.55 They apparently recognize suffering
in other members of their species and try to alleviate it. They cooperate and even, as van
Wolkenten,  Brosnan,  and de  Waal  (2007)  show in  an  experiment,  have  a  rudimentary
understanding of fairness, which plays a part in the distribution of food.56 
As Suchak and de Waal (2012) demonstrate, reciprocity and altruism in capuchin
monkeys is “without the cognitive burden.” There is a fast instinctive reaction, probably
wired into the behaviour on a genetic level. This behaviour is very advantageous to the
group, as it minimizes conflicts between members and allows the group to successfully
compete  with  other  groups.  Capuchin  monkeys  also  cooperate  within  groups  when  it
comes to warning about predators and defending against them. This entails costs for the
individual, as the warning shout attracts attention to him or her, as does defending his kin
instead of fleeing.
Cooperation is even more important for us human beings (Klein 2011 and Pagel
2013).  On  the  one  hand,  we  tend  to  be  weaker  than  our  ape  cousins  and  lack  their
formidable jaws. Our children stay dependent for a long time, even compared to other
higher mammals (Pinker 2011 263). On the other hand, we have evolved the capability of
language  far  beyond  anything  possible  for  them,  and  we  have  a  more  sophisticated
approach to learning. For the great apes, learning consists in imitating the behaviour of
others  (Chomsky  1968).  Humans  actively  teach  their  offspring,  thus  enabling  the
55 Rowlands (2008) cites the example of a dying elephant cow that is supported by the members of her 
herd in her last hours. They surround her, try to lift her up and offer her food, showing signs of distress. After 
her death, they remain several hours at her corpse and defend it from scavengers. This could be seen as a 
precursor to the human tradition of burial ceremonies.
56 In this experiment, two capuchin monkeys receive a reward for performing the task of handing the 
experimenter a token. If the reward is perceived as unfair, i.e. if one monkey receives a grape while the other 
only receives a cucumber, the unequally treated monkey showed very negative reactions and in fact became 
quite agitated. Van Wolkenten, Brosnan, and de Waal (2007) prove that the negative reaction cannot be 
attributed to the mere visibility of better rewards (greed hypothesis) nor to having received such rewards in 
the immediate past (frustration hypothesis). It must therefore have been caused by seeing their partner obtain 
the better reward. Interestingly, the negative reaction is less pronounced, if the tasks are of different difficulty.
This suggests that even primates value fairness and dislike inequality, which is of course also the case for 
humans. 
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transference of very complex skills and the construction of elaborated tools (Boyd and
Richerson 2009 and Sloan 2010). Oral tradition and – later in the history of mankind –
writing enable each generation to build upon the wisdom of the previous one.  The early
survival and success of the human species thus relies on cooperation,  for example the
coordination of the group and selection of adequate ambush tactics in hunting (Boyd and
Richerson  2009).  The  hunters  are  thus  confronted  with  higher  evolutionary  pressure
concerning  intelligence  and  communication.  At  the  same  time,  this  will  be  further
reinforced by the availability of protein-rich meat to successful hunters, which allows for
improved brain development. With increasing coordination and communication, comes the
necessity to establish a system of fairness and norms, which is required to guarantee an
efficient  and just  distribution of  the  spoils  of  the  hunt.  Once a  large animal  has  been
caught,  there is  much more meat  available  than a  single individual  can consume.  This
means that it is beneficial to distribute the meat among the group, ensuring reciprocity in
the future, improving the hunter's individual standing in the group hierarchy and improving
the survivability of members of the extended family, thus indirectly propagating one's own
genes  (cp.  Tomasello  2009).  Bauer  (2008)  argues  that  cooperation  is  at  the  core  of
humanity's success as a species. He goes as far as to argue that cooperation is at the very
root of our genetics,  and he vehemently criticises  social Darwinism, a position which he
sees as unscientific and even morally dangerous. While this goes beyond the scope of this
thesis, the neurobiologist position towards the human as a social animal is very interesting,
as it  mirrors the Aristotelian position on why humans live together  in  a  society.  What
seems to be certainly true is that the capacity to help others may be characterized as a
human universal.57 Indeed a human being that lacks this capacity is considered emotionally
57 “Human universals” is a term used in anthropology and evolutionary psychology to refer to 
behavioural or cognitive traits common to all neurologically normal humans. The notion of human universals
was partially formulated as a challenge to cultural relativism, a predominant view of human nature in the late 
20th century, which some psychologists and anthropologists see as greatly exaggerating the variance among 
members of the human species (Aknin et al. 2013, Brown 1991, and Haidt 2012).
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or mentally disturbed.58  
Mechanisms for conflict  resolution had to  be developed  to prevent in-group in-
fighting. It is very probable that in this context the advent of language played a crucial part.
Language and the improved communication possibilities where certainly of strategic use in
hunting. Arguably, the social use of language was even more important, with talking partly
taking  over  the  function  of  grooming,  helping  to  maintain  social  peace,  and  thus
strengthening group cohesion (Chomsky 1968). Steven Pinker (2011, 266) points out that
there is an obvious connection between language, culture, and technological know-how.
Language as a vehicle of thought between persons allows interpersonal communication,
and especially teaching of the next generation on a level that is impossible for  animals.
New complexities in interaction arise, as speech makes long-term promises of reciprocity
as well as punishment of defection possible (Origgi and Sperber 2000).59 But it also allows
for  deception,  we  can  use  language  to  trick  one  another and  gain  unfair  advantages
(Dunbar 1998). 
However, evolution has also allowed for the development of tools or means to deal
with  “cheaters” (Boehm 2012  and  Nelson and Greene 2003).  An example is the  anger
reaction of people when detecting such a lie or deception, another one the punishing of free
riders and liars, often viciously,  and even at a cost to ourselves (Axelrod 1984). It does
therefore not come as a surprise that we have a certain ability of detecting lies based on our
comprehension  of  facial  expression  or  body-language  and  our  capacity  to  detect
inconsistencies in a person's story, although we are less good at this than most of us like to
think (Etcoff et al. 2000). To deceive, we need to be able to understand another person's
58 In a 2001 article in Nature, Abbott points out that neurological research into psychopathy suggests 
that the condition should be considered a mental illness with an underlying biological condition, as they lack 
the ability of empathy. ”Psychopaths are not necessarily the sadistic killers of popular fiction. But they lack 
empathy, and are unable to experience guilt or remorse. They are assertive and egocentric, may be highly 
manipulative, and are unconcerned by the negative consequences of their actions. When they kill, the crimes 
are usually well planned and committed for personal gain. But engage in conversation with a psychopath, and
he or she might seem perfectly normal.” (Abbott 2001, 296, cp. also Baron-Cohen 2012, Haidt 2007, and 
Mealey 1995) .
59 Just imagine the success of the first hominid who found out that by using the term “honey” he could 
indicate that a female was sweet.
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position and to a degree predict their thoughts and reactions (Kidd and Castano 2013). But
just  as empathy and understanding another person's  mind  is  necessary for a successful
deception, it also means that we comprehend our fellow human beings, and their pain can
be  imagined  and  thereby in  part  felt  by ourselves.  This  is  arguably  the  basis  for  the
evolution of morality (cp. Boehm 2012). 
Finally, language can serve as quite an effective tool to expose free riders, as we
“gossip” about the moral behaviour of others (Nelson and Greene 2003, 26f). The moral
transgressions of an individual, once exposed, are likely to be spread around in society,
making  further  infringements more difficult  and  limiting  the  cheater's  chances  to
participate in  future cooperative projects.  This  has the disadvantage that  sometimes an
individual can get alienated from society because of a minor mistake or some baseless
rumour. The Scarlet Letter by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1850) and the The Crucible by Arthur
Miller (1953) are literary example of such cases.  However, in our large and anonymous
modern societies the effectiveness of this strategy of ostracising is limited.
In “Signalling Goodness” (2003), Nelson and Greene theorise that many instances
of altruism, among them donations, serve to advertise that a person is a “good guy”, i.e. a
reliable  partner  for  social  interaction.  The  selection  of  the  cause  can serve  as  a
demonstration of group membership, for example  when wealthy conservative Christians
join an organisation such as the Lions Club. The fact that many charitable donations – just
take gala events, the naming of University scholarships or of museum and hospital wings –
are very public can be taken as evidence for this (Grace and Griffin 2006 and West 2004).
Additionally, some people are so reputation-conscious about their donations that they tend
to overstate  or  even lie  about  their  charitable  contributions  (Nelson and Greene 2003,
28ff.).60 This is  referred  to as  conspicuous compassion, mirroring the term “conspicuous
60 Nelson and Greene (2003, 28ff.) quote a 1950 social experiment by Parry and Crosley. The 
researchers obtained data on their donors from a charitable organisation (Community Chest) and asked 920 
individuals in the area whether or not they had contributed to the charity. A staggering 34 per cent said they 
had given to Community Chest, but where not listed as donors in the files. On the other hand, 31 per cent 
admitted that they had not donated, and 35 per cent did both donate and tell the truth.
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consumption” for money spend on publicly visible luxuries  (such as large cars or shiny
jewels) to signal economic power (Grace and Griffin 2006, Harbaugh 1998, Skidelsky and
Skidelsky 2012, 207ff.,  West 2004, and Veblen 1899).
As  the  possibility  of  deception  always  exists,  external  controlling  mechanisms
alone – without an intrinsic motivation or desire to cooperate – would be quite ineffective.
Indeed, game theory  predicts that such external measures tend to  reduce cooperation to
instances of direct reciprocity (Axelrod 1984 and Schmidt 2001). Cooperation is the norm,
for example we pay instead of shoplifting, even if there is little chance of reprisal (cp. Rose
2014).  Human  beings  need  to  maintain  a  positive  self-image,  and  there  are  not  only
psychological costs associated with lying,  but also physical ones, as it  tends to  produce
feelings of discomfort (Nelson and Greene 2003, 29f). Internal “moral chains” are at work
here.  David Hume famously noted that altruist behaviour translates into personal utility
(cp. Anik et al 2011, Ratner, Zhao, and Clarke 2011, and Strahilevitz 2011). 
“It appears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility in all subjects, is a
source of praise and approbation: … [I]t is inseparable from all the other social
virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, levity, mercy and moderation.”
David Hume [1751] (1977, 324).
However,  as has been indicated and will  be further supported by evidence from moral
psychologists and researchers of donor behaviour,  while a charitable impulse is part of
human  psychology,  this  impulse  tends  to  be  near-sighted  and  emotional  rather  than
intellectual  in  character.  What  this  means  for  possible  solutions  of  the  problem  of
international poverty and for development aid remains yet to be explored. 
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3.2. When Are People Most Likely to Help? 
In  his  2011  book  “The  Expanding  Circle:  Ethics,  Evolution,  and  Moral  Progress”,
essentially an update of “The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology” (1981), Peter
Singer argues that altruism began as a genetically based drive to protect one's  kin and
community members. Our inherited  tribalism is therefore the underlying reason for our
moral  incoherence  when  it  comes  to  caring  about  friends,  family,  and  compatriots  in
contrast to (unknown) strangers from other countries (Singer 1981, 2009a, and 2011a, and
Greene 2013). Our capacity for sympathy seems to depend to a large degree on perceived
social and geographical distance. This is referred to as the geo-cultural bias (Small 2011).
This means that we care less and are less motivated to help a distant stranger.
Cooperation also has a darker side to it.  Chimpanzees hunt smaller monkeys  in
groups, and fighting between groups over territories is  frequent (Wrangham, Wilson, and
Muller 2006 and Mitani et al. 2010). This insider-outsider dilemma has implications for the
topic of the thesis (cp. Axelrod and Hammond 2006 and Haidt 2012). Similarly to their ape
cousins, humans are capable of great altruism when their kin and friends are concerned.
But the willingness of altruism generally decreases dramatically when it comes to far-away
strangers with whom no social connection is shared (cp. Hume  [1751]1977 and Singer
2011a). In this case, cooperation within the group can turn against outsiders, when people
unite  to  defend  and  preserve  advantages  over  others.  This  tendency  for  inter-group
competition means that hominid groups unite when they feel a common threat.  From an
evolutionary point of view, attacking competing groups while striving for relative cohesion
within the group may have its benefits (Hamilton 1963 and Greene 2013). 
Research on the hormone oxytocin indicates that this tendency is deeply ingrained
in our biology. Paradoxically, while oxytocin alleviates anxiety in interactions with known
persons, thereby indirectly promoting trust and cooperation within a group, it promotes
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ethnocentrism and distrust towards unknown people, thereby promoting defensive up to
even aggressive behaviour towards perceived out-group members (Bethlehem et al. 2014,
Grillon et al.  2013, and De Dreu et al.  2011).  While Bauer and others may be right in
proclaiming that cooperation is key to success and happiness, it may very well turn out to
inadvertently entail cooperation against others.
It seems that not only perceived social distance is important, but causal distance
plays a role as well. Greene (2007) presented participants with several variants of the well-
known footbridge dilemma and recorded their answers. The footbridge dilemma is about
the  saving  of  a  group of  people  by sacrificing  a  single  person.  He  found that  people
distinguished between “close-up and personal” violations and indirect violations. People
asked to directly themselves push a stranger off a footbridge showed increased activity in
areas  of  the  brain  associated  with  emotions  and  generally  decided  against  the  action.
Moreover, the minority of subjects who did consider that it would be right to push the
stranger off the footbridge took longer to reach this judgement than those who said that
doing so would be wrong, thereby indicating that a emotional barrier had to be surpassed.
In the relatively “impersonal” alternative case of throwing a switch to push a stranger off
(and not intervening directly and personally), brain areas that are linked to cognition and
contemplation lit up on the screen. 
Why do our judgements, as well as our emotions, vary in this way? A convincing
hypothesis is that because for most of our evolutionary history, human beings – and our
primate ancestors – have lived in small groups, in which violence could be inflicted only in
an up-close and personal way, “hitting each other with a club” as Singer (2007) puts it. As
the footbridge dilemma shows, moral imagination has trouble with abstraction. This could
be one reason why donations to a beggar on the street corner are easier than supporting a
far away child.
This does not bode well for the global poor, as they are geographically, socially, and
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causally  remote  from us.  They  live  in  far-away places  the  names  of  which  we  have
problems  to pronounce,  they mostly have a different skin  colour  and speak a  different
language. Their culture and customs seem strange to us. Even more importantly, their lives
are completely remote from our own life. In the introduction I tried to give an impression
of what it means to be poor, but  in truth it is quite unimaginable for us in the Western
world. The poorest people in this world have a standard of living and quality of life that
may appear closer to the middle-ages than our own days. It is difficult  to imagine not
having enough to eat and that quite normal occurrences such as a broken leg or childbirth
can bear a deathly risk in ten to twenty per cent of cases. We do not see them,  nor their
suffering or the harm we cause to them. We do not see traces of exploitation in our clothes
or mobile phones. We do not see how rising food prices kill. 
Of course there are  the international  media and the Internet,  but their  reporting
tends  to  focus  on  catastrophes  and not  everyday suffering  (Benthall  2010,  Brown and
Minty 2008, and Moeller 1999). In case of natural catastrophes and suffering we get some
news reports, but as they cover things that happened very far away, they fail to touch us as
deeply as suffering compatriots. Why should we care about those people? We don't know
them, and from what we know, they could be suffering every day (De Botton 2014). Still,
there are people willing to donate to suffering strangers.  This will  be explained in  the
following chapters. 
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3.3. Why Do We Give? – Explanatory Approximations
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing
it.“
Adam Smith [1759] (2010, 3).
An anecdote is told about Thomas Hobbes, who was observed by a cleric while giving
alms to an old beggar (retold by Singer 2011a, 15). The English philosopher's stand on
human beings acting out of self-interest,  and potentially quite ruthlessly,  of course was
well known, and there were even rumours about his being an atheist. The surprised cleric,
anxious to make a point and perhaps save a lost soul, asked Hobbes why he would commit
such  an  act  of  altruism,  be  it  not  for  the  divine  great  commandment  to  “love  thy
neighbour” (Matthew 22:36-40). Hobbes replied that seeing the beggar's misery made him
miserable, and he therefore gave to alleviate his own pain. 
As Singer notes, a wide definition of egoism may end up being tautological, i.e. not
very much use for anyone. If an egoist's  circle of empathy includes family members and
friends, then acquaintances,  and finally people he is aware of, his actions become quite
indistinguishable from an  altruist's, and the discussion is reduced to the very theoretical
“does he help individuals because it helps them and brings them pleasure”, i.e. for their
own sake, or because it “brings him pleasure to see them doing better.”
Explanations  of  internal  motivations  are  necessarily  difficult  and  prone  to
controversy.  Why  people  show  benevolent  behaviour  in  some  cases  and  can  behave
indifferently, even hostile, in others has puzzled social scientists for a long time. Human
behaviour  is  complicated  and  depends  on  individual  traits,  environment,  culture,  and
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education.  It  is  in  large  parts  situational,  meaning  that  the  same person can  act  quite
distinctly in different situations.
Economists  and  social  scientist  have  renewed  their  interest  in  the  motives  for
charitable behaviour since the 1970s (Rutherford 2010 and Adloff 2010). Becker (1974,
1083) notes that charitable behaviour very often is partly motivated by social pressure, “to
avoid scorn of others or to receive social acclaim”. To remain within Humean terminology,
we would call these the “external chains” that bind our charitable behaviour. Radley and
Kennedy (1995), basing their work on the analysis of French sociologist Marcel Mauss in
“Essai sur le don – Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques”  (1924),
examine  reasons  for  giving  and  whether  explanations  of  charity  are  based  upon  an
individual motive, social norms, or the setting in which the solicitation of gifts occurs.61
They identify three features which appear to be important in the determination of whether
people  will  act  in  a  charitable  or  helpful  way.  A.  The person's  individual  or  personal
motive,  i.e.  to “feel good” or wanting to be seen as a philanthropist.  B.  Social  norms,
expected charitable behaviour, or “moral chains”. C.  Situational conditions that apply at
the  time  help  or  funds  are  being  solicited,  especially  media  attention  to  a  particular
humanitarian emergency at the time. 
A more in-depth analysis was performed by Bekkers and Wiepking (2011), who in
a comprehensive literature review identify eight key mechanisms of philanthropy: (1) need
awareness;  (2)  solicitation;  (3)  costs  and  benefits;  (4)  altruism;  (5)  reputation;  (6)
psychological benefits; (7) values, and finally (8) efficiency of donations (cp. Elster 2011).
These  categories  can  be  roughly  divided  into  internal  and  external  motivations.  For
example need awareness,  solicitation,  costs  and benefits,  efficiency,  and reputation  are
61 The French sociologist Marcel Mauss analyses the tradition of social gifts in different archaic 
societies, developing a thesis of social reciprocity. According to him, the dichotomic view of self-interest and
altruism is misleading, as these categories are highly permeable or transcendent. The example of the social 
gift showcases this, as material possessions and capital translate into social, political, and even reproductive 
capital (Adloff 2010, 34ff.). Mauss writings were extremely influential in anthropology and are still relevant 
today. As has been tried to explain so far, evolutionary pressure has favoured altruism in small communities, 
leading to the positive emotional feedback mechanisms and reputational effects that have been demonstrated 
to be an integral part of donor motivation.
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external, whereas altruism, values and psychological benefits are considered internal. 
That individuals and even companies, today often in the form of Corporate Social
Responsibility,  use  charity  to  improve  their  reputation  has  already  been  outlined.
Awareness of need is essentially an external factor, outside of the donor. It is the basic
precondition of donations as well as of other forms of activism. To make people aware of a
problem is the aim of fundraising campaigns and sometimes the intention of the media (cp.
Beckett 2012). What needs to be stressed here is that what motivates individuals to act is
not the objective need, but the subjectively perceived  one (Wagner and Wheeler 1969).
These perceptions are heavily influenced by media attention and personal experience, such
as knowing a (potential) beneficiary personally or having visited the country  concerned
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 and Radley and Kennedy 1995).
Solicitation will be discussed in depth in the chapter on fundraising methods. The
essential  findings  are  that  solicitation  increases donations  through  social  pressure
(Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2011). However, as Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman (2011)
show people will also try to avoid being subjected to this pressure.
For  the  amount  an  individual  is  willing  to  donate,  the  personal  costs  play  an
important role. Bill Gates simply can afford more than most of us. If Governments want to
increase the level of generosity, they lower these costs by making donations tax deductible
(Okten and Weisbrod 2000, Stern 2013a, 60ff. and 102f.). Benefits, too, are a tricky case.
By definition, if the remuneration reaches a certain level, an act can no longer be seen as
altruistic or charitable. It is then simply in one's self-interest and costly for any society or
organisation  making  use  of  benefits.  As  Sargeant  and  Jay  (2004,  100)  formulate  it
generally  “donors  will  always  be  better  off  not  making  a  donation  and  keeping  their
money”.  I  can hardly claim that  my paying into my retirement  fund or  for  my health
insurance is altruistic, although others benefit from it as well. A certain level of reciprocity
is however common in donations. Usually,  these benefits  are designed to reinforce the
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reputational gains from the gift, for example by setting up a plate with the donor's name or
company logo on it  (Olson 1965).62 Another  way in  which  a  possible  benefit  is  used
successfully to encourage giving, both by charitable organisations and by the state, is via
lotteries (Lange, List, and Price 2007). 
Efficiency, unfortunately, plays a far too little role in our decisions to give. It could
even  be  said  to  be  the  least  important  mechanism  of  the  ones  discussed previously
(Harbaugh 1998 and van Iwaarden et al. 2009). Other factors, such as the area of activity
or the location of the charity that endorses it, the religious and political affiliation, or how
well-known a charity is, are more important in donor decisions (Reitsma, Scheepers, and
Grotenhuis  2006 and  Stern  2013a).  While  donors  of  course  prefer  their  money to  go
towards  an  efficient  organisation,  they  generally  make  very  little  effort  to  gain  the
information necessary to identify such an organisation (van Iwaarden et al. 2009 and Stern
2013a).  When  donors  are  interested  in  efficiency,  they  tend  to  focus  on  relatively
irrelevant, but easy to measure factors, such as “overhead” (Bowman 2006). Overhead, as
an  indicator,  refers  to  the  administrative  and  the  fundraising  costs  of  an  organisation.
Conversely, the remainder of the donations directly benefits the project work. While this
may appear as a good indicator for efficiency at a first glance the focus on overhead has a
lot of problems. As an indicator, it tends to favour large, established, government supported
NGOs that do effective fundraising. This, however, is no indicator whether the organisation
truly improves the lives of the target groups. Additionally, the focus on overhead has lead
many  organisations  to  be  especially  cautious  with  administrative  spending,  leading  to
many  organisations  being  undermanaged,  lacking  evaluation  of  their  intervention  and
further preventing effective knowledge management, which, as will be shown in part 4, is
essential for success in development work (Bowman 2006, MacAskill 2015a, ch. 7, Palotta
2008, 162ff., and  Stern 2013a, 9f.). Overhead should thus be only used as one indicator
62 Clever fundraisers make use of the psychological mechanism of reciprocity by including small, 
inexpensive gifts in their donation appeals. While efficient, this is frowned upon as it puts pressure on the 
donor and raises fundraising costs without a benefit to the programme (DZI 2012, Haibach 2012, 44f, and 
VENRO 2011).
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among many,  for  example  to  determine  fraud.   Conversely,  not  all  organisations  even
attempt to communicate their efficacy (Stern 2013a). Fortunately, this lack of transparency
seems to be waning with the increase of charity evaluation mechanisms, such as “Charity
Navigator” or “GiveWell”, and the advent of social  reporting standards (cp.  MacAskill
2015a, 5ff., Singer 2009a, 82ff., and Stern 2013a, 28f.). Here the positive influence of both
Singer's and MacAskill's work should be noted.
In  the  context  presented,  values  are  in-between  internal  and  external  factors.
Personal values are, of course, internal convictions. They have  proved to be  difficult to
influence and can influence donations positively or negatively, depending on the situation
(see previous chapters). Donors will likely support an organisation that shares their values,
for  example  religious  people  donate  more  extensively,  but  of  course  with  a  focus  on
religious organisations (Reitsma, Scheepers, and Grotenhuis 2006). People who self-report
as being committed to humanitarian and egalitarian goals are more likely to donate than
those who do not share such convictions (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Other values and
beliefs at least occasionally decrease the likelihood of charitable giving, such as the belief
in a fundamentally just world (Zagefka et al. 2011). 
In the context of this thesis, personal motivations or “internal moral chains” are of
particular  interest.  On the  surface,  charitable  giving  seems to  contradict  the  theory of
personal utility maximization. But in fact it does not do so, as altruism seems primarily to
occur  impure  or  near  altruism  (Andreoni  1989  and  1990).  The  “warm  glow”-model
indicates  that donors  receive a  psychological  benefit  from their  donations.  It  has  been
frequently  demonstrated  that  when  helping  others  or  when  giving  away  money  and
presents, we feel good about ourselves, experiencing a warm glow inside (Andreoni 1989
and 1990, Anik et al. 2011, Elster 2011, Frey 1997, and Strahilevitz 2011, 16f). This is
corroborated by neurophysiology research on the reward centre  of the brain  (Harbaugh,
Mayr, and Burghart 2007 and Zahn et al. 2009). In human evolution, a tendency towards
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this “warm glow” was favourable. As attempted to show in the previous chapter, it seems
that  while  acting  altruistically  requires  some  effort,  the  psycho-physical  reward  is
immediate and requires no effort (De Waal and Suchak 2012 and  Harbaugh, Mayr, and
Burghart 2007). Acts of altruism provide happiness for the individual, whereas to fail one's
fellow human beings leads to feelings of culpability or guilt (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011
and  Smith  and Davidson 2014).63 So evolution  may have  adapted us  for  altruism and
benevolence, at least for  impure or near altruism.  Research done by psychologists of the
University of  British Columbia  even suggests  that  increasing  pro-social  behaviour  and
being  more  charitable  can  create  a  positive  feedback-loop  that  makes  the  “helpers”
permanently happier, actually more so than spending money on oneself (Anik et al. 2011,
Dunn, Gibert,  and Wilson 2011, and Smith and Davidson  2014).  This is  surprising,  as
happiness research generally indicates that we have a basic level of happiness to which we
try to return after positive or negative shocks (Lucas 2007).
Unfortunately, there are several caveats. As the experimental results and the theory
of impure altruism indicate, it is the act of helping that produces happiness, not a socially
beneficial outcome (Bowman 2006, Frumkin and Kim 2001, and Rutherford 2010). This
means  that  people  will  focus  on  the  pro-social  act,  tending  towards  what  is  either
spectacular or easily achieved, for example dousing themselves with ice water or “liking” a
video which protests against bad labour standards in Bangladesh, while continuing to buy
the products manufactured there. I am alluding to the Ice Bucket Challenge to promote
awareness and gain donations for the disease amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that was
popular in the social media in 2014 (Bordelon 2014). Collecting donations of over 220
million,  the  campaign  was  very  effective  in  the  short  run,  as  it  combined  celebrity
63 Guilt is a very powerful motivator. It is disparaged by most progressive charities, but it is used, often
blatantly,  in some of the most effective fundraising campaigns. It motivates the giver, but it also motivates 
the asker. “I felt impelled to do it out of a sense of rage and shame,” as Bob Geldof (a musician active in the 
“Feed the children” and the “Band Aid” initiatives) describes his fundraising efforts that started the mid-
1980s. “Shame was the over-riding thing. I was ashamed that we allowed these things to happen to others.” 
(Smillie 1995, 27). Lindsey 2005 and O'Keefe 2002 argue that guilt is primarily felt due to a perceived 
violation of justice. This negative emotional state needs to be purged by acting to restore justice.
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publicity,  a  certain  frisson  of  suffering,  and  group  belonging.  While  it  lead  to  much
reporting, a considerable increase in one-time donations and “likes”, this campaign neither
transformed  into  long-term  support,  nor  did  it  address  the  globally  most  dangerous
diseases.  Olivola and Shafir  (2013) find evidence for  the  so-called ”matyrdom”-effect,
meaning  that  other  people's  suffering  and  effort  for  a  cause  seem to  translate  into  a
subjective feeling of meaningfulness in donors (also cp. Olivola 2011). It should be noted
that this  is again completely irrelevant to any notions of efficiency or outcome for the
intended recipients. Rather, these and similar  campaigns are characteristic for self-centred
online “clicktivism”,  that will  be discussed further  on with the example of the KONY
2012-campaign.  A true  rational  evaluation  of  the  outcome,  however,  would  require  a
considerable and sustained effort, which is much harder. As will be presented in the next
part  of  this  thesis,  many donations or other actions aimed at  the global poor are quite
ineffective. This is very bad news for the poor, who could be not only exploited by corrupt
politicians and unscrupulous entrepreneurs, but also  used for a quick feel-good without
accountability by the very people that claim to help them. 
Another problem is that, while doing the right thing may increase our happiness,
this does not mean it comes easy. Just as eating healthily or doing sports is difficult, there
are psychological barriers in place that make it difficult for us not to act selfishly, even if it
may contribute to our happiness and overall well-being. An overview over these barriers
and biases will be given in chapters 3.8.-3.13. 
Finally, a wish to help and donate is more an emotional reaction, taking us back to
the capuchin monkeys, whose sharing was without the cognitive burden. The pure rational
wish  to  help  others  probably  motivates  some,  but  as  Hume  already  noted,  it  is  very
improbable that the intellectual decision to help is the prevailing motivation for most of the
donors.64 It is much more probable that the emotions are the stronger and more effective
motivators.  While it may be good news that donating makes us happy, we also have to
64 Cp. Small and Loewenstein (2007) for a discussion, under which conditions donors may behave 
more reflectively.
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realize that donating is subject to the economic law of  diminishing marginal utility  (cp.
Becker  1974  and  Strahilevitz  2011).  This law  states  that the  marginal  utility  of  each
(homogenous) unit decreases, as the supply of units increases (and vice versa). A consumer
maximizes his individual utility by purchasing a certain good until the point of satisfaction
is reached. The existence of this point of satisfaction means that only a limited amount of
donations  is  available  in  a  society.  This  is  apparent  from  theoretical  economics.
International  statistical  comparisons,  too, are  good  evidence  that  donations  are  a  very
slowly growing resource, as will be shown further on (Priller and Sommerfeld 2005 and
Radtke 2007).
3.4. The Limits of Altruism
The economical approach to charitable giving reveals a fundamental problem. It may seem
surprising that  a science that  heavily relies  on the model  of the  homo oeconomicus,  a
rational self-interested decision maker, has anything to contribute to the field of altruistic
behaviour. But charitable giving has interested scholars of economy precisely because of
its  apparently  paradoxical  character  (List  2011  and  Rutherford  2010).  Economics  can
contribute to the understanding of charity in one way particularly: It can point out that
altruism in a  way  functions  like a limited resource.  Donating can be seen as a  scarce
resource  which  needs  to  be  carefully  managed  (Andreoni  1990 and Becker  1976). As
Roberts (2008) puts it:
“As long as people do not have infinite amounts of time and money, economics will
have  something  to  say  about  how  they  behave  in  settings  involving  love  and
compassion, duty and honour The essence of economics is remembering that few
virtues are absolute – when they get more expensive, harder to do, or less pleasant,
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people will do less of them.”
That financial altruism is a limited resource is evidenced by the following facts: 
• Overall donations per year and society are relatively stable. For example Germans
donate around €4 billion annually to global poverty relief organisations (Haibach
2012, 170 and Keller 2008, 23).
• The phenomenon of  mental accounting  (Andreoni, Rao and Trachtman 2011 and
Thaler  1999) implies that individuals remember their charitable giving and refuse
additional donations when they have already donated within a certain time span.
• The  phenomenon  of  the  tragedy of  the  forgotten  disaster  discussed  further  on,
referring  to  the  phenomenon  that  when  a  humanitarian  catastrophe  claims  no
Western lives, when it occurs shortly after another one, or even worse, becomes a
protracted disaster  with no end in  sight (as happens with many civil  conflicts),
relief agencies find it difficult to generate the donations needed (The Economist
2003). 
The  modern  debate  on  the  economic aspects  of  altruism  (or  the  altruistic  aspects  of
economics) can be said to have started with Richard Titmuss' influential book  The  Gift
Relationship and the subsequent reactions to it by Kenneth Arrow (1972) and Peter Singer
(1973).65 Titmuss examines the role of altruism in society  by the example  of voluntary
blood donations.  He stresses  the  voluntary character  of  the  act  of  donating blood that
differs from monetary forms of exchange  that are typical of  our market-oriented society
65 Previous research on the social phenomenon of the gift was conducted by the French sociologist 
Marcel Mauss in his 1925 Essai sur le don. Mauss analyses the tradition of social gifts in different archaic 
societies, developing a thesis of social reciprocity. According to him, the dichotomic view of self-interest and
altruism is misleading, as these categories are highly permeable or transcendent. The example of the social 
gift showcases this, as material possessions and capital translate into social, political, and even reproductive 
capital (Adloff 2010, 34ff.). Mauss writings were extremely influential in anthropology and are still relevant 
today. As has been tried to explain so far, evolutionary pressure has favoured altruism in small communities, 
leading to the positive emotional feedback mechanisms and reputational effects that have been demonstrated 
to be an integral part of donor motivation.
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(cp. McLean 2010 and Rutherford 2010, 1035ff.). The economic intuition would be that
providing payment  for  blood leads  to  an  increase  in  donations.  Titmuss  disagrees,  his
argument being that there is already an intrinsic reward present in donating that will be
crowded out by offering a monetary reward.
“In the gift of blood [...]  there is the absence of tangible immediate rewards in
monetary or non-monetary forms; the absence of penalties, financial or otherwise,
and the knowledge among donors that their donations are for unnamed strangers
without  distinctions  of  age,  sex,  medical  condition,  income,  class,  religion,  or
ethnic group [...]. How can they and do they learn to give to unnamed strangers?” 
Richard Titmuss 1970, 212.
Donating blood  takes time, and the procedure is  certainly inconvenient,  if  not outright
painful. Donating money reduces one's budget. In both cases we are giving without the
expectation of reciprocity and direct extrinsic rewards. We have already encountered the
explanation why people incur these costs: There is an intrinsic reward of doing the right
thing. As the theory of impure altruism explained above says, we receive an emotional
reward, the so-called “warm glow”, if we do something for someone else.
Arrow (1972, 354f.), while agreeing on the “warm glow” principle still criticised
Titmuss' study. Voluntary blood donations, he warned, would end using up “recklessly the
scarce resources of altruistic motivation”. He assumed that altruism was a scarce resource
and that it should only be used when absolutely necessary. As blood is a valuable resource,
it is easily possible to pay donors in affluent societies with functioning health systems, thus
transforming them into sellers and supplanting the charitable enterprise into a supposedly
more efficient market.
Peter  Singer  (1973)  defended Titmuss' argumentation:  There  is  a  tendency that
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financial  reward  will  crowd  out  voluntary  donations  and  replace  them  with  self-
interestingly calculated ones.66 If a financial reward is offered, the individual will perceive
the action of giving blood more as a financial transaction than an act of altruism, which
lessens his moral euphoria or warm glow. Additionally, if the amount paid per donation is
low,  this  will  be  no  incentive  for  well-off  people  but  especially  attract  low-income
individuals. As low income is positively correlated with poorer health, as well as with drug
addiction, financial  rewards  could  disproportionately  attract  lower  quality  blood.  As
Titmuss mentions, there is a special need for high quality blood, so the fact that primarily
the middle class will be motivated to donate is an asset. 
Titmuss' and Singer's view has become the dominant position and influenced  the
WHO  guidelines  on  blood  donations  (Campbell,  Tan,  and  Boujaoude  2012,  Niessen-
Ruenzi, Weber, and Becker 2014, and WHO 2010).  The two ethicists  rightly pointed out
that  human  beings  are  not  motivated  by  self-interest  alone,  but  also  by  reciprocity,
altruism, and other intrinsic motives. This has been verified by extensive experimental and
field research supporting Titmuss' thesis that extrinsic financial incentives tend to crowd
out intrinsic motives, although small non-financial favours seem to have no influence, it is
quite usual for donors to receive a free meal and a small gift (Fehr and Schmidt 2001, Frey
1997, and Meier and Stutzer 2008). A well-known social experiment is the example of the
Israeli  kindergarten  which  introduced  a  fine  to  punish  delayed  pick-ups  of  children
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a and 2000b). Before the introduction of the fine, parents at
least tried to be punctual to meet the requirements of the social convention of punctuality
(intrinsic motivation). After the introduction of the fine, they changed their perception and
behaviour, and delays increased drastically. The fine became the price for being late, which
was now deemed an acceptable  behaviour.  As it  was  no longer  perceived as  impolite,
parents  were  late  whenever  paying  the  fine  seemed  worth  it.  Frey  (1997)  contributes
another  example  where  extrinsic  financial  incentives  tend to  crowd out  other  intrinsic
66 Probably laying a second cornerstone for his culture of giving, together with his 1972 “Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality”.
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motives by showing that it may be a bad idea to offer direct financial rewards to teenagers
who are already helpful. Paying adolescents to undertake household duties leads them to
neglect  other  duties  they  previously  fulfilled  gratuitously,  and  to  expect  payment  for
additional chores.67
Donating  blood  can  also  be  seen  as  a  communal  activity  reinforcing  group
membership, meeting other like-minded people (common values), and chatting with the
nurses while donating is frequently mentioned in surveys on donor motives (Misje et al.
2005). Counter-intuitively, the fact that donating blood is a little painful can raise volition
to participate (Olivola and Shafir 2013).
However,  newer  research  indicates  that  overall  blood  donations  increase  when
remuneration is sufficient, for example commercial blood banks in Germany offer between
€25 and €60  (Niessen-Ruenzi,  Weber, and Becker 2014, 4). The researchers found that
especially the reliability of donations increases when sufficient payment is offered (cp.
Gneezy and Rustichini  2000b). As the problem is not easily solved, one has to look at each
problem  individually  and  ask,  if  it  is  solved  better  by  markets,  charity,  or  national
redistribution, and should companies, civil society, the state, or a cooperation of these be
used to address this problem.
But along the way, Arrow's fundamental point that altruism is a scarce resource has
been forgotten. Blood is a valuable commodity and that blood banks, hospitals, and health
insurances can afford to pay for it, and the important question remains whether this will set
altruistic resources free for other undertakings. It is difficult to estimate whether the freed
altruistic resource  will  be transferred into other areas.  If they do not donate blood, will
people extend their charitable impulse to other opportunities, such as helping strangers,
donating to charity, or lobbying for better trade conditions for the developing countries? So
far there has been no research directed towards this question (cp.  Andreoni and Payne
67 The philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) therefore worries about the increasing monetarisation and 
marketisation of society.
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2011).  But  the  theory  of  mental  accounting,  that  will  be  discussed  further  on,  would
suggest so. 
3.5. How Much Do We Give?
The question that serves as title for this chapter can be answered when we look at national
patterns of donations.  As in most countries donations to charities are tax deductible, the
statistics on giving are quite reliable, although  there is  a tendency to underestimate the
amounts given, as not all donations are actually declared (Piff et al. 2010, CAF 2006, 11,
and Stern 2013a).
As figure 1 from the annual overview of the  Deutscher Spendenrat [German Donations
Council]  (2012) shows, the  total  yearly amount  of  donations in  Germany  is  relatively
118
Figure 1: Annual Overview of Total Donations in Germany (Source: Deutscher 
Spendenrat 2012, 10, transl. by the author).
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The volume of donations in 2011 lay slightly above the level of 2009, but 
markedly below that of 2010, which was strongly influenced by the two „great“ 
natural catastrophes in Haiti and Pakistan. In a middle-term view, there is a small 
increase in the volume of donations by on average 2 per cent per year. 
Declining volume of donations by -5.8% in comparison with 2010 – a small 
increase (+2%) in the middle-term view
Revenues from private donations: Total market
stable  around  €4  billion,  with  peaks occurring  in  years  of  large  natural  disasters.
Depending on the  year,  only between 82 and 74 per  cent  of  the  amounts  donated are
destined  towards  poverty  relief, with  the  rest  going  to  animal  and  environmental
protection, as well as to culture funding. Additionally, the category “humanitarian aid” also
includes poverty relief within developed nations, most notably of course within Germany
itself. On a positive note, the averaged amount of donations is increasing slightly from year
to year, with a total average growth of 2 per cent per year. This could be taken as evidence
for a small increase in donations, but may also simply reflect economic growth. Radtke's
(2007,  12ff),  analysis  of data  from the  Deutscher  Spendenmonitor [German Donations
Monitor]  and  the income  development  of  16  major  INGOs  in  Germany,  such  as  the
International  Red Cross  or  Terre  des  Hommes,  shows that  an increasing  proportion  of
donations  goes to international poverty relief. Indeed, some organisations, such as  Terre
des Hommes, were able to nearly double their  revenues  from private donations between
1990 and 2005.68 While the total amount of donations, especially for international poverty
relief, is increasing, the number of donors is declining (Deutscher Spendenrat 2012 and
Priller  und  Sommerfeld  2005).  This  can  be  partly explained  with  the  rising  income
inequality (Cingano 2014, also cp. Stiglitz 2012 and Piketty 2014) and partly by the results
of research on the so called civic core. This term denominates the members of society who
disproportionately contribute to  charity, as  well  as  take part  in  civic  activities  such as
volunteering. A 2011 study in the United Kingdom by the Third Sector Research Centre
showed that  around seven per  cent  of  the population  are responsible  for  two-thirds  of
volunteering; 87 per cent of all donations are given by 31 per cent (Mohan 2011, 9). The
civic core is mostly composed of well-educated, well-off, middle-aged, and often female
professionals.69 As a rule, the core groups are overrepresented in wealthier areas (Mohan
68 This raises the question whether this positive result is due to a change in general public perception 
or increased professionalisation of the organisation's fundraising. This will be discussed towards the end of 
this part of this thesis.
69 The research on (disproportionate) civic engagement is a relatively recent area of study. It originated
in a 2001 paper by Reed and Selbee on Patterns of Citizen Participation and the Civic Core in Canada. A
comparable analysis in Spain or Germany to the author's knowledge yet remains to be done.
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2011, 7ff.). The author John Mohan warns that with these groups approaching “altruistic
saturation”, a wider range of people would need to be drawn into voluntary action. He is
sceptical of efforts by INGOs or the government to increase the level of donations and
volunteering, as his evidence points to its stability. To increase donations, he thinks, one
would have to increase the amount of well-educated and (economically) well-off middle-
class citizens.
An international comparison of donation levels is useful, as a comparison between
different societies reveals the potential for increasing giving. As countries differ in their
culture, religion, and attitudes, levels of donations will differ, and the comparison may give
an estimate of how much they can be increased by changing the conditions and culture of
giving.
The USA are often cited as country with a particularly developed civic society and
willingness to donate (Adloff 2010, 83ff. and Anheier 2010). According to data collected
by Smith and Davidson (2014, 101ff.), in the year 2010 13.9 per cent of US citizens gave
away two per cent or more of their income, with most giving two to five per cent, the
amount Singer advises. 41.3 per cent gave less than two per cent and 44.9 per cent gave
nothing. It should be noted that while financially less well off people tend to give more
proportionately, the reasons for this will be examined in chapter 3.12., when it comes to
total  amounts  donated,  a  small  group of  Americans  is  responsible  for  the  majority  of
donations. This list includes such prestigious names as Bill Gates or Warren Buffett and if
we follow Singer's  most  recent  books  it  should  be  our  aspiration  in  life  to  become a
member. However, this concentration of philanthropic power in the hands of few people
also  means  that  they  can  exert  a  lot  of  influence,  both  in  civic  society  at  home  and
development aid abroad (McGoey 2015 and Wilson 2015).
Figure 2 is taken from the annual report  of the Charities Aid Foundation  (CAF
2016, 7) compares national levels of donations,  based on the General Domestic Product
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(GDP).  Quite  astonishing  is  the  particular  situation  of  the  English-speaking countries,
especially the United States, where significantly more is donated. With 1.67 per cent of the
national  GDP donated,  the  US-American society actually  approaches  the  two per  cent
envisioned by Singer. However, this has to be taken with a grain of salt. As we are mainly
concerned  with  donations  towards  international  poverty  relief  and  development,  it  is
necessary to adjust the statistics accordingly.
A majority  of  donations  in  the  US goes  to  religious  organisations,  which  inflates the
statistics for this country.  In the US, there are no church taxes as e.g. in Germany, where
they are collected with the income tax (CAF 2016, 8). These church taxes are partly used
by the churches or religious organisations to maintain their  services and buildings,  but
partly also for poverty relief  in the country or abroad. This is why religious donations
present  a  difficulty.  While  per  se  they cannot  be included in a  comparison concerning
global poverty relief, not including them at all is difficult as well,  as at least the great
Christian churches, as well as the Muslim and Jewish communities dedicate part of their
resources  towards  combating  poverty.  A typical  example  for  this  is  the  international
Caritas organisation  of  the  Catholic  Church.  Thus  contributing  to  many  religious
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Figure 2: International Comparison of Charitable Giving (Source CAF 2016, 7).
organisations is indirectly contributing to international poverty relief, too.
To get closer to the actual sums, we will also have to exclude donations that are
destined  towards  cultural  purposes,  scientific  research,  environmental  protection, and
(arguably) domestic poverty, although the categorisation here is difficult. However, many
projects  that implement  environmental protection in developing countries also help the
local population, for example by providing jobs. A model for this is Caritas International.
This organisation relies on local organisations and their teams in the field.  Additionally,
non-interest-driven  official  development  aid  should  be  counted  into  the  statistic.  This
aspect will be dealt with later on in this thesis.70 
Once we take into account all these factors, a characterization of the United States
as  most  charitable  nation  does  not  hold  water,  at  least  in  the  context  of  international
solidarity (cp. CAF 2006, 9f.). What remains is evidence for a comparably higher level of
the professionalisation of fundraising,  combined with some cultural variables in the US
(Adloff 2010, 83ff. and Haibach 2012, 91ff.). 
3.6. Mental Accounting for Charity
Psychological  research suggests  that  our  moral  conscience functions  comparably to  an
accounting ledger. We (subconsciously) keep in mind our budget for good deeds and tend
to limit  our pro-social  spending to  this  budget  (Liu 2011, 202ff.  and Thaler  1985 and
1999). The accounting system provides the inputs for ex ante and ex post benefit analyses.
This means that once we have donated to a good cause, we will not immediately give to
another one, which seems quite intuitive. We seem to have a specific mental account for
70 Official development aid will be discussed at the beginning of the last part of this thesis. With the 
term interest-driven aid, I refer to aid the aim and result of which is primarily the establishment and 
maintenance of strategic and commercial interests and which does not really benefit the poor. The United 
States are especially prone to the strategic use of development aid as military and financial support of a 
friendly regimes. Israel, for example, is difficult to characterise as a poor country, yet received $6.180 million
in aid in 2012, making it the second largest recipient after Afghanistan 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD).
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altruist actions such  as charitable donations, just as for housing, food, or leisure, which,
once  exhausted,  takes  time  to  replenish.  As  Thaler  (1985  and  1999)  observes,  this
behaviour is quite irrational and violates the economic premise of fungibility. We bracket
our spending according to episodes and categories, which makes little sense, as we should
be  more  concerned with  overall  budget  restraints  and utility  maximisation.  But  as  the
school  of  bounded rationality  indicates,  this  behaviour  may very well  make sense  for
individuals with limited cognitive capacities and time (Elster 1979 and Simon 1957). The
behaviour  even  seems  to  have  some  similarity  to  the  Catholic  Church's tradition  of
indulgences, as we tend to “balance the books”: People acting in a pro-social way see this
as kind of dispensation and are more likely to act selfishly immediately afterwards, for
example people are less helpful and more likely to cheat and steal after purchasing organic
and  environment-friendly  products  (Mazar  and  Zhong  2010).  As  Andreoni,  Rao,  and
Trachtman (2011) show, to avoid straining their altruism budget, people will actually stay
clear of situations in which they may be asked for donations, even incurring costs to do so.
The researchers stationed two solicitors for the Salvation Army at two different entrances
of the same supermarket, making the appeal either easy or difficult to avoid. Additionally,
the solicitors varied their technique, either asking for a donation or just remaining silent.
Results were that asking for donations, i.e. social pressure, increased donations by 75 per
cent,  but  also  led  to  a  dramatic  level  of  avoidance  (cp.  Diamond  and  Noble  2001).
Conversely,  people feeling guilty for having violated a norm are more generous (Basil,
Ridgway, and Basil 2006).
It can thus be quite safely assumed that our social budget is limited. We focus on
spending  and  not  on  the  good  that  has  been  achieved  by it,  as  results  are  generally
unobservable and not relevant for our own well-being. Finally, it seems that the budget is
more influenced by absolute than by relative figures, meaning that amounts donated will
not increase proportionately with rising income (Piff et al. 2010). 
123
Whatever the reasons for this behaviour, it constitutes a severe problem for Peter
Singer's project.  If the amount of donations per persons is limited in this way, a sharp
increase in  donations seems impossible.  Singer  (2009a, ch.  4) as well  as several  other
advocates of the idea of a culture of giving, such as Peter Unger (1996) or New York Times
journalist  Nicholas  Kristof  (2007),  argue  that  we  can  make  use  of  the  results  of  the
research on donor behaviour and fundraising to increase donations. And indeed, as will be
attempted to show in the following chapters, there are some ways in which a gentle nudge
can  make  giving  easier.  For  example  Liu  (2011)  proposes  that  we  reframe  calls  for
donations by also asking for time and not only for money. An example would be to donate
the results of one hour of work per month or week. Liu shows that individuals tend to be
more optimistic about the amount of time they will have available in the future than about
the amount of money. Campaigns reframing their donations in terms of donating working
hours, as the British non-profit “80,000 hours”, could therefore increase the total amount of
donations.
But  other  psychological  barriers  to  giving  are  not  so  easily  overcome.  Singer
(2009a, 64ff.) advises the use of social pressure as a tool to increase donations. But as the
already  mentioned  natural  experiment  by  Andreoni,  Rao,  and  Trachtman  (2011)  from
above and our intuition indicates, people react to social pressure not  automatically with
increasing their donations, but rather with avoidance. The well-meaning idealist, who takes
Singer's advice to heart and speaks openly about giving and tries to motivate his friends to
act accordingly, may very well find himself ostracised for his efforts. 
However, if done rightly, campaigning seems to pay off in the long run (cp. Radtke
2007). Without the serious effort to inform and convince people, activism will decay and
donating will decrease. The right way to  inform and motivate people has therefore to be
found. Additionally, it is important that the effort is not limited to donating or increasing
development aid. This is the easiest way to help, and it can be very effective. But as has
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been indicated in part I and will be tried to show in part 4, only the establishing of just and
inclusive national and international political and economic institutions will lead to a long
term solution.
Other  findings about altruist behaviour  are quite easily applicable in fundraising
(Andresen,  McKee,  and  Rovner  2010  and  2011).  For  it  has  become  more  and  more
apparent that convincing donors has less to do with proof of efficiency and statistics, but
rather  with good storytelling and presenting a single,  identifiable, and relatable victim.
However, in the light of the stability of total donations and of mental accounting, this will
not necessarily increase the total of revenues gained, but rather increase competition for
existing donations among organisations. 
NGOs thus find themselves in a situation of competing for limited donations, a
competition in which not the most  effective one wins, but rather the one that is best at
presenting and pushing emotional buttons, and who is willing and able to  supply large
resources to win this competition.  This may be called  the  Machiavellian problem, as for
fundraising – as well as for the  Principe – appearance  seems to matter more than actual
efficacy. It pays for INGOs to act like show-offs, spending a lot of resources on securing
resources with diverse fundraising methods, making use of all the  mechanisms described
above, for example by showing a single hungry named baby (Cameron and Haanstra 2008,
Dogra 2012, Gharib 2015, Kennedy and Hill 2010, and Plewes and Stuart 2006). This is
fuelled by the tendency of many donors to give to charity for the sake of their reputation or
to calm their bad conscience. But donors do only care little about demonstrated efficiency
(Bowman  2006,  Sargeant  and  Hudson  2008,  and van  Iwaarden  et  al.  2009). Similar
instances have been observed when it comes to corporate giving. The tobacco giant Philip
Morris infamously spend more on advertising its charitable giving than actually donating
(Baines 2014, ch. 1). Additionally, there are instances of corporations using donations to
secure only public goodwill and ensure their access to developing countries' market and
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influence regulations in their favours (McGoey 2015, 226ff.).
While presenting great difficulties to the feasibility of Peter Singer's solution to
world  poverty,  this  problem – of  the  doubtful  orientation  of  many donors  –  might  be
surpassable. What Arneson (2009, 267) calls Singer's “moral vice” is still binding, because
Singer addresses us as individuals who are responsible for other individuals in need of
help. In  doing  so,  he sets  up  the  normative  “rule”  or  “requirement”  that  there  is  an
individual obligation to save as many human lives as possible. As noted in chapter 3.2., the
mechanisms that govern our donating behaviour are currently being researched and the
results might allow to reach larger portions of the population and motivate them to donate. 
After all, this is exactly the Machiavellian plan that underlies Singer's publication
of the book The Life you can Save and creation of the website “Giving What You Can”.
But, the fickleness of donors shows that this is not necessarily the main solution. If the
discussed normative claims hold, an international solidarity taxation system might imposed
to contribute to the fight against poverty, may be the way forward.71 
3.7. The Tragedy of the Forgotten Disaster – Limited Attention
“Common sense would dictate that the larger the disaster, the greater the media
attention  and the more generous the response. That was certainly the case with the
tsunami. But it is not, unfortunately, a universal rule. Research across a range of
disasters reveals that there is no clear link between death tolls and media interest.
Rather Western self-interest gives journalists a stronger steer.”
International Federation of the Red Cross (2006, 8).
“Western self-interest is the pre-condition for significant coverage of a humanitarian
71 For example through a Tobin tax, which would be an international financial transaction tax.
126
crisis.” 
CARMA (2006, 5).
Humanitarian catastrophes can touch the public emotionally and increase annual donations
above the usual. But unfortunately, this benevolence is very unreliable. The phenomenon
of the  tragedy of the forgotten disaster  refers to the unequal distribution of both media
attention  and  donations  to  different  humanitarian  catastrophes  (The  Economist  2003,
International  Federation  of  the  Red  Cross  2006,  and  CARMA  2006).  While  some
catastrophes can generate high public and media interest and subsequently donations, often
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Figure 3: Overview of Resources Needed and Resources Pledged per Country
(Source World Disaster Report of the Red Cross 2006, 179).
even surpassing  what  is  effectively needed,  others  remain  severely  under-reported and
underfunded. Figure 3, taken from the World Disaster Report of the Red Cross (2006, 179),
illustrates  this  for  the  year  2005,  contrasting  estimation  of  needed  funds  per  affected
individual with actual donations. The calculation includes both private and government
contributions. Some disasters,  most notably the Indian Ocean Tsunami with nearly five
times the amount required, have been able to generate far more donations than needed.
Contrary to this,  other disasters, such as the war in  the Sudan region of Darfur or the
flooding in the Central African Republic, were neglected.
Both the International Federation of the Red Cross (2006) as well as the CARMA-
report (2006) evaluate that there appears to be no link between media interest and the scale
of people affected or victimized by a natural disaster.  What  they  rather identify as the
crucial variable is the threat perceived to Western lives or economic interests. It appears
quite understandable that disasters in Western countries such as the 2005 hurricane Katrina
in Louisiana (USA), or the 1997 “Oderflut” – the high flood of the Oder River in Poland
and in  Eastern  Germany –  generate  more  interest  within  the  country,  even if  there  is
comparatively little loss of lives. Yet the sheer  disproportion is quite shocking. Analysing
media  reports  in  eight  different  countries,  CARMA found  1.035  articles  dealing  with
Katrina,  with  only  half  of  that  number  (508  articles)  dealing  with  the  Indian  Ocean
Tsunami,  and  even  less  with  the  Darfur  crisis  (312  articles),  although  the  latter  both
claimed one hundred times as many human lives as the Atlantic cyclone. Similar results are
found for TV airtime covering catastrophes (MSF 2006 and International Federation of the
Red Cross 2006, 14).72
This can be partly explained with the  geo-cultural bias (which will be discussed
later  in  this  chapter).  Volition  to  donate  depends  on  sympathy  for  the  victims, and
sympathy  increases  when  a  connection  to  the  victim  is  established,  for  example  by
72 Sheer spectacularity of the disaster may also play a part (cp. Lauer 2010 and Sundby and Pawar 
2008). Floods or droughts do not appear very threatening and do not provide the highly dramatic imagery that
tsunamis, earthquakes, or volcano eruptions do.
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nationality  (The  Economist  2003).  When  a  catastrophe  claims  Western  lives,  media
attention is high and the Western public especially generous. The perception of reality in
some  media  is  quite  self-absorbed.  For  example  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Indian  Ocean
Tsunami, 175.000 were dead and 2.4 million displaced, but 40 per cent of Western media
coverage focused on affected Western tourists (CARMA 2006, 7). From a purely pragmatic
standpoint, the presence of these tourists was a blessing for the native people affected, as it
ensured a steady flow of both sympathy and donations.73
A likewise forgotten, or at least underfunded, disaster  –  due to competition from
other catastrophes and geo-cultural bias – were the 2010 Pakistan floods. The victims had
the bad luck of their fate being overshadowed by the horrifying Haiti earthquake, through
which the  charitable  impulse  was  already  sated.  Moreover,  many donors  were  quite
reluctant to donate to a  Muslim country because of the image-problem of Muslims and
Islam after  terrorist  attacks  on  the  World  Trade  Center  (Der  Spiegel  Online  2010 and
Tisdall and Rahman 2010). Muslim communities gave quite generously, for example those
in Germany, as did Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, but overall donations still fell
short of the needs estimated (Retterath 2010 and Rogers 2010). 
Media attention can have a dramatic effect on giving, as it visualises the suffering
of the victims and is often coupled with a direct or indirect appeal to donate (Brown and
Minty 2008).74 As Brown and Minty (2008) show by using data of online donations, an
additional minute of news coverage increases average daily donations for a typical relief
agency  by 13.2 per cent. Comparably, a 700-word story in the  New York Times or  Wall
Street Journal raises donations by 18.2 per cent of the daily average. Unfortunately, the
attention span of both the public as well  as the media that depend on it  is  short-lived
(Benthall 2010). After a certain time span, articles and reports, and subsequently donations,
73 A more recent example is the disproportionate attention for the 17 victims of Islamic terrorism in 
France (Paris) in comparison to the more than 2.000 murdered by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Shearlaw 2015).
74 The importance of visualising the victims and reporting individual tragedies to induce charitable 
giving will be further discussed when presenting the identified victim effect, the geo-cultural bias, and 
storytelling as a fundraising technique.
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trickle out, sometimes even before sufficient resources have been accumulated to address
the crisis (CARMA 2006, 6). This short attention span is cut even shorter when a second
disaster occurs,  and this new disaster will have serious trouble securing resources, as the
altruistic initiative is depleted, and with it the volition to donate. Consequently, protracted
conflicts, slow-onset catastrophes, and chronically vulnerable populations – for example in
drought–prone regions such as South Sudan or North Ethiopia – are especially unlikely to
mobilise aid (International Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 21ff., 34ff., and 189f.).
There are several additional reasons why a disaster may be forgotten (International
Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 13ff.). People tend to donate less in politically difficult
situations. Particularly victims of conflicts and civil wars, such as the conflict in Darfur,
which has lasted over several years,  or the current crisis in the Ukraine,  will receive less
help.  In  complex  political  situations,  it  is  not  clear  who  the  “good  guys”  are,  which
facilitates donor mistrust and victim blame (Fritzen 2014 and Zagefka et al. 2011). Other
humanitarian crises, such as the 1973 famine in Ethiopia or the 1994-1998 famine in North
Korea,  were kept secret by the respective  governments,  because hunger  was  used as a
political weapon, and foreign influence was not desired (De Waal 2011, 106ff. and 112ff.,
The Economist 2003, Keneally 2011, 101ff., and Patel and Delwiche 2002).
As the Red Cross report points out, several measures can be taken to help victims of
forgotten disasters. A first effort could be to increase their visibility. One can always appeal
to the integrity and impartiality of journalists, and some will certainly follow, and NGOs
can  use  publicity  stunts  to  create  public  attention  for  a  forgotten  crisis  (International
Federation of the Red Cross 2006, 15ff. and 19). Yet, media will still be bound by public
interest. The danger of attention seeking stunts is that they can become disconnected from
their  actual  goal,  which  makes  them merely  self-referential.  This  phenomenon will  be
attempted  to  demonstrate  by  the  example  of  the  KONY 2012  campaign  later  in  this
chapter.
130
A  more  promising  approach  would  be  to  focus  on  disaster  prevention  and
strengthen communal disaster funds, such as the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)
of  the  Red  Cross  and  the  Red  Crescent  (ibid.,  34ff.  and  188f.).  While  the  fund  was
originally devised to provide fast  relief  in emergency situations,  so that the Red Cross
could start  helping  without  having  to  wait  for  official  and  private  donors,  it  has
increasingly been used to provide aid in the case of minor and underfunded emergencies.
However,  while  this  is  a  laudable  idea,  the  resources  of  the  DREF  are  limited.  Its
endowment is around €10 million,  which is far too little to provide adequate relief on its
own, especially in years with several large catastrophes, as happened in 2005 or 2010. 
A major problem is that most donations, especially in the case of a humanitarian
disaster, are tied or dedicated. This means that when an individual or a governmental body
donates  funds for  a  particular  emergency,  the  organisation  is  obliged  to  use  the  funds
accordingly.  While this  may reduce misuse,  the problem of partiality and inequality in
international poverty relief is exacerbated by this practice, especially as most organisations
continue to accept donations even after the needed amount has been collected, arguing that
this  money can always be well  used.  However,  this  results  in “using up recklessly the
scarce resource of altruistic motivation” (Phelps 1975, 22). Not only can this largesse lead
to unnecessary spending and misuse, but the funds are also direly missing in other places
(Carstens  2011 and  The Economist  2003).  It  could  also be said  that  donors  are  being
misled. Only Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is exemplary here, as they stop taking tied
donations  and  actually  inform  people  to  stop  donating  once  the  necessary  funds  are
reached (Redfield 2013).
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A very recent example of this is the reaction of donors and governments to the
recent refugee crisis. According to the OECD European countries now spend nine per cent
of their  foreign aid on hosting refugees (OECD 2016).  As the British newspaper “The
Guardian” (Jones 2015) analyses, European donor countries spent a net total of $131.6
billion on aid in 2015, with $12 billion addressed “in-donor refugee costs”, up from $6.6 
billion in 2014. This means that a large share of aid money is spend within these very
countries. Unfortunately, foreign aid depends largely on political and economic interests or
country ties, as will be discussed in chapter 3.9. and part 4. As the newspaper “Die Zeit”
shows,  the  German  donors  follow  suit,  with  a  large  part  of  private  donations  being
redirected towards  refugees,  while  other  projects  and causes  receive less  attention and
donations (Rehage 2015). This points towards a worrying conclusion: If willing donors are
easily distracted not by need and more importantly, good solutions, but by media attention
and psychological biases, the attempt of establishing a culture of giving will be much more
difficult than sketched out by Singer. In the following chapters, more barriers to giving and
biases  will  be  presented.  A  worrying  tendency  of  self-reinforcing  and  self-fulfilling
prophecies  will  become  apparent,  which results  in  poverty  becoming  perceived  as  a
perpetual feature of some regions of the world, and especially of Africa (Darnton and Kirk
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Figure 4: Development of Aid from 2000 to 2015, Including 
Spending on Refugees (Source OECD 2016).
2011).75 Combined with a lack of media attention, this can easily lead to donor fatigue and
a general lassitude in the fight against poverty.
3.8. The Identifiable Victim-Effect
“Without individuals we see only numbers, a thousand dead, a hundred thousand 
dead, “casualties may rise to a million”. With individual stories, the statistics 
become people – but even that is a lie, for the people continue to suffer in numbers 
that themselves are numbing and meaningless. Look, see the child's swollen, 
swollen belly and the flies that crawl at the corners of his eyes, this skeletal limbs: 
will it make it easier for you to know his name, his age, his dreams, his fears? To 
see him from the inside? And if it does, are we not doing a disservice to his sister, 
who lies in the searing dust beside him, a distorted distended caricature of a human 
child? And there, if we feel for them, are they now more important to us than a 
thousand other children touched by the same famine, a thousand other young lives 
who will soon be food for the flies' own myriad squirming children?
We draw our lines around these moments of pain, remain upon our islands, and they
cannot hurt us. They are covered with a smooth, safe, nacreous layer to let them 
slip, pearl-like, from our souls without real pain.
Fiction allows us to slide into these other heads, these other places, and look out 
through other eyes. And then in the tale we stop before we die, or we die 
vicariously and unharmed, and in the world beyond the tale we turn the page or 
close the book, and we resume our lives. A life that is, like any other, unlike any 
other.”
Neil Gaiman (2001, 345).
75 A poignant analysis of this “danger of a single story” has been made by the author Chimamanda 
Ngozie Adichie in a TED-talk (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9Ihs241zeg).
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“There is a distinction between an individual life and a statistical life. Let a 6-year-
old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an operation that will prolong
her life until Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels and dimes
to save her. But let it be reported that without a sales tax the hospital facilities of 
Massachusetts will deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in 
preventable deaths — not many will drop a tear or reach for their check-books.”
Thomas Schelling (1968, 144).
We are much more likely to help an unknown, but identifiable individual than to donate to
help a group of people.  This  is referred to as the  identifiable victim-effect  (Greene and
Haidt 2002, Greene 2007, 43ff, Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b, 2007, and 2011, Slovic
2007,  Small  and  Loewenstein  2003,  and  Small,  Loewenstein,  and  Slovic  2007).
Identifiable  victims  seem to  produce  a  stronger empathic  response,  accompanied  by  a
higher willingness to make personal sacrifices to provide aid (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997,
236).  The idea that human beings, against all economic rationality, differentiate between
individual and statistical lives is quite self-evident and has been proven empirically several
times.76 
Our minds generally are not good at statistics, but at recognising human faces and
emotions (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). An identifiable victim increases  the emotional
reaction, thus increasing donations (Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b, and 2007). It seems
76 An often cited example in this context is the then eighteen–month old Jessica McClure, who in 1987
spent 58 hours trapped in a well. Americans responded with sympathy, a tremendous rescue effort, and 
money. Even after Jessica was rescued, the McClures received over $700.000 in donations. At the time, there 
was no question that everything possible should and would be done to rescue the child. Cost was no object. If
similar resources were spent on preventative health care for children, hundreds of lives could be saved (Jenni 
and Loewenstein 1997, 235). A more recent example is the bullying of 68-year-old bus driver Karen Klein, 
who was verbally harassed by a group of middle schoolers on their way home from Athena Middle School in 
Greece, New York. After the video of this scene was uploaded to YouTube by a student who had filmed it on 
the bus, people started to donate. The amount given far exceeded the expectations of Max Sidorov, who had 
started the drive with the goal of raising $5.000 to send Klein on vacation. A campaign raised $700.000, 
which was handed to Klein, enabling her to retire from her job (Huffington Post 2012). While we do not 
begrudge Mrs. Klein her good fortune, this money could have improved a lot more lives if donated to Oxfam 
or used to implement an anti-bullying campaign.
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that our empathic capacities are limited, as Paul Slovic (2007) demonstrates in his article
Psychic Numbing and Genocide. The ability of people to realize and discriminate a change
in a physical stimulus diminishes, as the magnitude of the stimulus increases.77 People also
exhibit a diminished sensitivity in valuing lifesaving interventions against a background of
increasing numbers of lives at risk. These findings suggest that the cause of the identifiable
victim-effect is the relative size of the reference group compared to the number of people
at risk. Identified victims constitute their own reference group, 100 per cent of whom will
die if steps are not taken to save them. If I know about one and a half year-old Jessica
McClure's almost certain death, I am more compelled to act than when I hear about malaria
annually killing half a million African children in a population of 1.2 billion (WHO 2012,
xiv and 59ff.).
This psychological oddity is known and (ab-)used by INGOs and the media. I am
referring to the presentation of individual children and young mothers by name and with
their history on INGO posters and in media coverage, often referred to as “human interest”
stories.
Already presenting two children instead of only one makes a difference (Kogut and
Ritov 2011, 135). When the number of children presented was increased and a whole group
was shown, the rate of donations fell even further. Singer himself uses this effect in his
drowning child-example. The normative problem arising here is, of course, whether or not
we can be taught to value lives consistently, as Singer wants us to.78 But how high is the
possibility  that  we  can  surpass  our  emotional  apparatus  and  our  evolutionary
programming? We have to ask ourselves if  we really  can subscribe to the principle of
equality in such a way. 
This bias is particularly perfidious, as –  contrary to the other biases presented  –
there is a negative effect of enlightening education. In a series of field experiments, Small,
77 “[T]he statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the 
true meaning of such atrocities. The numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action”
Slovic (2007, 2). 
78 This question intensely preoccupies Kogut and Ritov (2011, 143).
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Loewenstein, and Slovic 2005a; 2005b showed that elucidating people about this bias had
perverse effects: “[I]ndividuals gave less to identifiable victims but did not increase giving
to statistical victims, resulting in an overall reduction in caring and giving. Thus, it appears
that, when thinking analytically, people discount sympathy towards identifiable victims but
fail  to  generate  sympathy toward  statistical  victims.”  (Small,  Loewenstein,  and  Slovic
2005a and 2005b)
The identifiable victim effect helps  to understand why in the field of third world
poverty relief, child-sponsorship agencies are the most successful in eliciting funds from
the public (Plewes and Stuart 2007, 30, Stern 2013a, and Westhead 2013). This points
towards possibilities of actually using the effect to the benefit of INGOs: They need to
present a single person in a donation plea and tell his or her story as exemplary. However,
this  solution  can  also  give  rise  to  misuse,  and  child-sponsorship  agencies may  not
necessarily be the most effective organisations in respect of poverty relief in developing
countries. An over-reliance on images of children in fundraising easily becomes “poverty
porn”, and if too many organisations make use of this  imagery, it  could  easily lead to
overstimulation  and  donor  fatigue  (Moeller  1999,  Suski  2009,  and  Plewes  and  Stuart
2006). The problem is, however, that drastic  images still work best, because they target
emotions and are easily recognised. They are an already accepted “branding”.
3.9. The Geo-Cultural Bias
Research by Alesina and Dollar  (2000) shows that  nations,  as  well  as individuals  (cp.
chapter 2.2.), give preferential treatment to geographically and culturally close countries.
For example, their research indicates that most donor countries give more aid to recipient
countries with whom they have a long shared, often colonial,  experience, as well as to
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countries that share political positions with Western countries as measured by their voting
behaviour in the United Nations. Neumayer  (2003b) confirms the finding with respect to
former colonial status.  
Donors – as well as their nations – empathize more and show more willingness to
give to people they see as culturally or geographically close, i.e. if they perceive to have
some kind of connection with the victim (Small 2011, 150ff.). This is a  sympathy bias,
meaning that we feel more sympathetic and relate easier to people that we perceive as
“close to us”. This applies to geographical, cultural, and social closeness (Small 2011). 
A study by the Max Planck Institute observing donations to beggars in Moscow
trains showed that ethnic Russians were more likely to receive alms from their compatriots,
despite the demanding behaviour of Russian beggars in comparison to other ethnic groups
(Butovskaya et al. 2000). Baron and Szymanska (2011, 225f) present further evidence for
this.  An interesting observation can be made by just  switching on the television: After
reporting a disaster or catastrophe in a foreign country, most media pay special attention to
whether citizens of their own country are involved in the tragedy. This also relies to the
fact that we empathise more with our fellow countrymen.
The  geo-cultural bias is further confirmed by moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt
(2001) and Joshua Greene (2007). Experiments, in which test subjects were presented with
moral dilemmas, show that the moral response towards cases that were perceived as close
up and personal was a lot stronger than with cases perceived as distant or impersonal. 
On the aggregate level, Neumayer (2003b and 2003c) finds that the positive effect
that  colonial  experience  has  on  the  receipt  of  aid  by individual  donors  holds  true  for
aggregate  bilateral  and  multilateral  aid  flows  as  well.  As  already  mentioned,  there  is
evidence  that  most  donors  give  more  if  the  recipients'  countries  were former  colonies
(Alesina  and  Dollar  2000,  Angulo  2004  and  Neumayer  2003a).  The  same  is  true  of
recipients from countries that share political positions with Western countries, as measured
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by  their  voting  behaviour  in  the  United  Nations  (Bølstad  2011  and  Olson  2000).
Additionally, Neumayer (2003a) also found that some donors give more aid to recipients in
countries  that  are  geographically  close,  and  practically  all  donors  give  more  aid  to
recipients in countries that import a high share of the donor country's exports. 
Closeness  – geographical,  political  or  cultural  –  can  still  be positive and has  a
positive impact related to the votes received by politicians involved in aid policy. This line
of reasoning can be found in a series of publications on aid, including McDonnell et al.
(2003)  and  the  work  of  Gloria  Angulo  (2004)  and  Marc  Stern  (1998),  expressing  the
opinion that there is a positive relationship between a government and its spending of aid.
A similar belief is found in the report “The Reality of Aid” (ROA 2010). 
As well as any other biases, the geo-cultural bias leads to a distortion of attention
and subsequently of donation away from real need and good possibility to aid. It is based
on morally insignificant factors. We have already seen that addressing these biases can be a
two-edged sword,  as it reduces overall sympathy and helping behaviour. In the case of
sympathy biases, research indicates that social relations rather than geographical proximity
are most important in increasing helping behaviour after natural disasters. According to
Allport's  (1979) contact  hypothesis,  a  social  connection can simply be formed through
meeting people. This means that popular spots among Western tourists, such as Thailand or
Indonesia,  can hope for or even rely on the support of international donors,  while other
regions will be ignored and forgotten (Levine and Thompson 2004). Importantly, though,
this sympathy is again neither led by concerns of fellow humanity nor efficiency.
3.10. Victim Blame
When faced with disasters that we perceive to have a human cause, we tend to negate
responsibility to help. This bias is a variant of the attribution bias, which leads us to assign
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other people's problems and misfortunes to their bad choices, whereas in similar situations
claiming bad luck for ourselves (Kelley 1967). Zagefka et al. (2011) show that decisions of
whether or not to donate to victims of disasters are influenced by the perceived cause of a
disaster. Donors were systematically more reluctant to donate to victims of disasters which
they thought to have a human cause rather than a natural one. This was to no small extent
due to the fact that donors tended to perceive victims of humanly caused disasters as being
more blameworthy and less pro-active in helping themselves.
 People form less positive impressions of victims of humanly caused events than of
victims of natural disasters.  These findings are troubling.  People seem to  systematically
and quite comfortably making moral judgements and attributing blame and inability or
unwillingness of self-help, due to irrelevant  or unreliable  information. One may call this
blaming the victim. But victims of government corruption or of a genocide79 do not suffer
less and are not less innocent than victims of a natural disaster. The problem is worse when
these judgements are made on very sparse information. There seems to be a heuristic in
place that quickly distinguishes between “good” and “bad” victims.80 
Zagefka et al. (2011, 361f) propose an interesting explanation for this phenomenon:
the “just world belief”-hypothesis (cp. Lerner 1980). According to this hypothesis, people
tend to believe in a just world, in which “everything happens for a reason”. Therefore it is
opportune to blame victims whenever  possible, and humanly caused events present more
opportunities for victim blame, which can then be stretched to include additional aspects
such as passivity (cp. Boltanski 2007, 201). Appelbaum (2002) shows that belief in a “just
world”,  in which pains and blessings are  the results of previous bad or good individual
behaviour or actions, reduces readiness in German students to aid out-group members and
leads to judging them more harshly. 
These  insights  can help to explain the  difference in donor and media attention to
79 Two of the examples used in the studies.
80 People perceive victims of humanly caused events in more negative terms even when there is no 
information available about the victims' blameworthiness or self-helping efforts (Zagefka et al 2011, 361).
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various humanitarian catastrophes.81 The researchers themselves (Zagefka et al. 2011, 362)
see the utility of their research primarily in the informing of charities and NGOs on how to
target their relief appeals more effectively and to avoid “forgotten” victims by addressing
and counteracting biases, for example by stressing the victims' effort to help themselves
and by explaining the innocence of the civilian victims of an armed conflict.82 But it is
doubtful whether this strong and very general tendency to blame the victims can be fully
overcome this way.
This bias can be particularly problematic, as victims of disasters and civil war may
actually display passive behaviour, combined with lack of energy and activity, due to their
psychological  trauma (Hausmann 2006,  chp. 4  and 10).  Similarly,  hunger  may lead to
passive behaviour, as the body shuts down to conserve energy (Keneally 2011, 12ff.). 
Additionally,  Mani  et  al.  (2013) find  that  financial  stress  may impair  cognitive
function,  leading to bad choices.  In a series of experiments,  the researchers tested 464
sugarcane farmers in India and found that a person preoccupied with money problems
exhibited a drop in cognitive function similar to a 13-point dip in IQ, or the loss of an
entire  night's  sleep.  The  explanation  put  forward  is  that  the  cognitive  “bandwidth”  is
occupied by the constant and all-consuming effort of coping with the immediate effects of
having too little  money,  such as  scrounging to  pay bills  and  cutting costs.83 This  may
explain why poor people sometimes exhibit lack of judgement, which further perpetuates
poverty and serves the affluent as rationale for not helping them (e.g. by donating). 
A 2014 survey by the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung” on German donor
behaviour  among  NGOs  illustrates  this  and  the  previous  geo-cultural  sympathy  bias
81 This is inexplicable by the number or people suffering, e.g. if we compare the aforementioned sparse
donor reaction to the 2009 Pakistani flood with the much more significant donor effort to the South Asian 
Tsunami of 2004 (Baker 2005). It can also explain why Peter Singer quite deliberately uses the innocent 
child in his appeal.
82 This, however, can be difficult. Polman (2008, 120) explains that the refugee warrior is one of the 
new realities of the modern civil war. She estimates that between 15 and 20 per cent of refugee camp 
inhabitants today may be militia or army members that use the camps to obtain free food and shelter. They 
use the civilian refugees as human shields and often extort money from them and/or from the resident aid 
organizations.
83 For a detailed analysis of the negative effects of poverty on cognitive capabilities see Mullainathan 
and Shafir 2013.
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(Fritzen  2014).  The  survey found  that  volition  to  donate  in  a  conflict  was  especially
powerful if there was an identifiable “bad guy”, such as the Islamic State (IS), or if there
were evidently victims of natural disasters, such as the previously discussed Indian Ocean
Tsunami or the 2014  typhoon Haiyan. For more complex situations, such as the Syrian
civil war or the Ukraine conflict, volition to donate is comparatively low. The “Diakonie
Katastrophenhilfe”, a German  Protestant relief organisation, received three million Euro
for Iraq, but only €400.000 for Ukraine. Relief for victims of Ebola was surprisingly low
with €41.000. As the article explains, this was probably a result of lacking images of the
victims due to the danger of infection. But pictures of victims are essential to fundraising,
due to the aforementioned identified victim effect (cp. Fritzen 2014 and Regev and St John
2014). 
Additionally, the tragedy of the outbreak was overshadowed by other events. Some
good news came from the German Red Cross which collected €30.000 Euro within two
weeks after opening a donations account. Similar results apply for the German chapter of
Caritas International which collected five million Euro for its work in northern Iraq, but
only €100.000 for Ukraine, and €11.000 for the fight against Ebola. The alliance of several
German relief organisations “Aktion Deutschland hilft” (German for “Campaign Germany
helps”) was able to collect €4.2 million for northern Iraq in less than two months, more
than they were able to collect in a  two-year time span  for Syria (€3.8 million). For the
victims  of  the  typhoon  Haiyan,  donors  entrusted  33  million  Euro  to  the  organisation
“Aktion Deutschland hilft”.
The  survey  shows  how  difficult  it  is  to  predict  the  outcome  of  a  fundraising
campaign. For example Ukraine should have profited more from the geo-cultural bias, and
it  is  surprising how little  the media attention for Ebola translated into donations,  even
though several campaigns  were started to increase awareness and reach donors, among
them a  re-release  of  the  “Do They Know It's  Christmas?”  song,  which  had raised  £8
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million  for  famine  relief  in  Ethiopia  in  1984  (Ellis-Petersen  2014).  Even  NGOs
specialising on medical care such as MSF received only $5.5 million in donations globally
by October 2014 (Regev and St John 2014). 
However, that  the ability to predict donations is still  extremely low only further
increases the  problem of not being able to react adequately. If INGOs were capable to
somewhat accurately predict the outcome of a fundraising campaign, they could adapt their
strategies  accordingly,  for  example  by  asking  for  more  government  support  or  by
transferring resources  from popular  to  less  popular  causes.  As  it  is, governments  are
subject to sympathy and media pressure as well, which aggravates the problem.
3.11. Dispersion of Responsibility
If there are others around who are able to help, the so-called dispersion of responsibility
makes it less likely that we will help, especially if we do not see the others helping, which
seems paradoxical (Latané and Darley 1968, 1969, and 1970, 58ff and 101ff, Latané and
Rodin  1969,  Boos,  Kolbe,  and  Kappeler  2011,  and  Levine  and  Thompson  2004).
Conversely, a single person is much more likely to help (e.g. rescue the child  in Singer's
well known example) as it is clear that he or she should do something (concept of personal
responsibility). This bias is also called the Kitty Genovese- or bystander-effect, due to the
case of a New York murder, when 37 people heard the cries of the murder victim, but no-
one called the police (Singer 2009a, 53f.). Cambridge psychologist John M. Doris explains
the effect  as follows  (2012, 538): “The presence of others meant that no individual was
forced to bear the full responsibility for intervention.” He adds that “mild social pressures
can result in neglect of apparently serious ethical demands.” Thus a feedback loop of social
inaction is created.84 
84 It would be interesting to compare this effect with results gained by the Milgram experiment on 
deference to authority (Milgram 1963, also cp. Zimbardo 2007).
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Boos  et  al.  (2011,  5f.)  define  the  bystander-effect  as  a  problem of  group
coordination. Hominid evolution required groups to maintain cohesion and act collectively
in order to achieve common goals. This led to the emergence of mechanisms of collective
decision-making. Unfortunately, these mechanisms may fail in ethically important cases. If
nobody  helps,  we  presume  that  a  group  consensus  has  been  established  not  to  help,
especially in cases  in which  the situation is interpreted as ambiguous (Clark and Word
1972). This mechanism of collective decision-making can also explain the rush of helpers
which often occurs, once a first person has started to help (Levine and Crowther 2008).
Singer's (2009a, 64ff.)  interpretation is that people are more likely to give if they
know that others are giving, too. Very probably, this is related to the human desire for
social  acceptance  and  fairness.  People  will  withhold  their  donations  until  others  have
given, signalling that donating is the socially adequate way to behave (Nelson and Greene
2003). In the worst case, this waiting and watching what others do before taking initiative
themselves can lead to a vicious circle of inaction, just as in the case of Kitty Genovese. 
Experimental designs using game theory show that once a social norm to participate
has been established, for example if a critical number of people declare that donating is the
right thing to do, social pressure will increase overall donations (cp.  Andreoni, Rao, and
Trachtman 2011). For example the dictator game, as well as games analysing public goods
allocation, show that individuals care about fairness and are angry at non-contributors or
shirkers, whom they punish, even if  it  entails  private costs (Güth,  Schmidt,  and Sutter
2007). This is probably explainable with the evolutionary need for co-operation and mutual
assistance. If the perception is that others are “playing their part”, donations will be given
more freely.85 Singer (2009a, 88ff.) therefore wants us to be “upfront about our giving”.
For this goal he created the website “The Life you can save” already mentioned, on which
he urges people to give what they can,  in effect to join a club and to sign up to donate a
85 We find this knowledge applied in several everyday situations. e.g. during charity marathons on 
television, donation clocks record the amount given by donors, and beggars always put some coins and 
banknotes in their basket to ensure that no one has the perception of being the only giver.
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specified amount of their income. Additionally, the website provides prospective donors
with  suggestions  of  especially  effective  organisations  that  can  demonstrate  their
effectiveness in combating poverty.86 
Research on this topic is still  in its infancy, but a field experiment by Khadjavi
(2014) conducted in  a barber  shop shows that  social  pressure actually seems to work.
People are more likely to act pro-socially when they have just seen that someone else does
so,  too,  e.g.  by  tipping  the  barber. As  Karlan,  List,  and  Shafir  (2011)  demonstrate,
matching grants, meaning that my personal donation will be matched by an enterprise or
by the public purse, can function as such a signal and increase donations. This is very good
news,  especially  in  combination  with  the  positive  impact  of  donating  on  personal
happiness.  Notably, “persuaded”  donations  increase  happiness  to  the  same  extent  as
voluntary ones (Anik et al. 2011 and Smith and Davidson 2014). 
Unfortunately, there are certain caveats here. First of all, as both Khadjavi (2014)
and Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011) show, this effect  primarily applies to people who are
disposed to act pro-socially. Some people will neither donate, nor, in the case of the barber
shop, give a tip. This can have several reasons. They just may be in a bad mood. As will be
tried  to  show further  on,  situationism is  an  important  factor  in  determining pro-social
behaviour. People may have exhausted their mentally allocated funds destined towards pro-
social  activity (see chapter 3.6.), or they may just belong to the part of the population
which simply is not disposed towards altruistic actions. 
As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, people may also avoid pressure by
overstating or simply lying about their contributions, as they are liable to do (Nelson and
Greene 2003, 28ff.). Social pressure might also increase the tendency to give to spectacular
causes, instead of the most efficient and important ones. Social pressure, as Andreoni, Rao,
and Trachtman (2011) demonstrated,  can also have the effect that people simply try to
avoid petitioners (also cp. Diamond and Noble 2001 and Landry et al. 2006). 
86 A similar website is “Giving what we can”, an organisation founded by Oxford philosopher Toby 
Ord. (cp. www.givingwhatwecan.org).
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However,  Singer is  probably on to something. Social  pressure and appealing to
people's  honour and responsibility has  been effective in  slowly changing social  norms
several times throughout the history of mankind (Appiah 2011).
3.12. “Moneying Around”
“Perché s'appuntano i vostri disiri
dove per compagnia parte si scema,
invidia move il mantaco a' sospiri.”
Dante Alighieri (Divina Commedia Purgatorio: Canto XV, 49-51.)
Psychological  effects  associated  with money are  highly relevant  in  the  context  of  this
thesis. Georg Simmel (1900) pointed out the increasing influence of money on society,
politics, and the individual. Simmel highlights that in the modern society, which is shaped
by  markets,  money  plays  a  central  role  in  determining  our  self-esteem  and  attitudes
towards life. So far, not enough philosophical or psychological research has been directed
towards the effects of money on our thinking and behaviour. Fortunately, this seems to be
about to change (cp. Sandel 2012). 
In good Aristotelian tradition, research seems to indicate that while having money
is good for you, preoccupation with the subject tends to decrease your happiness and to
make  you  less  sociable  (Vohs,  Mead,  and  Goode  2006).  Financial  problems  are
accompanied by a heightened risk of depression, increased stress levels, and a lower life
expectancy (Adler  and  Snibbe  2003,  Fiske  2010,  and  Mullainathan  and  Shafir  2013).
People who are greedy (i.e. “value money highly”) tend to have poorer relationships and
experience more social anxiety (Fiske 2010). As mentioned above, Mani et. al (2013) find
that financial stress may impair cognitive function, leading to bad choices.
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Vohs,  Mead,  and  Goode  (2006  and  2008)  conducted  an  enlightening  series  of
studies on the effects thinking about money can have on individual behaviour. The results
showed that even subtle reminders of money changed behaviour significantly, leading to
reduced sociability, helpfulness, and volition to donate.87 
In one experiment, the participants received two US dollars. Then, a questionnaire
unobtrusively  confronted  them  with  the  concept  of  money.  They  were  given  the
opportunity to donate part of their proceedings to a University Student Fund. Whereas the
participants in the control group gave on average 67 per cent of those two dollars, the
“money-minded students” only donated 39 per cent.
In another series of experiments, the participants who had been reminded of money
preferred more  physical distance in seating arrangements between themselves and other
participants than those who were not reminded of money. Thinking about money also leads
people on average to prefer solitary leisure activities over activities with friends or family
members. Helpfulness, measured by disposition and willingness to assist an experimenter
posing  as  a  confused  or  clumsy  participant,  also  decreased  when  participants  where
confronted with money-related cues.  At the same time,  being reminded of money lead
participants to work harder and longer.
The experimenters systematically varied whether and to what extent the concept of
money was activated in participants' minds, using different cues, for example textual ones
or visual ones such as posters and screen savers with bank notes. To resume:
“On the one hand, participants reminded of money were less helpful  than were
participants not reminded of money, and they also preferred solitary activities and
less  physical  intimacy.  On  the  other  hand,  reminders  of  money  prompted
participants to work harder on challenging tasks and led to desires to take on more
87 Studying economics seems to have a similar effect, making the students on average less cooperative 
and more likely to defect in moral dilemma situations, such as the prisoners dilemma (Frank, Gilovich, and 
Reagan 1993 and 1996, also cp. Schüssler 1991).
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work as compared to participants not reminded of money.  In short,  even subtle
reminders of money elicit big changes in human behaviour.”
Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2008, 208.
A series of experiments have been performed by Falk and Szech (2013) on the influence of
markets and monetary rewards on ethical behaviour. The participants were confronted with
the  dilemma  of  letting  a  mouse  die  and  receiving  €10  or  letting  the  mouse  live  and
receiving nothing.88 More than 40 per cent of participants were willing to engage in this
trade. Quite surprisingly, when markets are introduced and participants could barter over
the life of the mouse, willingness to let the animal die nearly doubled. Falk and Szech
(2013,  708)  theorise  that  both  dispersion  of  responsibility,  discussed  in  the  previous
chapter,  as  well  as  the  materialistic  framing  of  market  interaction  lead  to  this  moral
erosion. It primed people to think rationally and self-interestedly, not emotionally and from
the heart. 
For the context of this thesis, these results indicate two problems: The first one is
that thinking  about money will make people less likely to donate, and the second one is
that  fundraisers  cannot  avoid  mentioning  it.  Likewise,  in  a  context  of  global  markets,
dispersed responsibility for far away exploitation will be seen as less emotionally pressing. 
This bias is certainly difficult to overcome for fundraisers, as even Peter Singer
admits (2009a, 66ff.). A possible solution would be to rely on the force of reciprocity by
offering potential  donors a gift  (cp.  Cialdini  2001).  But  this  would probably lead to a
cannibalism  effect,  entail  additional  costs  for  NGOs  as  well  as  entail  certain  ethical
problems.89 Another very popular alternative that circumnavigates the need for money is
donating goods such as used clothes. However, donating clothes is obviously much less
practical for NGOs and may have negative effects on the clothing industry in developing
88 As the mouse is killed painlessly, a true Singerian could argue for accepting the money and donating
it.
89 This will be discussed further on in chapter 3.17. on fundraising methods.
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countries, as will be discussed in chapter 4.7. A plausible alternative would be to reinforce
the message that pro-social behaviour such as giving increases happiness, yet it is difficult
to estimate whether this could preclude this very problematic bias.
Money is the cause for another problem. It seems that being wealthy and having a
high social rank makes people less likely to care and donate for the needy (Piff et al. 2010).
While  rich  people  donate  more  in  absolute  terms,  measured  relatively,  they  donate
significantly less. For example in 2011, the wealthiest US citizens, with earnings in the top
20 per cent, on average donated 1,3 per cent of their income to charity. Those in the bottom
20 per  cent  donated  3,2 per  cent  of  their  income (Stern 2013a,  236 and 2013b).  This
relatively more generous behaviour is maybe underestimated. Unlike wealthy or middle-
class  donors,  people  with  a  lower  income  do  not  take  as  much  advantage of  the  tax
deduction  for  charities,  as  they  pay  less  taxes  and  often  only  profit  from  itemizing
deductions on their income-tax returns. 
Additionally, the wealthy tend to give more self-interestedly. They tend to investing
in  areas  such  as  culture  (museum,  opera,  cultural  organisations)  or  education  (elite
universities and colleges) whereas people with less income are much more likely to give to
social causes (Piff et al. 2010). The rich also donate more prestige oriented, for example in
the course of expensive charity galas or with the aim to  naming a new hospital or museum
wing after themselves (Ostrower 1995). 
Piff et al.  (2010) put forward the explanatory hypothesis that the poor are more
dependent on pro-social behaviour and cooperation, whereas the rich can afford to be more
self-reliant and autonomous. An example for this would be getting an au pair versus having
to  ask  your neighbour to babysit.  This  hypothesis is supported in a follow-up study by
Kraus, Côté, and Keltner (2010) who showed that people of higher social status, which is
intimately  based  on  and  connected  to  income,  have  problems  showing  empathy  and
recognizing other people's emotions. Interestingly, this does not seem to be a permanent
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feature, as manipulating the social class of the study subjects, for example by making them
compare themselves to even richer people such as CEOs, film stars, or footballers, led to
an increase in their empathic and emotional cognition abilities.
An additional explanation can be inferred from the results of Susan Fiske (2010),
who found that people tend to react with envy to those higher up on the social ladder than
themselves, and with scorn to those below. These negative feelings accumulate to a point
where better-off people tend to see poor people as objects  and not as subjects (Fiske and
Harris 2006 and Fiske 2010). 
A concept that can help to explain these research results is social distance (Hodgetts
et  al.  2011),  derived  from a  text  by  Georg  Simmel  (1908)  entitled  Exkurs  über den
Fremden (German for Digression on the stranger). Lack of contact with the world of the
poor  leads  to negative  reactions,  such  as  fear,  and  the  better-off more  readily  ascribe
negative  traits  such  as  laziness  to  them.  This  aspect  will  be  discussed  further  on  in
connection with the perception of far-away poverty. But the important result is that – even
in their own society – rich  people, to a certain degree, live  in a different world than  the
poor and are unsympathetic to  their daily plight. They do not understand it and tend to
blame them indifferently for the situation they are in. This can cause serious doubts on the
possibility of the rich to charitably support the poor within a society. This may be even
more difficult  in an international context.  For the comfortably well-off individual,  it  is
simply difficult and uncomfortable to breach the gap between themselves and the poor,
implying that we cannot rely on the civic core for global poverty relief.
As a way to avoid this effect of thinking about money, some propose to ask not for
money,  but  to  frame  donations  as  time  (Liu  2011).  Another  attempt  at  re-framing  is
relationship fundraising,  with new emphasis on creating an emotional rapport  with the
donor  (Haibach  2012,  20f.).  Unfortunately,  the  question  of  money cannot  be  avoided
completely, as in the end this is what fundraising is all about.
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3.13. The Elephant in the Room90 – Racism and Donations
Colonialism and  Imperialism  and  their  Aftermath  –  and  the  role  racism plays  in  this
context – has already been treated in chapter 2.10. In the following chapter, distance due to
racial stereotypes will be discussed. The influence of racism and nationalism on donations
and the willingness to support the population in developing countries needs to be addressed
here, although it is a somewhat ugly topic. Maybe due to the sensitive nature of the subject,
the  literature  here  is  sparse. To  the  author's  knowledge  no  publication  has  explicitly
addressed  the  influence  of  racial  stereotypes  on  fundraising. Even  in  the  context  of
development aid there are only rare examples: Baaz (2005), Goudge (2003), and Kothari
(2006). 
The phenomenon of nationalism essentially is another insider-outsider problem (cp.
Axelrod and Hammond 2006). Nationalists want to secure an advantage over others by
postulating  a  national  community,  whose  members  are  to  be  treated  preferentially.
Nationalism sometimes goes hand in hand with racism, when the national community is
equated with an ethnic community. Members of a nation state arguably have some special
responsibilities towards one another, and be it only because the nation state is an effective
tool  to  allocate  accountability and organise  the political  community (Goodin 1988 and
Rawls 1999). At its worst,  nationalism is the denial that all human beings are of equal
moral importance. Consequently, exploiting some of them becomes justifiable. Racists or
nationalists are consequently much less likely to donate to foreigners.
As can be extrapolated from the research of Hanna Zagefka (et al. 2011) already
mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a strong influence of the attitudes and beliefs of
donors  on  their  behaviour.  The  suggestion  is  that  these  attitudes  and  beliefs are  not
necessarily subject to rational scrutiny. A racial bias in donations should therefore not come
as a surprise. One could of course maintain the position that racist people are immoral and
90 Crewe and Fernando 2006 provided inspiration for this title.
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thus should not be included into the discussion. I would disagree for two reasons. Firstly, it
should be hoped that people with racist attitudes remain accessibly to rational argument. If
it is not possible to convince at least some people to overthink their positions, not only this
thesis, but the science of philosophy as a whole would be in serious trouble. Secondly,
several  studies,  some  of  them  presented  below,  indicate  that  racism  also  operates
subconsciously, acting as a hidden negative bias  of people who actually try to be decent
(cp. Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Raising this fact into consciousness may be worth while.
Several psychological experiments give evidence that a racial bias influences our
perception  on  the  subconscious  level.91 In  their  famous  doll  experiment,  Kenneth  and
Mamie  Clark  (1947)  observed  children's  self-perception  in  relation  to  race.92 The
experiment consisted of two hundred fifty-three African-American children aged 3 to 7
each individually being  presented  with  four  dolls,  identical  in  every respect  save skin
colour. Each child was then requested to hand the experimenter the doll they would play
with best, which doll was the nicest, had the nicest colour, and which one looked like a bad
doll. Additional questions were asked to enquire whether the child had a concept of race
(white,  coloured, or black,  in those days still  referred to as “Negro”).  A final question
determined the self-identification of the child:  “Give me the doll  that looks like you.”
(Clark and Clark 1947, 169). 
The experiment showed that the children understood the concept of race from a
very early age. As skin colour is a very easily distinguishable feature, this does not come as
a big surprise. Much more problematic was the clear preference for the white doll among
most children in the study (67 per cent), generally identified by them as being “prettier” or
“cleaner”, together with a rejection of the darker dolls as being “the bad ones” (59 per
91 Since the 1950s, this experiment has been repeated often and in different countries, for example in 
Mexico, and with different groups of children. The results with coloured children from different countries 
reinforce the original findings. Caucasian children exhibit an overwhelming preference for the white doll, and
of course they do not suffer from the cognitive dissonance effect when asked about the doll that looks like 
them (see Milner 1996).
92 In the authors' own words “the development of racial identification and preferences in Negro 
children” (Clark and Clark 1947, 169).
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cent).  The self-identification question caused some of the children distress and elicited
rationalizations or avoidance behaviour such as humour (“I look brown because I got a
suntan in the summer”,  ibid., 178). Lighter coloured children overwhelmingly chose the
white doll as a representation of themselves. 
The experiment  suggests  that  racial  distinctions,  while  being unscientific,  come
quite  naturally.  It  further  shows  that  besides  the  harmful  effect  of  discrimination,
manifesting for example in less job opportunities (cp. Bendick, Jackson, and Reinoso 1994
and  Bonilla-Silva  2014,  ch.  5),  racism can  harm the  affected  person  from the  inside,
resulting in lack of self-confidence and self-esteem (cp. Rist 1970). 
A more recent string of experiments on the pervasion of racist attitudes has been
done  with   the  Implicit  Association  Test  (IAT),  created  by  psychologist  Anthony
Greenwald and his colleagues (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). The IAT relies
on  the  theory  of  cognitive  burden,  which  assumes  that  it  is  easier  to  make  word
associations if the idea is already present sub-consciously, thus measuring the strength of
automatic  associations  already  subconsciously  present.93 In  the  test,  the  subject  is
confronted in a two-choice task with two concepts (e.g. flower names vs. insect names),
and in  a  second task  with  attributes  (e.g.  pleasant  words  vs.  unpleasant  words  for  an
evaluation attribute). In the case of easily associated categories which share a response key,
(e.g. flower + pleasant), performance is faster than with less easily associated categories
(e.g.  insect  +  pleasant)  which  do not  share  a  response key (Greenwald,  McGhee,  and
Schwartz 1998, 1464).
The uncomfortable result of several IATs conducted was that people who did not
consider themselves racist were considerably slower when they had to respond to positive
word pairing with a coloured person's image than to white-positive word pairs (e.g. white +
smart vs. black + smart). This would imply that stereotypes tend to function unconsciously.
Gaertner  and McLaughlin (1983) presented subjects  with pairs  of  letter  strings,
93 See Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998 for an in depth explanation of the IAT, also cp. 
Greenwald and Banaji 1995.
152
requesting the judgement “yes” if both were words, and “no” otherwise. Using the speed of
“yes” responses to measure the strength of existing associations between the two words in
a pair, they found that white subjects responded reliably faster. This difference did not
emerge on judgements of negative traits (e.g. white + lazy vs. black + lazy). These results
occurred similarly for subjects who scored high and for ones who scored low on a direct
measure  of  race  prejudice  (i.e.  standard  self-report).  These  results  were  interpreted  as
evidence  for  aversive  racism,  which  they  defined  as  a  conflict  “between  feelings  and
beliefs associated with a sincerely egalitarian value system and unacknowledged negative
feelings and  beliefs about Blacks”. Even worse, Kennedy and Hill (2010, 56) found out
that attempts to suppress the activated stereotype actually exaggerate later  behaviour and
raise the possibility that “viewers of aid advertising who avoid thinking stereotypically
may find that their subsequent behaviour is more strongly driven by their stereotypes of
people living in poverty than they may have wished, which in some cases can lead to
greater negativity and a reduction of support”.
This does not necessarily mean that (sub-conscious) racial biases will be with us
forever.  Kurzban,  Tooby, and  Cosmides  (2001)  from  the  Center for  Evolutionary
Psychology of the University of California point out that racism is  relatively recent in
human  history.  Their  theory  is  that  “race”  is  just  a  proxy  for  coalition  and  group
membership,  something that  was  very important  in  our  past  as  hunter-gatherers.  Their
experiments  show  that  group  membership  is  codified  independent  from race  and  can
overwrite it as primarily perceived, therefore being more important to our subconscious
cognition. Conversely, the researchers found that sex as defining feature is impossible to
erase.
The results are reinforced by Hazama (2010), who in a review on the literature on
ethnic political tolerance finds that, while on an individual level authoritarian personality
types are more vulnerable to racial stereotyping, the societal level of tolerance depends on
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various social and political factors, such as education, contact, and threat perception. Thus
it is possible for a society to reduce prejudice and increase trust between various ethnic
groups.  Especially  education can  reduce  racism  by  “disseminating  knowledge  and
information,  empowering  cognitive  capacities,  and  introducing  universal  values  and
norms” (Hazama 2010, 3 and Coenders and Scheepers 2003, 317). But the effect of these
measures  is  weaker  in  emerging  democracies,  as  liberal  values  take  time  to  permeate
through the national educational system.
Perceived competition over jobs and scarce resources between the majority and
emerging  minorities,  e.g.  through  immigration,  makes  the  majority  more  intolerant,
especially  in  times  of  economic  difficulty.94 Similarly, threat  perceived,  for  example
because of fear of terrorism, can enhance prejudice against different ethnicities. This points
towards the importance of the prevalent tone in media and the political sphere. If the tone
is one of scaremongering and crude nationalism, racism will increase.
When it comes to ethnic heterogeneity, the research finds a dual effect. On the one
hand,  frequent  contact  between  different  groups  reduces  social  distance  and  prejudice
(Hazama  2010).  Contact  improves  the  emphatic  relations  between  individuals  from
different  ethnic  and  social  backgrounds  (Allport  1979,  Hodgetts  et  al.  2011,  and  Rist
1970). This can be crucial in eliminating racial prejudices, provided that Kurzban, Tooby,
and Cosmides (2001) are right with their hypothesis that alliances trump racial biases. One
can easily imagine this paradigm shift in perception: The person in front of me is suddenly
my good friend Francis from Ghana.
On the other hand, it is well documented that prejudice and aversion will increase,
if the majority perceives a minority constantly increasing in numbers and feels endangered
of becoming supplanted (Hazama 2010, 6f.). For Germany, Semyonov et al. (2004) found
94 Actually, immigration reduces job opportunities a lot less than commonly thought, as immigrants 
mainly take up jobs that the local workers either cannot or do not want to do (Clemens 2011). They are also 
overrepresented in creating their own enterprise, thereby creating new jobs instead of taking them. Political 
opposition, racially or otherwise motivated, to immigration is quite costly for a society, as Clemens 2011 and 
McKissick and Kane 2011 show.
154
that, while the actual size of the foreign population in a “land” (one of the 16 federal states
Germany consists  of)  had  no  influence  on  either  perception  of  threat  or  exclusionary
attitudes of Germans,  the perceived size was the  key.  The larger this perceived size, the
more pronounced are both the sensed threat and the anti-foreigner attitudes. This can help
to explain the paradox of the success of right-wing parties in regions with a low density of
immigrant population (which is referred to as the paradox of xenophobia, Semyonov et al.
2006). 
This apparent intra-country effect can influence donations to people living in other
countries twofold. First, people will associate a certain ethnic appearance with immigrants
in their own country which they perceive as a menace. Second, as has arguably begun to
happen in Europe, people will increasingly see Africans as a mass herding towards Europe.
In combination with the stereotype of Africans being poor, uncivilised and child-like, this
can lead to the denial of donations for them and the rejection of responsibility for global
justice (Baaz 2005, Darnton and Kirk 2011, and Dogra 2012).
As already mentioned, research results point towards the possibility of overcoming
prejudice by education, positive contact, and dialogue. These measures could also be an
important  prerequisite  to  successful  donation  appeals  and  political  action.  Yet,  both
political action and donating may be uncomfortable, and even if  they do not directly go
against one's (apparent) self-interest, they may not serve it. The important task would then
be to inform, to educate, and to facilitate contact between the first and the third world. This
could also help to overcome the  perception of people in developing nations as passive
victims (Zagefka et al. 2011), and help people in the first or Western world to understand
what a little help and better opportunities can accomplish.
However, a further problem presents itself in fundraising if NGOs intentionally use
racial stereotypes in their donor appeals. As familiar images are more easily recognized
and retained, the use of helpless “donor darlings”, black children with big eyes and swollen
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bellies, can be quite successful. This problem will be discussed in depth in chapter 3.9. in
relation to the very successful KONY 2012 video.
What  if  racial  stereotypes  influence  the  actual  work  on  the  development  aid?
Perceived incompetence of local populations could then lead to patronising projects and to
the sending of white – and therefore more competent – development experts. This would
consume resources and  could be quite demoralizing for local workers who earn only a
fraction of the salary of their white counterparts. Several aid critics, such as Baaz 2005,
Easterly 2007b, and Goudge 2003 raise similar criticism. In their opinion, development aid
strengthens colonial style power differences, further coining and reinforcing the image of
Western competence in contrast to Southern incompetence.   This important point will be
further discussed in part  4,  in which the power differences between the givers and the
seekers of foreign aid will be scrutinized.95 
3.14. Convincing the Unconvinced – Reason versus Emotion
The biases  presented are only some of  the great  and many difficulties in establishing a
culture of giving as Singer envisions it. Even more worrying is that at least some of these
biases, for example the identified victim effect or the geo-cultural sympathy effect, are not
accessible to reason and may, if pointed out to the individual concerned, even diminish his
or her propensity for donating. The confirmation bias, often racially laced,  can reinforce
the perception of the global poor as lazy and undeserving of help. This limits the possible
scope  for  convincing  people  by  rational  argumentation.  Even  worse,  in  recent  years,
experimental ethics has given additional evidence for the position that our decision-making
95 It speaks volumes that white emigrants from Western countries are usually referred to as “ex-pats”, 
shortened for expatriate from the Latin ex patria, whereas emigrants to the West from Africa, South America,
or Asia are called immigrants (Koutonin 2015).
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process is largely dominated by our intuitions and emotions (Greene et al. 2001, Greene
and Haidt 2002, Greene 2007 and Haidt 2001 and 2007).96 
Challenging the  “rationalist  delusion”  in  the  Humean tradition,  authors  such as
Greene and Haidt argue that  our rationality is generally not used to question our (moral)
intuitions, but to justify them post hoc (Haidt 2007). As Haidt (2007, 998) puts it
“Moral reasoning, when it occurs, is usually a post-hoc process in which we search
for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction.”
Haidt illustrates this with the image of the mind as a “lawyer” who is employed to defend
an  already  pre-determined  position.  This  echoes  Nickerson's  description  of  the
confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998, 175). This concept refers to the “unwitting selectivity
in the acquisition and use of evidence” (ibid.). This leads to an overconfidence in one's
own judgement (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). Of course, the line between deliberate and
unwitting selectivity is  difficult  to  establish,  as  researchers are  not  able  to look into a
person's  head,  but  confirmation  bias  seems to  occur  subconsciously (Nickerson 1998).
Taber and Lodge (2006) show that confirmation bias leads to motivated reasoning, which
poses a problem for democracy, as it limits deliberation and political argumentation, thus
leading to the persistence of disconfirmed beliefs and to attitude polarisation, for example
in the case of gun control, climate change, or conspiracy theories. Especially conspiracy
theories are characterised by a lack  of falsifiability, as  they are  usually vague and often
self-contradictory, yet appear convincing to a large portion of the public (Sunstein 2014).
This can lead to severe societal problems. For example anti-vaccine conspiracy theories
have lead to a severe drop in vaccinations, endangering not only the lives of children of the
believers in such conspiracies, but – as vaccinations rely on herd immunity – also the lives
of others (Jolley and Douglas 2013 and 2014 and Nyhan et al. 2014). 
96 See Haidt (2007) for a summary of the evidence for intuitive primacy and post-hoc rational 
justification and Appiah (2008) for a profound discussion of the role of experiments in ethics.
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Self-fulfilling  prophecies  may also  very well  be  examples  of  confirmation  bias
(Rist 1970). In chapters 3.4., 3.6. and 3.7., the worrying tendency was discussed to blame
the poor for their poverty, especially if they are of a different “race”. Experiments confirm
that  we  perceive  and  remember  information  better  that  affirms  low  expectations  of
individuals of low socio-economic status and different ethnicities (Rist 1970). Indeed, the
surprising quickness and ease with which prospective donors attribute blame to the victims
of humanitarian catastrophes is highly problematic (Zagefka et al. 2011).
In such cases, judgements are  based only to a limited degree on reasons, as our
perception and evaluation of arguments and facts is heavily biased towards our original
position (belief persistence; Nickerson 1998, 187f). It seems that our reasoning apparatus
has trouble to accept arguments contradicting our original convictions and subsequently to
change  or  adjust  them. Thus  it  is  better  described  as  a  “machine  created  to  win  an
argument” than as an impartial judge (Greene and Haidt 2002 and Haidt 2001). 
Haidt (2001, 818) finds further proof for his thesis in behaviour he calls “moral
dumb-founding”, which he defines as “the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of a moral
judgement without supporting reasons”. In several studies, Haidt confronted subjects with
situations of “harmless yet offensive taboo violations”, asking them for their moral verdict
and the reasoning behind it (Haidt and Hersh 2001, 193, Haidt 2012, and Huppert 2010,
8f). The quite colourful scenarios included a woman cleaning a toilet bowl with the US
national banner, a family which decides to cook and eat their recently departed dog, a man
who buys a chicken at the butchers', uses it for sexual gratification, and then cooks and eats
it. Another question refers to whether or not it is morally acceptable in an emergency to use
a urinal for defecation, provided one cleans it up afterwards. Perhaps the most disturbing
story is about Mark and Julie, a vacationing adult pair of siblings. During a holiday trip
they decide to have sex, using two kinds of contraception. Although it was enjoyable and
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did not change their relationship, they afterwards decide never to do it again or talk about
it. 
In all scenarios, the descriptions  explicitly mention that no one is  being harmed,
and the researchers pointed this fact out to the participants. Nevertheless, many subjects,
especially those of low socio-economic status, judged the respective acts to be morally
wrong.  When asked why, they condemned the act  in  question and  often constructed a
narrative about some harm being done, such as contracting a disease from consuming the
dog or from having sex with a chicken carcass, or in the case of Mark and Julie a distorted
relationship or handicapped children. The phenomenon occurred and persisted, even when
the subjects were confronted with their inability to justify their judgement, and even when
they  acknowledged this. Rather they fell back to the position “such behaviour is simply
wrong”. As Huppert (2010, 9) resumes: 
“This  strongly  indicates  that  moral  judgements  are  often  not  the  result  of
consciously  weighing  reasons  for  and  against,  but  the  expression  of  quick,
unconsidered affective attitudes (i.e. moral intuitions).” 
Individuals seem have a surprisingly strong capacity of manufacturing ad hoc explanations
for sources of their actions. These results fit in well with research on the existence of a fast
and a slow reflective process (Gigerenzer 2007 and Kahneman 2011). The fast and simple
heuristics help us act in everyday situations in which many decisions have to be taken and
time, processing power, and attention span are limited (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). To
apply moral standards and to avoid violations, as has been tried to show further above, is
an integral feature of survival and cooperation. Therefore it makes sense to allocate moral
decision processes primarily to intuitive and emotional reactions.  Our  intuitive heuristics
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work fast,  effortlessly, and surprisingly well.  But there are  blind spots in our affective
moral make-up that lead us to commit errors. 
This raises disturbing problems for the possibility to convince people rationally to
donate (cp. Singer 2007 and Slovic and Västfjäll 2010). If reasoning primarily is applied to
support  whatever  judgement  has  been passed  previously,  reliance  on  rational
argumentation, such as attempted in the first part, will only get us so far. It will chiefly
convince  donors who already are ready givers, either because they have a  liberal social
mindset  or  because  they  believe  in  a  religious  duty  to  help  (Greene  2013).  More
conservative or libertarian readers will answer: “It's wrong, I just don't have to share. It is
their own responsibility to rise from poverty to affluence.”97 As Haidt (2012) and Greene
(2013) show, individuals with different political affiliations have differing values, and it is
difficult to reach a compromise. This does not mean that  such a compromise is  per se
impossible.  This illustrates that there are many and high obstacles. To reach a situation in
which enough people who can afford it donates in the sense of Singer, we will need time
and a very  open and  public discussion. A hindrance to success is, however, that global
poverty – as well as the injustice in international and economical relations between the
West  and  the  underdeveloped  countries  –  were  and  remain  fringe  topics  in  public
perception (Bølstad 2011 and Darnton and Kirk 2011). In everyday life, other concerns
seem much more important.
Both from an empirical as well as from a moral point of view, there is reason for
caution,  but  not  for  fatalism.  There  are  some  examples  of  social  and  moral  progress
throughout  history which raise  hope (Appiah 2011 and Buchanan 1996).  Attitudes and
judgements can change and improve, as has happened in the case of slavery in most parts
of  the  world,  concerning  women's  rights  in  the  developed  world, and  regarding  the
acceptance of homosexuality in the West. Steven Pinker (2011) for example is especially
optimistic about the social development from the 1950s until today, arguing that poverty
97 Two examples of conservatively motivated criticism are Badhwar's 2006 and Gordon's 1998 reviews
of Unger's “Living High and Letting Die” (1996).
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and discrimination as well as war and violence have continually decreased.  But, as reason
has  a  doubtful  stand versus  intuition  and emotion, social  progress  happens  very,  very
slowly and not without opposition and obstacles. There are reasons to believe that such a
discussion is hard to implement, even more in the fractured societies that we seem to be
developing where partisans of one group simply dismiss or reinterpret in a self-serving
way the evidence provided by members of another group, this is called “identity protective
cognition” (Kahan et al. 2013).
3.15. Convincing the Unconvinced – Situationism
In the context of altruism and charitable behaviour, another line of experiments illustrates
even  more  limits  to  rationality  and  reason.  Our  behaviour  and  decisions  are  highly
situational and context dependent (Doris 2012 and Elster 1979). People behave differently
in situations that should objectively be assessed as similar. This means that not only are the
possibilities of convincing people of changing their attitudes and behaviour towards the
global poor limited, but also much of the success of the convincing effort will depend on a
priori irrelevant factors. There are two classic studies that are especially relevant in this
context of altruism and charitable behaviour.
In 1972, Isen and Levin observed helpful behaviour towards strangers in a shopping
mall. When the unwitting participants left a phone booth, an actor went by and dropped a
folder, spilling papers. It was then recorded if the participant helped picking up the papers
or not.  Most people did not  prove to be very helpful,  only one out  of 25 assisted the
“clumsy dropper.” However, the situation changed dramatically when the phone booth was
prepared so that the unwitting participants found a dime in the change slot of the booth.
Then helping behaviour jump-started up to nearly 90 per cent.98
98 In a less frequently cited study in the same paper, the authors show that receiving a cookie 
dramatically increases helpful behaviour as well.
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Darley  and  Batson  (1973)  tested  whether  intellectually  and  narratively  primed
students would behave more pro-socially. Students were asked to participate as subjects in
an experiment and hold a lecture on the parable of the Good Samaritan or on some other
unrelated topic.  Then they were told that they had to move to another building to deliver
the talk. While crossing over to the other building, they were confronted with an actor
slumped in a doorway in apparent medical distress. If people had just  thought, read, or
prepared  to  lecture  about  the  ethical  necessity  of  helping  a  stranger  or  not  made  no
difference to their volition to help. What did, however, decrease helping dramatically was
hurrying the subjects. Fear of being late apparently makes us quite anti-social, illustrating a
worrying tendency to put societal conventions over ethical requirements.
More recent experiments demonstrate that people confronted with moral dilemmas
judge others more harshly when  these are hungry or sitting at a disorderly or dirty desk
(Haidt et al. 2008). It seems that elicited disgust leads us to judge taboo violations and
other misbehaviour more harshly. People behave extremely inconsistent here, they even
apply  double  standards.  While  they  judge  others  more  harshly,  inducing  visions  of
collective erosion of morality or referring to  the tragedy of the commons, they are more
permissive towards themselves (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993 and Haidt 2001).
On the other side of the emotional spectrum, people are more likely to help and
donate if they are in a pleasant environment, especially if they are surrounded by good
smells  such  as  the  perfume  of  a  bakery  (Baron  1997  and  Guéguen  2012).  Generally
speaking,  people in a good mood are more altruistic and also donate more (Bekkers and
Wiepking 2011 and Strahilevitz 2011). As giving and volunteering also has been shown to
improve overall happiness and well-being,  this has primed hopes of creating a positive
feedback loop. 
However, people should not be allowed to think too much about their actions, as an
experiment by Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) shows. A group of people who had
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previously expressed  their  willingness  to  donate  to  the  needy were  then  involved  into
conversations  either  about  babies,  thus  priming  their  emotional  cognition,  or  about
mathematics,  thus  priming  their  rational  side.  Those  who  where  primed  for  rational
thinking afterwards acted more self-interestedly and in the end gave less to charity. In the
light  of  these  results,  it  probably  does  not  surprise  that  acts  of  helping  are  often  not
reflective, but fast, spontaneous, and following a gut feeling. Studies on motives of the
“Righteous Gentiles” that helped Jews persecuted during the Second World War confirm
this (Gushee 1993).
The debate on situationism rages wild in modern ethics and behavioural sciences in
general  (Appiah  2008,  Greene  and  Haidt  2002,  Huppert  2010,  and  Vargas  2013).  A
tentative  result  seems  to  be  that  we  are  confronted  with  “intuitive  primacy  (but  not
dictatorship)”. But although environmental conditions have a strong influence, most of us
are able to overcome this influence if we make an adequate effort. The experiments do not
necessarily demonstrate that we are incapable of reflection and rational thought, but they
do show how easily our thinking processes can be mislead and erroneous.  Situationism
constitutes a further barrier to rational convincing people to donate. An appeal may not
work because it simply reached the intended target at the wrong time or in the wrong place.
As a reaction to this, charitable organisations have learnt a central lesson from marketing:
A constant stream of messaging must be kept up to reach people when they are in the right
mood.
But this logic, borrowed from the for profit-sector, has it's problems. As non-profit
agencies,  organisations,  and  institutions  cannot  counterbalance  their  fundraising
expenditures with the sale of a product or service, they forcibly have to use a part of the
money gathered from donations to finance additional fundraising efforts. This, as will be
attempted to illustrate in the following chapter, is very costly and takes up a considerable
part of the charities organisational capacity. 
163
3.16. Convincing the Unconvinced – Hearts before Minds
Long before Peter Singer, the fundraising industry has recognised the need to convince
people to donate by using frequent emotional appeal.99 One  of the basic tenants of the
profession is that one needs “to convince first the heart, then the head” (Andresen, McKee
and Rovner 2010, and 2011 and Haibach 2012, 20f.). 
The importance of fundraising for non-profits is illustrated by studies conducted by
Yörük,  (2009)  and  Bekkers  (2005), which  demonstrate  that  around 85 per  cent  of  all
donations  result  of  a  solicitation.  Techniques  used  include  direct  approaches  such  as
phoning or mailing, and personal  solicitations,  for example in a pedestrian area or via
door–to–door  fundraising  (Haibach  2012,  227ff.).  But they  also  include  indirect
solicitations through a television advertisement, a poster or, increasingly, online by use of
the Internet. As Haibach (2012, 148ff.) shows,  fundraising has become a more and more
relevant, feeding the so-called third sector (cp. Anheier 2010 and 2011). A  result  of  this
growing relevance is an increasing professionalisation of fundraising, which started in the
United States, where with $1.5 billion per year it constitutes ten per cent of the GDP (Stern
2013a, 2), but has since reached Europe (Anheier 2010, 91ff. and 445ff.). In  Germany, the
often underestimated third sector provides 2.6 million jobs, making up for more than four
per  cent  of  the annual  GDP (Rosenski  2012,  214 and 217).  The sector  is  a  little  less
developed in Spain, with around 1.7 per cent of the GDP and 635.000 people  employed
(Fundación Luis Vives 2012, 7f). Only a small minority of these organisations focus on
global poverty relief. Most of them are  providers of hospitals, of social  services, or of
youth and care institutions within the country.  The extent alone indicates  that there are
many fundraisers and many different causes competing for donor attention.
99 There are several definitions of fundraising, but at its most basic, the term “fundraising” refers to the
acquiring financial means for a charitable organisation through information and appeal (cp. Haibach 2012, 
16). The denomination comes from “raising funds”.
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To the professional fundraiser, there is a vast array of techniques available, many of them
arising  out  of  previously described  psychological  mechanisms.  First  it  is  necessary to
trigger emotions, as those are the activating determinants. Emotional messages motivate us
to  act  and  are  remembered  much  easier  than  rational  arguments  (Gröppel-Klein  and
Kroeber-Riel  2013).  Examples  for  emotions  that  are  frequently targeted  in  fundraising
campaigns are pity with the victims or anger or disgust at injustice. A standard technique is
using  compelling  imagery  and  storytelling  (Merchant,  Ford,  and  Sargeant,  2010).
Storytelling  makes  up  for  our  inability  to  grasp  or  be  touched  by  statistics,  already
discussed (cp. Slovic 2007). To circumvent this, fundraisers present a single identifiable
victim (cp.  chapter  3.8.  of  this  thesis)  and  tell  his  or  her  life  story,  always  trying  to
establish an emotional connection between the sufferer and the prospective donor. Children
are  used  particularly  often  in  this  context,  as  their  age  and  innocence  makes  it  more
difficult  to  attribute  them with blame or responsibility for  their  fate  (Manzo 2008 and
Westhead 2013).  Of course,  while  effective,  storytelling carries with it  the problem of
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Figure 5 Fundraising Message from the UK Disaster Emergency Committee (Source 
https://fundraising.co.uk/2017/03/15/disasters-emergency-committee-launches-east-africa-
crisis-appeal/#.WRslHsakI2w).
misrepresenting the truth, especially due to our short attention span and other limitations,
such as space in the case of posters or time in television advertisements.
The stories told by INGO fundraisers have changed somewhat during the last thirty
years of the profession. Arguably the birth of modern development fundraising was the
1983–1985  Ethiopian  famine,  which  provoked  an  international  outpour of  sympathy,
among it Bob Geldof's “Live Aid” initiative (Gill 2010, 13ff.).100 Its beginning (fig. 5) was
characterised more by so-called “poverty porn”, showing images of starving children with
their distended bellies,  so-called “hunger babies” or “donor darlings” (Dogra 2012, 33ff.,
Plewes and Stuart 2006, and Polman 2008, 77ff.). 
While we still find this imagery today, it has been recognised as being exploitative
both of the victim as well as of the donor. It also carries with it the risks of overstimulation
and avoidance, probably leading to donor fatigue. In response to the problem of treating
their subjects responsibly and avoiding undue emotional pressure on the donor, fundraising
codices have sprung up (DZI 2012, Haibach 2012, 38ff., and VENRO 2011). 
100 Of course fundraising is much older than that. Medieval monks petitioned rich merchants and 
princes, citing the good example of Saint Martin and warning of hellfire (Burens 2012, 10ff.). After the 
Second World War, millions of  US CARE packages helped starving Europeans survive (Ilgen 2008).
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Recent  fundraising  campaigns  focus  more  on  the  happiness  aspect  of  giving,
communicating  the  donor  that  his  engagement  matters  and  can  accomplish  something
positive  (fig.  6).  The  goal  is  to  take  advantage  of  the  previously  explained  positive
feedback mechanism of giving and well-being.
However,  the  fundraising  profession  suffers  from  the  same  problems  as  have
plagued the economic discipline of marketing – to which it has been closely related – for a
considerable  time.  The  profession  is  characterised  by  an  over-reliance  on  “casual
acceptance  of  anecdotical  evidence”  (Lindahl  and  Conley  2002),  and  not  by rigorous
scientific  approach (cp.  Bekkers  and Wiepking 2011).  This  entails  a deep rift  between
167
Figure 6: This Advertisement from the German INGO 
Welthungerhilfe Showcases the Trend of Happiness 
Fundraising (Source Scholz & Friends Berlin 2007 for
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe).
practise and theory, which  experimental economists have been trying to bridge  in their
science only recently (Khadjavi 2014, Landry et al. 2006, List 2011, and Oppenheimer and
Olivola 2011). 
Modern fundraisers try different presentations and formulations in their attempt to
increase   the  attractiveness  of  their  organisation  and  their  concern (and  consequently
donations). As media attention is a prerequisite to generate public attention, which in turn
gives  rise  to  political  pressure  and  secures  support,  financial  or  otherwise,  for  the
organisation. The basic intent, however, remains the same: to inform and to appeal through
as many channels as possible. For this purpose, fundraisers make use of direct mailing,
posters, online information (often making use of the variability of online platforms),  and
television clips. They apply these media in a way to gain as much attention of the viewer as
possible. 
Just as with marketing, a high frequency of appeal is important, as giving depends
on many circumstances such as the personal mood of the addressee and on a high stimulus
environment.  It  has been shown that even variations in colour  can influence donations
(Glück 2008, 59f. and Keller 2008). Messages  need to be repeated often to be perceived
(Bekkers 2010 and Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Unfortunately, this again is very costly
and, especially in the case of solicitation via mail, risks to aggravate the prospective donor.
Due to data,  frequent  donors  can receive so many  solicitations  that  this  irritates them.
Although this has not been demonstrated to have a negative effect on giving, this may very
well  mean  that  messages  from  organisations  that  cannot  –  or  are  less  willing  to  –
abundantly  spend on marketing are crowded out by organisations that do (van Diepen,
Donkers, and Franses 2009). 
But whether or not an organisation is able to spend much on marketing does not
indicate if it does a good job in alleviating poverty. On the contrary, bigger organisations
and organisations  that  re-invest  a  large  part  of  their  funds  raised  into  fundraising  can
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consequently become more and more self-serving (Glück 2008 and Stern 2013a). This is
another instance of the  Machiavellian problem. As a partial response, fundraisers  spend
quite  some  time  on  developing  an  easily  recognisable  brand-name  to  distinguish
themselves from other charities and to build up resilient trust and a durable connection to
their supporters. This has lead to frequent worries of “over-commercialization of the non-
profit  sector”  and  “misappropriation  of  techniques  developed  specifically  for  the
commercial environment”,  as e.g. uttered by Kylander and Stone (2012, 39). The widely
held opinion is that charities should not be primarily revenue creating and self-serving 
As  was attempted to show in the previous chapters, income from fundraising has
been steadily increasing in the passing years, but this increase has been much slower than
the  exponential  growth  of  NGOs  and  the  third  sector  in  general  (Adloff  2010,  84ff.,
Haibach  2012,  149ff.,  and  Rosenski  2012).  As  more  NGO  compete  for  the  resource
altruism, there is considerable pressure to increase fundraising professionalism This means
that especially large organisations have to be ever-present, have to take up every fad that
the donor enjoys, and have to dedicate an ever increasing part of their resources to create
public attention and fundraising.
The increasing distraction by digital media further exacerbates the problem. It is
especially difficult for INGOs to set global poverty into an appropriate relationship to for
example homelessness in Germany or Spain. Victims of poverty in developing countries
and their specific problems are so removed that people can easily avoid thinking about
them or give in to the illusion that all this has nothing to do with them (an illusion which
was tried to disperse in the first part of this thesis). The aspect of an undue power of the
donor will be discussed further on.
Fundraisers compete  for  public attention directly through campaigns and ads, but
also  indirectly  by  competing  for  media  attention  (Hilton  et  al.  2013,  157).  After  a
catastrophe, a multitude of NGOs arrive to show presence and compete for attention. When
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the organisations cooperate insufficiently, this  can lead to large wastages of resources. It
can occur that different organisations perform the same task worthy of publicity,  while
other tasks are neglected.101 
Another frequently raised criticism is that fundraising efforts are too costly, with
not enough of the proceedings benefiting the intended target. The costs of fundraising are
indeed not negligible. Especially direct mailing to “cold contacts”, referring to individuals
who have no previous connection to a NGO, is highly expensive. There are costs for the
envelopes and the materials sent, for the printing and mailing.  Most  of the appeals get
thrown away, only between one and four per cent of appeals result in an actual donation
(Crole 2007, 144f. and Haibach 2012, 263ff.).  More  than half of the initial donations go
towards  covering  the  fundraising  effort.  Similar  costs  incur for  paying  fundraisers  to
directly approach prospective donors, through telephone calls, at a mall or down town, or
just door-to-door. Their success depends on the brand of their organisation, but even more
on the warmness of the contacts. As Chicago economist John List has found out, when it
comes to fundraising in door-to-door solicitations, attractive blondes raise about 100 to 200
per cent more (Landry et al.  2006, List 2011, and Raihani and Smith 2015). The main
being that men want to show off to them. This is perhaps the strongest  example of charity
being motivated y self-interest.
Some authors, such as Palotta (2008), argue that we should not primarily look at the
costs of fundraising or payment of the CEO of an organisation. What should count is the
problem-solving capability of the organisation, its effectiveness. While this is certainly true
to an extent, Palotta over-stretches the analogy towards the economy in general. Firstly, his
point  of  view on the  private  sector  is  debatable  in  itself.  Even more  important  is  the
difference  in  easily  measurable  outcomes,  which  distinguishes  the  first  from the  third
101 An apt example of this is the multitude of wells that have been and are being built by NGOs in 
Africa. Building wells is good publicity and tangible, therefore good fundraising material. However, 
educating people to build or maintain their own wells is much less so, though it would be much more 
efficient. Ruins of aid-built wells are now part of some African landscapes (Glennie 2009 and Easterly 
2007b).
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sector.  The  appearance  of  an  NGO  could  become  so  relevant  that  by  Palotta's
recommendations the Machiavellian problem would be reinforced. 
In the first sector, high expenditures in marketing can be justified by increased sales
and therefore profit.  As concerns high salaries of Chief  Executive Officers (CEO), the
problem  is  very  complex.  Whether  an  increased  performance  is  due  to  good  CEO
performance or  other  factors  is  often  difficult  to  evaluate.  This  situation  is  even more
complex in the case of NGOs whose impact is much more difficult to measure.  They do
not make a direct financial profit, and especially in the case of global poverty relief, their
long-term success can hardly be observed by their donors. Reporting standards in this field
are still under-par (van Iwaarden et al. 2009 and Stern 2013a). Meanwhile, the problem of
overall efficiency and accountability of charitable organisations towards the beneficiaries is
raised more and more often (Stern 2013a) – and will be dealt with in the following chapter.
 
3.17. Evaluating Fundraising Methods
At its  best, the  fundraising  profession  is  an  intermediary between the  non-commercial
organisation and prospective donors, between people who can do good with the money and
those who have it. Fundraisers direct our attention towards the lives and needs of others
and present possible solutions.
At its worst, as has been indicated, fundraising is self-serving, with the generated
income primarily benefiting the organisation, not the needy or a worthy cause. Fundraisers
may even make use of dubious techniques of moral blackmail and psychological tricks to
convince people (Glück 2008). This is aptly depicted by Charles Dickens in his essay The
Begging–Letter Writer (1850). 
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“THE amount of money he annually diverts from wholesome and useful purposes
in the United Kingdom, would be a  set-off against the Window Tax. He is one of
the  most  shameless  frauds  and  impositions  of  this  time.  In  his  idleness,  his
mendacity,  and the immeasurable harm he does to the deserving, – dirtying the
stream  of  true  benevolence,  and  muddling  the  brains  of  foolish  justices,  with
inability to distinguish between the base coin of distress, and the true currency we
have always among us, – he is more worthy of Norfolk Island than three-fourths of
the worst characters who are sent there. Under any rational system, he would have
been sent there long ago. That the calling is a successful one, and that large sums of
money are gained by it, must be evident to anybody who reads the Police Reports
of such cases. But, prosecutions are of rare occurrence, relatively to the extent to
which the trade is carried on. The cause of this is to be found (as no one knows
better than the Begging–Letter Writer,  for it  is  a part  of his  speculation)  in  the
aversion people feel  to  exhibit  themselves  as  having been imposed upon, or  as
having  weakly gratified  their  consciences  with  a  lazy,  flimsy substitute  for  the
noblest of all virtues.”
This  Victorian  England  critique  of  direct  mailing  still  has  some  bite  today.  Dickens
deplores  that  the  poor  have  no  voices  and  communication  is  left  to  an  arbitrator  of
questionable intent, as “[t]he poor never write these letters.” 
The  problem of  self-servingness  versus  public  benefit  in  NGOs  is  increasingly
discussed today (Glück 2008, Magee 2014, Singer 2009b, and Stern 2013a). All registered
organisations may collect donations that are then tax exempt. Additionally, revenue created
by  the  organisation  is  exempt  from taxes  as  well,  as  in  theory  the  very  goal  of  the
organisation  already  provides  a  public  benefit  (Anheier  2010  and  2011).  While
theoretically, public benefit is the essential pre-condition to gaining NGO status, very few
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applications to register as a non-profit organisation are actually denied (Stern 2013a, 76f.
and Thieme 2011). This raises the question whether the standards are too lax. As non-profit
organisations take money from the public purse, thus removing it from democratic political
control, their responsibility should be to not only show that they are serving the public
good, but also that they do so in ways that taxes do not (Anheier 2010 and 2011). There is,
however, little to no effort of accreditation authorities to assess or control the effectiveness
of an NGO. Rather, the focus is on legal formalities.
Once  gained,  the tax-exemption  status  may  only  be  lost  if  there are  severe
irregularities in the organisation's bookkeeping (Stern 2013a, 77). Just using donations for
the organisation itself or to pay spectacular salaries is not necessarily enough to lose this
status.  There  have  been  several  scandals  including  such  renowned  organisations  as
UNICEF, the German chapter  of which was proven to divert  donation money from its
intended use in 2008, paying salaries up to €30.000 to uninvolved fundraisers, and using
millions for the construction of a new head-office in Cologne (Thieme 2011). UNICEF did
not lose its tax-exemption status, but it could be argued though, that public opinion served
as a regulator here. The scandal resulted in UNICEF  losing an estimated €7 million in
donations  and  5.000  regular  donors  between  2008  and  2009,  forcing  the  originally
reluctant CEO of the German chapter of UNICEF to step down (ibid.). Unfortunately, as
the charitable sector highly relies on  good  reputation, there was a negative spillover of
distrust towards other organisations as well. This is a frequent feature of scandals in the
charitable  sector,  where  one  organisation's scandal,  instead  of  translating  into  more
donations for more effective and transparent organisations, translates into a loss for the
whole community (Stern 2013a, 105ff. and 110ff.).
UNICEF  did however lose its accreditation by the  Deutsches  Zentralinstitut  für
Soziale  Fragen (DZI)102,  a  foundation  that  evaluates  NGOs  in  Germany  with  special
attention to the appropriate  use of donations,  for two years,  only regaining it  in 2010.
102 German Central Institute for Social Questions (cp. http://www.dzi.de/).
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Certification is voluntary and meant as a signal of special trustworthiness and high quality
to donors. To become certified with the DZI Spendensiegel-Logo103, organisations have to
comply with accounting standards, must not use more than 30 per cent of their donations
for  internal  administrative purposes  and  comply with  the  previously cited  DZI  ethical
fundraising codex (Haibach 2012, 54ff.). The focus on fundraising methods and minimal
standards of resource use however give not indication of project efficiency and mean that
once again accountability works in one direction only: towards donors and their intended
use. The true accountability to society and especially towards the poor can easily get lost
on the way. 
Use of Celebrities in Fundraising and the Negative Image of the Third World
The role celebrities play in the context of donations is ambivalent. Celebrities are often
used as spokespersons for a cause (Cameron and Haanstra 2008, Dogra 2012, and Davis
2010). They can act as role models when they adopt children or give to donations. As
research  shows, role  models  can  convey  positive  effects  (Khadjavi  2014).  However,
celebrity activism may be regarded as not adequate for humanitarian causes and, as Sireau
(2009, 60ff.), may lead to internal conflict over celebrity involvement in campaigns such as
“Make Poverty History”. It also leads the focus away from the global poor towards a self-
involved  celebrity  culture  (Davis  2010).  Celebrities  are  only  very  seldom  experts  on
development aid and thus their support of a certain cause can lead donations away from
more sensible investments. For example Oprah Winfrey with her support of the disastrous
“play-pump” and the KONY 2012 campaign has a very bad record of supporting efficient
NGOs, as will be discussed in the next chapter (cp. MacAskill 2015a, 3).
As Cameron and Haanstra (2008) analyse, this reinforces the Western stereotype of
the helpless poor Africans, with the “white saviour” coming to the rescue. As many critics
103 German for donation seal logo.
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plausibly  argue,  this  contributes  to  the  continuing  view of  the  developing  world,  and
particularly of Africa, as poor, passive, inferior, and in need of saving (Dogra 2012, 163ff.
and  Plewes  and  Stuart  2006).  The  press  quite  subtly  contributes  to  this  perception
(CARMA 2006,  Kennedy and Hill  2010,  and Rothmyer 2011).  Fortunately,  some self-
critical journalists recognise this. For example, in 2013 the German newspaper “Die Zeit”
published a series of articles on the good news in the world often forgotten, among them
the recent growth spurt in seven African countries and what it means for their inhabitants
(Albrecht 2013). Unfortunately, these examples remain few and far between, one reason
being the  already mentioned  confirmation  bias.  It  is  simply easier  for  fundraisers  and
journalists to work with easily recognised and accepted images. Thus it is not surprising
that a 2002 report by the British NGO Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) found that “80%
of the British public strongly associates the developing world with doom-laden images of
famine, disaster and Western aid [...] these images are still  top of mind and maintain a
powerful grip on the British psyche”. Similar results are echoed by Dogra (2012), Smillie
(1995), Stern (2013a), and the CARMA report (2006), confirming that the image of Africa
characteristically consists of children not being able to go  to  school, people dying from
diseases or hunger, or of violent conflicts continuing endlessly As depicted before, this is
certainly  part  of  the  reality  of  Africa  and  poor  countries  in  general.  But  positive
developments are  too little or not at all recognised.  This confrontation with never-ending
problems  may lead to donor fatigue (cp. Moeller 1999).  Moreover, as it may influence
investors and business partners, it can reduce economical (business) opportunities or lead
to paternalism, as people do not believe that there are sufficient self-regulation forces in
Africa. But  this  would  be  an  over-simplification,  as  Africa  is  a  very  large  continent,
comprising over 50 states of varying degrees of development, security, and democracy,
from Egypt to South Africa, and containing around one billion of inhabitants.
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The  image  problem  of  Africa  and  the  continuance  of  paternalistic  attitudes
translates into true harm, makes it easier to dismiss the poor wishes and world-views, as
well as leading to a loss of investment and trade for developing countries, notably Africa
and thus less job creation (Baaz 2005). This image problem and this branding are exactly
what the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie deplores in “the danger of a single
story”. The poor and undernourished child with a distended belly in a desert-like landscape
is the only image many Westerners have of Africa. 
This image problem is much more subtle than the consequences arising out of crude
racism,  of psychological racism, or the aftermath of colonialism depicted and discussed
previously. Unfortunately, Singer's efforts may indirectly contribute to this by claiming that
it is the citizen of the affluent world that can and thus should save a live, without going
further into the complexities arising from global poverty.
3.18. The Internet – A Brave New World of Activism?
“Da es  nun  mit  der  unter  den  Völkern  der  Erde  einmal  durchgängig  überhand
genommenen (engeren oder weiteren Gemeinschaft) so weit gekommen ist, daß die
Rechtsverletzung an einem Platz der Erde an allen gefühlt wird: so ist die Idee eines
Weltbürgerrechts keine phantastische und überspannte Vorstellungsart des Rechts,
sondern  eine  nothwendige  Ergänzung  des  ungeschriebenen  Codex  sowohl  des
Staats– als Völkerrechts zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt und so zum
ewigen Frieden, zu dem man sich in der continuirlichen Annäherung zu befinden
nur unter dieser Bedingung schmeicheln darf.”104
Immanuel Kant [1796] (1970, AA VIII, 360).
104 “The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the 
nations of the earth, has now extended  so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt 
all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a 
complement of the unwritten code of law-constitutional as well as international law – necessary for the 
public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring
to  fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we are gradually 
approaching that ideal.” Kant [1795] 1917, 142.
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As is quite frequently noted (for example by Assheuer 2012 and Culp 2014,1f.), Kant´s
vision of the world growing together,  as alluded to in the quotation from  Zum ewigen
Frieden, has been proven as nothing less than prophetic. The phenomenon of globalization
is  a  combination  of  intensified  trade,  faster  and  cheaper  transportation, and  a  planet-
spanning  media  network.  Recently,  the  rise  of  global  social  media  in  the  guise  of
Facebook, YouTube, or Google have supplemented the (by themselves still relatively new)
possibilities  of  airplane  travel,  radio, and  television  as  symbols  of  the  world  growing
together. In this digital age, the Internet has become the marketplace of our global village
(cp.  Silverstone 2008, 15ff.).105 This could be seen as good news for the creation of a
“culture of giving”, as the convergence of different lives across the globe and the rapid
dissemination of information could lead to an increased knowledge of the “other” and thus
to an increased to  discuss  issues  of  global  justice  and thus  a  willingness  to  donate to
identified effective causes.  As will  be attempted to  show in the following part,  this  is
unfortunately not the case so far. While a positive result was indeed the improved access to
information,  that  facilitates  the work of  charity evaluators  such as  GiveWell,  who can
publish  their  evaluation  results  online  with  free  access  for  all  interested  donors.
Additionally, the Internet is increasingly important in the collection of funds.  Even Peter
Singer has used the Internet to encourage people to follow his ethical imperative to end
poverty via the support of aid organisations with proven efficiency. On his “The Life you
can Save”-website, which is part of Singer's programme to create a “culture of giving”,
individuals can make a pledge to donate part of their income to charity. He accepts that the
Internet can be a social sphere where international justice can be discussed and increased.
Still, the fight for an increasingly short attention span has the tendency to increase fads in
development aid and closing off to other positions. 
The success of electronic communication cannot be explained by the technological
progress in data transfer alone. Rather, while the technological advancement constitutes a
105 The term “global village” was coined by Marshall McLuhan in his books “The Gutenberg Galaxy: 
The Making of Typographic Man” (1962) and “Understanding Media” (1964).
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necessary prerequisite, it is a large literate population with free time on their hands that
shaped  the  Internet  into  its  current  form,  a  manifestation  of  humanity's  hunger  for
information. The term “information”  is used here instead of “knowledge”, because  –  as
was to be expected  –, this hunger does not only extend to scientific facts, culture, and
rational  political  discussion.  Instead,  large  parts  of  the Internet  are  used for  gossiping
(about celebrities), hurling insults at  one another, and pornography.106 However,  as was
mentioned  elsewhere  gossip  may  actually  be  a  prerequisite  of  human  culture  and
community, as of course is sexuality. It is therefore not surprising that this new medium is
so intensely dedicated to these subjects.
The Internet now presumably forms part of our public sphere, a term coined by the
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1962 and Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1964).
Habermas defined the public sphere (in German Öffentlichkeit) in this way: 
“By "the public sphere" we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all
citizens. […] In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific
means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it.  Today
newspapers  and  magazines,  radio  and  television  are  the  media  of  the  public
sphere.” 
Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox (1964, 49).
The  Internet  is  the  newest  technology  that  facilitates  the  transfer  of  information  and
opinion, via the means of websites such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, all kinds of blogs,
106 There is a scientific discussion on pornography (See Williams 2004, Bishop and Hall 2007 and, 
especially relevant to philosophers, Grebowicz 2013) and on gossip (Solove 2007) on the Internet. For 
background information on  criminal activities on the Internet see Brunton 2013. In an article in the German 
newspaper Die Zeit, Assheuer (2012) argues that the Internet has become the battlefield of a new civil world 
war (in German Weltbürgerkrieg). He refers to the exchange of insults between Muslims, radical adherents of
secularism, or agnostics, and Christian fundamentalists that seem to delight in burning each other's holy 
symbols (e.g. the U. S. flag on the one side, the Koran on the other one) and hurling insults at each other 
(also cp. Silverstone 2008, 36f.).  
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etc.  While  Habermas  himself  is  critical  of  the  Internet,  claiming  that it  leads  to  a
“fragmentation  of  audiences  into  isolated  publics”.  Internet enthusiasts  hail  the  new
technology as facilitator of social (ex)change via the democratisation of information.107 
On the one hand, the Internet is much easier accessible to individuals who search
for a way to make their voices heard than traditional media, as anyone can write a blog or
post a video on YouTube. The possibility to directly comment online content makes it far
easier for readers and viewers to interact with the author, although some censorship by
private administrators or authoritarian governments may still occur (cp. Silverstone 2008,
211 and Janus and Paulo 2013).
Yet on the other hand, the German philosopher's scepticism is understandable and
made even more solemn by his theoretical background. Habermas' idea of global (in his
terminology  supranational)  justice  relies  on  his  theory  of  Diskursethik (discursive
ethics).108 Just as within a state,  worldwide principles of supranational justice have to be
established within a process of collective reflection, discussion, and political justification,
culminating in what he calls public reason. The legitimacy of decisions in Habermas' view
is very much process dependent.109 Therefore,  the establishment  of a  Weltöffentlichkeit
(supranational  public  sphere)  through  media  and  public  dialogue,  including  as  many
citizens as possible, is of primary importance. If the  Internet leads to a fragmentation of
audiences instead of contributing to a collective open dialogue,  it  actually counters the
107 “The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers. 
However, computer-mediated communication in the web can claim unequivocal democratic merits only for a 
special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public
opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend
instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of 
isolated issue publics.” Habermas 2006, 423.
108 As Habermas' position on international justice is developed over several books (for example 1998, 
2004 and 2006), I rely on Hahn (2009, 127ff.) who consolidates Habermas' position.
109 Of course, asymmetry of political power and influence poses a problem for Habermas' theory. These 
asymmetries motivated Rawls to make use of the veil of ignorance – a move that Habermas rejects; in his 
view, principles of justice should not be established by a single abstract reasonable calculation. Rather, they 
have to be continually established in a deliberative process of dialogue. Trying to circumvent the problem of 
asymmetry of power, and hereby influencing Silverstone, Habermas argues that in the process of public 
justification all participants must recognise the position of weaker members in the public sphere, such as 
inhabitants of developing countries. All participants of the public sphere have to be receptive to moral 
arguments. Habermas' student Rainer Forst has developed further the theory of discursive ethics to address 
this issue (Forst 2007).
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process of finding mutually agreeable ethical guidelines.
The  search  engine  “Google”,  and its  acquired  video provider  “YouTube”,  have
become one of  the  world's  most  valuable and at  the  stock markets  most  highly listed
companies.110 With Facebook, marketing techniques have entered individual privacy on a
new level, with advertisements, being based on private messages about their lives people
share  with  friends,  and presented  accordingly.  Smart  phones  with  satellite  connections
make it increasingly difficult to escape the digital life and its imperative of accessibility. As
the  digital  world  is  constantly  accessible  for  us,  reversely  we  have  to  be  constantly
accessible to it,  be it  for work (short  messaging service or emails)  or in our free time
(Facebook). 
 Assheuer  (2012)  and  Meckel  (2011)  expresses  scepticism concerning  the  new
interconnectedness. They fear that the lack of true contact leads to misunderstandings and
– subsequently – aggressiveness. They are among the many “cyber-sceptics” critical of the
Internet and digital consumerism who claim that the Internet has made life worse.111 It
directly takes much free time (leisure time) and substitutes our real-life occupations with
consumerist  pseudo–occupations.  Many  of  these  pseudo-occupations  are  particularly
tempting because they simulate a successful life.112 This simulation includes  friendships
and  connections  (through Facebook),  as  well  as  illusionary  successes  by overcoming
obstacles  and  being  a  hero  in  online  video  games.  Through  a  constant  flooding  with
commercials  it (at  least  sometimes)  can  create  an  artificial  need  for  a  constantly new
stream of products with the promise of higher social status and – essentially – happiness
110 According to their 2012 annual record, Google Inc. (now named “Alphabet”) had a revenue of 
$50.18 billions, with an effective profit of $12.76 billions.
111 Ulrich Beck in this context coined the term “risk society" (Beck 1986). Miriam Meckel (2011) 
writes about “Weltkurzsichtigkeit” [global near sightedness]. She claims that digital algorithms lead to a 
diminished perception of the world and our fellow human beings.
112 Of course it is philosophically difficult to distinguish between a “simulated” online life and a “true” 
offline one. The naïve view would be that “there simply is something different about a direct conversation”. 
However, what this “difference” consists in is difficult to ascertain. But there are several differences: In an 
online conversation, parts of the other's body language and expression are missed, even if the conversation is 
over Skype. There are several activities and connections one cannot do together over the Internet, such as 
sports or giving each other a hug. A philosophically interesting aspect would be that in a chat room 
conversation, I am unable to discern whether I am conversing with a true person or a Turing machine. 
Another ethical difference pointed out by Silverstone (2008) is the possibility to switch off the machine, 
thereby ending the conversation unilaterally. 
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(Skidelsky  and  Skidelsky  2012,  208ff.).  Skidelsky  and  Skidelsky  (2012)  deliver  an
Aristotelian criticism of modern consumption culture fuelled by advertisement. For them,
advertisement  leads  to  a  rat  race,  meaning that  the  individual  gets  the  impression  of
needing to earn more to buy more to improve his social status. This – of course – contrasts
with the Aristotelian notion of the finite utility of money. Once one's comfortable living is
assured, one should use the time for leisure and contemplation. 
New possibilities of connecting people with each other through the Internet may
make donating – and maybe even acting for the poor – easier, but we should be sceptical
about this, as also on the Internet there is no one–to–one communication (in the sense of
Habermas),  and  the  medium  Internet carries  a  high  risk  of  miscommunication  and
escapism.  It  may have  its  uses  as  a  platform,  but  it  cannot  overcome  the  underlying
psychological and political biases and problems.
While these reflections on the possibilities and limitations of the Internet does not
concern  development  aid  per  se,  it  can  point  towards  new  difficulties  charitable
organisations may face in fundraising and point towards the answer of the puzzle of the
persistence  of  poverty  in  the  face  of  abundance. In  the  Internet,  too,  charitable
organisations  have  to  compete  for  our  attention  and our  resources  with  the  marketing
divisions  of  companies  who  have  more  money  available, as  their  publicity  is  profit-
oriented. Also, as the global poor are not part of our social group of reference, we do not
compare  our  relative  wealth  with  their  poverty,  but  rather  with  the  perfect  world  of
advertisement surrounding us in the media, thus finding our own inadequate.
Damning the new media is  certainly not the right reaction.  Rather,  I agree with
Roger  Silverstone's  (2008)  thesis,  put  forward  in  his  book Mediapolis, that  the  digital
world should be seen analogously to the environment. Both provide us with necessary and
useful resources, but can be polluted by deliberate or imprudent misuse. As the Internet is a
relatively new medium, new ethical challenges present themselves to whom we need to
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find answers in academia as well as in everyday life. 
Silverstone's  mediapolis113 has  several  differences  to  Habermas,  in  which  “only
reason,  and  a  singular  and  narrow  kind  of  reason  at  that,  determines  the  viability  of
discourse and the possibility of action” (Silverstone 2008, 59). Rather, as Dayan (2007,
114) analyses, 
“The  mediapolis  is  a  site  in  which  “communication  is  multiple  and  multiply
inflected. It is open to the circulation of images and narratives.” It is also open to a
characteristic  combination of moral  and dramaturgic  concerns.  Mediapolis  is  an
Arendtian space of appearance: “the space where I appear to others as others appear
to me.””
To be able to live together in this shared mediapolis, ethical guidelines are necessary. For
Silverstone, the main virtue that should be cultivated in digital media is hospitality (2008,
210ff.).  We should allow every citizen the possibility of expressing his opinion and of
entering,  the  Habermasian  inspiration  is  evident,  into  a  global  dialogue.  The virtue  of
hospitality addresses the problem of fragmented audiences and tries to overcome it. 
Another virtue that should be cultivated in the new media is proper distance (ibid.,
78). Reversely, improper distance is its vice.114 To have the proper distance we need to
avoid getting either too close to the other person (the “immorality of sameness or identity”)
or rejecting him or her (the “immorality of difference”), but to find the accurate or correct
mean.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Silverstone  understands  distance  not  only  as  a
geographical or social category, but also as a moral one. In rejecting the “other” persons,
we create an “us versus them”-mentality, defining ourselves as a group and excluding the
113 Silverstone's mediapolis is not a physical location. As an organization of the people acting and 
speaking together, it transcends geographical boundaries (Dayan 2007, 114 and Silverstone 2008, 54f).
114 Arguably Singer commits this vice with his example of the drowning child.
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others,  often  to  the  point  of  dehumanising,  even  demonising  them (ibid. 115).115 The
“other”  person then becomes the “enemy”,  often bereft  of  his  or  her  humanity,  and is
regarded  as  something  alien  and  evil:  “vermin”  that  is  depicted  as to  be  feared  and
“exterminated” to protect the community (cp. Steuter and Willis 2009, 13).116 Ultimately,
the “us versus them” dichotomy may be used to legitimatise violence against other groups.
Silverstone identifies this tendency as inherently dangerous, as it is eliminationist.117 
In Siverstone's view, the perceived special moral status of the USA permits them to
stylise themselves as the forces for good, while their enemies are regarded as terrorists that
should be targeted (Silverstone 2008, 95). Silverstone (ibid., 125) calls this a  rhetoric of
violence and a  rhetoric of pride. It violates the requirement of hospitality and degrades
oneself  and the other one. Rather,  we should always accept the other one, even in the
difficult case of terrorism, as human being and consequently someone accessible to reason,
so Silverstone.
On the other end of the scale there is the immorality of identity, which implies that
we deny the other a distinct identity to our own. We then see him as part of our group, so
close to us that he becomes indistinguishable from ourselves. This phenomenon is quite
frequently  used  in  charity  appeals  by  INGOs.  We  are  invited  to identify  with  young
Mohammed (12) and his dream of becoming a doctor,  and his pain becomes our pain.
However, as Silverstone argues, by identifying with the “victims”, we deny them their own
identity and their own voices. He or she becomes a part of us and we imagine knowing
what he or she will say and what he or she needs, thus patronising him or her. Silverstone's
ideas on media and morality will serve as orientation points for the analysis of the KONY
2012 video in the following chapter. 
115 As seen in chapter 2, we humans, just as our primate ancestors and cousins, tend towards this 
behaviour of group building and indifference or in extreme cases even violence towards outsiders.
116 Nazi propaganda prior to the holocaust or the 1994 Tutsi genocide by the Hutu in Rwanda are sad 
examples here.
117 Phyllis Bernard (2009, 174) discusses the term eliminationism in the context of a conflicted society, 
tracing it back to Daniel Goldhagen's book “Hitler's willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust “(1996). Bernard's article on conflict and communication is worth reading as she adapts lessons 
learned from developing countries in Africa to the situation in Oklahoma (USA).
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However, some research paints a more positive picture of digital media. A study by
the  French  Centre  de  Recherche  en  Économie  et  Management indicates  that,  unlike
television,  the  Internet  can  increase  personal  happiness  and  life  satisfaction  (Pénard,
Poussing, and Suire 2011). And as the Arab spring and even the German flood of 2013
show, the Internet can serve as rallying point for political and humanitarian causes. The
new technology therefore offers new connecting possibilities between the global “North”
and “South”, as well as within the countries. The Internet also enables NGOs to denounce
injustices worldwide, such as the working conditions in garment factories in Bangladesh
(Mahr 2013, 30f.), and donations for poverty relief are increasingly collected online.
On the receiving end of development aid,  Internet and mobile phone technology
offer new possibilities in reducing poverty. One could argue that the new products needed
to use these media will serve as one more way of redistributing money from the (poor)
consumer to the rich producer (or telecommunications company). But it seems that there
are some rather positive effects in developing communities, e.g. by creating new business
opportunities or by improving livelihoods via the use of mobile phones.  For examples
mobile  phones  with  Internet  access  can  provide  farmers  with  more  precise  weather
forecasts and merchants with the prices of their goods in nearby villages (Aker and Mbiti
2010). It might also be argued that Internet and mobile phones can help combat corruption.
They  do  so  mainly  indirectly  by  providing  a  new  and  relatively  independent  media
platform, where for example bloggers can communicate their suspicions and show their
evidence to a larger public. A more direct approach is being tested in Kenya, where mobile
phones are used by health care personnel to improve the provision of and to minimize the
theft of medical equipment (Chêne 2012). 
Although Habermas' criticism basically rings true, the Internet is not only a place of
fragmented audiences, but it can also be a place where people from different backgrounds
unite. And while the Internet population is indeed fragmented, this may be less the case
184
than with traditional media, as London School of Economics researcher Charlie Beckett
(2012) analyses in tradition of Roger Silverstone. He uses the example of KONY 2012 to
consider the  two  main  differences  between  the  Internet as  information  provider  and
traditional mass media. 
First of all, it is global in a new way. While before it was possible to see certain
television channels via satellite in every corner of the world, the channel still had to collect
their information through a network of journalists, and the TV channels had a country of
origin,  meaning that  they focused on a  certain geographical  area  and  favoured certain
political views. 
The other difference is that the flow of information is leaving the traditional “linear
and  hierarchical”  field  of  news  media  (Beckett  2012,  7f.).  Before,  Beckett  explains,
journalists and editors acted as “gatekeepers” to information. This meant, the public had
only access to pre-selected and filtered information and opinions. Even if the goal was to
provide  information  as  neutral  as  possible,  there  were  still  limits  to  the  quantity  of
information that  could be provided as well  as the need to  finance the product,  mainly
through advertisements. News media reached the comfortable situation of a fourth estate
that  gave the  public  the facts  and the  forum where public  opinion was formed.  Other
actors, for example charities, had to learn to function before this background. This means
that charities had to learn how to arouse the media's attention so they could get their share
of the public sphere. 
Due to the  Internet,  the access to news and opinions is now much more direct.
There has been a shift from the individual as merely  news consumer to news producer
(Beckett 2012, 19). It is now possible to read private opinions on political developments in
a far away country in blogs. The Internet provides software that translates these messages
into English, the new lingua franca, so that the language barrier is minimised. In the case
of demonstrations, civil unrest, or war, images uploaded to the net and films on YouTube
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can serve as testimony and help denounce the regimes or people responsible  for human
rights violations.118 
Of course, this new medium can be influenced just as the old ones, if the goal is to
get  maximal attention. Due to the social network character of for example Facebook and
YouTube, it is even easier to create a self-propagating message, if  this is done with the
necessary psychological acuteness. For the remainder of this chapter, one such example
will be discussed, where a video from an INGO has “gone viral”: the KONY 2012 video.
By this example, the challenges that Internet and social media pose to INGOs active in
development  aid  will  be  attempted  to  demonstrate.  A particular  focus  will  be  on  the
psychological mechanisms that are behind the success of social media public relations,
especially in view of the problem of providing balanced information and good sustainable
solutions – in contrast to gaining short term public attention and funds. 
3.19. KONY 2012 – A Humanitarian Plea Goes Viral
“It has become much easier for us to be moved to action by sad and sentimental stories.”
 Richard Rorty 1994, 134.
The 30-minute KONY 2012 video was released by the small INGO Invisible Children in
2012. It was the most successful one in a series of films produced by the organisation, the
first being “Rough Cut” in 2004. The video deplores the situation in northern Uganda,
where the rebel organisation “Lord Resistance Army” (LRA) had been fighting the Uganda
government  since  the  late  1980's,  terrorizing  the  civilian  population,  and  abducting
children, using the boys as child soldiers and the girls as sex slaves (Le Sage 2011, 1). The
LRA is responsible for over 30.000 abductions, 100.000 lost lives and has forced 400.000
118 To give testimony in the case of human rights violations is a central concern of the organisation 
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders). Besides the medical help they supply, the witnessing, 
as it is called by the organisation, is an integral part of this organisation's policy.
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people to flee their homes in northern Uganda since 1986. The video is named after the
leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony. 
Meanwhile, the importance of the LRA has been diminishing, as the rebel group
had to leave Uganda and then roamed the countryside somewhere in the borderlands of
South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic (Allen
and Vlassenroot 2010, 17ff.). 
In less than a week after its release, the video gained over 105 million views, being
shared on Facebook and endorsed by celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey (Beckett 2012, 15
and Kanczula, 2012). Luis Moreno Ocampo, first prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, features prominently in the video, his testimony being used to boost the message's
credibility. On the positive side, one can gratify the video with making development aid no
longer an elite or leftist topic. The video at least lead to an increased awareness of the
situation in Uganda, especially in young people who perhaps never even had heard of the
country before (cp. Cavanagh 2012 and Gregory 2012). While many commentators voiced
their scepticism, one might argue that the mere fact of there being a discussion on the issue
is  an  improvement.  It  has  been targeted  by critics  for  reinforcing  stereotypes119 about
Africa  and  Africans  (Waldorf  2012  and  Drumbl  2012),  oversimplifying  Uganda's
problems, encouraging “clicktivism” or “slacktivism”120, and misinforming – to the point
of manipulating – the public (Cavanagh 2012). Most importantly, the organisation Invisible
Children has failed to live up to their own goal, which was capturing Joseph Kony by the
end of 2012. Notably, the organisation talks about capturing Kony, while actually meaning:
119 The word “stereotype” originates from the Greek words stereos and typos, meaning something along
the lines of a “solid model”, and was later designating “a metal plate used to print pages” (Schneider 2004, 
8). The term is quite difficult to define, as there are positive as well as negative stereotypes which may be 
more or less accurate. I therefore propose Schneider's (2004, 24) neutral definition of “qualities perceived to 
be associated with particular groups or categories of people”. In the context of the KONY 2012 video, we 
find multiple stereotypes of Ugandans. We are presented with the suffering, helpless, and passive majority of 
the “victims” who are contrasted with the violent, sex-obsessed and evil “perpetrator” Joseph Kony.
120 “Slacktivism” is defined by Evgeny Morozov as a “term to describe feel-good online activism that 
has zero political or social impact. It gives those who participate in 'slacktivist' campaigns an illusion of 
having a meaningful impact on the world without demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group” 
(Morozov 2009, also cp. Drumbl 2012). This could be seen in the context of Sartre's mauvaise foi 
emotionelle. The problem of slacktivism will be discussed later. “Clicktivism” refers to he same effect while 
focusing on the action of “clicking” the “share” or “like” button when viewing online content.
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Enabling the Ugandan military to capture him. Their main tool in this battle is to petition
the US government  to  continue their  effort  of  training the  Ugandan military with 100
military advisors. The video continually gives the impression that the USA are on the point
of recalling their military advisors, however there was no such indication from an official
source before the publication of the video. On the contrary, from a strategical point of view
this was unlikely. As this indicates, and as we will see below, the accusations against the
INGO Invisible Children are at least partly justified.
The first  interesting question is, why KONY 2012 was so successful in gaining
public  attention.  Applying  the  previously  presented  psychological  mechanisms  which
influence donor behaviour, we can try to analyse and understand the video's success. It is
important to note that we can only analyse the success ex post. Predicting whether or not a
video will become a “hype”, a much viewed and shared phenomenon, is difficult if not
impossible  beforehand.121 Marketing  departments  of  companies,  as  well  as  fundraisers
from the third sector,  are constantly trying to create such self-propagating messages. But
while there are certain marketing techniques that can make a message successful, it is still
impossible,  and one might  say fortunately so,  to predict  –  and even less to  plan – an
Internet hype.122 In the following part  of this chapter,  it  will  be attempted to critically
demonstrate that several of the aspects that made the video so successful are connected
with the problems and final failure of the campaign. 
“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come.” The KONY 2012
video  starts  with  this  quotation  by Victor  Hugo.123 The  music  sets  in  and  after  some
flickering images, we see the KONY 2012 logo, an inverted triangle, for the first time. The
image fades and we are treated to a view of the earth from outer space. 
“Right now, there are more people on Facebook than there were on the earth 200
121 Cp.  Ancu, English, and Sweetser (2011) for one of the few studies on the appeal of viral videos, 
using Aristotelian rhetoric as theoretical background.
122 However, marketing departments are becoming increasingly efficient at mastering the technique, as 
showed the viral Ellen DeGeneres selfie marketing photo by Samsung at the 2014 Oscar ceremony.
123 From Histoire d'un Crime (The History of a Crime) [written 1852, published 1877], Conclusion, ch. 
X. Transl. T. H. Joyce and A. Locker.
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years  ago”,  the  narrator  Jason  Russell,  co-founder  of  Invisible  Children,  continues.
“Humanity's greatest desire is to belong and to connect. And now we see each other, we
hear each other.” We are shown messages of love from grandchildren to grandparents, a
Haitian child being saved after the devastating 2010 earthquake, a motivational speech by a
three–year–old bicycle adept and images of a woman hearing her voice for the first time
due to a new medical treatment.
The tone of the video is already very much apparent. We are presented with a view
of a beautiful world, a good world that has improved through the  Internet, because now
Kant's ideal of a world society that has grown so close together that “a violation of right in
one part of the world is felt all over it”. 
The video then introduces the topic of political activism and how the Internet has
changed the possibilities in this sector, using the arab spring as an example. Jason Russell
shows us the birth of his son Gavin, who has an important role representing the viewer
throughout the video. The logic is  simple: If a child can understand the problem of child
soldiers in Uganda, so can the viewer, and if a child wants to act against this injustice, so
should we (in the form of a tu quoque argument).124 The use of little Gavin is quite
ingenious  from  a  marketing  perspective  and  can  help  demonstrate  several  important
philosophical arguments.  For example,  Russell  comments the birth of his  son with the
words: “He didn't choose when or where he was born, but because he's here he matters .”
The video contrasts  the life of Gavin with the life of Jacob Acaye, a young Ugandan.
Jacob's  life  is  quite  different  from  Gavin's,  his  childhood  was  marked  by  constant
insecurity. He often did not have enough food, only primitive shelter, and there was the risk
of being abducted and used as child soldier. A very emotional part of the video shows him
crying when he tells the story of losing his brother to the LRA. Jacob stands as an example
for the 30.000 children that have been abducted by the LRA during 25 years. This is further
illustrated by a nightmarish collage of images that show an African child being roughly
124 A psychologically effective argument, even if philosophically fallacious.
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woken up and dragged from his bed by a pair of dark hands.
Behind this rather sensational comparison lies a solid philosophical argument: The
egalitarian  argument  of  equal  opportunity.  The  video  contrasts  the  position  of  Gavin,
growing up in a country with good institutions, security, and economic possibilities, with
the situation of Jacob, experiencing hunger, violence, and an uncertain future. The question
arises: “What has Jacob done to deserve this?” 
What distinguishes him from Gavin is simply geography: his place of birth and
therefore  his luck. The place of luck in morality has been discussed in connection with
Rawls. The result was that the argument that luck should not account for basic capabilities
and opportunities in life is very solid, and people who do reject it do so at a price. They
negate a principle of common humanity in an era of global interconnection and common
problems. Illustrating this moral problem with a concrete case, even if the video does this
quite dramatically, can therefore be seen as legitimate. 
As the example of Jacob is supposed to illustrates that conflicts and the resulting
insecurity are a severe problem in developing countries, forcing many people to leave their
homes  and  become  refugees  (Fearon  and  Laitin  2013).  This  in  turn  makes  economic
development  difficult.  Due  to  insecurity,  individuals  cannot  invest  in  their  future,  as
profitable  farms  or  businesses  can  always  be  stolen  or  destroyed.  Due  to  constant
displacement, the accumulation of physical and human capital is difficult, and the gains
from investing in it are unsure (Guisan and Exposito 2008). External capital, for example
through development aid, will be difficult to come by, and it is often lost or diverted in
conflict. It is therefore legitimate to call this out as a moral evil, against which something
should be done. However, the video artfully avoids mentioning Joseph Kony's diminished
influence and his fleeing from northern Uganda.
Using Jacob as representative for the 30.000 children abducted leaves the video
open to Silverstone's critique of improper closeness. The boy's tragic fate does stir our pity,
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and we are encouraged to think about our own family and what it would mean to lose any
of them so early in life. We are shocked by young Jacob's statement that he would willingly
pay with his life if he could be reunited with his brother. But while this emotional state of
dismay motivates us to action, it is less conducive to reasoning and reflection. Ten years
later, Jacob will be grown up. As an adult, he will hardly get any attention at all, while one
might imagine that an analysis from his perspective would be crucial to understanding the
situation in northern Uganda today.
The video continues with the commitment stated of the director Russell that Joseph
Kony should be stopped. Jason Russell says that we are now at a stage of human history,
when it is possible for individuals to act against injustices, even if they happen in a far
away country. And he will tell the viewer “exactly how we can do it”. 
From a  philosophical  viewpoint,  Jason Russell  claims  that  Kant's  cosmopolitan
ideal, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, has been realised by now due to the technical
innovation  of  social  media.  But  his  claim goes  even further. In  analogy to  Singer,  he
postulates that an individual can do something effective against this specific case of far-
away injustice right now. However, in a move that would be seen as illegitimate by the two
philosophers  and  judged  as  morally  apprehensible  by  Silverstone,  Russell  implicitly
constructs an image of Joseph Kony as the ultimate evil. In the simplified world-view of
Invisible Children, it is evil individuals like Kony that keep the world from being the just
and beautiful  place shown in the  introduction  of  the video.  But  this  misrepresents  the
reasons  for  poverty  in  Uganda  in  general,  and  it  ignores  the  underlying  institutional
problems. 
The video also sets a time limit for a successful intervention (“Expires December
31st 2012”). In hindsight, this may not have been a good decision, as the continuing evasion
of Kony up to the time when this thesis is written points towards the limited effectiveness
of Invisible Children's efforts. From a more short-term view, the setting of a time limit is
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psychologically very shrewd. It creates a sense of urgency. Together with the postulation of
the  individual  viewer's  capability  to  intervene,  this  helps  surmount  the  dispersion  of
responsibility-effect discussed in chapter 2.5.
The video continues with a presentation of results of  Invisible Children's efforts.
This is the only part of the video  in which an adult Ugandan is given a voice, but it is
reduced to praising Invisible Children for providing education and an early warning radio
network.  More relevant information is missing in the video – e.g. how much money did
Invisible Children collect for Uganda altogether, what was it used for in detail, what could
be achieved for Ugandan children,  especially former child  soldiers,  etc.125 What is  not
mentioned is that only a very small part of all donations given to Invisible Children in 2012
went to aid for projects or programmes in Uganda (Invisible Children 2011).
The film finishes with motivating the audience to share the video with others. The
wish is that an army of young people spends time watching the video, cover the night, buy
the kit126 offered in the video, and pressure the American government to continue with their
military support of the Ugandan government  by sending 100 military advisors,  which –
Invisible Children claims – will only be stationed there, if the American public is aware of
the LRA atrocities. Yet there had been no mention of the US government planning to recall
those military advisors before the video was released (Finnström 2012).
Furthermore,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  organisation  pressures  the  US
government to send military advisors to Uganda to train the local military and enable them
to capture Joseph Kony for the International Criminal Court in Den Hague, as ironically
this is an authority that the United States of America do not recognise for themselves.
Another sad irony is that the makers of KONY 2012 call for US military support of
125 Some of the information missing in the video can be obtained under 
http://invisiblechildren.com/get–involved/fundraise/. There is a downloadable credsheet.pdf entitled “Proof 
that our efforts are working” on which Charity Navigator is quoted saying “We give the charity 4 out of a 
possible 5 stars for its Financial Health. It spends upwards of 80% of its budget on its programmes and 
services. As such, Invisible Children is actually outperforming most charities in our database in terms of how 
it allocations its expenses.” 
126 A package consisting of campaign buttons, posters, bracelets and stickers
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the Ugandan government, whose quasi-dictatorial President Yoweri Museveni was himself
a rebel warlord in the 1980's, allegedly using child soldiers himself (Dodge and Raundalen
1991, 54). In his defence it must be mentioned that he helped overthrow  the infamous
rulers  Idi Amin (1979) and Milton Obote (1985), both guilty of heinous crimes against
humanity  (cp.  The  Economist  2013,  60  and  Dodge  and  Raundalen 1991).  Museveni,
nicknamed  the  “Gentleman  Farmer”  due  to  his  frequent  and  long  stays  at  his  south
Ugandan cattle farm, has been Uganda's President since 1986 and maintains a strict control
of the government (The Economist 2013, 59f.). Corruption and inefficiency run rampant,
especially  in  the  military,  which  goes  some  way  in  explaining  their  inefficiency  in
capturing rebel groups such as Joseph Kony's (Cavanagh 2012). 
Last year, an estimated US $100 million of government funds were misappropriated
in Uganda, and while oil was discovered in 2006, refineries still remain to be built to this
day. To ensure his power, Museveni has placed members of his family and loyal supporters
in the government, while the “democratic affirmations” of his rule are a farce (ibid.). When
he came to power, Museveni was hailed as an example of a new generation of African
leaders that cared about their countries and democracy. Yet, although he remains popular,
he has, as “The Economist” (2013, 60) puts it, overstayed his welcome. So it is difficult to
perceive him as a flawless hero. This probably goes some way to explain why he doesn't
appear  in  the  KONY 2012  video  and  why support  for  his  government  is  thematised
indirectly through support for the Ugandan military by US military advisors. A cynic might
add that an old African man simply has no appeal to a young Western public, and the video
instead concentrates on white attractive Jason Russell and innocent Jacob and Gavin as
protagonists. 
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3.20.  How  to  Appeal  Successfully  in  the  Digital  Area  and  How  to  Do  so
Sustainably
Why did the KONY 2012 video work so well in capturing viewer's attention? Different
analyses of the video tend to focus either on narrative techniques or the expert use of social
media (cp. Beckett 2012, Gregory 2012, and Finnström 2012). Yet, the success of the video
can be best explained by combining content and context. Concerning content, the video
makes expert use of emotional scenes, capturing the viewer's attention and making him
charitably disposed (cp. chapter 2). It also provides a strong narrative of “good vs. evil”,
with  the  viewer  assuming  the  role  of  the  hero  being  called  to  save  the  innocent  (cp.
Gregory 2012 and Waldorf 2012). But the effect was only short-lived, as can be seen in the
following  statistics.  Invisible  Children's record  revenues  in  2012  were  followed  by  a
drastic decline in 2013 (and most probably the years henceforth). By 2014, the INGO had
to  drastically  reduce  its  team size  and  investments  with  “lasting  effects  on  the  many
communities and students to whom it committed and whose lived experiences it aims to
represent” (Sebastian and Titeca 2014). 
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Table 1: Overview and Development of  Invisible Children's Donation and Overall
Income
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
5
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15
20
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30
From General 
Donations
Overall Net
in
 $
U
S
 m
il
li
on
Total Yearly Income
(in $US million) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
From General
Donations 2.08 2.59 4.68 8.69 4.32 2.97 0.90
Overall Net 7.84 8.25 12.92 26.49 4.95 6.22 2.79
(Source: Invisible Children Financial Records 2010-2016, 
www.invisiblechildren.com/financials/).
It  has to be noted that very little of the money raised was actually invested locally in
Uganda. According to the organisations annual report, as little as 37 per cent of the money
raised went into the construction of schools and a radio early warning system (Invisible
Children  2011).  Invisible  Children  justified  this  by  making  “raising  awareness”  their
primary mission. It is a dangerous trend in the Non-Profit sector when self-publicity and
fundraising masquerades as “raising awareness”.
Concerning  context,  we  are  reminded  of  McLuhan's  famous  saying  that  “the
medium is the message”. As experts on the use of social media, the makers of KONY 2012
were very much aware of how a video can be shared and viewed easily throughout the
Facebook and YouTube community. Therefore their first plea is for the viewer to share the
video  on  those  platforms.  As  Waldorf  (2012,  469)  shows,  KONY 2012  innovatively
“repackages  humanitarianism  as  commodity  activism,  human  rights  militancy,  and
clicktivism” (cp. Drumbl 2012).
An essential part of the success of the video is that it gives the audience the feeling
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that they matter, that they are powerful, and that they can do something to help. Instead of
leaving the viewer with despair,  as the traditional  marketing techniques of INGOs and
many news reports  tend to do, it gives the viewer the feeling that his  or her engagement
matters and that he or she can help improve the world. It provides an easy access to the
campaign with  barely any entrance  barriers.  By watching the  video and  sharing  it  on
Facebook, the viewer has already become a supporter of the campaign. A campaign that,
the video claims, will “change the course of human history”. The strategy is simple: The
organisation Invisible Children will try to reach as large an audience as possible and then
use public pressure to get Western governments, specifically that of the United States, to
involve in the capture of Joseph Kony. Once a critical mass of followers has been reached,
the  message  goes  viral.  Both  storytelling  and  social  media  techniques  combine
exceptionally well. 
The video also offers  a concrete description of action. There is no immediate  or
direct call to donate money. Instead, the video presents the viewer with the possibility “to
take  action”  by  buying  “kits”,  consisting  of  campaign  buttons,  posters,  bracelets  and
stickers (as mentioned above). This is known as commodity activism. Psychologically, this
makes a difference, as the de facto donor has the impression of receiving something for his
money. 
The  idea  of  a  providing  a bracelet  is  not  new.  Originally  used  by the  AIDS-
awareness movement, the selling of bracelets reached development aid during the British
“Make Poverty History” movement in 2005. White bands were used by the campaigners
and affiliates to show support for this campaign, a strategy that was very successful (Sireau
2009). 
Commodity activism is very effective. As we have seen in chapter 2, donating is
motivated by a complex mixture of self-interest and altruism. Providing the donor with a
consumer good “in exchange” increases the willingness to donate, as it combines the two
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motivations.  It  also allows for  the donor to  show his  support  of  a  campaign publicly,
making it possible for him to integrate his humanitarian support in his lifestyle and hereby
to receive prestige in his peer group. For a more profound critique of commodity activism,
see Darnton and Kirk (2011) and Mukherjee and Banet-Wieser (2012), who regard this as a
playful  form of  consumerism,  contrasting  to  a  true  and  honest  involvement  with  the
problem in question.
The  narration employed is as effective as it is dangerous. The symbolism of the
KONY 2012 video is especially problematic. In chapter 3 of his Mediapolis, Silverstone
discusses the role of  evil  in  the media.  He identifies (and criticizes) a tendency  in the
conservative American rhetoric to invoke the evilness of their enemies. Many European
viewers, when they see the inverted triangle and the army of youngsters raising their fists
towards the sky in the KONY 2012 video, will be reminded of fascism and the novel “The
Wave” by Todd Strasser (1981). Waldorf (2012, 469) refers to this as “military activism”.
The problem of these polarising or Manichean world-views is that they simplify a complex
reality  into  a  comic  book story.127 The  video does  therefore  not  only present  a  single
identified victim. It makes use of this psychological mechanism in a second way, too: It
presents us with a single identified perpetrator. 
This does not mean that the world would not be a better place with Joseph Kony in
prison. Indeed, it would be, as it would be with many other warlords, dictators, or other
“immoral  individuals”  behind  bars.  However,  believing  that  simply eliminating  these
individuals will solve  the problem is at best short sighted, at worst in itself immoral. It is
short-sighted because it simplifies complex social and economical problems, claiming that
the removal of an individual can solve them. Eliminating a warlord or a criminal does in
most cases not solve problems, it even may lead to new and bigger ones. In recent cases of
removing dictators, the subsequent situation in countries such as Iraq or Libya shows that
the  situation  after  a  military intervention  can,  to  say the  least,  be  very difficult  for  a
127 Star Wars is actually mentioned in the video.
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population.128 In “Why Nations Fail” (2012), Acemoglu and Robinson note that without
previously  established  democratic  and  just  institutions,  countries  can  easily  become
trapped in a vicious circle of unjust or even criminal leaders.
Some problems may appear  more important  than they are in  reality,  while  less
spectacular  issues  like  malaria,  safe  drinking  water,  or  education  may  suffer.  Other
problems are much more complex, such as trade justice, development countries' debts and
the  building  of  just  international  institutions  (cp.  Beckett  2012,  13).  Simplifying  and
reducing  the  problem to  one  which  is  solvable  with  just  a  military intervention  is  no
durable solution. 
Even more problematic is the use of stereotypes in the video. The young Ugandans
are portrayed as passive and helpless (Cottle and Nolan 2007), while the perpetrators are
presented in a “colonialist  'Heart-of-Darkness'  stereotype of primitiveness and religious
fundamentalism” (Finnström 2012). “Images of child soldiers and mutilated faces are used
to  build  sentiment  to  evoke  pity  and  cause  public  action”  (Chouliaraki  2010).  In
consequence, the West, supported by a “rhetoric of benevolence” (cp. Pogge 2010a and
Smith  2009),  comes  as  a  superior  saviour.  The implication  of  this  portrayal,  although
aimed at creating proximity,  further increases a notion of remoteness by separating the
spectator and the sufferer into “us” and “them” categories. 
An aspect put forward by Boltanski (2007, 196ff.) is a psychological phenomenon
called  pitié sadique  (sadistic pity).  This would mean that the spectator may sadistically
enjoy watching  human  beings  suffering.  This  idea  is  inspired by  de  Sade's  view that
humanity's state of nature is characterized by constant violence and suffering – much more
so than in the Hobbesian model, in which the “war of all against all” is (arguably) more a
threatening potential than a constant reality, and people's conflicts arise from competing for
resources and from contrary views. According to de Sade, there are not few people who
128 Historical evidence from the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition of several Latin-American 
countries to democracy shows that reform or revolution from within has a much better chance of creating a 
stable and peaceful society (Cenoweth and Stephan 2011).
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actually enjoy the (contemplation of) suffering of others.129 
People who enjoy seeing other people suffer do exist, but are the exception.130 If it
were  different,  no  community  would  be  possible,  as  states  Boltanski  (2007,  206ff.).
Moreover,  sadistic  emotions  are  in  contradiction  to  Silverstone's  media  ethics.  Yet  the
uncomfortable question remains, to what extent the audience of a report on a humanitarian
catastrophe may be driven to  action  or  to  donate money by sensationalism or  sadistic
contemplation. 
It  would have been useful for the appeal to include more African voices in the
video.  More  interacting  with  Ugandan  youths  could  have  helped  to  implement  a  real
exchange and a true connection,  to build trust and gain a knowledge of their real wants,
wishes, and needs. Several African organisations are  acting in this way and so trying to
combat the prevailing damaging stereotypes of Africa. E.g. the organisation “Mama Hope”
has published a video called “African Men. Hollywood stereotypes”, in which they mock
Hollywood for presenting African men as obsessed with violence.131 
Invisible Children has tried to act similarly by publishing a follow-up video, which,
however, was much less successful. They were certainly overwhelmed by the unexpected
success of their KONY 2012 video and all its consequences. Yet, this implies a worrying
conclusion: It seems that the goal to gain attention and make money through fundraising
and the goal to really help the poor are not connected, and an organisation may very well
succeed in the one goal without reaching the other one. The combination of sensationalism
and short attention span may mean that we will always be too late to help and too bored to
129 To the authors knowledge, knowledge, there has not yet been any research covering these 
hypotheses, perhaps due to their critical nature.
130 Cp. International Handbook of Cognitive and Behavioural Treatments for Psychological Disorders, 
edited by V. E. Caballo, New York Premium Press 1998
131 “Africa for Norway” has done something similar in calling Africans to aid their fellow humans 
living in the unforgiving Scandinavian cold, thereby ironically reversing the rhetoric of aid to depict the 
problems behind it. (“Africans unite to save Norwegians from dying of frostbite. You too can donate your 
radiator and spread some warmth!“ cp. http://www.africafornorway.no/) However, the situation here is 
unfortunately doubly ironic, as behind Africa for Norway is the Norwegian Students' and Academics' 
International Assistance Fund, financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the 
Norwegian Children and Youth Council. A critic could find it deplorable that Norwegian development 
workers are helping Africans to empower and to develop a better image.
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prevent? Ertharin Cousin, head of the United Nations World Food Programme, referred to
this problem in a 2013 interview in Time Magazine:
“The global community tends to invest during times of crisis and emergency. We
saw it in Haiti. What we need is a recognition that in order to change things, we
need to give people the ability to feed themselves. But the media don't cover these
kinds of stories. They don't cover the opportunity – they cover the crisis.”
To some extent, this is a result of the way fundraising is being done and the way people
tend to react – both of which was already discussed before in this thesis. Many NGOs try
to act more professionally here. Most NGOs of a certain size now have a public relations
office.  As Habermas (Habermas,  Lennox,  and Lennox 1964, 55)  put  it  (already half  a
century ago):
“The very words “public relations work” (Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit sic.) betray the fact
that  a  public  sphere must  first  be arduously constructed  case  by case,  a  public
sphere which earlier grew out of the social structure.”
From Habermas' idea about public relations work follows consequently that the NGO step
by step should change their ways. They should pay more attention to the way how they
construct their own public sphere in the field of fundraising – towards more rational and
effective  help  and  away  from  feeding  the  sensationalist  tendencies  of  parts  of  their
prospective or anticipated donors. 
In his landmark publication, Boltanski (2007, 45ff.)  severely and in various ways
criticises a strategy used by INGOs he calls “payer et parler” (French for “to pay and to
speak (out)”).  Concerning  payer, he maintains  that  there is  no direct  link between the
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person one has perceived as suffering and one's donation. Indeed my donation will not be
used only for Mohammed (12),  whose photo appears in the media or the INGO website,
but will be used by the NGO of my choice to try to help people in the region. But this
criticism seems void,  if  we accept  that  the person seen in  the media serves just  as an
example. In relation to cognitive limits, the impossibility for individuals to see and to be
concerned with every single suffering individual's tragedy has been established. To do so
would require an impossible amount of time and quite probably cause depression. 
A possible simplification is the statistical representation of the suffering. This also
has been dealt with before in this thesis. Yet, unfortunately, statistics are too abstract to
animate  us  into  action  and  lack  an  emotional  impact.  The  “singularity  of  the  victim”
(Boltanski 2007, 47) is therefore  nothing else but the previously discussed psychological
effect of the single identifiable victim.  This is why  media and INGOs can legitimately
present one suffering victim as an example of the many. The choice of the right example is
an important responsibility for INGOs and for international media as well. They would be
required to show only examples that are typical and representative. 
There is a worrying tendency not to live up to this responsibility. Polman (2008)
challenges  the  international  media  and  humanitarian  aid  agencies  in  this  respect. As
discussed above, to increase the emotional impact and therefore the attractiveness of their
story,  journalists  tend  to  over-dramatise  the  situation  and  to use  “donor  darlings”  (or
“hunger  babies”),  often  children,  who  suffer  a  particularly  tragic  fate  (and  not  a
representative one). INGOs do so because they want to increase donations. This leads to a
distorted image of the local reality. The consequence can be an abundance of donations for
some parts of the worlds, while – as likewise discussed above – “quiet” disasters that lack
media attention (or the “right” pictures or videos) get very little or no help at all. For donor
attention is no less fickle than media attention (Chouliaraki 2010). 
Not only press photos and videos, but also the arts have a very important role to
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play in the combat against poverty and political injustice. Indeed, often artists are better in
shaking up the public's conscience than a scientist or a politician and recent studies confirm
that reading improves empathy and understanding of others (Kidd and Castano 2013). The
writer Victor Hugo for example,  who was quoted at the beginning of the KONY 2012
video, was  a  true  fighter  against  political  injustice  and  poverty  (for  example  Les
Misérables  is a poignant critique of the 19th century French penal system and drastically
shows the effects of poverty on individuals), similar things can be said about many painters
(Picasso's  Guernica as  one  of  the  most  impressive  arguments  against  war)  or
cinematographers  (City of  God,  About  Smith,  Last  King of  Scotland  for  the  history of
Uganda). Another example would be Charles Dickens who advocated heavily for the poor
and presented their lives in works of fiction that influenced the moral imagination of his
large readership, e.g. in his novels “Oliver Twist” (1839) and “Bleak House” (1850).
As we have learnt, among others, from Singer (1981) and Shermer (2008), we are
evolutionary programmed to value  in-group and family members over distant outsiders.
But  there seem to be ways  art  can help us  overcome those distances.  Shermer (2008)
demonstrates this with the example of the 2002 comedy drama About Smith. In this film,
Jack  Nicholson  plays  a  retiree  who  has  to  come  to  terms  with  his  wife's  death,  his
daughter's marriage, and a general feeling of uselessness. After viewing a late night “Plan
USA”-plea, he  decides  to  sponsor  a  foster  child  in  Tanzania.132 He  then  receives  an
information package, including a photo of his foster child named Ndugu Umbo. Schmidt
writes various letters to Ndugu, telling him about his life, his feelings of dissatisfaction and
loneliness. In a final letter before driving to his daughter's wedding, Schmidt questions his
life, lamenting that he will soon be dead, that his life has made no difference to anyone,
and that eventually it will be as if he had never existed at all. As Schmidt returns, there is
pile  of  mail  waiting for  him.  Among many advertisements,  there  is  also a  letter  from
Tanzania. It is from a nun who writes that Ndugu is still illiterate, but appreciates Schmidt's
132 Unfortunately, the form of this plea is very similar to the “poverty pornography” criticised in this 
thesis.
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letters  (read  to  him)  and financial  support  very much.  A painting  drawn by Ndugu is
enclosed, showing two smiling stick figures, one large and one small, holding hands on a
sunny day. The film ends with Schmidt weeping in delight. 
This emotional ending can to a certain extent explain the  success of many child-
sponsorship organisations (Wydick,  Glewwe, and Rutledge 2013 and  Yuen 2008).  That
children are especially potent in fundraising was tried to show in several previous parts of
this thesis.  Shermer admits that the scene  – although in a film and therefore fictitious  –
encouraged himself to take a foster child. 
The problem of distance between donor and bestowed (or receiver of the donation)
– as well as the problem of the scattering of donations among many receivers (i.e. not
benefiting directly the child in the picture) – can be avoided if, as is common practise,
donors are made aware that their sponsorship does not only benefit the individual child
itself, but partly goes towards the benefit of his surroundings or entourage, e.g. the child's
whole village.133 Under these premises, the donor, once he already has made the decision
to support it, probably will understand that the child he wants to help needs a functioning
surrounding to grow up, including a well for clean water, a school, etc. 
Journalism can fulfil a similar role as the arts. It can detect, analyse, and report on
and so expose inhuman working conditions, human rights abuse, cases of political injustice
and corruption.  Reports on human rights abuse can shed public attention on local human
rights  activists  and  so  help  to  guarantee  their  safety.  Negative  side-effect  can  be  the
reinforcement of stereotypes, and the raising of strong emotions, when journalists present
the good story that thrills the audience.
133 More on the effect of direct cash transfers in the following part.
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Conclusion: Why an Exclusively Emotional Approach Alone Cannot Solve the
Problem
Part 3 of this thesis is entitled “Why and when do human beings help each other?” In this
context, there was reflection on altruism and cooperation. It has been shown that while
human beings are capable of altruism, it is mainly limited to family members, friends and
acquaintances. Empathy towards others may be increased by establishing an, even arbitrary
connection,  but  there  are  limits  to  these  techniques.  It  seems  as  though  empathy and
altruism are finite resources. Finally, it has been shown that donating is a very intuitive and
spontaneous act and there are several biases that limit a rational approach here.
In  the  preceding  chapter  results  of  moral  psychology were  used  to  situate  the
concept of charity in the context of development aid. Joshua Greene (2007) and Jonathan
Haidt (2001) present evidence that our moral emotions, such as anger, disgust, sympathy,
or charity, can be triggered by certain situations, which means that we can be manipulated,
and that our rational influence on these emotions is minimal. Moral psychologist Joshua
Greene, inspired by David Hume, has proven empirically that our empathy is strongest in
cases which we perceive as “up close and personal”.  When applying these findings to
development  aid,  the  question  occurs  if  we  are  not  trying  to  solve  a  complex  global
problem with unsuitable instruments (cp. Innerarity 2011). As noted by Ainslie (2007), the
influence  of  emotions  in  the  field  of  economics  has  been underestimated,  with  severe
consequences.  In  sub-chapters  3.7.–3.13.  several  additional  biases  displayed by donors
were identified such as attribution of blame and overemphasising with a single identifiable
victim.
The problems of global poverty are constant and on a large scale.  In contrast, in
chapter 3.2. and 3.5. it has been argued that the amount of resources available to altruistic
projects is limited. INGOs then have to compete for limited resources for their projects. In
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an economically rational world, a number of disinterested INGOs would compete for these
resources via their results. However, this does not happen. Rather, to get the maximum
resources possible, INGOs use marketing techniques that exploit our emotional response to
suffering.134 As was tried to show by several examples, with a focus on the KONY 2012
campaign,  INGOs  increase  their  income  by  the  use  of  shocking  pictures  of  starving
children or by getting support from celebrities. Larger and established organisations have a
natural advantage here.
In the case that development aid is not financed by INGOs, but by governments, the
politicians involved must see how they can “sell” this engagement best to their voters and
how they can convince the media that their support of developing countries corresponds to
national  interests.  The  charitable  nature  of  development  aid  (instead  of  a  political  or
rational basis) is a major problem and may prevent long-term solutions. Olson (2000, 2ff.)
notes that in a vicious circle, the persistence of poverty and the lack of perceived outcomes
lead to passivity and despair of the donors. 
Basing  development  aid  on  public  opinion  carries  the  risk  of  short-sighted
campaigns that are oriented on thrill and spectacle rather than long-term results. Therefore
manipulable public opinion should carry less weight in the distribution of aid. If you want
to  obtain  results  that  are  effective  and  sustainable,  you  have  to  rely  on  evaluation,
reflection,  and  rationality.  Political  action  towards  the  creation  of  fair  international
institutions is even more important.
Donors care little about efficiency, and if they care, they tend to focus on irrelevant
factors  such  as  overhead or  a  credible  spokesperson.  So,  aid  money is  at  least  partly
distributed according to unfair and manipulable heuristics and not according to need or
efficiency. When no compatriots are touched, it takes “hunger babies” or “donor darlings”
to get attention (Polman 2008, 77ff.). Singer recognizes this, but thinks we can surmount
these difficulties by creating a “culture of giving”. This possibility will be further discussed
134 They also have to compete with other causes, such as national poverty relief, support for the sick, 
animal rights, and with the efforts made by religious organisations.
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below. Distance and nationality do limit the voluntariness to aid distant suffering strangers.
I  agree  with  Peter  Singer  that  the  scope of  human suffering  in  contrast  with  Western
“affluence” is unacceptable, as the disparity of living conditions is abysmal.135 However, I
remain highly sceptical of the solution he proposes for world poverty. The quantity and
nature of the limitations to our donation would require a complete change of the way we
think about charity. And these are not the only problems. In the following I will attempt to
highlight the problems of aid guided by donor opinion and interests for recipient countries.
Moreover, I will try to discuss the question: What role does efficiency play in donation
decision-making?
The idealism of authors such as Singer is admirable. However, the question remains
whether  this  idealism is  not  based  on too  much  optimism.  Both  authors'  advocacy to
increase and improve fundraising techniques, sounds a bit like “we have the technology”.
Their  optimism  is  twofold.  Firstly,  what  can  be  accomplished  by  professionalising
fundraising  and  making  use  of  psychological  research.  Secondly,  what  can  be
accomplished with the funds thus raised. 
Peter Singer (2009a) proposes several solutions to increase donations, the use of
identifiable victims (ibid., 46ff. and 69f.), being upfront with our giving (ibid., 64ff.), to
use  nudging (ibid.,  70ff.),  and collectively challenging the  norm of  self-interest  (ibid.,
73ff.). After the presentation of both the biases and limits of the charitable impulse, as well
as the considerable concurrence in the market for charitable donations. For example the
attempt to put pressure on people by speaking publicly about donating could simply lead to
avoidance or even lying. If therefore the conclusion that more should be done about global
poverty, as the ethical discussion in part 2 indicates, alternative options should be taken
into account. Singer himself indirectly proposes such a solution, which is to direct as much
135 With the approximately €405 monthly financial aid a German unemployed receives, plus free health 
care and housing support, he nominally has the same resources as a Mexican teacher working full-time. With 
the same money, in Somalia, where around 3.7 million people were endangered by famine due to a drought in
East Africa in 2010 and again in 2016-2017, a family of ten can survive a whole month. It costs 10 € to feed a
person in the Kenyan refugee camp Dadaab for a whole month (Carstens 2011 and Perry 2011).
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as possible of existing donations towards more effective organisations. But what exactly
means effectiveness and how can it be measured? A small glimpse into the comparatively
minuscule sector of charity evaluators has already been given with a focus on fundraising
techniques. What and how effectiveness can be measured in the context of global poverty
will be discussed in the following and final part. 
The discussion of effectiveness is important for another reason. Only if a strong
enough  proof  of  sustainable  improvement  of  living  conditions  can  be  achieved,  is  it
possible to argue for non-voluntary measures such as taxation to benefit the global poor in
combination with a strong ethical requirement. Unless eliminating poverty is a problem
that  actually can be solved by financial  means,  calls  for  donations  or taxation are not
justifiable, if not we have to ask ourselves if we do not owe them something different
(Wenar 2011b). For example if the theory of Neo-Malthusianism, which will be presented
in the next part, any financial support directed towards developing countries would simply
lead to an increase in population growth and thus suffering and environmental problems. It
will  be  shown,  that  several  measures  indeed  support  the  poor  in  a  sustainable  way,
especially by reducing the burden of disease and by increasing the meagre income. To
reduce the problem to a merely financial one, however, falls too short. It is more a political
one, a question of empowerment. 
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4. Aid in Practise or How Effective is our Aid?
This final part of the thesis deals with what I consider the outstanding contribution of Peter
Singer's  and William MacAskill's  work in the field of effective altruism. Namely their
efforts  and  arguments  directing  potential  donation  towards  effective  organisations  and
projects in the context of international development aid.
In the previous part several problem with the concepts of “effective altruism” and
“culture of giving” have been identified. It has been shown that determining a duty to
donate is much less easy than a simple utilitarian framework may indicate and efforts to
alleviate poverty should relate more to our a sense of common humanity and to reparation
and  avoidance  of  past,  current  and  future  harm.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  ethical
requirements of living an altruism focused life go to far and do not leave sufficient room
for individual development. Additionally, what we would be morally obliged to do against
global  poverty  has  been  contrasted  with  our  actual  and  feasible  behaviour.  The
psychological and sociological research on charitable behaviour discussed has shown that
the reach of a donating movement as envisioned by Peter Singer is limited. Biases and
entrenched attitudes limit the volition to donate, especially for causes of global poverty,
which remains a fringe topic in the public debate.  Charitable giving is championed by
society, philosophy and all major religions and co-financed and supported by the state, but
the number of donors remains quite constant over the years. An exponential growth of
donors is therefore unlikely.
Even more important is thus the idea proposed by Singer (2009a and 2015) and
MacAskill (2015a) to focus donations on effective organisations and projects. That we do
not  owe everything to  the global  poor,  does  not  entail  we do not  owe them anything.
Global injustices in which we as Western public and consumers are indirectly participating
and simply that we can help, does make a convincing argument that we should dedicate a
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certain amount towards helping, and helping effectively is both a rational and an ethical
requirement. 
A first problem here has been shown in the previous part, donors tend to be self-
centred in their giving and fundraising professionals adapt to this situation. It has been
shown that media and donor attention is fickle and easily seduced by attractive campaigns
and fads. The considerable cost of fundraising campaigns means that larger organisations
able to spend more have an advantage,  not necessarily the most effective ones (Dogra
2012, 27ff. and Stern 2013a, 183ff. and 190f.). 
The next part examines what donations and aid can actually do, both in the best and
in  the  worst  case.  What  can  private  and  official  development  aid  accomplish,  which
projects and interventions are effective? How much can be accomplished by International
Development  Organisations,  both official  and non-governmental,  and what  role  do  the
different political actors and institutions involved play? An overview in the form of case
studies helps develop an understanding of the current state of aid,  with a focus on its
effectiveness. This supports both Singer's and MacAskill's assessment that there is a huge
gap between what our donations can achieve for others when used in a thoughtful manner
and with minimal research effort. 
Of  course  there  are  several  difficulties  when we talk  about  focusing  donations
towards effective organisations. First there are epistemological difficulties in defining what
is meant by effectiveness. This translates into the difficulty of evaluating effectiveness in
the development context practically due to lack of reliable information (Jerven 2009, 2012
and 2013), lack of local knowledge and unintended and unforeseen consequences (Wenar
2011b and Ramalingam 2013).
 While,  contrary to  Singer and MacAskill  hopes,  these problems may be not be
entirely  solvable,  it  will  be  shown  that  a  good  enough  approximation  can  be  given,
especially if  it  would be possible to implement  a  system of information exchange and
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mutual learning on what works in international aid. Unfortunately, we are then confronted
with the previously discussed problem of fads in aid and the media and a lack of respect
and inclusion of the poor themselves in the development and implementation of solutions,
due to them being donor-centred. Additionally, the problem of dependency and national
interests  not  only  dictates  global  trade,  but  unfortunately  also  development  aid.  To
illustrate this and the accompanying tendency of development professionals and donors to
repeatedly fall for “fads” and “hypes”, several examples will be discussed (cp. Glennie
2009,  Hickel  2014,  and  Lauer  and  Lepenies  2015).  The  examples  have  been  chosen
because  they  represent  a  specific  approach  such  as  social  engineering  (Jeffrey  Sachs'
Millenium Villages), are very popular (Fair Trade) or have received enormous institutional
and academic support (microfinancing). I will then present an idea that actually works and
should receive the majority of  funding, both from private and official side: direct financial
support. 
4.1. From Humanitarian Aid to Development Aid
This chapter aims to distinguish between the different forms of international aid. There is a
considerable difference between humanitarian and development,  as  well  as private  and
official  aid.  Humanitarian  aid  is  targetted  towards  a  specific  population  to  prevent  or
alleviate a specific crisis, for example in case of natural disasters or war or to prevent
famine or the spread of disease (Riddell 2008, 325ff.). Private aid, in the form of individual
voluntary donations to INGOs, is distinguished from official development aid, which is
paid  for  by  taxes  (Lichtenberg  2014,  189ff.). There  are  transitions,  interlocking,  and
permeability of all these forms of aid. For example humanitarian aid can, and in the case of
developing countries should, be followed up by  development aid (Riddell 2008, 352ff.).
Conversely, an increasingly important factor of development aid is catastrophe and conflict
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prevention work. Private  and official  aid are distinguished by the institution financing,
organising and implementing the projects, being either governmental, usually affiliated to
the  donor-countries  ministry  of  development  aid,  or  non-governmental  (INGOs),  for
example citizen initiatives such as Oxfam or religiously affiliated organisations such as
Caritas International. It should be noted that governmental aid is partly distributed through
private INGOs, blurring the lines between private and official institutions (Riddell 2008,
259ff.). 
It  is  also  important  to distinguish between  micro  and  macro  projects.  Micro-
projects, for example support of small farmer cooperatives or the building of a village well,
ideally should lead to  improvements on the macro-level,  such as  improved democratic
institutions,  an improved national  life  expectancy, or economic growth.  Macro projects
usually target the countries infrastructure, or finance state institutions directly. A definition
of “aid” from Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (Harrison 2009, 8), elaborating the
difference between bilateral and multilateral aid, closes this chapter, moving towards the
central argumentative point of this part of the thesis: The problem of efficiency of aid.
“aid: International aid generally encompasses any transfer of resources between
states which is not undertaken on a commercial basis. Normatively, most would
exclude military assistance from their definitions of foreign aid, which highlights
how the politic of aid is largely conducted through discourses of humanitarianism
and economic development.  Indeed, aid is  closely associated with the notion of
development,  and  this  association  is  in  itself  structured  through  a  distinction
between “developed” and “developing” countries. The vast majority of aid moves
from the former to the latter.
Official aid may be handled on a bilateral basis, through intergovernmental
transfers  from developed  states  to  developing  states;  or  through  transfers  from
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multilateral  institutions  (e.g.  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  or
aspects  of  the  World  Bank's  lending)  to  developing  states.  Another  important
multilateral aid institution which has a unique structure is the Global Fund. The
European Union has its own aid strategies, focused on the African, Caribbean, and
Pacific post-colonies. Other sources of aid include non-governmental organizations,
funded through private donations and “home” governments.
Since the mid-1950s, aid has emerged as a key aspect of global politics, and
the politics of international aid has become a prominent issue, rising up the agenda
of G7/8, OECD, and other intergovernmental meetings. There is concern about the
efficacy of aid; after $2.3 trillion of aid has been disbursed over the last fifty years,
it is questionable whether aid makes much of a difference to development. Aid can
also be seen to influence the relationship between donors and recipients. Questions
have been raised about the motivations of aid givers, especially in respect to donor
states, whose geopolitical and economic interests may affect how aid is allocated.
In terms of aid strategy, forms of aid differ widely and donor institutions always
attach projects, plans and preferences to aid, commonly known as conditionality
and tied aid. Aid can be seen to lead to dependence, establishing a hierarchy of
giver and receiver and allowing for intervention in developing states by developed
states.”
4.2. Aid Effectiveness
As the definition from the previous chapter indicates, a heated discussion on the efficiency
of  development  aid  has  accompanied  the  field  since  its  beginning  in  the  1950s  (cp.
McGillivray et al. 2006, 1032). Many economists have argued that aid does only little good
and may even be pernicious (Bauer 1971, De Waal 2011, Easterly 2001, 2007b and 2014,
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Erler  1985,  Glennie 2009, Maren 1997, Moyo 2009, Mwenda 2006, Polman 2008 and
2010, and Shikwati  2006).  These authors mainly criticise that aid distorts  markets and
leads  to  crowding  out  of  local  efforts,  that  it  weakens  government  accountability  by
providing  a  tax-independent  source  of  income, and  thus  leads  to  dependency.  Former
World  Bank  economist  William  Easterly  raises  scepticism  on  the  possibility  of  aid
achieving  long-term  economic  improvements  in  poor  countries,  pointing  towards  the
problematic  state  of  evidence  for  development  aid  so  far.  His  credo  is  that  the  $2.3
trillion136 (Easterly 2007b, 4, Harrison 2009, 8, also cp. Riddell 2008, ch. 4 and 5) spend
on aid so far have largely been for naught. In his opinion this is largely due to progress and
growth are not being plannable by a external actors, and that economic growth is rather a
result of markets working in a stable environment which is guaranteed by good institutions,
than governmental spending (cp. De Soto 2000, Hayek 1948, and Ramalingam 2013).
The critics' proposals go from radical calls to dismantle all forms of aid to more
modest  proposals  of  reform.  Reformists,  such  as  Riddell  (2008),  Glennie  (2009),  or
Ramalingam (2013),  usually target the way aid is implemented. The main thrust is the
move from direct budget support of, unfortunately often corrupt and inefficient, and quite
often  undemocratic,  governments  or  economic  subsidies  to  infrastructure  to  trying  to
implement  institutional  reforms  and  a  focus  on  projects  that  directly  target  the  poor
improving education,  health  or  simply provide support  directly to  the  poor.  The focus
should therefore be less on increasing economic performance, but improving individual
living conditions and life expectancy (Glennie 2009, 78ff.). As growth may simply mean
increased inequality, which may actually result in the poorest people being worse off. For
example, the Nigerian economical growth over the last ten years was exceptional, with a
growth  rate  of  around  seven  per  cent.  In  2013,  with  a  BNP of  $510  billion,  Nigeria
surpassed South Africa as biggest economy on the African continent (Rybak 2014). The
boom is mainly due to high resource prices, especially for crude oil, and to construction.
136 This number is of course not undisputed. Due to different methodologies, estimates range between a 
careful estimate of $1 trillion (Moyo 2009, xix), the mentioned $2.3 trillion and $4.6 trillion (Harvey 2012).
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Unfortunately, both sectors are very susceptible to corruption and misdirection of funds.
With reference to a long tradition of corrupt practices International 2013, 3). The result is
that  after  a  decade  of  growth,  inequality  and  poverty  have  in  Nigeria's  economy,
Transparency  International ranks  the  country  in  corruption  144th of  altogether  177
countries worldwide,  attesting “scant or no” government budget openness increased, so
that now 61 per cent of Nigerians live on less than a dollar, whereas in 2004 it was 52 per
cent (Rybak 2014 and Transparency International 2010). 
On  the  other  side  of  the  discussion  we  find  supporters  of  aid  who,  generally
accompanied by a few reformatory ideas of their own, are convinced by aid's effectiveness
and insist on an important increase (up to a doubling) of aid (f. ex. Collier 2008 and Sachs
2005). An argument often brought by the defendants of this view is the success of the
Millennium Development Goals  (MDGs),  most,  if  not  all  of  them have been reached,
particularly the number of people defined as living in extreme poverty has been halved
since 1990 (UN 2015, 14f.).
How are these quite contrary assessments able to coexist? A first explanation is that
there is no simple narrative of how a countries wealth is created and how it converts into
individual living standards of its citizens. For many countries geographical situation has a
considerable  influence  on  it's  wealth,  it's  (colonial)  history,  government  system  and
institutional  quality  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson  2012,  Diamond  1999,  Landes  2010,
Marshall 2015, and Riddell 2008, 136ff.). Adding to this is the fact that from a macro-
perspective, the influence of aid on economic growth and improving (or worsening) living
conditions is difficult to determine statistically. Each country has to be viewed separately,
as many other influences compete with the effect of aid. It should also be noted that even a
country that stagnates economically or where living conditions do not improve the effect of
aid need not necessarily be negative or neutral, as the researcher does not have access to
the counterfactual situation (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 14f. and  Deaton and Cartwright
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2016). Simply put, the situation without aid could have been much worse than the actual
result. 
Further  exacerbating  this  situation  is  the  poor  quality  of  statistical  data  in
developing countries. The results of Morten Jerven's (2009, 2012, and 2013) research make
the possibility of  a  correct  or  even meaningful  estimation of  the impact  of aid on the
macro-level even more doubtful. In his 2012 paper “For Richer, for Poorer: GDP Revisions
and Africa's Statistical Tragedy”, he comes to the conclusion that the GDP estimates for
many African countries are unreliable and may be off by between 50 and 150 per cent (also
cp. Jerven 2009 and 2013). For example Ghana's GDP estimate was corrected upwards by
over 60 percent on November 5th 2010. This meant that from one day to the next, Ghana
changed from being a low-income to a lower-middle-income country. It also reveals that in
previous GDP estimates, Ghana's Statistical Services had missed economic activities worth
about US$13 billion. Jerven argues that while this may be the most spectacular case, GDP
misestimations abound in developing countries.
Reasons for this “statistical tragedy” (Jerven 2012) include poor data quality and
control, the lack of adequately qualified staff, a focus less on inland taxation than on border
taxation, and large parts of the economy being extra-legal or even illegal (cp. Neuwirth
2011). There may be a political interest of appearing poorer than one is to secure better
lending conditions, to receive foreign aid and to qualify for debt cancellation. Statisticians
in developing countries have the additional problems of high incidences of illicit financial
flows  (Kar  and  Leblanc  2013).  Together  with  large  sections  of  the  economy  being
informal, the real data are almost impossible to obtain, especially when there are actually
efforts made to occult these economic activities. Furthermore, in remote areas, much of the
economic activity is extra-monetary, with people small farmholders and self-supporters and
relying on bartering for many of their commodities.  Consequently, it is very difficult to
provide a reliable and comprehensive database. This said about simple economic data, one
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can imagine how difficult it is to compile sound data on living conditions, life expectancy,
health and education, which would be what would really interest effective altruists, with
economic performance only being a useful proxy.
This problem of incomplete data is  further complicated by the need to measure
long-term achievements.  Short-term boosts  facilitated  by development  aid  that  are  not
sustainable would not be a meaningful use of the donors and the developing countries
resources. In simple words, financing the construction of a dam to create electricity will
create jobs and increase income in the short  term, yet if  there is  no qualified personal
around to maintain it, it is likely to break down and no further benefit can be derived from
it (cp. Chakravarty 2011). Similarly, a newly constructed hospital will not be of any use if
the nurses and doctors all left because they haven't been paid for months. The term often
used  for  these,  unfortunately  quite  frequent,  failures  in  foreign  aid  projects  is  “white
elephants”. This means that we have to adopt a long-term perspective when examining the
impact of aid on growth. 
Finally,  the  discourse  on  development  aid  is  characterized  by  ideological
differences of the authors, for example William Easterly and Angus Deaton are defendants
of the a conservative-liberal view, with a strong focus on individual responsibility and high
scepticism of any interventions by the nation state. Apart from problems of measurement,
problems of implementation keep aid from reaching its potential. An overview of the most
frequent problems of development aid will  be presented in the following chapters as a
background to discuss implementation of efficient projects.
4.3. The Millennium Development Goals
Defendants  of  development  aid  can  point  towards  a  specific  project  that  at  first  sight
promises to fulfil many of these criteria and make quite a convincing case for aid. The
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United  Nation's  eight  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  had been  established
following the United Nations Millennium Summit in the year 2000, after the adoption of
the United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN 2015). The following goals were to be
achieved by the end of 2015 
1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, notably to halve the proportion of people
living on less than $1.25 a day by 2015 and halve the proportion of people suffering
from hunger.
2. To achieve universal primary education, namely  enrolment in primary education
and completion thereof.
3. To promote gender equality and empower women.
4. To reduce child mortality, specifically to reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and
2015,  the  infant  under-five  mortality  rate Proportion  of  1-year-old  children
immunized against measles.
5. To improve maternal health, besides a reduction in maternal mortality ratio, this
includes contraceptive prevalence.
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, most notably tuberculosis.
7. To ensure environmental sustainability.
8. To develop a global partnership for development.
At least part of these goals are clear and measurable. This was a highly important step for
development aid, as being able to measure results of development interventions means that
we are  able  to  evaluate  the  results  of  aid  invested  over  a  period  of  15  years.  Just  as
important is the fact that measuring and keeping track of results creates responsibility. As
has  been  shown  previously  aid,  both  from  the  donor,  as  well  as  from  the  recipient
governments,  has  unfortunately  not  always  been  directed  towards  those  who  would
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ethically be entitled to it and need it most. If results are publicly tracked, at least part of the
resources will have to be dedicated towards the achievement of the proclaimed goal, lest
the countries concerned want to face international embarrassment (and perhaps a reduction
in future aid).
The  results  of  the  MDG-initiative  are  quite  impressive  and  are  a  convincing
argument towards the effectiveness of aid. The initiative itself confidently calls itself “the
most successful anti-poverty movement in history” (UN 2015, 3). But the claim that they
have been realised to a large degree has not gone unchallenged. This warrants a closer look
at the, from a humanitarian point of view, most important results: the reduction of extreme
poverty, and the improvements in the areas of health and of education. 
The final Millennium Goals Development Report (UN 2015, 4 and 14ff.) indicates
that extreme poverty has declined significantly over the last two decades. In 1990, nearly
half of the population in the developing world, 1.9 billion people, lived on less than $1.25 a
day. That proportion dropped to 14 per cent, 836 million, in 2015. At the same time, the
proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half
since 1990, from 23.3 per cent in 1990 to 1992 to 12.9 per cent. 
Several authors have raised issues with these optimistic numbers. Pogge and Reddy
(2010) and Hickel (2016) maintain that this decrease of the number of global poor was
simply a sleight of hand. A close reading of the report reveals the important role of the
Chinese economic growth in this progress. The proportion of Chinese living on less than
$1.25 a day has been reduced by a staggering 94 per cent between 1990 and 2015 (UN
2015, 14 and UNDP 2015). Coupled with the enormous population of an estimated 1.37
billion,137 the  influence  of  China's  staggering  success  in  decreasing  (food)  poverty  is
difficult to overestimate. Indeed according to a Communication for Discussion with the
Food and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations  (FAO)  by 17  scientists  and
activists, the progress of  China (ca. 96 million) and Vietnam (ca. 24 million) amounts to
137 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the–world–factbook/geos/ch.html.
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91 per cent of the net numerical reduction in undernourished people since 1990 (Lappé,
Clapp, and Wise 2013, 3 and 6ff.). In fact, China has recently gone from being a recipient
of development aid to a provider (Li, Wang, and Wang 2009 and Moyo 2009, 103ff.).
This might not appear worrisome in itself, after all a reduction in global poverty is
good news wherever it occurs and the report admits quite frankly the role of the world's
most populous countries of China and India  and that poverty-reduction, while an overall
success, has still to reach some regions and populations, namely sub-Saharan Africa and
specifically women (UN 2015, 15ff.). But the fact that the positive results are relying on
the economic performance of one country poses some difficulty, especially as the Chinese
governments success in the 1990's in combatting poverty, is estimated by several experts to
be unrelated to receiving development aid, and more to land reforms that have improved
small farmers access to land, strong governments investment in creating (partially) state-
owned enterprises and protecting own industries through tariffs (Chang 2002b and 2008,
28f.,  FAO,  IFAD,  and  WFP 2012,  30,  and  Lappé,  Clapp,  and  Wise  2013,  7).  These
measures are difficult to duplicate by any other developing country, as they are possible
only for large countries with a strong central government and enough international acumen
to  run  against  what  the  World  Trade  Organisation  and  other  international  institutions
prescribe as economic policies.
Another  problem  that  critics  have  with  the  numbers  quoted  is  that,  while  not
manipulated per se, the data most certainly has been altered to present the situation in an
optimistic light. As Hickel (2016) and Pogge and Reddy (2010) show, there has at least
been some embellishment. Instead of halving the absolute number poor, the goal centred
on halving the  proportion  of very poor people, which with the background of a growing
world population actually means that the absolute number of people living in poverty may
increase and the goal still be met.
Even more problematic, that the measurement of poverty and hunger relies on an
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arbitrary international poverty line that is “not adequately anchored in any specification of
the real requirements of human beings” (Pogge and Reddy 2010). After all, the absolute
poverty line being  defined as living on less than $1 a day already strikes one as arbitrary.
In their defence it has to be said that this number was increased to $1.25 a day by the
World Bank. Yet, as Pogge and Reddy (2010) point out, as the income-threshold is still too
low and is calculated under a concept of purchasing power equivalence that this means,
that many people are actually classified as “middle class” who still  suffer from severe
deprivations.
Hickel (2016) points out that similar embellishments have occurred when it comes
to the measurement of calories. In 2009 the FAO changed the methodology of their 25-year
longitudinal study just three years before its conclusion, effectively lowering the minimal
caloric intake to 1.800 per day (cp. FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2012, 12). This may be sufficient
for most poor people to barely survive, but is not enough for farmers, manufacturers and
other  physical  labourers.  Additionally,  it  neglects  that undernourishment  also  includes
symptoms  of  serious  deficiencies  of  basic  vitamins  and  nutrients  are  not  counted  as
undernourished, although this can lead to dramatic illnesses, particularly in children (FAO,
IFAD, and WFP 2012, 23ff.).  This methodology also excludes people who suffer from
parasites, which inhibit food absorption rates, and people that frequently are going hungry
for  periods  of  less  than  a  year,  as  many  farmers  do  just  before  harvest  season  (cp.
Mullainathan and Shafir 2013, ch. 8).
Another problem of measuring effectiveness is shown when having a closer look at
the reported success in the area of education, namely what I would like to call the “bare
minimum”–effect. As the MDG report shows, primary school net enrolment rate in the
developing regions has reached 91 per  cent in 2015, up from 83 per cent in 2000. As
Easterly (2007b, 165) points out, school attendance is a “good observable”, it is sufficient
that  schools  submit  their  attendance  rate  and  that  these  submissions  are  randomly
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controlled (which does not necessarily happen in developing countries, but let us leave this
issue  beside).  What  unfortunately  cannot  be  so  readily  observed  is  the  quality  of  the
education, which unfortunately seems to be deplorable (Pritchett 2013). Not only do few of
the teachers receive any pedagogical training, there are also high instances of bribery and
teacher absenteeism (cp. Chaudhury et al. 2006 and Easterly 2007b). Pritchett concludes
that for many children, it may actually have be a better idea to have stayed at home being
taught useful skills by their parents, with the funds invested in a national education system
being issued to the parents in the form of money or a voucher.
These  examples  illustrate  what  can  go  wrong  once  the  notion  of  measuring
effectiveness.  It  is  difficult  to  do  in  the  best  of  times  and  unfortunately  open  to
manipulation by donors and recipient countries. Certain important criteria, such as a strong
civil society, political representation and  equal rights are even more difficult to measure
and notably as absent from the Millennium agenda, as they are from reflections of Peter
Singer. At a first glance, this may appear justified. After all, having enough food for one's
family and decent access to health care seems to be a more urgent priority than voting. This
development  pragmatism however  ignores  the  complexity  of  poverty.  There  are  many
reasons for absolute poverty. Complete absence of national resources is however, not a
frequent one. On the contrary, many developing countries are rich in resources that they
export  to  the  more  developed  world.  “Purchasing”  developmental  progress  with  an
eschewal of democracy and human rights is therefore myopic, as these positive results are
of questionable reliability and sustainability, and this is playing into the hands of “African
Strong Men” (Easterly 2007b, 117ff. and Matfess 2015). Notable examples would be Paul
Kagame of Rwanda and Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, that can present themselves as
beneficiaries  of  their  respective  nations,  while  their  government  is  characterized  by
authoritarianism and, sometimes violent, suppression of political opposition and freedom
of the press (Davison 2016).
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To  put  priority  on  civil  rights  and  political  empowerment  seem  to  be  more
important for a healthy development of a country that actually benefits the poor in the long
term. As Easterly (2007b, 36f. and 120ff.) puts it, it is highly important that the impulses
for  development  come  from  the  inside  of  a  country,  that  the  need  for  political  and
economic reforms is understood, and that action is taken. 
Going more into the details about the effectiveness of aid on the macro-level would
go beyond the scope of this thesis. As was explained, the issue is complex and heavily
depends on the country receiving the support, especially institutional quality, and the donor
policies.  Even  careful  meta-studies  for  example  Doucouliagos  and  Paldam (2008  and
2011) and Riddell (2008, 253ff.) can only provide answer a very tentative “in some cases
yes”.  In the following, a case study approach will therefore be adopted to differentiate
between several interventions, from humanitarian aid to government support, to specific
interventions that have proven attractive with private donors, such as addressed by Peter
Singer. A closer analysis of microfinance and fair trade, the more holistic approach Jeffrey
Sachs' Millennium Villages will be undertaken, closing with an appeal for direct giving to
the  poor.  As  has  been  a  reiterated  several  times,  there  is  a  problematic  tendency  to
overestimate the possibilities to lift the poor out of poverty via external aid. This myth of
the  white  saviour  or  white  man's  are  Western  hubris,  that  leads  to  paternalism and  a
disregard towards the life-plans and abilities of the poor themselves (Dogra 2012, Easterly
2007b, 237ff. and  Goudge 2003). There is however one way in which aid, coupled with
today's health technologies, has been extraordinarily successful, which Singer (2009a, 85ff.
and 2015, 154ff.) and MacAskill (2015a, 59ff.) rightly point out: Providing simple health
interventions that either save or considerably improving the quality of life. With the most
successful result so far being the elimination of smallpox. Killing an estimated 300 to 500
million  people  during  the  20th  century,  smallpox  continued  to  be  responsible  for  two
million  deaths  per  year.  A global  vaccination  campaign,  with  a  focus  on  developing
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countries, resulted in the disease being finally declared as eliminated in 1979 (Fenner et al.
1988, 1227 and MacAskill 2015a, 54f. and 81ff.).). MacAskill (2015a, 54f.) takes this as a
powerful argument for the efficiency of aid.
“Prior to its eradication, smallpox killed 1.5 to 3 million people every year, so by 
preventing these deaths for over forty years, its eradication has effectively saved 
somewhere between 60 and 120 million lives. The eradication of smallpox is one 
success story from aid, saving five times as many lives as world peace would have 
done. Just for the sake of argument, let's be generous to the aid sceptics. Let's 
suppose that, over the last six decades, foreign aid achieved absolutely nothing 
except eradicating smallpox. A simple calculation shows that even if this were true, 
foreign aid would still be a bargain. The total aid spending of all countries over the 
last five decades is $ 2.3 trillion [...]. That means that, using the low estimate of the 
benefits of eradicating smallpox, at 60 million lives saved, foreign aid has saved a 
life with every $ 40,000 spent. In comparison, government departments in the US 
will pay for infrastructure to improve safety if doing so costs less than about $ 7 
million per life saved […].”
This is indeed a powerful argument, as the life-saving revolution of smallpox eradication is
often forgotten because it was so unspectacular. This sets the theme, as actually effective
and life-saving interventions are often small and unspectacular. Besides vaccinations, such
as polio, other powerful measures are the free provision of insecticide treated malaria nets
and de-worming, providing a considerable rise in quality of life, while the cost-per-unit are
more than reasonable (Gallup and Sachs 2001, Miguel and Kremer 2004, and WHO 2012,
2013 and 2015).138 While  none of  these actually have the power to  lift  people out  of
138 Malaria nets cost around $10 per unit, while vaccinations and de-worming preparations often cost 
under a dollar.
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poverty,  they actually take away worries and provide people with time and resources ,
meaning they can help themselves better.
4.4. The Philosophy of Effectiveness
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the question, whether foreign aid benefits the
recipient countries – and if yes, in what ways – is a highly disputed one, but one that a
philosopher  concerned with  the  attempt to  fight  poverty cannot  avoid,  as  it  has  direct
influence on the ethical  requirement of giving aid,  as  the philosophers and economists
Lichtenberg (2014, 189ff.),  MacAskill (2015, ch. 3), Wenar (2011b) and most certainly
Singer (2009a, 85ff.) recognise. Efficient use of limited resources is a general requirement
of (economic) rationality, but in this case also of ethics. It has already been mentioned that
only a limited amount will be dedicated towards the poorest, both for psychological, as
well as for political and economic reasons. Calls for increasing donations, for example by
Peter Singer and others, may raise a bit more, and the engagement of welfare organisations
such as  Oxfam  and political campaigns such as “Make Poverty History”  may hopefully
pressure governments to dedicate more funds towards development aid (Sireau 2009), but
the topic  will  likely remain on the  fringe of  public  attention and receive  its  ounce  of
scepticism  (Darnton  and  Kirk  2011).  Before  this  background  of  limited  means,  it  is
therefore  even  more  important  to  make  the  most  out  of the  amount  that  is dedicated
towards the poor.  As projects and organisations differ widely in their effectiveness, it is
crucial  to distinguish and to choose the right ones.  In development aid,  supervision of
project effectiveness can also serve as safeguard against corruption and misuse of funds.
This aspect  of  poverty relief  had,  with the exception of  Peter  Singer  and Leif  Wenar,
previously found only insufficient attention by philosophers who have focused their efforts
and arguments on working out or criticising ethical theories of global poverty, but have
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largely left the field – and thus the question of efficiency – to economists. 
As Wenar (2011b) analyses, the open question of (or the lack of) effectiveness does
not mean that our obligation to help the poor ends. Rather it means that our responsibility
is to look for alternative and more powerful ways to support them. Rational giving on the
basis of situational analysis and involvement is what the poor need and what the principle
of beneficence demands from us. It is neither half-hearted slacktivism or ethical shopping,
nor ignorance and deference of responsibility (Davis 2010 and Glück 2008). 
Some other  ethicists  such as  Neera  Badhwar  (2006),  Judith  Lichtenberg  (2014,
177ff.), and Peter Singer (2009a, 81ff. and 2015, 149ff.) do approach the practical angle of
the  problem.  Singer  (2009a,  87ff.  and  2015,  150)  for  example  relies  heavily  on  the
calculation of the organisation Give Well.  MacAskill  (2015,  10ff.)  proposes measuring
project effectiveness by using quality adjusted life years (QALY), or  their inverse societal
counterpart  disability-adjusted  life  years  (DALY),  per  dollar  spent  as  indicator  of  an
efficient  NGO (MacAskill  2015a,  ch.  2,  McKie et  al.  1998, and Singer  2015,  130ff.).
Originating from medical research, this metric has been developed in order to help health
insurances and national health institutions make decisions about how to prioritise among
different  health  programmes  (Williams,  Evans,  and  Drummond  1987).  It  has  since
translated into development aid (Bendavid et al. 2015 and Shiffman 2006). The advantage
of QALY is that it not only captures shortened lifespans as average life expectancy does,
but also reduced quality due to a debilitating illness. Using survey data about the trade-offs
people  are  willing  to  make  in  order  to  assess  how bad  different  sorts  of  illnesses  or
disabilities are. For example, on average people rate a life with untreated AIDS as 50 per
cent as good as life at full health; people on average rate life after a stroke as 75 per cent as
good as life at full health; and people on average rate life with moderate depression as only
30 per cent as good as life in full health. Thus curing a thirty year-old man with a life
expectancy of 75 years of depression would amount to 45 time 30 per cent 13.5 QALYs,
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although one would have to include the resulting reduction in the suicide rate as well.
Measuring quality of live is important in a development context is important, as
many  of  the  illnesses  that  plague  people  in  the  developing  world,  such  as  malaria,
schistosomiasis  or  tuberculosis,  are  not   necessarily  fatal  in  the  short-term,  but  do
significantly reduce an individuals opportunity to learn, work and earn income (Gallup and
Sachs 2001, Sachs 2005, 201, and Shiffman 2006). This is even worse for poor households
in developing, as they cannot rely on insurances to help with the costs of medical care or
loss of income.
Finding out, how many QALYs an intervention actually saves relies on randomised
controlled  trials (Banerjee  and  Duflo  2011,  14f.).  This  method  taken  from  clinical
evaluations  on  a  treatment  effectiveness,  rely  on  separating  different  individuals,
households or communties that share the same conditions into intervention and control
groups.  The  intervention  groups  receive  the  treatment,  for  example  insecticide  treated
malaria bed nets, while the control group remains without them. After a certain amount of
time, rate of infection,  quality of life  and in the long run,  even average life years are
compared. As Banerjee and Duflo (2011, 14) note that of course a “single experiment does
not  provide  a  final  answer  on  whether  a  program  would  universally  work”.  These
experiments are  meant  to  be  repeated  several  times  in  different  contexts  and different
countries. Using this method, GiveWell calculated that it costs around $1.36 to protect one
person  from  malaria  for  one  year,  estimating  that  the  “cost  per  life  saved”  is  about
$2.300.139 Western societies  with a national health service are usually willing to spend at
least  $50.000  per  QALY  gained  (MacAskill  2015a,  61  and  Neumann,  Cohen,  and
Weinstein 2014).
Of  course,  there  are  clear  limitations  to  the  use  of  QALYs  and  randomised
controlled  trials  (Deaton  and  Cartwright  2016  and  Reddy  2013).  The  quasi-utilitarian
calculus  pretends  than  intra-individual  comparisons  on  survey-based  assumptions  of
139 http://www.givewell.org/charities/against-malaria-foundation.
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individual preferences are possible, which can be disputed (cp. Prieto and Sacristán 2003
and Schlander 2007). For example, how bad the experience of loosing and arm versus
loosing your hearing affects you personally and financially depends very much on you and
your  job.  Determining  this  via  survey  will  not  necessarily  yield  correct  information.
Additionally, there is evidence that life satisfaction and quality, even with disability, may
return to a personal baseline (Lucas 2007). From a philosophical point of view, weighing
different lives is of course difficult, as from a deontological perspective you may dispute
the ethicalness of interchanging different persons (Broome 2004, Reddy 2013, and Taurek
1977).  There  are  also  doubts  from a  consequentialist  perspective,  as  you  never  know
whether the life saved is one of the next cruel dictator or someone you finally invents the
vaccination for malaria. A life saved may thus result in many additional lives saved or lost.
Finally, even rigorous evaluations of this kind do not necessarily tell us why an
intervention worked or did not work. For example, providing free malaria nets may not
have worked in some communities, because of they used they used the fine nets as tools
for  fishing  instead  of  protecting  themselves  and  their  children  (Gettleman  2015).140
However, as Broome (2004, 12ff.) and MacAskill (2015a, 46ff.) convincingly argue the
numbers should at least factor into our considerations, because we have limited resources
available and there are important reasons for saving every single human life. As we want to
find what helps many people, not making use of these tools condemns us to inaction or
arbitrariness. I therefore side with MacAskill, especially when considering his additional
advice,  that we should not only look at  these numbers.  Rather,  what  should guide my
decision is whether my additional donation will provide a special benefit. As  Give Well
factors into its consideration  whether a certain INGO and cause is under- or over-funded,
so MacAskill (2015a, 68) asks us to consider the marginal utility added by our donation,
this means that efforts are focused not only on effective, but also underfunded issues. 
It  should be recognised,  that,  as  the methods discussed come from the medical
140 With, as Gettleman (2015) describes, the consequence that the fine nets actually lead to overfishing, 
as the infant fish are caught and killed as well.
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sciences,  health  interventions  have  a  natural  advantage  when being  subjected  to  these
evaluations. While this may point out some simple, effective and underfunded treatments
that  we  can  provide  at  very  low  cost,  there  are  important  interventions  that  are  not
captured.  Precisely because these interventions are so cheap and effective, the question
should  be “Why do developing countries,  who are  often rich  in  natural  resources,  not
already providing them themselves for their population”. As has been shown in this thesis,
a  major  obstacle  here  are  kleptocratic  elites,  corruption  and  lack  of  democracy.  But
interventions that strengthen democracy and combat corruption cannot be measured with
these  methods.  For  example  the  INGO  Transparency  International  (Transparency
International  2010),  provides  civil  actors  and government  opposition  with  reliable  and
comparative data on the extent of corruption in a country, which is a valuable instrument in
forcing regime change and reforms. QALYs can thus not remain the only answer. A solid
argument in this context would be that good health is a pre-requisite for empowerment of
the global poor. By improving their lot we give them the resources to change things for
themselves. This however means that we cannot simply rely on data, but have to actually
listen to the poor and interact with them (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Standing 2008,
and Toth 2014). With the exclusive orientation on data, the effective altruism movement
currently is in danger of losing contact with its original ideals and by focusing on so-called
“extinction events”, forgetting about the poor. This will be discussed in the conclusion.
4.5. Should We Not Help At All? – The Position of Thomas Robert Malthus
A great advantage of the QALY and other rigorous evaluations of interventions is that it
provides a clear counterargument to an attitude that unfortunately remains pertinent in the
public mind when it comes to donations and development aid in general. Namely that they
are futile and ineffective, with a common position remaining (Neo-)Malthusianism. 
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To this  day,  political economist  Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) remains a
highly controversial  author, and many view (Neo-)Malthusianism as inhumane, fatalistic,
and unscientific.141 Indeed, Malthus' arguments have at times been used by politicians to
turn down pleas for famine relief and as Abramitzky and Braggio (2005) and Ross (1998)
show,  is  still  very  present  in  the  public  debate  on  poverty.142 Malthus' work  was
scientifically highly relevant, influencing others such as Charles Darwin, popularizing the
economic theory of rent and arguably founding population studies (cp. Sloan 2010 and
Ekelund and Herbert 2005, 140f.). In this chapter, I will try to present basic aspects of
Malthusian thinking on charity in his time and to show that, concerning possible ill-effects
of well-intended charity, he is still influential in the public imagination. Malthus' basic idea
was  that,  while  population  growth  progresses  exponentially,  food  production  can  only
progress arithmetically.
“Must it not then be acknowledged by an attentive examiner of the histories of
mankind, that in every age and in every State in which man has existed, or does
now exist that the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of
subsistence, that population does invariably increase when the means of subsistence
increase, and, that the superior power of population is repressed, and the actual
population kept equal to the means of subsistence, by misery and vice.”
This means that food shortage and famine are inevitable in the long run, if population
growth  progresses  unchecked.  Malthus  felt  his  results  vindicated  by  the  frequent
141 For example Charles Dickens ironically refers to Malthusianism in Bleak House (1852) as “the 
gentle politico-economic principle that a surplus of population must and ought to starve.” Chomsky (1999, 
59) accuses Malthus together with David Ricardo and “other great figures of classical economics” as 
negating poor people's right to live: “the best gift we can offer the suffering masses is to free them from the 
delusion that they have a right to live.”
142 For example by the administrator of government relief to Ireland Charles Edward Trevelyan during 
the 1840's potato famine (Keneally 2011, 64), and by the Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery during a
debate in the British Parliament on occasion of the Bengali famine in 1944 (ibid., 26).
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occurrence of famines throughout history.143 To avoid overpopulation, human beings can
establish  artificial limitation mechanisms of population growth. As in Malthus' times no
reliable method of birth control existed, population control essentially meant abstinence.144
Individuals should “control their urges” before getting married, and when starting a family,
make rational decisions on family size based on their expected income. However, it has to
be noted that Malthus was sceptical of the capability, especially of the “lower classes”, to
control their “passions” in this way (cp. Abramitzky and Braggion 2005 and Ekelund and
Herbert 2005, 142).
It  now becomes  evident  why Malthus  and people  influenced by Malthusianism
vehemently oppose charitable giving. Charity, while intuitively judged as altruistic, in the
Malthusian model actually is regarded as cruel. Increasing the income of the poor goads
them into thinking that they can support a bigger family, resulting in higher population
growth. Moreover, immediately after such a transfer, people can afford buying more food,
bidding  its  price  up  and  decreasing  real  wages  through  inflation,  which  hurts  poor
individuals whose main income is earned by manual labour. The result of financial and
food  support  therefore  is  a  larger  population,  dependent  on  charity,  but  in  the  same
disastrous condition as before (cp. Abramitzky and Braggion 2005). Similarly, when wages
increase  because  of  new  production  possibilities,  population  growth  just  eats  up  the
increased wealth per capita in a few years. Malthus therefore argued that it would be better
for a family to foresee the incapacity to support additional children before having them,
than to have them and to see them starve. John Stuart Mill actually argues in a similar vein
in “On Liberty“ (1859, V. 15):
143 Diseases and wars are population checks as well, reducing population size and establishing the 
necessary balance with resources. An example would be the great plague in the middle ages or the thirty 
years war in Germany 1618 to 1648.
144 Malthus also considers migration as a possible means to reduce population pressure, but regards this 
possibility unfeasible, as general conditions were too harsh in possible receiving countries. Today, the 
objection would be that the receiving countries are unwilling to accept (more) immigrants. This problem will 
be discussed further on.
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“The fact  itself,  of causing the existence of a  human being,  is  one of the most
responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility – to
bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing – unless the being on whom
it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence,
is a crime against that being.”
Mill, although in more gentle terms than Malthus, argues against a family having more
offspring then they can afford. It might well be assumed that the well-off Mill and Malthus
perhaps did not understand the dire rationale of the poor: The need to have many children
to secure manual labour for the farm or additional income through (low) wages in the
cities,  thereby gaining a limited security for old age (cp.  George 1976, 59 and Kenny
2007). This need was made even more pressing by a high infant mortality among the poor
in increasingly industrialising England (Kenny 2007, 291). Yet it is remarkable that Mill
proposed a solution for this problem that actually empowers the poor instead of controlling
them  (or  their  “urges”).  He  believed  that  a  combination  of  education  and  women's
emancipation could reduce this problem (Mill 1859, V. 12).
One could consider Malthusian theory as surpassed, as obviously his prediction of
continuous absolute poverty has been disproved, at least in what we call the industrialized
countries. The invention of the artificial fertilizer by the German Justus von Liebig (1803–
1883), six years after Malthus' death, and the subsequent Green Revolution dramatically
increased the agricultural production, thus reducing prices significantly (cp. Wrigley 1987,
52). This went hand in hand with a shift from agricultural to industrialized and then post-
industrialised societies, which brings with it a change of incentives concerning fertility.
Technological  change improved both  farmer  and worker  productivity  much  more  than
Malthus could have predicted, and a national welfare system reduced the need for children
as provision for old age. Today, the average household in developed countries spends only
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a fraction of  its  income on food, for  example in Spain 14.4 per  cent  (INE 2011, 22).
Moreover, as has been shown in part one, food-production is no longer the biggest problem
responsible for world hunger. Purchasing power on a worldwide food market means that
often countries with parts of the population suffering hunger export agricultural products
(Schooley 2010 and Williams 2012). 
In addition, the already mentioned invention of improved methods of birth control,
together  with  the  emancipation  of  women  after  the  Second  World  War,  resulted  in
additional  checks  to  population  growth  (cp.  Wrigley  1987).  Indeed,  recent  changes  in
fertility rates show that today half of the world's female population only has a birth rate of
2.1 or  below (The Economist  2009).145 This  is  the  replacement  level  of  fertility,  often
reached when the growth of a country's population slows down and eventually stabilises.146
The countries where this process occurs are not only the Western countries, but emerging
countries such as Russia and Brazil, and of course China due to political encouragement of
the one child family. The wealth and education of a country's population seem to have a
slowing effect on the fertility rate, too. According to United Nations estimates, the world's
population will rise from 6.8 billion to 9.2 billion in 2050, at which point it will stabilise
(Klingholz 2014).
Paradoxically, many European countries, such as Germany and Spain, now suffer
from demographic change, as not enough children are being born to keep the workforce
stable, which can be a problem for the social security system (INE 2011, 10f.).147 It seems
that there is an inverse relationship between a society's education and wealth on the one
hand and its birth rate on the other hand, with an increase of the former variables reducing
145 The rate needs to be slightly above 2.0 because of the possibilities of early deaths and childlessness 
either because of biological reasons or out of choice.
146 “Fertility starts to drop at an annual income per person of $1.000 – 2.000 and falls until it hits the 
replacement level at an income per head of $4.000 – 10.000 a year.” (The Economist 2009).
147 This is not without adverse side-effects, as the demographic change threatens the possibility of a 
sustainable generation contract concerning annuity and pension systems. This problem is alleviated by 
encouraging the immigration of skilled workers (engineers, computer specialists, but also nurses). The 
negative side of encouraging immigration from the developing countries is the resulting “brain drain”, as the 
developing countries' educated elite emigrates to the developed world, instead of working and creating 
wealth and paying taxes in their country of origin.
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the latter (Klingholz 2014). 
Wrigley (1987) in his influential book  People, Cities, and Wealth  shows that the
Malthusian problem continually lost its strength and completely disappeared in the last
quarter of the 19th century. However, he also outlines that in – and for – his time, Malthus
was right. From 1566 to 1871, prices and population in Britain were closely related: When
population increased, for instance from 1781 to 1806, the price index also rose. On the
other  hand,  downturns  in  population  corresponded to  declines  in  prices.  Moreover,  he
points  out  that  fertility  rather  than  mortality  was  the  main  determinant  of  population
growth during the eighteenth century, and that nuptial changes accounted almost entirely
for the movements in fertility. In 19th century England, weddings tended to be celebrated
after a careful economic calculus operated by the potential bride and groom, and therefore
constituted the main mechanism relating population size with economic conditions. This
indicates that Malthusian laws hold some truth, but could be circumvented by people's
being aware of them.
Wrigley (1987) and Becker (1960) conclude that Malthus'  theory still  applies to
poor countries that are still struggling to get out of the Malthusian cycle. The poor in the
developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, continue to have too many children (cp,
Sachs 2005, 263f). Daulaire et al. (2002) calculated that about one quarter of the 1.2 billion
pregnancies  that  occurred  in  the  developing  world  between  1990  and  2000  were
unintended.148  An example would be Nigeria, where the average woman still gives birth to
5.7 children during her lifetime,  resulting in an annual population growth of around 7
million. Since reaching independence in 1960, the population nearly quadrupled, reaching
174 million in 2014 (Klingholz 2014, 35). While especially the country's elite currently
profit  from rapid  economic  growth  and  natural  resources,  namely  crude  oil,  Nigeria's
problems may increase in the future. Today, 85 per cent live on less than two dollars a day,
148 The authors estimate that 40 million of these unintended pregnancies end in abortion because the 
pregnant woman feels she does not have the physical or economic resources to support the child. As many of 
these women do not have access to professional health care, these abortions often result in physical trauma or
even death.
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and around half of the population is less than 15 years old (Klingholz 2014, 35 and World
Bank 2012, 42ff.).
Even among richer countries,  a Neo-Malthusian relationship between population
growth and the environment has been argued for, based on the idea of the overuse of scarce
natural resources. But this problem, too, is more severe in poor countries, which usually
depend  more  heavily on  their  natural  resources  (Abramitzky  and  Braggion  2005  and
Hansen and Prescott 2002, 1214f). Finally, a direct line can be drawn from Malthus to the
Club of Rome, which uses the argument of scarcity of resources and limits to growth on a
global scale (Meadows et al. 1972). A large part of the rise in world population predicted
will actually happen in Africa, but there, too, growth is slowing down (Klingholz 2014).
West  et  al.  (2014) show that  it  will  be possible to feed three billion additional  people
without overusing the environment, if the current system of food production is improved.
The recommendations include reducing food wastage and meat consumption in the West,
improving yield of the arable land by using better and more sustainable fertilizer, and by
installing irrigation systems in dry zones.
What conclusions should be drawn from Malthus' work? Some consequences are
important in this context: We should be critical of “blind” altruism, as it can have negative
results for the recipient. Malthus saw clearly that good will alone does not condone every
charitable action. Examples will be shown in the following chapters. Malthus was among
the first to recognize that charitable aid could lead to vicious circles. Additional ethical
problems occur, such as dependency or the unintentional support of local militant groups
and corrupt politicians. 
On a positive note, it has been shown that the laws of population growth and famine
are by no means unavoidable. Rather, technological progress, education and empowerment
of women are means to overcome these problems. This points towards actions that have to
be  taken if  we want  to  reduce  poverty in  the  long term.  Unfortunately,  the  view that
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poverty is unavoidable is still  very much present in Western imagination,  and it  shows
where we need to go with calls for donations towards development aid (Darnton and Kirk
2011).  If  the  importance  of  education,  better  financial  prospects,  women's  rights,  and
contraceptives were unknown, Malthus would perhaps be right.  But  as  it  is  otherwise,
Malthusian fears – while perhaps warranted – these days are now no longer an argument
against  development  aid.  On  the  contrary,  effective  programmes  targeting  the  above
mentioned factors can effectively reduce child-bearing, lead to more individual prosperity,
and reduce  the  stress  on  the  planet's  resources.  A general  criticism of  efforts  towards
alleviating poverty may thus be dismissed, although ideas of general ineffectiveness of aid
still hold sway with the Western public (cp. Bølstad 2011, 41ff. and 79ff. and Ross 1998).
This means that a successful argumentation for more donations or an increase of official
aid  would  first  have  to  inform,  persuade  and  activate  a  sufficiently  large  group  (cp.
Darnton and Kirk 2011).
4.6. Obstacles towards Aid Efficacy in the Short Run – Humanitarian Aid
A closer  look at  disaster  relief  or emergency aid reveals some of  the most  depressing
problems that aid organisations and the poor face. Bringing in food and nourishment in
case  of  a  catastrophe  is  frequently  too  late,  as  the  problem must  first  be  recognized,
political will established and donations collected,149 the logistics established (DARA 2010,
Polman 2010, Riddell 2008, 311ff., and Terry 2002).150 The bulk of deliveries arrives only
when the first people have starved, and afterwards – when the whole machinery of helping
is into full  motion – delivering food carries on long after  being actually needed.  Side
effects of this can be a negative for the local food production and food markets, up to the
149 Often donor countries take considerable time in make good their promises of aid payments. See 
chapter 3.7.
150 As explained in chapter 3.7., a preventative Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) would be a 
solution, but governments have already problems committing funds once a catastrophe is in place. Therefore 
the fund is chronically underfunded.
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loss  of  farms  which  are  no  longer  economical  because  of  a  crowding-out  effect.  The
surplus  food –  and other  things  delivered  such as  tents  etc.  –  can  become objects  of
merchandise or of theft. 
The goods delivered can be misused to support allies, or to buy political influence
or favours. These negative effects are even more intense in conflict zones, when warring
parties compete for the goods brought in, trying to use them exclusively for themselves and
to prevent that the rivals profit as well (Anderson 1999, Maren 1997 and Polman 2008).
This can further fuel the conflict.
As  all  these  side  effects  become  obvious  only  after  the  focus  on  the  area  of
catastrophe has shifted away, it seems not to be fully realized – at least there seems to be
no effective tackling of these problems. A solution could be to move on from food aid to
food assistance, as aimed at e.g. by the European Union and Oxfam (Dilley and Boudreau
2001 and Luscombe 2013). Simply put food aid denominates the direct delivery of food to
the threatened population, while food assistance focuses on providing the population with
means  to  acquire  food for  themselves  through  cash  (usually  in  the  local  currency)  or
vouchers. Food assistance is usually flanked by measures to rebuilt and strengthen local
agriculture.  From an ethical and economic point of view, food assistance is clearly the
preferable method, as it does empower the starving people to make their own decisions
what and from whom they buy what they need. It also does not result in any crowding out
of local farmers and markets, indeed it strengthens them. Vouchers can simply be fitted
with a termination date and any money left over will actually benefit the rebuilding effort.
While generally cash would be the better alternative, vouchers are the better solution in a
background of conflict or high inflation background.
Unfortunately, this solution is far from accepted and food aid remains the norm. In
case of private aid, donors simply expect the image of sacks of rice being distributed by
helpers and the entrenched distrust towards the poor makes any advocating for direct cash
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transfers  difficult.  On  the  side  of  official  aid,  the  situation  is  even  more  difficult.  As
mentioned previously,  a  major  problem of  official  aid is  the  entanglement  of  aid  with
political, strategic and economic interests. This is unfortunately also the case of food aid,
which especially in the USA is a reliable source of income for agro-industrial enterprises,
who thus ensure that a considerable part of the US governments expenditure on emergency
and development aid is spent at home. For the agricultural industry this is of course a great
deal, as it not only is a direct source of income, it also ensures that part of their, already
subsidised, production is sold overseas, thus increasing prices on the US market. For the
people threatened by starvation, this is a very bad deal, as not only does the imported and
freely distributed food lead to crowding-out, it also means that they actually get very little
of the promised funds, as the food grown in and transported from the United States is
considerably more expensive than what could be bought locally.
It  seems as  if  the  problems  of  humanitarian  aid  will  remain  with  us,  with  the
occurrences of famines probably increasing in the next years as climate change increases.
The question is therefore even more important if we can prevent famines beforehand by
ensuring  a  good  level  of  development.  Humanitarian  aid  alone  will  not  be  enough,  a
majority of deaths caused by poverty result of common diseases and other unspectacular
causes, in the long run, developing a country is the best way to prevent catastrophes.
4.7. Misuse of Development Aid and Corruption
Continued foreign aid can actually damage the recipient country's economy by creating
dependence through crowding out (Kiely and Marfleet 1998 and O'Neill 1986).151 It is no
longer worth while for a local farmer to produce rice or corn if the population receives
151 Crowding out denominates every occurrence in which an external measure (insufficiently) replaces 
an intrinsic motivation. Two occurrences of this phenomenon play a role in this thesis. Firstly, it refers to the 
destruction of local markets by oversupplying them with charitable goods (e.g. food or textiles). Secondly, it 
denominates the reduction the voluntariness of private individuals to donate, as the government applies itself 
in the relevant area.
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them for free.  We do not need to know about the famous  hog cycle (Harlow 1960) to
understand that farms need continuous efforts to produce. If the agricultural sector of a
country in need has been dramatically diminished, perhaps due to a natural disaster or a
war, and afterwards due to crowding out as a negative side-effect of humanitarian aid,
dependence is established, and the international community will find it hard to decide to
stop free food supplies. 
This  might  lead  to  a  perverse  cycle  of  poverty and aid,  perhaps  reinforced by
corrupt local leaders,  because it  enables them to keep their  populace fed and therefore
complacent. A dictator might actually have an interest in the continued suffering of his
population,  as  it  guarantees  media  attention  and  consequently  donations.  Economic
problems  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  “blind”  charity  might  actually  be  ethically
reprehensible. 
Corruption is  a problem for most,  if  not all,  countries that  receive international
development  aid  (cp.  Cremer  2008).  The  effects  of  corruption  on  development  also
depends on how income from corruption is spent. It could possibly be an essential source
of capital accumulation. However, this argument makes sense only if we assume that the
sum of  income earned from corruption is  not  negligible  in comparison to  the national
income,  so that  corruption  constitutes  more  than  just  a  fringe phenomenon,  and if  we
assume that it is spent at home and not invested in foreign countries or deposited in some
(in)famous Swiss bank accounts (Cremer 2008, 23).  
Corruption  can  have  several  results.  It  can  create  inequality  in  income  and
opportunities,  and  it  can  destroy  market  allocation  mechanisms  and  thus  introduce
systemic  inefficiencies.  By  circumventing  official  laws  and  practices,  it  can  cause
dangerous working and living conditions under insufficient security measures. An example
for this is lax building safety in Haiti that lead to a complete breakdown during the 2010
earthquake (cp. Lauer 2010). Many public buildings there are completely unsafe, even in
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earthquake hazard areas where building standards should be especially high (Dilley et al
2005, 100ff.).
Contrary to some older economic theories, corruption is no longer seen as a way to
circumvent red-tape and overly strict bureaucracy. On the contrary, it rather establishes an
incentive  for  government  officials  to  create  a  difficult  legal  jungle  situation,  so  that
constant bribery is necessary and assures a steady flow of extra income (Cremer, 2008,
18ff. and  Gupta et al. 2000, 24). The rate of misused foreign development aid has been
estimated to be between five and 25 per cent. This means that of the $525 billion the World
Bank has given out since 1946, between $26 and $130 billion have been misused. Similar
results  may apply  to  development  projects  from INGOs  and  Western  nations  (Cremer
2008).
Aid  organizations  typically  remain  quiet  about  the  issue  of  bribery  or
embezzlement as a hindrance to projects and tend to write them off as additional costs, as
they do not want these problems to influence potential donors' decisions. Linda Polman
(2008, ch. 6) points out that international organisations involved had no interest in passing
this information to donors. An example for this is that only after the United States had
declared Al-Shabaab152 a foreign terrorist organisation in 2008 – which meant that any
action thereafter taken by US aid workers which, even indirectly or unknowingly, benefited
the  extremists  was  regarded  as  a  criminal  act  –  food  deliveries  to  Somalia  were
discontinued. The distribution of aid in war-torn regions therefore, while apparently the
right thing to do, will have to be judged more carefully. 
The misuse of  aid can further foster corrupt and rent-seeking elites. When those
lack accountability to their own people (Mwemda 2006 and Shikwati 2006), this can lead
to a delay of necessary economic reforms, which could also help to overcome poverty.
Especially humanitarian aid can become a resource that can prolong conflicts, and may
even actually cause them. 
152 Cp. for more information http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
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However, information about corruption and possible theft of equipment as well as
the misuse of donated goods, sold instead of given to the most needy, is crucial when we
have to evaluate the efficiency of donated money. A main line of argument in this thesis is
that funds for humanitarian action are severely limited. This makes questions of efficiency
especially  important.  Donors  and  receivers  have  a  right  to  know  about  inefficiencies.
Fortunately, there have been improvements in corruption monitoring since the end of the
nineties of the last century (Cremer 2008, 4). Transparency International – the global civil
society organisation leading the fight against corruption – was founded in 1993. The World
Bank's  ninth  president  James  Wolfensohn  (1995–2005)  made  transparency,  combating
corruption, and good governance the priorities for the World Bank.
Peter  Singer is aware of this corruption problem (2009a, 111ff.), but thinks that it
can be solved, if we donate only to organisations that can prove that they make good use of
the money.153 There are now organisations such as GiveWell, founded during the last years,
that evaluate the performance of charitable organisations (Singer 2009a, 118). As a positive
example,  Singer  mentions  the  Population Service International  (PSI),  an initiative that
sells insecticide impregnated mosquito nets, condoms, and water filters, in malaria plagued
regions of Africa. Again, this certainly is a step in the right direction, and PSI does many
things right. Instead of simply distributing the goods, they sell them, thereby ensuring that
they are taken better care of,154 and encouraging a more active and self-reliant attitude. In
the following, several projects, among them microcredits and starting with Jeffrey Sachs
Millennium  Villages  project,  a  social-engineering  approach  similar  to  what  effective
altruism may envision.
153 If a donation to a NGO, operating in an affluent country, could save more human lives per Euro than
an INGO could in poor countries, Singer's logic dictates that we should give our money to the latter. This is 
no trouble for his argumentation, as he distinctly proves that more lives can be saved with the same money in
poor countries than in rich ones (2009, 118ff.). The only problem might be that donations “near home” may 
be more easily evaluable. The difficulty is that it is quasi impossible to calculate the precise amount that it 
takes to save a life (for how long?). According to GiveWell, it costs PSI between €650 and €2.000.
154 Another surprising human reaction (Singer 2009a, 118).
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4.8. Setting Yourself up for Failure – Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages
As attempted to show previously, poverty is a multi-dimensional problem. The poor suffer
not only from lack of income, but also political representation, legal rights, and access to
health and education. A holistic approach to poverty therefore seems very promising at a
first glance.  Holistic in this context refers to an approach that does not only address a
single facet of poverty, but several or all of them. Such an approach, unfortunately limited
to  the  problems of  health,  education,  and income,  was proposed by economist  Jeffrey
Sachs in his 2005 bestselling book The End of Poverty – Economic Possibilities for Our
Time, the title being a nod towards Maynard Keynes' seminal essay Economic Possibilities
for our Grandchildren (1930). In his book, Sachs describes the blight of the poor and its
results, hunger and malnutrition, lack of access to sanitation and safe drinking water, lack
of employment opportunities, low productivity of small  farms, high burden of diseases
such as river blindness, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, high child and maternal mortality. 
His argument is that the poor are trapped in a vicious circle of poverty (Sachs 2005,
56ff.). Overcoming all of the burdens of poverty together is simply impossible, as they
reinforce one another through a feedback loop  (cp. Collier 2008, 33ff.). To solve these
problems he advises for a coordinated „big push“ (Sachs 2005, 233f. and 254f.). Donors
should stop investing trifling sums and commit themselves to a stronger comprehensive
investment over a limited time period that helps to provide basic health and education
services, to increase agricultural productivity, and to ensure access to safe drinking water
and  to  markets.  Pointing  out  several  interventions  that  target  these  problems,  such  as
increased use of fertilizer and better  access to medicine and health care, Sachs'  central
argument in his book is that addressing these issues does not require a financial investment
that surpasses the financial capacities of the West (ibid.,  288ff.). On the contrary, with a
coordinated approach, absolute global poverty could be eliminated sustainably by 2025
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(ibid., 1). Sachs promises that once taken, this investment is enough to eliminate absolute
poverty, thus limiting further necessities of aid, supplanting poverty with economic self-
determination and sustainability. The  sum he estimates necessary to lift a person out of
poverty amounts to around $120 annually (ibid., 290).
To prove that his theory is more than an utopian vision, Sachs proposed a daring
experiment:  He  founded  the  Millennium  Promise  Alliance  Inc.,  named  after  the  UN
Millennium  Goals.  14  different  villages  in  10  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  were
selected to become Millennium Villages, comprising nearly 500.000 people.155 The aim
was  to  provide  these  projects  with  targeted  financial  support  and know-how to  create
„islands of development“. The original seed money was $120 million (Munk 2013, 41). 
Fundraising  possibilities  of  this  project  were  very  good.  While  most  of  the
interventions  proposed  were  not  very  innovative  in  themselves,  the  holistic  approach
certainly was new, and Sachs promised to deliver something spectacular, the long awaited
„silver bullet“ in the combat against global poverty. Being a well-connected and famous
economist with a great capability to motivate people, Sachs was able to secure celebrity
endorsement, most notably by Bono156 who wrote the foreword for “The End of Poverty”,
as well as funding for his project from several sides, from the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP)  and  entrepreneurs  such  as  Tommy Hilfiger157 and  “Diesel”  founder
Renzo Rosso.158 Major financial  support  came from investment magnate George Soros
whose  Open  Society  Foundation  gave  $50  million  to  the  project.  Interestingly,  Soros
referred to the project as one of „high risk investment with potential high returns“ (Munk
2013, 40). Success was a long shot, but as close academic monitoring was promised, there
was the possibility of learning from the approach. This meant that working intervention
155 www.Millenniumvillages.org/the-villages/.
156 Irish singer, songwriter, and guitar player, frontman of the world famous band U2, with the real 
name Paul David Hewson.
157 www.Millenniumvillages.org/field-notes/tommy-hilfiger-launches-promise-collection-to-support-
ruhiira/.
158 www.Millenniumvillages.org/press-releases/only-the-brave-foundation-launches-partenership-with-
Millennium-promise/.
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could be scaled up while mistakes would be avoided in the future.
The  attitude  of  many  developmental  experts  was  much  more  pessimistic,  after
presumed “silver bullet”-approaches had not worked several times in the past (Clemens,
Kenny, and Moss 2004, Easterly 2007b, 6ff. and 132f., and Nocera 2013). Unfortunately,
time seems to prove Sachs critics right.  Even worse,  the Millennium Promise Alliance
leadership impeded knowledge gains by trying to maintain a strict information control over
the  progress  of  the  participating  villages  (Nocera  2013).  But  without  an  independent
evaluation  and  comparison  to  villages  that  did  not  benefit  from the  measures  of  the
foundation,  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  whether  the  project  has  made  a  difference
(Clemens, Kenny, and Moss 2004 and Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 14f.). This information
control does not only seem unethical towards donors and the intended project beneficiaries,
it also undermines the project's raison d'être, as without confirmed knowledge what works
and what does not, it is impossible to identify the scalable interventions, the introduction of
which could benefit most regions of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Then why did the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership decide on this clearly
counterproductive policy? Munk (2013) at least partly credits Sachs arrogance, he just does
not want to be proven wrong. But the true reason seems to lie in the necessity of further
fundraising. The Millennium Village Project simply has become another victim of the logic
of  the  Machiavellian  problem159.  Reaching  mid-term,  the  project  was  confronted  with
severe funding problems (Munk 2013, 142ff.). The project exceeded projected costs, and
the villages did not become financially independent as fast as hoped. In urgent need of new
cash, the project hired a new fundraising expert  who tried to raise money not only by
approaching wealthy individuals (a reluctant Soros contributed another $47.4 million in
2011),  but  also  by  increasingly  appealing  to  the  public  for  donations  (ibid.).  But  to
maintain funding flows, a successful appearance is indispensable. Indicators of partial or
complete failure translate into less donations than are necessary for the survival of the
159 As mentioned previously, appearance seems to matter more to fundraising success than actual 
efficacy (Stern 2013a).
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foundation.  Thus  the  organisation  has  become  self-serving,  putting  its  own  existence
before their original mission and the benefit of the poor.
While one has to be critical of the reported progress in the Millennium Villages, it
is important to recognise that some progress has been made. Indeed, it seems as if the
livelihoods of people in the respective villages have been improved. It would be a surprise
had it not, as simply the increased inflow of money should improve the economic situation
in these very poor communities (cp. Nocera 2013). The question rather is,  whether the
money  could  have  been  better  used  to  finance  less  grandiose  and  more  targeted
interventions and whether the organisation has diverted from its original mission.
That said, it has to be recognised that at least one of Jeffrey Sachs' ideas was in
advance  of  the  global  development  community.  Sachs  early  on  advocated  for  a  free
distribution of malaria nets to threatened populations (Gallup and Sachs 2001  and Sachs
2005, 196ff.). The donor community was reluctant here, fearing misuse and the cost of free
distribution.  Recent  evidence  shows  that  Sachs  was  right  all  along,  even  low  prices
significantly reduce the adaption of malaria nets, excluding the most vulnerable households
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 44ff. and Munk 2013, 215). As already mentioned previously,
few interventions are as cost-effective when it comes to improving health and maintain
economic productivity, than free distribution of impregnated malaria nets. This however,
could have been achieved at far lesser cost.
While  not  an  original  idea  of  the  Millennium  Promise  Alliance,  the  hiring  of
community health workers for the villages has proven to be a very efficient measure (Singh
and  Sachs  2013).  Community  health  workers  have  evidenced  their  effectiveness  in
reaching  poor  and  marginalised  populations  in  developed  as  well  as  in  developing
countries (Viswanathan et al. 2009, 12ff.). Their role is to diffuse medical knowledge and
increase  basic  health  literacy,  such  as  hand-washing  or  taking  one's  medication  as
prescribed. They usually are able to diagnose and treat basic illnesses, such as cholera or
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influenza (the “flu”), and advise patients as to when a visit to the doctor is necessary. They
have  been  shown  to  be  a  cost-effective  way to  significantly  increase  the  health  of  a
community, particularly the children's well-being (ibid., 37ff.).
Unfortunately,  it  seems that  neither  these nor  the other  measures  taken had the
desired effect.  Michael Clemens and Gabriel  Demombynes (2011) from the Centre for
Global  Development explain  that  rigorous evaluation of  the  impact  of  the Millennium
Villages is not possible, as it is difficult to separate the effects of certain interventions from
others and to distinguish between endogeneous and exogeneous effects. They indicate that
the Millennium Villages did not show a significant improvement in important indicators
such as child mortality, compared to other villages in the area (cp. King 2013). In some
categories,  the  Millennium  Villages  performed  even  worse.  An  article  in  the  famous
medical journal Lancet,  which had originally claimed the contrary,  had to be corrected
(Bump et al. 2012, Pronyk et al. 2012, and Pronyk 2012).
As Munk (2013, 155ff.) indicates, many of the interventions were fraught with the
typical flaws of top-down planning in a complex environment (Easterly 2007b and 2014).
One of the features of complex environments is that new problems can arise often out of
the very solutions (Ramalingam 2013). An example is the introduction of new crops such
as maize160 with the promise of higher yields and access to international  markets.  But
selling the maize to international markets was problematic due to high transportation costs.
A deal with the World Food Programme (WFP) did not succeed due to corruption and high
red tape.161 Finally, farmers lost part of their harvest to vermin infestation and had to sell
their products at a loss on local markets that were glutted with maize, especially as it was
not part of the local traditional cuisine. This may partly explain why research noted that the
increase in agricultural productivity did translate into additional available food, but did not
translate into additional income (Muradian and Wanjala 2013).
160 Known in some English-speaking countries as (indian) corn.
161 Officially the maize did not meet the high quality standards of the UN World Food Program 
(WFP).
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Of course, the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership cannot be held responsible
for external or environmental factors. Variability of macro–conditions is one of the central
problems  of  evaluating  development  aid  interventions,  although  the  “islands  of
development“ approach makes the Millennium Village Project particularly susceptible to
external changes (Clemens and Demombynes 2011). Positive trends in the country, such as
increase in political accountability,  democracy, and economic growth will  translate into
improvements on the micro-level, but this can overlap the true effect of an intervention. On
the other hand, more corruption, poorer institutional quality, political instability, conflict,
or natural disasters can set back developmental efforts and fragile successes for quite some
time. 
To improve their success figures, the Millennium Promise Alliance leadership can
be blamed for abandoning and scaling back its efforts in villages where, due to external
circumstances, development stagnated. This has been claimed in least two cases: by Nina
Munk (2013, 157ff. and 200) in the case of the village of Dertu in northern Kenya and by
Japhy Wilson in the case of the village of Bonsaaso in central Ghana (Wilson 2015). 
In Dertu, flooding and then a prolonged drought had the consequence that the local
people's  main  source  of  income,  their  livestock,  starved,  grew  sickly,  and  died.
Additionally,  increased  threat  of  conflict  in  the  region  makes  it  improbable  that  the
improvements financed with Millennium Village money will sustain. 
The village Bonsaaso experienced a ”gold rush“ due to recent high prices for the
commodity (cp. Hirsch 2012). While there used to be a tradition of local ore mining, this is
now done either by foreign companies or illegally, in both cases with little respect for the
environment and often on land that used to be reserved for local farmers. Some of these
have been forced to sell their land for a meagre compensation, or it is now unusable, due to
pollution as a result of legal or illegal mining. Access to drinking water is threatened, and
because water accumulates in abandoned villages,  cases of malaria and drowning have
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spiked. Thus the newly generated income does not flow towards the poor, but it vanishes
instead.  The  inflow  of  legal  and  illegal  mining  workers  has  caused  social  problems:
teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases have increased.
This  shows  that  the  Millennium  Village  Project  suffers  from  the  strange  and
paradox condition of being both too ambitious and not ambitious enough. The project is
not ambitious enough, as the approach ignores the underlying roots of poverty and tries
instead to overcome poverty with an “engineering approach“ (Easterly 2007b and 2014).
The approach does not address the political and socio-economic conditions of the poor (as
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter): their being exploited or abandoned by their
political representatives to situations of disaster and conflict. The project is too ambitious
insofar as it simply wants too much instead of focusing on improving the lives of the poor
in one way, for example by providing free malaria nets and training people in their use.
Social engineering approaches such as Jeffrey Sachs' are characterised by top down
decision making, bureaucracy, and little and only ex post participation of the poor (Easterly
2007b  and  2014,  Ramalingam  2013).  This  leads  to  a  potentially  disastrous  lack  of
knowledge of local conditions. As local population – poor as well as elite decision-makers
– were not implicated in the process, motivation and political will to implementation were
probably low. This is illustrated for the Millennium Villages by Munk (2013) and Nocera
(2013). Nocera (2013) also points out that so far, a scaling up of solutions tried out in the
Millennium Villages, as was originally planned, has been limited to a $10 million project
financed by the Islamic Development Bank in Uganda. The lack of inclusion of the people
concerned in the planning and development of the project is probably to blame here as
well. 
That said, the final internal evaluation of the project is still pending, with the last
annual report dating from 2013, as well as its external evaluation by independent critics.
But several points can already be extrapolated for this thesis. A culture of effective giving
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will have to centre on realistic goals, not a “silver bullet” or “social engineering”-approach
in a chaotic and unforeseeable world (cp.  Ramalingam 2013). This is difficult,  as it  is
spectacular  causes  and  disasters  that  tend  to  attract  public  attention.  A focus  on  less
spectacular, simple solutions, such as free malaria net distribution or vaccinations, can help
ease the burden of poverty, and are thus more than worthy causes. As will be attempted to
show further  on,  the – from a Western donor perspective – much more risky move to
simply distribute the calculated $120 – even more the final $12.000 that were eventually
invested – to each individual household in the time period would have been much more
effective (Clemens 2012). 
To address the root causes of poverty, however, a donor would have to go beyond
the simple treatment of symptoms and reflect on his or her role in the causal chain of
poverty. Wilson (2015) does this for one of the big financiers of the Millennium Promise
Alliance, when he quite justifiably questions George Soros' involvement in this foundation,
while at the same time contributing towards the Bonsaaso gold rush by putting pressure on
the price of the mineral by speculation.
4.9. Fair Trade – Ethical Consumption?
Advocates of “effective altruism” argue that it will be possible to change the behaviour of
the population towards not only significantly more donations, but also towards giving more
rationally. Finding a previous example, where citizens and consumers supported such a
societal change, even at a cost to themselves, would give their ideas credibility. At first
glance, the success of Fair Trade could be such a case.162 Fair Trade is a movement to
foster a new and fairer way of doing business with the Third World. As there is hardly any
162 There are many different ways to label the movement from fair trade to Fairtrade. The author 
decided on the denomination “Fair Trade” used by the movement itself
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supermarket chain in Western countries left that does not have at least one counter labelled
“Fair Trade”, it can be said that Fair Trade has made – and is still making – a triumphal
march.163 Leaving behind its humble origins of church sales and specialised shops in the
1970's, Fair Trade has grown dramatically in recent years in many developed countries and
has entered mainstream supermarkets, coffee retailing chains, and mail order catalogues
(Griffiths  2010  and  2012 and  Sylla  2014,  35ff.).  Fair  Trade  is  becoming  increasingly
successful as a brand (or label), especially as part of a new consumer “Lifestyle of Health
And Sustainability” (“LOHAS”), intimately connected to the issue of ethical consumption
(Brown 2013, Cortese 2003, Emerich 2011, 124ff., and Narlikar and Kim 2013), a general
trend towards organic food and (biological) food safety. It would appear that consumers
increasingly act  on preferences  for  a  juster  and more  sustainable world  by purchasing
certified  agricultural  products. But  what  exactly  is  meant  by  Fair  Trade.  A definition
presented by the organisations themselves would be the following:
“Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect,
that  seeks  greater  equity  in  international  trade.  It  contributes  to  sustainable
development by offering better  trading conditions to,  and securing the rights of,
marginalised  producers  and  workers  –  especially  in  the  South.  Fair  Trade
organisations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers,
awareness  raising  and in  campaigning for  changes  in  the  rules  and practice  of
conventional international trade.”164
The  basic  idea  appears  sensible:  As  shown  previously,  people  in  the  Third  World,
163 Although it has to be noted that Fair Trade certification is estimated to account for only 0.01 per cent
of global agricultural trade ( Brown 2013, Haight 2011, and Sylla 2014).
164 This is the definition produced by FINE, an informal network that involves the Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International (FLO), the International Federation for Alternative Trade (IFAT), the Network of 
European Shops (NEWS!), and the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA). For a general description of the
Fair Trade movement, see Moore (2004).
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especially in rural areas, are still  very dependent on agriculture for their income (FAO,
IFAD, and WFP 2002 and World Bank 2007). Once they are able to move beyond self-
sufficiency, it makes sense for them to create some extra income through the cultivation of
“cash crops”. A good way for this would appear to be focusing on products that can be
exported to the developed and to the wealthier emerging countries, for example coffee,
cotton,  cacao,  or bananas.  According to the classical theories of trade,  this  benefits  all
actors (Boudreaux 2007, Hassoun 2012, 143ff., and Moyo 2009, 114ff.). But this would
entail  that  poverty  would  have  largely  eradicated  itself  automatically,  which  it
unfortunately  didn't.  The  answers  have  already  been  sketched  out  as  conflict,
disenfranchisement,  exploitation  and  market  failures.  For  example  there  are  certain
conditions  under  which  an  exchange,  even  if  agreed  upon  freely  by  both  parties  and
beneficial to both, is to be considered unfair. An extremely unequal distribution of power
between buyer and producer results in a buyers market (in contrast to a sellers market),
leading to a very low price and extremely slim profit margin for small farmers. The micro-
level  explanation here is  that small  farmers,  especially in  remote rural  areas,  often are
confronted with only one or two local buyers of their  produce,  who then transport  the
produce to the capital or a port, where it will be sold again and shipped out. This is known
in economics as a monopsony. While the seller is dependent on the buyer, the buyer could
forgo  one  seller  if  he  asks  too  high  a  price,  thereby effectively  dictating  the  market.
Additionally, as already discussed, a typical problem of developing countries is the lack of
employment opportunities (Easterly 2007b, MacAskill 2015a, ch.8, and World Bank 2007).
This means that simply switching to a different occupation while renting out one's land is
not a feasible alternative for farmworkers or small farmholders.
Another problem for farmers is the fact that the agricultural commodities market is
volatile (characterized by large and frequent price fluctuations) and distorted (ridden with
high tariff barriers and subsidies) (cp. Williams 2012). At the same time, small farmers in
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developing countries have problems adapting to changing prices. They are confronted with
the famous hog cycle-theorem (Harlow 1960), as farmers have to base decision on their
production output  for  this  year  on last  year's  prices,  they are liable  to over- or under-
produce collectively, which leads to fluctuations of the prices. Once a field has been sown,
the farmer cannot change the output for the entire season. 
Price distortions are another major contributor. The distortions are largely the result
of policy choices by developed countries. In 2011, OECD governments, especially the EU
and US,  doled out  approximately $252 billion  worth of  subsidies  to  domestic  farmers
(Paarlberg 2013, ch. 8). These subsidies, along with relatively high tariffs, create a virtually
impenetrable  trade  barrier  for  developing  world  farmers.  Even  producers  that  are
potentially  more  efficient  than  those  in  the  West  are  blocked  from entering  lucrative
Western markets. Meaning that while food prices may rise in the developed world, poor
and vulnerable farmers in developing countries are unable to take advantage of them. On
the contrary, they are often faced with competition from Western overproduce (cp. Buntzel
and Marí 2007).
The global prices of coffee, cotton, and cacao have known high price fluctuations in
the  last  thirty  years.  For  example  the  price  for  coffee  plummeted  since  the  1989
abolishment of the International Coffee Agreement from $1.80 to $1 (Bates 1997, 25). A
part from the end of the agreement on a fixed price by various countries, he reasons for this
fluctuation are climate variability and previously mentioned specificities of the market for
agricultural  goods.165 Increased speculation with agricultural  commodities  also have an
influence here (Boudreaux 2007, Burch, Clapp, and Murphy 2012).166
The Fair Trade movement arose to address some of the failures of the market and
165 Again I refer to the famous hog cycle-theorem (Harlow 1960), as aforementioned on page 213. As 
farmers have to base decision for their production output for this year on last year's prices, they are liable to 
over- or underproduce collectively, which leads to fluctuations of the prices.
166 In classical economic theory, speculation is actually beneficial in the long–term, as the markets 
approximate the true price of a commodity. However reality has shown that in the short term speculation can 
lead to price fluctuation and, especially in the case of agricultural produce, hoarding (Brooks, Prokopczuk, 
and Wu 2015 and Williams 2012, 8ff.). It also should be noted that with the notable exception of the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange founded in 2008 , the financial activities takes place in the global North, 
thus again creating wealth primarily there.
251
remedy important social issues. As the name implies, Fair Trade has sought not only to
protect farmers but also to correct the legacy of the colonial mercantilist system and the
kind  of  crony  capitalism  where  large  businesses  obtain  special  privileges  from  local
governments, preventing small businesses from competing and flourishing. The basic idea
is simple, consumers should buy their product directly from small farmholders instead of
from big agricultural companies and assure their livelihoods by paying a reliable price.167
This seems to fit well into the aforementioned “Zeitgeist” of a lifestyle of health
and sustainability (“LOHAS”) (cp. Brown 2013). In theory, it serves at the same time the
farmer or plantation worker in the developing world, as well as the Western conspicuous
consumer, thus creating a win-win-situation. This form of conspicuous consumption could
also be interpreted as another  drain on pro-social  resource,  some buyers of Fair  Trade
products may even tend to act less ethically after the purchase due to the mental accounting
phenomenon explained earlier in this thesis (cp. Mazar and Zhong 2010 and Thaler 1985
and 1999). For example Carrigan and Attalla (2001) show that ethical considerations only
enter  into  buying  decisions,  when  it  is  convenient  to  consumers,  which  may even  be
regarded as a somewhat cynical attitude.
Nevertheless  there  is  a  lot  of  public  and  political  support  for  Fair  Trade.  For
example in February 2013, the British Fairtrade Foundation staged a march on the British
Parliament, a campaign featuring various celebrities, such as the Archbishop of York, and
more than 13.000 petitioners, urging UK Prime Minister David Cameron to put issues of
ethical consumerism at the centre of the G8 summit (Narlikar and Kim 2013, 1).
In view of the quite desperate situation of many of the small farmers, the idea of
Fair Trade looks convincing. As the issues of power balance and agricultural subsidies are
167 Although the concept of ethical trade has existed for a long time, the institutionalization of the Fair
Trade movement did not begin in earnest until the late 1980s (cp. Sylla 2014, 35ff.). In 1989, the World Fair
Trade Organization was founded, and in the years that followed, various Fair Trade certification and labelling
processes emerged. A product is  granted a Fair Trade label  once its producers have met a list of social,
economic,  and  environmental  requirements.  The  stated  purpose  of  the  Fair  Trade  movement  is  to  give
economic security to producers in developing countries – often of unprocessed commodities such as fruits,
live animals, and minerals – by requiring companies and consumers to pay a premium on the market price of
the certified product. In exchange, the Fair Trade retailer guarantees to take all the produce of the farm for a
minimum price.
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unlikely to improve his life, take solidarity directly to the farmer. But the final decision
should depend on proven facts, how and when did Fair Trade improve livelihoods of the
poor? In other words, the moral claim of being a more ethical alternative to other consumer
goods depends on the clear proof of a  moral superiority of the goods produced under the
Fair Trade label (cp. Brown 2013 and Fridell 2004).
Criticism of Fair Trade
Although advocates of Fair Trade often boast with impressive growth figures, it has to be
noted that Fair Trade remains a fringe phenomenon. It is estimated to account for only 0.01
per  cent  of  global  agricultural  trade  (Brown  2013,  Haight  2011,  and  Sylla  2014).
According to the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, Germans spent €784 million on Fair Trade
products, mostly coffee, in 2013 (Rohwetter 2014, 17). But more than 11.000 tons of Fair
Trade coffee were ground and brewed in Germany in 2013. The market share, however, is
still at a humble two per cent, in the US and Great Britain Fair Trade coffee has a more
important  market  share  of  4  per  cent  (Haight  2011  and  Sylla  2014).  Consumers  still
overwhelmingly choose their coffee because of price, quality or marketing, not because
they want to do something good for others. 
Even more problematic may be that even this relatively small success in terms of
market  shares,  again  is  by  a  movement  that  primarily  focuses  on  improving  western
consumer's self–image, while the effectiveness of Fair Trade is unclear (Haight 2011 and
Sylla 2014). Just as with many cases of donations the consumer may feel that by buying
Fair Trade products or by donating to charity he has contributed sufficiently to justice for
the world's poor, while he in reality has accomplished very little but gain a “warm-glow”.
Several  studies  agree  that  Fair  Trade is  the  wrong  instrument  to  combat  poverty  in
developing countries (Griffiths 2010 and 2012, Narlikar and Kim 2013, and Cramer et al.
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2014). 
The  movement  has  faced  repeated  criticisms,  for  example,  for  the  relatively
expensive  fees  that  producers  must  pay  to  get  a  Fair  Trade  label,  which  make  it
inaccessible for many poor farmers  (Griffiths 2010 and 2012 and Sylla 2014, 121ff.). Fair
Trade  can  primarily  benefit  already  better  of  farmholders  and  members  of  a  farming
cooperative in countries where cash crops are grown. Farmers do own land and therefore
are relatively wealthy, certainly if we compare their situation to that of landless workers.
Cramer  et  al.  (2014)  in  a  four–year  study  commissioned  by  the  United  Kingdom
Department for International Development observed the effects of Fair Trade certification
on poverty reduction in Uganda and Ethiopia. The results are quite sobering overall, but
especially  for  small  farmholders.  The  profit  goes  to  medium  and  larger  agricultural
producers, although it did have a small positive effect on wage employment, which is very
prevalent in rural areas producing agricultural export commodities.  The capacity of Fair
Trade to create quality jobs is limited, as the focus is on agriculture with much low skilled
labour, and a not very high profit margin. There is not much additional profit to be made,
as the supplier industry (including manufacture and service), the production of seeds, of
fertilizer, and of pesticides is in the safe-keeping of Western companies, for example with
Monsanto and Bayer. From a geographical perspective, a problem may indeed be that the
Fair Trade-movement has been especially successful in regions that are already quite well-
off. It is actually more the emerging countries that profit, such as Mexico or Nicaragua
(Valkila, Haaparanta, and Niemi 2010).  
Another area of concern is just how lucrative the process is for middlemen and
retailers, compared to how little of the premium that consumers pay actually reaches the
needy producers (Valkila, Haaparanta, and Niemi 2010 and Sylla 2014). Only one or two
percent of the retail price of a more expensive cup of Fair Trade coffee goes directly to
poor farmers (Griffiths 2012, 359f.). Both Griffiths (2010 and 2012) and Sylla (2014) are
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concerned that Fair Trade is primarily a marketing ploy which primarily profits retailers in
the  developed  world.168 This  would  make  Fair  Trade  another  example  for  the
Machiavellian problem. Meaning that the “Fair” is primarily targeted at customers seeking
an easy way to get a “warm glow”, while financial benefits from the higher prices are
essentially captured by the wealthiest groups in the supply chain, e.g. the retailers in the
west such as Starbucks. This problem is ironically a result of Fair Trade's rising popularity
and the higher selling prices. This very success is accompanied by now many certificates,
labels, and logos claim “Fair Trade”, that do not meet the original standards, but only but
even laxer  conditions  and little  control  on  labour  standards  and distribution  of  profits
(Fridell 2004, Haight 2011, Narlikar and Kim 2013, and Sylla 2014, ch. 2).169  Meanwhile,
there is a sort of impenetrable certificate and logo thicket (cp. Rohwetter 2014). 
Griffiths (2012) argues that the premiums charged for  Fair  Trade products is  just
another direct farm subsidy. While those subsidies are miniscule in comparison with the
ones that  OECD governments  hand out,  he raises  the point  whether  counteracting one
subsidy with another one makes economic and moral sense, especially since consumers in
developed countries ultimately pay both, either through taxes or at the supermarket. In a
perspective  similar  to  Charlton  and  Stiglitz  (2005)  and  Moyo  (2009)  he  argues  for
abolishment of trade barriers and subsidies instead.
From a macro-perspective we find that products such as coffee and cacao face high
competition  globally,  as  many  developing  and  emerging  countries  are  focussing  their
efforts in that direction. It might thus be better for citizens of wealthy developed countries
to advocate with their politicians for fairer international trade and debt regulations (Pogge
2010a and 2011),  for  farmers  to  focus  on high quality  products  instead  of  Fair  Trade
(Boudreaux  2007)  and  for  developing  countries  governments  to  try  to  limit  their
dependency on primary products to an improved manufacturing sector (Jütting  and De
168 As the title of Sylla's book illustrates: “The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the 
Rich.”
169 Cp. http://www.fairtrade-deutschland.de/ueber-fairtrade/ueber-transfair/fairtrade-siegel-logos/
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Laiglesia 2009 and MacAskill 2015a, ch. 8).
Additionally,  Fair  Trade certificates,  just  as  INGOs,  suffer  from a  problem of
overcrowding (Rohwetter 2014 and Stern 2013). So additionally to the “traditional” labels
such as GEPA and FairTrade (Transfair), new labels such as the Rainforest Alliance, UTZ
certified, and Naturland have been established. This variety can prove confusing to the
consumer. Similarly to charities (Stern 2013), an establishment of minimal standards could
help (Rohwetter 2014, 18). A problem is the mere number of Fair Trade labels – there are
more than 600 of them only in the UK (Sylla 2014, ch. 2). There activists who say that in
this case, government intervention is justifiable (Stern 2013a).  The German Ministry of
Development, while agreeing with the need to act against “greenwashing”, is reluctant to
act  due  to  difficulties  with  the  implementation.  For  an  in-depth  discussion  see  Dine
2013.170 
It  must  be  feared  that  some  Fair  Trade  certificates  primarily  serve  for  the
maximisation of profits of the food industry, e.g. the Rainforest Alliance (Sylla 2014). The
relevant products can be highly contaminated or polluted and of a minor quality. It is also
possible that the consumer receives a deceptive package, meaning that only a part of the
ingredients really stems from Fair Trade-certified farms, plantations, or artisans. 
Fraud  may also  occur  (Rohwetter  2014,  17).  As  there  are  no  entry  barriers  to
creating  a  Fair  Trade label,  this  leads  to  a  weakening  of  principles.  For  example,  the
Rainforest  Alliance  allows  the  mixing  of  non–certified  produce  with  certified  one
(Rohwetter 2014, 18). This means that the customer pays a Fair Trade price for a product,
say  coffee,  that  actually  has  only  30  per  cent  Fair  Trade content.  This  form  of
“greenwashing” weakens the trust in Fair Trade labels in general (Dine 2013, 199f.).
An aggravating circumstance is that only few of the logo bearing companies do
control  the  working conditions  and wages  of  their  suppliers.  It  seems that  exactly the
170 In Germany, the problem has been identified and is being addressed in an informational campaign. 
Cp. http://www.siegelklarheit.de/kampagne/ (also https://www.bmz.de/textil/#/ and 
http://www.fairtradekleidung.org/).
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scaling up has enormously diminished the benefit  of Fair  Trade.  The consumer is thus
trapped in precious illusion of doing a good deed. In can therefore be concluded that Fair
Trade detracts attention from the real solution and lulls consumers into a false sense of
satisfaction. 
4.10. Why Official Development Aid is No Solution
An alternative solution could be a state-organised or official development aid. Most states
are already active in this area. There are several advantages to this form of development
aid. The institutionalization would allow for a more result–oriented evaluation. This could
help avoid negative side-effects such as crowding out and lead to a more effective use of
resources for aid. Relying on taxes for funding may be less insecure than depending on
public perception, with geographical factors such as distance and emotional aspects such as
victim  blame  (see  chapter  3.7.  and  3.9.).  In  the  following,  some  falling  back  on
argumentation already used before will be unavoidable.
In democracies, as was already attempted to illustrate, public opinion can play a
crucial role, and it can be influenced, e.g. by television or tabloid press.171 To get public
support for development aid, politicians must present results to their voters.172 It is equally
important  to  note  that  governments  have  a  motive  to  publicize  their  investments  in
international aid,  although this  – as also was already tried to explain – can counteract
individual motivation to give.
To avoid competition between nations that help (in) developing countries, effective
forms of multilateral organisations would be necessary, e.g. under the roof of the United
Nations.  But  big  international  bodies  charged  with  responsibility  for  dispensing  or
171 After a terrorist attack it could be difficult to give development aid to the home-country of the 
attackers, although a country cannot be held responsible for the actions of individual citizens. Cp. the 
discussion on victim blame in the research of Zagefka et al. 2011.
172 Though INGOs regularly present their yearly reports, these do not seem find too much public 
interest.
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regulating aid to the less–developed countries  would hold the risk of a bureaucracy to
consume a significant share of the limited aid funds, thus giving citizens the feeling that
their  tax money,  meant to help developing countries,  went to bureaucrats in developed
countries.
Explanations for the allocation of foreign aid commonly emphasize the strategic
concerns of states. This approach generally purports that nations ultimately seek to advance
their  standing  in  the  international  community,  relying  (even  if  inadvertently)  on  the
premise that nations are inherently unitary actors in an anarchic self-help system in which
no overarching governmental body exists. This means – as was already attempted to make
clear – that foreign aid is directed to states based on the strategic interests of the donor
(Olson 2000, 19ff.). Nations particularly concerned with the recipient's behaviour may seek
to influence its policy through blackmail. This is seen at both the domestic level, where
legislators have been found to vote for or against aid depending on the economic benefits
to  their  constituents  (Milner  and  Tingley  2010),  and  on  the  international  stage,  as
permanent  members  of  the  UN Security  Council  (especially the  United  States)  give  a
disproportional amount of aid to the rotating, non-permanent members in order to secure
their cooperation 
Strategic  concerns  often  outweigh  most  other  concerns,  including  humanitarian
needs.  Consequently,  environmental  disasters  can  be  (mis)used  to  increase  national
security. The literature on strategic interests suggests that regime type would have little
impact on the allocation of aid, emergency or otherwise (cp. Alesina and Dollar 2000 and
Glennie 2009). If donors give aid primarily on the basis of strategic considerations, then
their domestic institutions will have only a negligible effect. Since the nation-state is seen
as a unitary actor, its democratic governmental structure would have little effect upon its
giving  of  aid,  as  a  different  regime  type  would  not  necessarily  alter  what  the  nation
perceives as its best interests. Domestic government would only matter insofar as it would
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determine  which  actors  pursue  the  state's  interests  and  how  they  go  about  doing  so.
Scholars have argued that, in the context of a variety of cases involving democratic donors,
greater media coverage led governments to give more aid to disaster-struck nations (Olsen
2000). At the very least, this would indicate that something other than national interest can
influence aid allocation. Theoretically, this works for a variety of reasons which have never
been tested empirically. 
In a democracy, the public is informed about environmental disasters through the
news media. This prompts a reaction from government officials, who provide aid in order
to  appease  the  electorate  and  enhance  their  public  image  by  appearing  more
compassionate. More intensive news coverage leads to a bigger government response, and
therefore more aid, because of its effect upon the populace. However, the ability of the
public to lobby the government and the related pressures on elected officials leads to a
conclusion  beyond  merely  the  amount  of  media  coverage.  If  the  suggested  causal
mechanism were correct, the amount of aid given by a country would depend upon regime
type, at least to a limited extent. Democratic governments would experience more internal
pressure in the aftermath of environmental disasters than officials in repressive states, and
would correspondingly give more aid.
The postulate that  democracy matters relies on several assumptions that deviate
from the previous literature. The more liberal international political theory assumes that the
state is composed of differentiated interests and that individuals and private groups have a
large influence on government actions and therefore on international relations. Domestic
politics are derived in a bottom–up process. In other studies on foreign aid, regime type is
distinguished in  large part  by the size of the electorate,  or the selection of individuals
whose majority support is necessary to govern. (Olson 2000, 5ff.)
However, the current international debate on development aid seems to contain two
more or less opposed points of view (Olsen 2000, 2f). On the one side is the argument that
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aid is facing a crisis of legitimacy. According to Nick van de Walle, the actual mood in the
donor societies is “one of great frustration and growing cynicism” (van de Walle 1999,
339). He argues that “the legitimacy of the aid continues to decline for lack of evidence
that aid actually allows countries to progress forward economically” (van de Walle 1999,
352). Roger Riddell (1999, 311) finds “serious and perhaps growing doubts about aid to
Africa”. 
The World Bank supports the general claim that the “donor fatigue” in the last two
decades  may  explain  the  decline  in  aid  to  Africa.  According  to  it,  donor  fatigue  is
“explained in part by the belief that aid to Africa has done little to increase growth and
reduce poverty” (World Bank 2000, 236f., also cp.  CARMA 2006, 9 and Moeller 1999).
Lloyd Thérien and Jean–Philippe Carolyn continue along the same lines that aid “has been
undergoing a deep crisis [...]”, and they note that “aid has never been lower in the foreign
policy agenda of developed countries” (Thérien and Carolyn 2000, 21ff.). The two authors
argue that public opinion in Western countries is perhaps the most decisive factor that will
affect the future of aid (Thérien and Carolyn 2000, 35).
Sweden is often seen as the good example of a country giving development aid in a
rational, efficient, and effective way (ROA 2010 and  Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor  1998,
314ff.). In Sweden, there are no tax deductions for charitable donations. Compared to the
United States of America, Sweden has a smaller private philanthropic sector and a larger
public sector. Yet, in proportion to the size of its national economy, the government of
Sweden gives more than three times as much money to help the world's poor as the US do
in governmental and private sector aid combined. That contrast should make us question
whether the present system of charitable tax deductions in the USA and in most European
countries is adequate – and effective.
During the cold war, strategic interests were of primary importance. Consequently,
official donors would not hesitate to provide major funding to governments like that of
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Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines (Kaufmann 2009).
Today, aid effectiveness and accountability have improved, but commercial and strategic
interests are still paramount. So Afghanistan is a major recipient of Official Development
Aid. The core problems of aid – bad governance, corruption, lack of transparency, control
of efficiency – do still play a far too big role. In other words, far too much money meant
for the poor goes into the wrong channels, where it does not achieve what would be really
necessary and truly help, or end up in the wrong pockets. 
Georg Cremer, secretary general of Caritas Germany, in his 2008 book “Corruption
and  Development  Aid:  Confronting  the  Challenges”  is  very  open  about  the  flaws  of
development aid, especially corruption, due to the rampant corruption in the developing
world. But he also has ideas about what could be done about this. Controlling corruption is
crucial,  but extremely difficult to achieve. At the basis there have to be anti-corruption
reforms  and  laws  installed  which  secure  the  utmost  transparency in  the  finances  of  a
country – for example by making payment flows public. Politicians and bankers have to
increasingly be accountable to their  citizens.  The legal base for prosecuting corruption
ought  to  be  strengthened.  One  possibility  to  reducing  corruption  is  through  the
implementation of an anti-corruption agency (as e.g. was done in Hong-Kong). A must is
certainly to secure the freedom of the press. 
But  all  this  will  only  work  if  a  government  is  really  interested  in  reducing
corruption. This cannot be claimed for many developing countries. The problem is that
often the incentives go against this. The English proverb “crime does not pay” does not
seem applicable here. The fact is that kleptomania and corruption frequently do pay very
well for politicians in developing countries. A consequence thereof is bad governance, and
this means that national resources in developing countries only profit the elite.  As was
already attempted to argue, to change this is difficult from the outside. As many developing
and  emerging  countries  are  actually  quite  wealthy  in  terms  of  natural  resources,  the
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problem would not have to be one of money, but is. But if the problem is not one of wealth,
it is illusory and naïve to believe that more money in the form of government aid will solve
it.
What could help the world's poor most probably? What could end their receiving
bad services? Different solutions have been presented here. It seems that direct support of
the poor, even better direct cash, will have the strongest impact on the improvement of
their health and education. This can lead to their empowerment. This, again, can help them
to engage into laying the political basis for a well-functioning democracy, which will give
the poor the power and freedom to take their destiny into their own hands and to “make
poverty history” by themselves (Sireau 2009).
4.11. Microcredits – Banking for the Poor
“In teaching economics, I learned about money, and now as head of a bank I lend
money. The success of our venture lies in how many crumpled bank bills our once
starving members now have in their hands. But the microcredit movement, which is
built around, and for, and with money, ironically, is at its heart, at its deepest root
not about money at all. It is about helping each person to achieve his or her fullest
potential. It is not about cash capital, it is about human capital. Money is merely a
tool that unlocks human dreams and helps even the poorest and most unfortunate
people on this planet achieve dignity, respect, and meaning in their lives.”
Muhammad Yunus reflecting on the 1997 Microcredit Summit in Banker to
the Poor, (1999, 1).
After their introduction by economist Muhammad Yunus and their implementation in the
Bangladeshi Grameen village bank programme (1974), microcredits (or to use the more
262
exact  term:  “microfinancing”)  have  been  hailed  by  journalists  and  academics  as  an
innovative and promising approach to reduce poverty in poor areas around the world (cp.
Hulme and Moore 2007 and Yunus 1999).173 The fame of the concept has since increased
extraordinarily. Yunus and his Grameen bank even received the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize
“for their efforts to create economic and social development from below” that microcredit
“must  play  a  major  part”  in  ending  global  poverty..174 2005  was  named  the  Year  of
Microcredit, by the UN and several large Western financial institutions.175 The microcredit
charity  Kiva  has  over  1.6  million  lenders,  the  highest  possible  rating  from  Charity
Navigator  and  promises  Western  donors  a  direct  contact  via  the  Internet  with  small
entrepreneurs in the developing world (cp. Coleman 2007).176 The 2006 Nobel Committee
boldly  claimed  that  microcredit  “must  play  a  major  part”  in  ending  global  poverty.
Attracting considerable public attention, it can safely be assumed that micro–lending was
and continues to be a development hype. But what is microfinancing and how effective is
it?
Microcredits make use of the inventiveness and industry of individuals, as well as
their capacity to evaluate and exploit market niches and business opportunities. The idea of
creating and investing into your own enterprise is a foundation of market economics (or
“capitalism”). Access to credits increases a society's innovativeness, boosts the rapidity of
technological progress, improves social permeability, and finally enhances the welfare of
the society as a whole (cp.  De Soto 2000). On an individual level,  access to financial
capital may be an important element in overcoming household poverty, as demonstrated by
Sen (2003) and Banerjee et al. (2009) for poor rural households in Bangladesh. 
There has been a long tradition of aid agencies and NGOs providing small loans,
usually  of  less  than  $100,  to  poor  families  (Coleman  2007,  4).  These  small,  often
173 Interestingly, Bangladesh, while the most famous example, was not the first region where 
microcredits were introduced. According to Doran (2008, 2), the movement began in the early 1970s in Latin 
America with experimental programmes by NGOs such as “Opportunity International”.
174 Cp. www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.
175 Cp. www.yearofmicrocredit.org.
176 Cp. www.kiva.org – motto: Loans That Change Lives.
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agricultural, loans, normally repayable with a very modest interest rate, have been shown
to be able to successfully improve the lot of the poor (Banerjee et al. 2015). 
However, several aspects of credit-based investment have to be discussed  here to
gain  an  understanding  of  how  microcredits  work  and  which  problems  they  have  to
confront. First of all, while many ideas and projects will result in a successful creation of
an enterprise, some of them will fail. This will often result in a forfeit or bankruptcy of the
debtor.  The  creditors,  the  bank,  and  its  clients  need  to  insure  themselves  against  this
possibility. They do this via interest rate, diversification, and collateral (cp. Garrett 1995).
The interest rate is money that banks charge in addition to the sum lent. It allows the bank
to cover  administrative costs  and to  gain income which serves as an insurance against
forfeits,  allowing  to  pay  employees  salaries  and  interest  to  their  shareholders.
Diversification refers to the fact that banks do not invest all of their resources in a single
project. Rather, they diversify their investments into different projects, thereby minimising
their losses in case of credit default. As clients pool their financial resources, they profit
from additional diversification possibilities. Collateral is a borrower's pledge of specific
assets  (for  example  property)  to  the  lender  as  insurance  for  the  repayment  of  a  loan
(Garrett 1995, 99ff.).
The idea behind microcredits can thus be explained quite easily. The problem of
poor families in developing countries is that even if they have a promising investment
possibility,  their  lack  of  (material)  collateral  makes  it  impossible  for  them to obtain a
credit, even if a functioning banking system exists in the country.177 This means that many
good  ideas  and  investment  opportunities  are  never  realized.  Typical  investment
possibilities are small businesses or agricultural in nature, typically to buy crops, livestock
and material, or to open a small trade or extent an already existing one (Banerjee and Duflo
2011, 158ff.).  Some families could create a regular income by e.g. by a market stand, a
sewing machine, a mobile phone to be rented out to other villagers, or cooking utensils and
177 Which of course is not necessarily the case, as De Soto (2000) shows.
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materials to open a snack bar. Such small business ideas do not need an exuberant starting
capital, most micro-loans are between $50 and $500. For many poor, this is already a large
sum. Here microcredit banking can help by providing small-scale loans. Without access to
regular financial institutions or collateral, many good ideas that can improve a families
income remain unrealised or the only possibility that remains is to borrow money from a
extra-legal (frequently criminal) „loan shark“, although an investment would pay off for
the bank as well as for the family. 
However,  it  is  naïve  to  think  that  micro-lending  exists  completely  without
collateral.  Rather,  microfinancing  institutions use  “social”  instead  of  “real”  capital  to
assure repayment. “Social capital” is an ancient idea that we can find under different names
(such as social community or cohesion) in the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and
Edmund  Burke  (Bowles  and  Gintis  2002,  419).  In  the  microcredit  context,  the  term
generally  refers  to  the  use  of  social  networks  by  banking  institutions  to  assure  the
repayment of (micro)credits.
Alan Doran (2008, 2) underlines that the solidarity lending system is “a key reason
why the poorest groups – and women especially – were able to take advantage of it”. He
explains the system in simple terms:
“(W)ould-be borrowers form groups (usually between three and six people), within
which  each  member  agrees  to  guarantee  the  loans  of  the  others.  If  any  one
individual member defaults on his or her loan, the other members of the group are
required to cover the shortfall.”
Alan Doran (2008, 2).
The inability to pay back one's loan therefore does not only influence one's own “credit
rating”, i.e. the possibility to obtain an additional credit and the corresponding interest rate.
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Rather,  the loans are given to a group of people, often from the same village or with a
common family background. If one group member defaults, the whole group has to pay.
This assures through social pressure that repayments are guaranteed by the community, and
repayment rates are high indeed (Schurmann and Johnston 2009). It also means, as people
have to apply collectively, that only people perceived as trustworthy by their group, and
therefore with a high social capital, can receive a loan. In the absence of material collateral
and credit-rating systems, the group-lending model makes use of local information among
a group or village about who is a reliable borrower and hard worker and villagers reveal
such information by using their judgement to select fellow debtors for their small groups.
In this way, the group-based lending model both uses and builds upon the social capital of
its  borrowers.  This  lowers  transaction  costs  and  risks  for  the  provider.  Women  are
specifically targeted by banks and NGOs that provide microcredits. This is often presented
as  a  developmental  measure,  as  most  of  the  poorest  countries  have  a  traditionally
patriarchal  culture  that  severely  limits  women's  possibilities  to  participate  in  the
marketplace (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996).  They are often excluded from political  and
economic progress and have difficulties acquiring social status and wealth independently
from their fathers or husbands. Therefore, women are particularly vulnerable to poverty. As
a beneficial side-effect can be seen that increasing a mother's income has a much more
positive  effect  on  the  children's  development  (education,  health,  and  nutrition)  than
increasing that of the father. 
But  while  microcredits  may  have  set  out  with  the  intention  of  women's
empowerment, a factor that was underlined in the 2006 microcredit summit (Reed 2011,
4), the political goals are no longer the primary reason why women are the special target of
microfinance.  It  seems that  they are “more sensitive to peer pressure and so are  more
reliable debtors” (Schurmann and Johnston 2009, 519).  
As good as it may appear, the approach has considerable disadvantages. Due to the
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social capital-approach, people who suffer from social stigma and exclusion are unable to
secure a credit (Schurmann and Johnston 2009). Those are often society's worst off. Even
when  explicitly  included  in  microcredit  programmes,  some  groups,  such  as  landless
seasonal labourers, are less able to benefit because they do not have a regular income that
would enable them to commit to repayments, including interest. A loan for such borrowers
means increased insecurity and risk. It is generally acknowledged that traditional group-
lending microcredit programmes are not appropriate for the ultra-poor. These people will
continue to have to rely on loan-sharks, which goes some way towards explaining why
these continue to grow even in societies where microfinancing has been introduced. By
benefiting only the less poor, microcredit can further isolate the ultra–poor by increasing
inequality (Doran 2008, 5).
Additionally,  the  use  of  peer  pressure  in  some cases  can  be  quite  problematic.
Especially the Grameen Bank is criticised for enforcing a strong group spirit and thereby
“indoctrinating” members of their microcredit-programme (Duflo et. al. 2013 and Bateman
and Chang 2009).  This pressure is not without its risks, anecdotal reports on suicides of
borrowers in India who could not succeed and meet their obligations, due to drought or
other  natural  problems,  or  due to  being cheated  out  of  their  money have  been further
collaborated  by  a  study  Ashta,  Khan,  and  Otto  (2015),  indicating  that  microfinance
penetration  among  the  poor  is  indeed  a  causal  factor  for  and  increased  suicide  rate
(Banerjee  and  Duflo  2011,  169  and  Polgreen  and  Bajaj  2010).178 When  there  are  no
personal institutions such as advising services for debtors or technical assistance, and if the
person involved is illiterate, there is a high risk that the household will be trapped in a
circle of unrepayable debt (Duflo et. al. 2013, Bateman 2010, ch. 4, Bateman and Chang
2009, and Hickel 2015). 
Finally,  the  contribution  of  microfinance  to  improve  household  income  and
empower women has also been questioned, especially when compared with other possible
178 The enormous stress people in poverty face has already been discussed (cp. Mullainathan and Shafir 
2013).
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interventions (Duflo et. al. 2013 and  Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012).  Roodman and
Morduch 2009 say there is no significant progress of the life-quality of the vast majority of
microcredit  takers  after  30  years.  Other  studies  corroborate  this  (Bateman  2010  and
Roodman and Morduch 2009). Concerning empowerment, Hunt and Kasynathan (2002)
provide evidence from interviews conducted in rural Bangladesh and India. The results are
worrying. While women are the ones receiving the credit, it seems that most of the time
they  only  have  partial  control  over  its  usage.  “Many  women  are  merely  'postboxes':
passing on the full amount of their loans directly to their husbands, sons, or sons-in-law,
with little or no access to the income generated, and receiving back only enough money to
make weekly loan repayments” (Hunt and Kasynathan 2002, 71). Goetz and Sen Gupta
(1996)  found  similar  results:  On  average  only 37  per  cent  of  loans  provided  by four
different Bangladeshi credit organisations were significantly controlled by their (female)
beneficiaries. The men  managed the enterprise, often using their wife and daughters as
unpaid labour (also cp.  Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012).  Several studies found that
although receiving a microcredit increases the probability that a small business is started,
there is little to no sustainable effect on household income, female empowerment, health or
education  (Duflo et.  al.  2013  and  Duvendack  and  Palmer-Jones  2012).  It  seems  that,
especially in poor communities, economic possibilities remain limited, whether families
have access to credit or not (cp. Moyo 2009, 129f). Finally, some scientists (Bateman and
Chang 2009, Roodman and Morduch 2009, and Chang 2010) criticise microcredits as a
“miraculous” approach that basically performs a bootstrap move.179 According to this view,
microcredits are a way for poor people to “pull themselves out of their misery” by their
own bootstraps. This resembles an anecdote by the notoriously famous German Baron von
Münchhausen,  in  which he  tells  how he  managed to help  himself  out  of  a  swamp by
pulling at his scalp. These sceptics claim that the idea is as ludicrous and unrealistic as
Münchhausen's feat. 
179 Before the success of microcredits, the economic consensus was that poor people are not “bankable”
(Hulme and Moore 2007, 105).
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In contrast to the myth of the self–made entrepreneur, the success of an individual
is  largely dependent  on his or her environment.  Developing countries already have far
more self-employed microentrepreneurs then developed countries, simply because people
there cannot rely on a safety net and neither are jobs abundant.  As already mentioned, in
Africa up to 60 per cent of the working population are employed in the agricultural sector,
and between 30 and 50 per cent of the rest are self-employed, in some countries even
more: 66.9 per cent in Ghana, 75.4 per cent in Bangladesh, and 88.7 per cent in Benin –
compared to 7.5 per cent of self-employed in the United States of America (Chang 2010,
213f.  and Jütting and De Laiglesia 2009).  Microentrepreneurism has only very limited
capacity to be scaled up, create additional jobs and one day become a successful national
or even international company. A good idea certainly is of high relevance, but also the
disposition infrastructure, existing products, technology, knowledge, rule of law and most
importantly, the existing market where he can sell his product (Chang 2010, 221ff.). If
these are not existent, even Warren Buffet, Steve Jobs, or Bill Gates would have had to
limit their idea to a local mobile phone rental shop.
From a macro-perspective, there is a limit when large organisations and companies
are needed. They lead to more wealth, as they employ and produce on a larger scale – and
they import and export goods. Scaling up microcredits is no alternative to larger industry,
capital,  and  secure  political  and  economic  structures.  In  fact channelling  too  many
resources into, often extra-legal, microenterprises and self-employment, and so not into
small  and medium businesses that are far more productive and usually pay taxes, may
hinder national growth (cp. Auriol and Warlters 2005 and Bateman 2010).
Further  criticism aims  at  the  providing institutions,  such as  the  aforementioned
Kiva  foundation  not  being  fully  transparent,  especially  receivers  having  to  pay  high
interest  but  (charitable)  donors  receiving  nothing  thereof.  Kiva  is  attractive  to  donors
because not only can you single out an individual on the online-platform to which you
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want to give a loan, also as they pay it back, then you can then loan the same sum out again
and again, meaning that contrary to a donation, you can keep re-using the same sum. Kiva
advertises high repayment rates of 97 per cent, however these are partly due to outstanding
loans  being  counted  as  repaid  and because  local  Kiva  partners  ensure  the  repayments
through high interest rates (Roodman 2012, 115ff. and 241). There is a yearly interest rate
on microcredits between 40 and 50 per cent in Bangladesh and even between 80 and 100
per cent in Mexico (Bateman 2010, ch. 5, Bateman and Chang 2009, Chang 2010, 218).
To close this chapter, while receiving a lot of attention and financing, microcredits
has a poor rate of impact both locally and none so ever from a macro-perspective. The
hype  around  microcredits  still  persists  and  leads  to  further  developments  such  as
“radicalised microfinance”, where the poor are supposed to take up credits pay for public
goods such as water, health or sanitation (Mader 2011 and Bateman 2010). This extreme
position is already set into the very fabric of microfinance, which is settling the poorest
with the task of  eliminating poverty by themselves.  A problem they are neither  solely
responsible  for  and  which  completely  ignores  the  role  and  of  governments  and  the
multinational community have played in the development of the Western world (Chang
2002b, 2008, and 2010b).
In fact the best results obtained by microfinancing, are an actual by-product. As
some banks also established affordable saving accounts, it provides a first possibility to
save and collect interest, although again this measure does not reach the very poor. It has
been demonstrated, that only 5 per cent of microloans are taken with intention of opening
an own trade and actually the money is used for  consumption smoothing (Banerjee and
Duflo 2011, 161f., Chang 2010, 219, and Rose 1999). Poor families, too, have periods of
more and periods of less financial neediness, e.g. small farmers directly after their harvest.
This money could be taken during seed-time to buy seeds and fertilizer. If there is no such
bank, the money stays under the mattress, where it creates no interest and where it even
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may get stolen. Or a credit can be taken to pay for expenditures such as building or school
fees, which can then be paid back during less lean times.
Even enthusiasts, affirm that microfinance can only be one contribution to facilitate
the  access  of  the  poorest  to  wealth  and  better  capacities  (cp.  Doran  2008,  8f.).  The
microfinance community increasingly recognises that their initiatives are not the “silver
bullet” that will terminate global poverty (cp. Reed 2011, 1).  As Hickel (2015) affirms
there is a much better solution, that not only has none of the disadvantages of microcredits
and is  much, much more efficient at  combatting poverty.  It even serves the poorest,  if
instead of loaning it out, we simply give cash to the poor. Unfortunately, this solution still
has to reach the popularity of microlending, partly due to entrenched mistrust towards the
poor.
4.12. Direct Giving to the Poor
“Despite eight years of successful cash assistance in Somalia, aid agencies and their
donors were reluctant to support cash transfers. Many donor countries had enacted
anti–terrorism legislation and so aid agency staff feared prosecution should cash be
diverted. We fought for cash assistance, writing letters to leaders, calling meetings,
and advocating with donors to support cash transfer programming. In the end, we
implemented the largest  NGO cash transfer  programme in history.  But this  was
done despite, rather than with the support of, the humanitarian system. It was a
battle, every step of the way, and in the months it took to fight it, many thousands
of people died unnecessarily.”
Degan Ali, one of the leaders of the Somali cash response quoted in ODI (2015, 22).
Contrary to intuition, one of the most promising approaches to development aid are direct
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cash transfers to the poor, both via governmental agencies in the form of welfare (as for
example in Ethiopia, Malawi, Brazil, and Mexico) or private, be it through traditional child
sponsorship-programmes or through GiveDirectly, which according to the rigorous charity
evaluation agencies The Life you Can Save180 and GiveWell,181 is among the best INGOs in
the world.  This  chapter  serves to  demonstrate why distributing money directly to  poor
households is one of the best development interventions, yet for several reasons, among
them  donor  psychology,  this  perhaps  simplest  of  solutions  remains  drastically
underfunded.182
The success of this form of aid can be inferred from a plethora of recent empirical
impact assessments (Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013, Fiszbein, Schady, and Ferreira
2009,  Hanlon,  Barrientos  and  Hulme  2010,  Haushofer  and  Shapiro  2013,  Hulme  and
Moore 2007, and Kabeer, Piza, and Taylor 2012). Direct aid has been shown to be cost-
effective, unbureaucratic, easily adaptable to different societies, and crucially, it is exactly
what the poor themselves want (Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012, Standing 2008, and Toth
2014). Quite uniquely, it is a measure that works well in the context of humanitarian as
well as long term development aid (ODI 2015). In the case of humanitarian aid the money
is  distributed  to  the  affected  population,  allowing  them to  buy  food.  Contrary  to  the
aforementioned problems of food aid,  it  strengthens local  markets instead of crowding
them out, as possible leftover money is simply put to reconstruction.
Research shows that the poor make good investment decisions, especially regarding
food,  their  own  and  their  children's  education,  accommodation,  sanitation  and  health
(Hanlon,  Barrientos  and  Hulme  2010,  53ff.,  Blattman,  Fiala,  and  Martinez  2013,  and
Dowling and Yap 2009). Indeed the results of these evaluations demonstrate that fear of the
poor investing in “unnecessary luxuries”, such as drugs, alcohol, or cigarettes is misplaced
(Evans  and  Popova  2014).  Instead,  the  poor  invest  soundly,  for  example  a  frequent
180 Cp. https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/Where-to-Donate.
181 Cp. http://www.givewell.org/international/top-charities/give-directly.
182 Part of this chapter is based on the article “The Poor Have No Money – So Just Give It to Them! In 
Favour of Inclusive Aid and Unconditional Cash Transfers” (Lauer and Lepenies 2015).
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expenditure is  on a tin  roof,  which is  better  equipped to handle rain than the cheaper
thatched ones and does not have to be replaced every few years. There is further evidence
that direct cash provides an incentive against young males becoming “violence specialists”,
a term used by Robert Bates to denote  individuals trying to win resources by joining a
criminal gang or a rebel group, in ways that other forms of aid do not (Bates 2008 and
Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013). Not only does it give people the necessary resources
to make political participation even an option, it  can also increase accountability.  Melo
(2007) uses the example of Brazil's bolsa família-programme to show that wide acceptance
of the transfer programme to alleviate poverty and especially support elderly and mothers
has lead the partly oil–financed programme to be adopted by both major political parties.
Political  competition  thus  ensures  that  the  programme  remains  intact,  even  in  the
background of currently low oil prices. Todd Moss (2011) argues along this line, citizens
naturally have a strong incentives to carefully monitor the incoming revenue. After all, it is
much easier to see if the same amount comes in each month, then to read government
reports. This fosters a critical attitude towards government management and distribution of
resources and aid money, and how it is distributed.  Political leaders and parties are thus
forced  to  demonstrate  responsible  management  and  prove  their  accountability.  Not
surprisingly,  it  is  much more difficult  to obscure diversions of financial  flows that  are
distributed directly, compared to for example infrastructure projects.
There  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that  direct  giving  may  also  reduce  some
consequences of the resource curse and the Dutch disease183 for the poor in developing
countries, which are partly responsible for their situation (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011 and
Moss 2011). Moreover, it can make their society more inclusive, as it gives poor people a
chance  to  participate  economically  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson  2012).  The  money
dispensation could be done digitally over mobile phone accounts, thus funder increasing
183 Cp. for these phenomena ch. 2.11. of this thesis.
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accountability and minimise risk of theft184 (Aker and Mbiti 2010, Aker et al. 2014, and
ODI 2015).  This  would  give  many poor  their  first  banking opportunity (Banerjee  and
Duflo  2011,  190ff.).  If  possible,  households  rather  than  individuals  should  be  the
recipients,  with  a  preference  for  money  being  distributed  primarily  to  mothers  and
irrespective of family size. For the first years, the money could be paid by donor country
governments  and private  contributors  exclusively.  After  this  period,  local  governments
could ideally take over an increasing share of the contributions, until finally taking over all
payments, thus in effect creating a minimal financial support system for their citizens.
Transfers  may  also  reduce  instances  of  (mental)  health  problems  caused  by
financial distress (Adler and Snibbe 2003 and Patel et al. 2001) and allow people to make
sounder financial decisions (Banerjee and Duflo 2011 and Mullainathan and Shafir 2013).
Direct transfers enhance the rights of the recipients and reduce discretionary power over
them by aid intermediaries, be it local or foreign agencies, bureaucrats, philanthropists, or
donors.  This  discretionary power  is  often  associated  with  long waiting  times  (e.g.  for
deliveries) and other transaction costs  for beneficiaries.  As attempted to explain in the
preceding chapters,  distributing  the aid money via  local  governments  can create  many
problems, notably clientelism and   misappropriation of funds, which should be avoided
(Cerami 2013, Cremer 2008, and Mwenda 2006). 
Finally,  direct  cash  transfers  have  a  unique  advantage  over  other  interventions.
While health interventions such as the distribution of malaria nets or de-worming have
been shown to be an invaluable support, their orientation is supply-sided. Supplying the
poor  with  working  solutions  needs  extraordinary  creativity,  empathy combined  with  a
practical  mindset,  while  at  the  same time  promising  very little  monetary reward.  This
184 Which is always a risk, but an avoidable one as the case of the French INGO Solidarités 
International in Mali demonstrates (Banning-Lover 2015). Wanting to help the population recovering from a 
civil war the INGO set up a cash transfer programme. Due to the lack of both a local banking infrastructure 
and a telephone network, the management decided on really directly distributing cash. To minimise risk of 
theft, this was done by local staff via boat, a successful measure, as there were reports of instances of theft. It 
could even be successfully implemented during the 2011 in one of the world's most dangerous countries: 
Somalia (ODI 2015).
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means  that  the  well-functioning  interventions  can  only  be  a  fraction  of  the  projects,
especially  if  we are  confronted  with  problems  in  knowledge  transfer  and  cultural  and
situational adaptability (Lepenies 2013 and Ramalingam 2013). Additionally, each solution
needs to be successfully pitched to donors, usually without input from the recipients. This
means that for every de-worming campaign, we get several “KONY 2012”s.
It would be much easier to switch to positive demand-side feedback loops. Here the
poor themselves can decide what they want, and if they can back up their demands with
money, markets have an incentive to provide (cp. Easterly 2007a). This indicates that direct
monetary support works especially well because it enables the poor to become customers
instead  of  remaining  recipients,  leading  to  incentives  for  entrepreneurs  to  implement
bottom-up solutions. This would also improve access to health care in the long run – such
as vaccination, malaria nets, or de-worming programmes – as well as for measures and
means that support sound health, as being provided with healthy and sufficient nutrition is
especially  important  for  children.  The  latter  may be  delivered  by  organisations  or  by
private  aid  if  enough  affluent  people  become  effective  altruists,  in  the  long  run  a
functioning  government  and  good  infrastructure  are  needed  to  build  sustainable
distribution and financing mechanisms.185 
Cash  transfers  can  be  conditional  or  unconditional,  and  there  is  currently  an
intensive debate within the academic community which alternative is preferable (Fiszbein,
Schady,  and Ferreira  2009 and Kabeer,  Piza,  and Taylor  2012).  Typical  conditions  are
school  attendance  of  children,  attendance  to  training  programmes,  or  compliance  with
health  interventions,  such  as  government  vaccination  programmes.  Conditionality  is
justified on various  grounds,  but  most  crucially as  a  political  tool  to  legitimize aid to
affluent  taxpayers  and  as  a  remedy for  the  fear  of  improper  investment  decisions  by
recipients. What could be bad about requiring aid recipients, say, to send their children to
185 This not only applies to enough available hospitals, it also includes roads and running electricity on 
the way to them, as blood, vaccination ampoules and other medicines need to be kept at a certain temperature
during transport and storage (cp. Hassoun 2012).
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school? 
From a theoretical perspective, there are good arguments against even a modest
paternalism as a facet of public policy (cp. Standing 2011). In a development context, the
point  is  that  paternalism in  aid  is  both  inefficient,  due  to  a  lack  of  local  government
structure  or  corruption  thereof,  and difficult  to  legitimise,  as  such interventions  would
ideally hinge on a demonstrated improved benefit to the target group than what the group
would  invest  in  by  themselves.  From  a  practical  perspective,  sending  children  in
developing countries to school has long been a priority in development aid, with mixed
results as quality of teachers and schools varies. Both Pritchett (2013) and Tooley (2009)
state that poor people in developing and emerging countries increasingly choose private
education, when it is comparatively affordable, as – most importantly – it has a much better
teacher presence and learning results. Additional resources make this option available to
more families. 
As shown in Lauer and Lepenies 2015, the term “unconditional” in combination
with “aid” typically makes representatives of established aid organizations go straight to
the barricades. Especially the World Bank argues that conditionality is part of a mutually
agreeable contract between donor and recipient (World Bank 2005). Conditions to aid are
important when it comes to governments reluctant to implement social reforms, democracy
and rule of law. However, external help cannot organize such partnerships, and any attempt
to do so is often inefficient, as local conditions – such as teacher absenteeism – are not
known. Rather than on binding contracts,  the focus should lie on the autonomy of the
recipients (Blattman et al. 2013, Mkandawire 2005, and Standing 2011).
Financing cash transfers also is a lot  simpler than thought.  Because the world's
poorest population lives on less than a $1.25, yearly stipends between $150 and $300 can
already  have  a  meaningful  impact  (cp.  Glassman  2014  and  Standing  2008).186
Administrative costs of this measure are rather low, with the main focus on distribution and
186 For example the average recipient in Kenya supported by GiveDirectly lives on just 65 cents 
(nominal) per day  (https://www.givedirectly.org/operating.model).
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fraud prevention. Margolies and Hoddinott (2015) in a detailed analysis of four countries
demonstrate that direct cash is in all cases cheaper than food assistance. Choosing cash in
these cases would have extended the reach of these programmes on average by 18 per cent.
Other studies estimate the efficiency gains to be even bigger with 25 to 30 per cent (ODI
2015). This is not surprising, recalling the discussion of the practise of food aid essentially
being a hidden subsidiary, especially in the case of US aid, meaning that the food has to be
purchased and transported to the people in need. 
The  expenditure  should  not  be  financed  by  aid  and  donations  alone,  rather
developing  countries  should  have  to  co-finance  the  measures  through natural  resource
export revenue as the World Bank proposes, and is indeed the case with several existing
programmes (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011 and Moss 2011). Further alternatives would be a
global resource dividend (Pogge 2010a and Wenar 2008 and 2011a), a global luxury or
wealth tax, such as envisioned by Piketty (2014), or a financial transactions tax or a global
minimum corporate  tax.  Additional  funds both for developing and developed countries
could  come  from eliminating  illicit  financial  flows  and  tax  havens  (Kar  and  Leblanc
2013).187
The only question that remains is asked by the Guardian journalist Paul Harvey
(2016) 
“... given the strong case for cash, why is it still at only 6% of humanitarian spend?
What's the hold– up in getting to 30%, 50% or even 70%?”
It is important to note that these 6 per cent include vouchers, which are more expensive
and more difficult  to administer,  but still  a step into the right direction.  Unfortunately,
giving directly to  the  poor  continues  to  have  to  overcome many problems,  first  of  all
political and psychological acceptability. Political and institutional opposition or resistance
187 See Lauer and Lepenies 2015 for a calculation of costs.
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are revealed in MacFarquhar (2015, 75f.), where in a discussion on the effectiveness of
GiveDirectly an aid professional argues that it would be quite sad if after all the research
done the easiest and most effective solution would be to simply give money to the poor.
There is a powerful agenda by governments developing countries to keep control of aid
money,  but also by international  institutions such as the World Bank to not only keep
control, but also to employ experts who review and implement new solutions (Easterly
2007b, ch. 5). As Harvey (2016) argues
“Part of the answer is the long tradition of governments and organisations deciding
what  people  need,  and  assuming  that  they  cannot  be  trusted  to  make  sensible
decisions  themselves.  These  priorities  often  reflect  organisational  mandates  and
interests hard–wired into the humanitarian system. Fears that cash will be misused
are deep rooted and do not simply fade away on the first sight of evidence to the
contrary. Organisational inertia is also an important factor; faced with uncertainty,
agencies  default  to  familiar  forms  of  assistance,  which  largely remain  in–kind.
Donor governments and aid agencies also fear that western publics will not support
cash – seeing it as less visible or more prone to corruption.”
Harvey mentions a crucial problem here both with donations for GiveDirectly as well as
national aid programmes when it comes to direct cash distributions that has been discussed
extensively in part 2 of this thesis, the deeply entrenched distrust towards the poor, both
psychological as well as institutional. Somehow, despise the overwhelming evidence for
the efficiency and good use of cash transfers, the illusion persists that in-kind aid will not
be diverted by the recipients or misused. Changing this attitude will remain an important
but difficult task for the future for effective altruists or simply people who care about good
development interventions and increasing the capabilities of the poor. Again, it is at least as
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important  here  to  influence  politicians  and  aid  administrators,  as  well  as  affluent
individuals. 
From the developing countries perspective, there is good evidence, that times of
crisis and hardship, coupled with some democratic structures, increase the likelihood of
cash transfer  programmes  being implemented  and financed,  partly with the  support  of
multinational institutions and aid money, contribute towards the implementation of cash
transfer  programmes  in  developing  countries.  Examples  include  the  implementation  of
bolsa família  in Brazil,  an anti-poverty measure during rising political  pressure due to
poverty, inequality and unemployment (Melo 2007 and  2009, and World Bank 2016).188
Political competition and citizen involvement is thus a precondition for the implementation
and continuation of such programmes, often against entrenched elite interests. This again
underlines the importance for democracy and civil societies in economic participation and
welfare. Institutions that are difficult to strengthen by external actors, but who certainly are
completely underfunded and ignored by most effective altruists.
On a more conciliatory note, the increasing fundraising success of Give Directly, is
probably partly attributable to the attention created by GiveWell189 and Giving what we
can.190 Donations, including contributions by institutions and foundations, rose from just a
few millions in 2012 to over $45 millions in 2015 (Give Directly 2015). In a promising
new step, the charity includes personal profiles of beneficiaries, thus making use of the
identifiable victim effect.  Maybe family sponsorships could be a way to bypass at least
some of  the  problems.  Sponsorships  are  attractive  to  donors,  due  to  the  possibility  to
establish  personal  connection  to  the  child  or  even  the  family  concerned.  Existing
sponsorship programmes are quite successful at raising money and at least some of them
188 Another example would be the Mexican programme progreso, which has also obtained very good 
results (Schultz 2004).
189 “Directly transferring money to poor individuals allows them to purchase that which they believe 
will help them most. We believe that Give Directly effectively distributes cash to extremely low-income 
individuals.” From the GiveWell evaluation of the INGO Give Directly 
(http://www.givewell.org/charities/give-directly).
190 https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/top-charities/.
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already demonstrated, that sponsored children will lead healthier and economically more
successful lives (Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge 2013). 
Direct cash is no “silver bullet”, it cannot by itself reconstruct and ensure security
in a failed state and some measures, namely immunisation, are still superior from a purely
live-saving perspective.  But it  should definitely be the “gold standard” of development
measures, meaning that any interventions proposed should in future have to demonstrate,
that they would be an improvement over simply distributing the needed resources directly
to the population in  need.  The increasing evidence for the efficiency of direct  cash in
different setting and societies would make this counterfactual check possible and be an
important guideline for both official and private development aid. Fortunately, there are
increasing calls to implement this (Lauer and Lepenies 2015 and ODI 2015). 
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5. Conclusion – Beyond Charity
In this thesis the ethical, psychological and practical implications of Peter Singer's culture
of giving or effective altruism have been discussed and contrasted to answer the question
of  what  role  donations  and  fundraising  should,  do  and  could  play  in  the  context  of
alleviating global extreme poverty. Starting with point have been the ethical considerations
of  Peter  Singer.  He adopts  a  moral  maximalist  point  of  view,  footed in  the individual
responsibility  to  alleviate  global  poverty  through  personal  investment,  especially  by
limiting expenditures, increasing income through career choices and donating the maximal
possible amount over one's lifetime. This position is rejected as too demanding, as it leaves
little  room for  development  of  the  self  and other  worthwhile,  pursuits  such as  family,
friends or, for example, art. An altruism-focused life may be a good and fulfilled life for
some. However, the individual consideration of human beings in general, entails that there
is a necessary and ethically important reason to be free to consider of one's own life plans
and develop one's capabilities. Additionally, attributing the maximal responsibility to each
individual that could help by donating a large part of their income, implies the loss of
important considerations of justice and responsibility. Depending on individual position,
place  and  ability,  people  have  different  levels  of  responsibility  towards  others.  For
example, the head of government of a developing country or the Chief Executive Officer of
a  company  that  imports  natural  resources  from  the  country  has  a  much  increased
responsibility towards the poor in the country. It was demonstrated, that there are many
ways in which global institutions, trade regulations and Western lifestyle harms people in
developing countries, thus a responsibility of Western citizens to collectively act seems
reasonable.  Peter  Singer  captures an important  ethical  intuition,  which is  that  it  seems
irresponsible that global wealth is distributed in such a way, that part of the population
lives in  overabundance,  while  approximately one billion are subjected to suffering and
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drastically shortened lives, because they are not even provided with basic healthcare and
living conditions. This entails a minimal responsibility of each individual that could do
something  against  global  poverty by sacrificing  a  little  income,  but  a  much increased
responsibility of very wealthy individuals and corporations with investments or suppliers
in developing countries.
In  addition  to  the  ethical  foundation,  effective  altruism relies  on  two  practical
implications.  The first  being that  it  is  easier  to convince people to  donate to effective
poverty relief  than to implement legal or political  measures.  This warrants an in-depth
deliberation of donor psychology, statistical analysis of levels of donations and fundraising
methods, as provided in chapter 3 of the thesis. The research of donor behaviour has been
gaining much momentum in recent years, partly due to the rise of experimental economics.
Moral psychologists in the tradition of David Hume show quite clearly that human beings
have altruistic inclinations and feel good about helping others (the so-called “warm glow”).
Pro-social behaviour such as donating actually increases personal happiness. But there are
several conflicting emotions and intuitions that impede taking concrete actions towards a
better world, for example that we tend to identify with single victims towards whom we
feel a certain connectedness. As Singer sees quite clearly, the problem is that while we may
have altruistic instincts, these instincts only work well in cases in which we feel personally
responsible  and  close  to  the  victim.  He  proposes  several  solutions  here,  notably  that
individuals  should  bind  themselves  to  generous  behaviour  by pledging  their  donations
publicly,  thus  also  encouraging  others,  and  by  putting  a  face  on  the  needy.  But  he
underestimates the degree to which donors are self-centred and that the decision to donate
is  situationist.  Rational  argumentation  tends  to  decrease  volition  to  donate.  Avoidance
behaviour and mental accounting, together with an analysis of societal donation pattern
indicate  that  donations  are  a  slowly  growing  resource  and  only  a  limited  amount  is
dedicated towards the global poor. Media attention is a key factor here, natural disasters in
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holiday countries lead to much attention and donations, while other disasters are too often
forgotten. Together with a very professionalized fundraising industry, the (social) media is
also partly responsible for the continuing negative image of the global poor, especially in
Africa, and the prevalence of development fads, as shown in the example of KONY 2012
campaign. As long as donors are stylized as “white saviours” that are the only hope for the
child-like poor, the inherent paternalism of the fundraising industry will  actually be an
obstacle towards increasing global justice.
The  second  practical  premise  of  effective  altruism is  that  small  sums  actually
sustainably prevent enormous suffering. The question of whether official and private aid
benefits  developing  countries  in  general  is  difficult  to  answer  due  to  difficulties  in
obtaining and correctly interpreting the relevant data. Many projects demonstrably bring
only little sustainable improvement on local living conditions, as projects are selected with
a  focus  on  donor  countries  strategic  and economic  interests,  instead  of  poverty relief.
Corruption and embezzlement are endemic problems, as are unwanted side-effects such as
crowding out of local producers. Critics of aid point out, that INGOs and development aid
agencies may actually benefit kleptocratic and oppressive regimes, as they help conceal
failures of the regime, such as an inability to provide public education, health services and
a functioning tax service, thus weakening government accountability. Case studies of the
microfinance-, Fair Trade- and Jeffrey Sachs' Millennium Villages-movement indicate, that
biases and fads, often coupled with distrust towards and lack of understanding of the poor,
translates into failure of aid projects at the implementation level. The twin accountability
of organisations towards donors and the target group often appears as a one-way street
towards reassuring and strengthening donors public and self-esteem, not actual efficiency. 
There are some good news: simple medical interventions, such as vaccinations, de-
worming and malaria nets, have a considerable effect on individual health and well-being.
Projects  that  trust  the  poor  by simply supporting  them with  comparatively small  cash
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endowments, with little or no conditions attached, are also demonstrated to be effective,
surprisingly with the positive effects lingering over the period of distribution. The increase
in income and health translates into increased capability and ability of the poor to help
themselves by investing in their own education, participating economically and politically,
and providing with the energy and time to form civil associations. It can also mean less
dependence of political  party clientelism or clan-structures.  Here donations can have a
sustainable effect. Unfortunately, these very projects tend to be under-reported, as they are
not very spectacular, and thus under-funded. It is doubtful whether the laudable rise of
charity evaluators such as GiveWell can change this. The amount of people who are willing
to donate may be increased, but not significantly. Donor voluntariness will remain fickle
and depend on morally irrelevant factors. Even more importantly, it has been shown that
uninformed charity can cause harm in the long-term instead of doing good. As a conclusion
I  propose  three  ways  in  which  we  should  act  in  front  of  these  psychological  and
institutional difficulties:
• In  agreement  with  Peter  Singer  and  William  MacAskill  we  should  focus  our
donations on the previously mentioned efficient INGOs and try to convince others
to  follow  suit.  Charity  evaluators  should  play  an  increased  role  in  the  public
discourse on aid distribution too ensure this is the role of the state and donors,
academia and media.  A profound and truthful evaluation of results of a charitable
project or government can improve performances, and together with the extensive
use of knowledge management systems, create knowledge that can be applied in
similar  development  scenarios.  Stern  (2013a)  correctly  demands  that  some
philanthropist  organizations  be  excluded  at  least  from  the  privilege  of  tax
deductibility, if they severely underperform their competitors.
• Contrary  to  MacAskill's  (2015a,  181ff.)  recommendation  against  working  in  a
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charitable  organisation  and  instead  focusing  on  earning  to  give,  I  argue  that  a
person should be free to follow his or her own life plan. However, the decision to
work for a government institution or INGO includes the responsibility to increase
the effective use of existing resources. It has been shown that large and established,
and  thus  well-known organisations  bind  a  large  part  of  existing  donations.  By
working to make these organisations more effective and being willing to listen to
the beneficiaries, one can make a notable difference as well. The benchmark for
effective  development  interventions  should  be  providing  the  target  population
directly with the funds used for the project (cp. Lauer and Lepenies 2015). If after
careful  consideration  or  testing  the  project  does  fall  behind  this  benchmark,  it
should be discarded.
• The development discourse is in urgent need of a paradigm shift. It needs to be re-
framed as an issue of justice, not of charity, but not from a moral maximalist point
of  view,  but  with  clearly  established  responsibilities.  For  an  effective  program
against poverty and hunger, developed nations –  and in this Europe, because of its
history and economic power, has a special place in the world –  should focus first
on  creating  the  international  democratic  institutions  necessary  to  allow  the
population of a country to provide for themselves instead of relying on international
goodwill (cp. Crocker 2008). This includes regulations on illicit financial flows and
corruption, but also debt forgiveness. Land grabbing should be blocked worldwide,
and infant industry protection allowed to a certain degree to give manufacturing in
developing nations a fair chance. Moreover, fair climate change regulations should
help the worldwide poor to end their plight. But the main responsibility lies within
the developing countries themselves. In many cases,  corrupt and kleptocratic or
even outright oppressive regimes care little about the well-being of parts or all of
their population. This thesis supports Leif Wenar's (2011a and 2015) claim that we
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should stop trade and banking with regimes that do not adhere to a minimal ethical
standard. Thus multinational corporations have a strong responsibility here as well.
Nicole  Hassoun (2012) addresses  the fact  that  diseases  and illnesses  frequently
occurring  in  poor  countries  are  insufficiently  – if  at  all  –  addressed  by  the
pharmaceutical  industry,  as  there  are  no  large  profits  to  be  made  (cp.  Pogge,
Rimmer, and Rubenstein 2014). With the result that in 2014 the long neglect of
research and development of medicine against Ebola has taken its revenge with the
epidemic killing several thousand people (Baker 2014). Other industries that trade,
invest and hire personnel in developing countries have similar responsibilities. The
investment  and  creation  of  jobs  with  minimal  standards  should  be  a  focus  of
development.
• A necessary step could be establishing a targeted Tobin tax on financial speculation
to finance a minimal social system that directly supports the people most in need
(Lauer  and  Lepenies  2015).  Further  alternatives  would  be  a  global  resource
dividend (Pogge 1998 and 2010a), a global luxury or global wealth tax, such as
envisioned by Piketty (2014) or a global tax on multinational corporations.  While
this project will  not be easily implemented politically,  the findings of chapter 3
indicate that this may actually be easier and certainly more sustainable and reliable
than trying to do this via voluntary donations. Two factors could serve to make this
proposal more acceptable. For reasons of political acceptability and accountability
within the developing country,  it  is  necessary that the developing country itself
contributes  to  the  social  fund  that  benefits  the  poorest  citizens.  This  could  be
financed on the developing countries' side through natural resource export revenue,
as  for  example  the  World  Bank  proposes  (Moss  2011). Additionally,  the  taxes
should be targeted in a way that hits the wealthiest or (tax-avoiding) multinational
corporations and enterprises, not the working or middle class and small to mid-
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sized entrepreneurs in developed countries, that are already subject to a high tax
burden.
As was already mentioned in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, inequality is an important
problem in developing as well  as  developed countries  (cp.  World Bank 2016).  This  is
echoed in a Pew Research Center (2014, 3) survey of the citizens in 44 countries that found
that a median of 60 percent – including 46 percent of US Americans – say that inequality is
a very big problem in their respective societies. Several important economists (Cingano
2014, Lansley 2011, and Stiglitz 2012) have already warned that the increase of inequality
damages economic growth, well-being and social order, and philosophers tend to agree
(Nagel 1991, Sandel 2012, Temkin 1993, and van Parijs 1995). But so far the view remains
rather limited to a national level.  To include the international level,  links (maybe even
interdependencies) between national and international justice should be established. This
re-framing of development as  both a question of justice that concerns them as well as us,
and the establishment of a dialogue with the people we want to support as real dialogue
partners and not as supplicants will help make some important steps towards the reduction
and, hopefully one day abolishment of absolute poverty. Singer's and MacAskill's efforts to
create a movement of effective altruism are laudable.  Yet, unless the movement moves
towards inclusion of the poor and international justice, it  is in the  worrying danger of
becoming itself a development fad. As long as the poor are only seen as a number, a life
that  needs  saving,  they  are  easily  excluded  from  the  attention  of  the  privileged,
predominantly white  donor community.  Jennifer  Rubenstein  (2015) in  a  reply to  Peter
Singer in the Boston Review resumes the situation:
“The problem is that he addresses these challenges via a social movement focused
on alleviating poverty that excludes poor people from its ranks. This movement
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therefore violates the democratic principle of inclusion,  summarized in a slogan
used  for  decades  by social  movements  from Poland  to  South  Africa:  “Nothing
About Us Without Us.” […] This orientation overlooks poor people's central role in
alleviating their own poverty and rich people's role in contributing to and benefiting
from  it.  The  effective  altruism  movement  retains  members  by  directing  their
emotional energies and commitments toward each other, not the people they aim to
assist. Singer thus profiles effective altruists for his readers to emulate; he does not
depict poor people using assistance to exit poverty. Likewise, organizations such as
Giving  What  We Can  encourage  their  members  to  make  commitments  to,  and
engage in community-building with, each other – not poor people. These strategies
rightly  avoid  using  pity  as  a  motivational  tool,  but  they  also  preclude  more
promising forms of connection, such as political solidarity.”
This  worry is  illustrated  by the  recent  tendencies  of  the  movement  to  make  avoiding
“extinction events” a priority (Matthews 2015). Extinction events are global catastrophes
on  a  massive  scale,  such  as  a  global  nuclear  war  or  a  massive  meteor  collision,  but
effective altruists also include more far-fetched scenarios such as a murderous artificial
intelligence. In a version of Pascal's wager, the compete annihilation of humanity through
one of these events makes donating towards the above issues suddenly more pressing than
relieving  global  poverty.  An  example  would  be  donating  to  the  Machine  Intelligence
Research Institute in Berkeley. In his intriguing Vox-article “I spent a weekend at Google
talking  with  nerds  about  charity.  I  came  away  …  worried”  Dylan  Matthews  (2015)
speculates that if the movement continues on this path of self-congratulatory cleverness,
the way is paved towards effective altruism without poverty relief. I therefore strongly
advise for a limiting our Western hubris, lest we forget that it is only the poor themselves
that can lift themselves out of poverty. They are as human beings who can take their lives
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into their own hands, who know what is good for them in the long run and who want to act
responsibly towards their families, their future and their environment.
Further research should be directed towards ways to communicate efficiency in a
way  that  captures  the  interest  of  prospective  donors,  for  example  through  narrative
techniques. A possibility could be making use of a connection similar to child sponsorships
or the mechanism used by Kiva that enables direct cash donors to feel a true connection
with the household they are supporting. Even more important would be an investigative
research on the role of different multinational and national actors on benefiting or harming
the global poor, similar to Nicole Hassoun's analysis of the pharmaceutical industry or, less
extensively for  food corporations  Oxfam's “Behind the  Brand”-report  (Hoffman 2013).
This  would  serve  as  an  indicator  for  citizens  and  consumers,  as  well  as  a  basis  for
calculation of “who owes what to the global poor” (Pogge 2007). It would also mean that
the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility would increase in importance. An important
project would be if and how it is possible to improve the image of the poor and how to
communicate  the  complexities  of  development  and poverty in  a  way that  engages  the
removed Western public (cp. Darnton and Kirk 2011 and Kennedy and Hill 2010). Finally,
a detailed and multi-disciplinary analysis of ways in which to implement and finance the
global  security  net  for  absolute  poverty  is  the  necessary  next  step  towards  its
implementation.
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